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ABSTRACT 
The thesis is about power and about the ways in which that concept might be 
useful-in exploring social relations in a domestic context. The central 
focus of attention is the relationship between instances of overt decision- 
related dispute and their ordering social contexts. Interview material, 
collected from a sample of 64 respondents, provides the basis for analysis 
of this issue. 
The first part of the thesis develops a typology of conflict, organised 
with reference to respondents' perceptions of the kinds of choices involved 
in instances of contentious decision-making. A discussion of capacities 
and resources takes this account a stage further and sets the scene for 
subsequent analysis of the contexts of conflict. 
Having outlined a model of the relation between context and conflict, part 
two of the thesis goes on to explore relevant dimensions of variation 
identified in the interview material. Discussions of discrete decisions 
about family and career, house and home, holidays, and leisure, give rise 
to accounts of patterning in described perceptions of choice. These, in 
combination with later discussions of family finance, and responsibility 
for housework and child-care, locate debatable domestic decisions with 
reference to a structure of informing routines, habits, beliefs and 
material circumstances. 
The concluding chapter considers the implications of the research for 
accounts of women's position in the family and for analysis of power 
relations in general. 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is about power and about the ways in which that concept might 
be explored in the "real" world. It is also about decision-making and 
relations between husband and wife in the domestic context. The informing 
argument represents an amalgamation of what are normally seen as separate 
lines of thought drawn from existing work on the family and on power. 
Though the literature on power, much of which has been developed in 
relation to work on formal organizations, community relations or politics 
has, on the surface at least, very little to do with traditonal 
sociological or feminist work on the family, there is actually plenty of 
scope for cross-fertilisation. I have tried to take advantage of that, and 
to explore the potential of an analysis of everyday domestic relations in 
terms of power. 
Accordingly, this thesis can hardly be described as "feminist", though 
certain feminist ideas informed the structure of my argument. Equally, the 
thesis is not entirely about power. Though the research was designed with 
reference to a particular concept of power and in the light of a specific 
idea of how power relations might be studied, the resulting empirical 
materials reveal much about the processes of routine domestic decision- 
making and about the cultural and material worlds in which such choices are 
made. In this aspect the thesis is concerned with the everyday domestic 
experiences of a sample of wives. However, my account of the interview 
material is designed to provide rather more than a documentary report of 
those experiences. Because I took "the family" as a context in which to 
explore a particular conception of power, the research inevitably comes to 
be concerned with the ways in which everyday family routines structure the 
context of conflict and so order domestic power relations. 
I began with the notion that the feminist literature had made a valuable 
and significant contribution to understanding the family in that it had 
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introduced questions of power, inequality, and injustice. However, it 
seemed to me that the feminist work had failed to realise the potential of 
its own insight and that, in particular, it had failed to take questions 
about power sufficiently seriously. While the feminist literature made 
rhetorical use of the term "power", the underlying concept was usually 
taken-for-granted -a case I shall develop more fully in chapter 1. It was 
for this reason, therefore, that I decided to explore notions of power in a 
family context in the hope of developing that aspect of feminist work on 
the family. 
As I shall suggest in the latter half of chapter 1, power has been 
conceptualised in a number of different ways, and existing work on family 
power exhibits many characteristics of the general power literature. A 
review of that material, with the aid of Lukes' three part classification 
of "one", "two" and "three" dimensional approaches to power (Lukes, 1974), 
suggests that there are several ways of distinguishing power relations from 
other types of social interaction. Each of these different methods rests 
on what are essentially different responses to the problem of identifying 
"real interests". Some approaches, especially those which resemble what 
Lukes describes as the "three dimensional" view, and, to a lesser extent, 
the "two dimensional" view, permit the analyst to describe actions (or 
inactions) in terms of power, regardless of the actor's own view of the 
situation. Others, especially those which resemble what Lukes describes as 
the "one dimensional" approach, are confined to an analysis of overt 
conflict. I shall suggest that it is important to separate the study of 
power relations from a general and essentially moral discussion of 
advantage and disadvantage. Because I decided not to claim that my 
respondents were the unknowing victims of some power structure which only I 
(or only I and other "experts") could see, I adopted a limited and "one 
dimensional" definition of power thus avoiding the need to make any 
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absolute decision about the "real interests" of the subjects of my study. 
However, and this is an important qualification, I decided to attend 
systematically to the social context in which those limited instances of 
"one dimensional" power were situated, thus edging towards a concern with 
Lukes' "two dimensional" concept, though without the "two dimensional" 
emphasis on advantage and interest. Again I did not want to take any 
essentially moral view of that context. Rather I wanted to explore the 
ways in which, in this case, domestic routines, habits, patterns of 
authority, and beliefs about appropriate family behaviour ordered the world 
in which A got B to do what B would not have otherwise done. Questions 
about how that context favoured particular categories of actors (as 
opposed to structured particular outcomes) raise what are, from my point of 
view, separate issues. 
This line of argument informed the way in which I set about the study of 
domestic power relations. It demanded, first, that I attended to instances 
of overtly contentious decision-making, (ie. instances which fitted the 
"one dimensional" definition of power) and second, that I found some way of 
situating these, in the event, relatively rare instances in a context of 
routinely "unproblematic" decision-making. To this end I chose to question 
my respondents about the ways in which they made certain common domestic 
decisions and about the ways in which they allocated certain common 
domestic responsibilities. I consequently accumulated a wealth of material 
on taken-for-granted decision-making procedures and patterns of localised 
authority as well as some data on decisions which were the subject of overt 
dispute. 
Further development of the analysis required some method of relating 
described instances of overt dispute to the described context of 
unproblematic decision-making and, in turn, to a broader context of beliefs 
about proper family behaviour. I needed, that is, to find some way of 
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linking those few reported cases of conflict to the wider world. Analysis 
of the materials suggested that the respondent's perception of the degree 
to which the outcome of a contentious decision was "open" (ie. seen to be 
determined only by personal preference) or, at the other extreme, "closed" 
(ie. seen to be determined by factors beyond the respondent's control) 
appeared to order the subsequent course of conflict. In particular, it 
seemed to order the respondent's definition of relevant resources: their 
views about the means or capacities which might be used to secure a 
preference in case of conflict. I categorised the reported instances of 
overt dispute accordingly. Chapter 3 describes that process, while chapter 
4 reviews the kinds of resources which were reportedly relevant in relation 
to different categories of contentious situation. These chapters fulfil 
two functions. On the one hand they provide an analysis of that section of 
the interview material concerned with overt dispute. On the other hand 
they allow me to develop a method of categorising instances of conflict 
which permits them to be reviewed in terms of their ordering context. 
The key argument here is that the respondent's definition of a relevant 
resource, and hence the course of a particular domestic dispute, varied 
according to their initial perception of the kind of choice associated 
with what later proved to be a contentious issue. Of course that issue 
might not have turned out to be contentious. But if I could classify the 
respondents' perceptions of choice associated with a range of unproblematic 
decisions, then I would have gone some way towards describing the world in 
which decision-making dispute (if any) would be located. It seemed that 
the world of overt conflict and "one dimensional" power could therefore be 
connected to an unproblematic structuring context of routine and taken-for- 
granted decision-making via this notion of perception of choice. Having 
ordered types of conflict in this way, and having explored the 
relationship between types of resources and types of conflict in chapters 
3 and 4+, 1 could then describe the kinds of choice seen to be associated 
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with a selection of common domestic decisions. If different sections of 
the sample described characteristically different perceptions of choice, 
then the contexts in which, to use the power terminology, A might get B to 
do what B would not otherwise do, would vary accordingly. Argument about 
the same topic could be expected to follow a different course, and would 
involve appeal to quite different resources, depending on the initial 
perception of choice. So, I needed to document the ways in which different 
sections of the sample defined the same issues. Were decisions about 
family size, holidays, leisure, house and home seen to be "open" matters of 
preference, "closed" matters of "no choice" or issues about which there was 
scope for personal preference provided that the outcome did not contravene 
some normative convention of appropriate behaviour? What were seen to be 
"normal" or viable alternatives? What was taken-for-granted and what was 
seen to be a genuine and so potentially debatable choice? Or, in more 
general terms, how did the contexts of conflict vary across the sample? 
The results of these enquiries are presented in chapters 5,6,7,8 and 9. 
The contention is that decisions, disputed or otherwise, can be ordered 
according to the respondent's perception of the type of choice involved. 
In cases of conflict the respondents' perceptions of relevant resources 
appeared to vary depending on the type of choice initially associated with 
what subsequently proved to be a contentious issue. For example, if a 
decision about holiday location were seen to be a matter of personal 
preference, and if that were to prove contentious, then those involved 
would be likely to draw upon certain kinds of "relevant" capacities. 
Those who saw the holiday location issue in some other way (ie. if they 
concluded that there was no, or only limited, choice) would be likely to 
draw upon other "relevant" capacities if there were any dispute about the 
subject. That was one way in which the context of conflict ordered the 
course of particular instances of domestic dispute. 
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Flow, 
Parallel to this, I had to attend to the ways in which decisions were 
actually made, and to the ways in which patterns of habit and routine 
served to obscure otherwise debatable and potentially contentious issues. 
This meant exploring the ways in which decisions were bracketed together or 
defined as the responsibility of either A or B and so removed from "joint" 
view. If different sections of the sample described different patterns of 
everyday domestic authority, if they allocated routine decision-making 
responsibilities in characteristically differently ways, then the 
boundaries between potentially contentious and normally taken-for-granted 
decision-making would fall in different places. In practice, therefore, I 
had to attend to the domestic routines and habits of different sections of 
the sample so as to map areas of similarity and difference in the ways in 
which decision-making responsibilities were allocated. This process is 
described in chapters 9 and 10. 
In effect, then, chapters 5 to 10 address variations upon the same 
question. How do respondents perceive different decisions? Which choices 
are "invisible" and which the subject of debate? Or, more generally, what 
are the domestic contexts in which decision-making conflict might (or might 
not) arise? In detail, chapter 5 reviews the respondents' described 
perceptions of family planning decisions and their view of of choices 
associated with their own and their husband's working lives. Chapter 6 
concerns decisions about house and home, chapter 7 choices about the use of 
leisure time, while chapter 8 focuses on decisions about holidays. Chapter 
9, on family finance, attempts to unravel the inter-relationships between 
areas of financial authority, methods of financial management, and 
decisions about spending and saving, while chapter 10 documents the ways in 
which different sections of the sample allocated responsibility for (and so 
authority over) certain areas of domestic decision-making. 
The thesis ends with a discussion of what are really three different kinds 
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of conclusion. The first is concerned with the interview material and 
focuses on the similarities and differences evident in the accounts 
provided by respondents from different sections of the sample. Those 
variations are, of course, identified with reference to the preceding 
argument about power and the context of conflict, and so make some 
contribution to the second and third kinds of conclusion. These latter 
concern the implications of the argument and material presented in the 
thesis first in terms of an account of women's position in the family and 
second in terms of an analysis of power relations. 
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PART 1 
CHAPTER 1 
FAMILIES AND POWER 
The literature on power is considerable and that on the family, quite 
overwhelming; accordingly, it is clearly impractical to provide a complete 
"survey" of existing work in both areas. If I were to attempt to review 
arguments in anthropology, debates in social psychology and history, 
research in psychology and politics, not to mention studies in sociology, 
I would have to fill many volumes before I even scratched the surface of 
the literature. This chapter on families and power, therefore, makes no 
pretence to be an exhaustive literature survey. Rather, it is an attempt 
to tease out a thread of argument from an enormous and tangled volume of 
work. In so doing I shall encounter many different debates, engaging with 
some of them head on while others, less relevant to the course of my 
argument will inevitably receive less attention. Though some attempt will 
be made to situate the argument in a wider context, the main aim of this 
chapter is to present a case first about feminist and sociological 
conceptions of the family, and second about the potential value of a 
particular approach to the study of power relations. I shall distinguish 
between what seem to be central and tangential issues accordingly. 
However, this should not be taken to imply that the literature which I 
shall consequently bypass, or which I shall only mention in passing, is of 
no value. 
The chapter is divided into two sections, each of which represents an 
element in a cumulative argument. The first involves a discussion of the 
feminist contribution to the sociology of the family and the second a 
review of the ways in which family relations might be conceived of in terms 
of power. In the first section, "Feminism and the family" I intend to 
suggest that the feminist (1) and sociological literature on the family 
shares a common vision of the family as an institution, though differing in 
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their analysis of the interests served by that institution. Despite this 
similarity, feminist re-conceptions of the family make a significantly 
different contribution in that they draw attention to the possibility that 
family members might have different or even opposing interests. I want to 
argue that the common framework of "family as institution" has structured 
the lines of enquiry followed by both feminist and family sociology such 
that neither has addressed questions of domestic power. In the 
traditional family sociology context the institutional emphasis has tended 
to obscure questions about relations within the family unit. Where such 
issues have been raised, they have usually been approached with reference 
to themes of "jointness" or "modernity" rather than power (2). In the 
feminist context, the over-riding concern to understand the role of the 
family as an oppressive institution has led to a particularly limited 
conception of women's "powerless" position in the family. Thus, while the 
feminist literature makes use of the term "power", that use is (almost 
always) rhetorical rather than analytical. My argument is that in neither 
the feminist nor the family literature is full use made of existing 
sociological conceptions of power, in part, at least, because of the common 
focus on the family as a coherent institutional form. 
The second section of this chapter reviews accounts of domestic (and other) 
power relations presented in family, feminist and power literature. That 
review focuses on the problems of developing a conception of power which 
goes beyond the simple baseline of overt conflict but which stops short of 
an essentially moral view of the interests of powerful and powerless 
groups. In conclusion, I shall seek to develop a strategy for approaching 
the study of domestic power relations which is not based on the presumption 
that wives are the unknowing victims of a system of power but which does go 
beyond a simple analysis of overt disputes. 
Essentially the argument is that the existing feminist and sociological 
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literature on the family has failed to realise the potential of an analysis 
of domestic relations in terms of power. In the case of the sociological 
literature (3), the informing conception of family as homogenous 
institution has served to obscure such issues. Because the family is taken 
to be a cohesive unit of analysis, questions about internal family 
relations are rendered (relatively) invisible. In the feminist context, 
such internal relations are the central focus. However, they are viewed in 
terms of, and with reference to, what is presumed to be women's oppression. 
Because the family as institution is known to be a, if not the, site of 
women's oppression, there is no scope for a more sophisticated enquiry into 
the nature of domestic power relations. As I shall show later, most 
feminist conceptions of power rest on an often implicit notion that women 
are relatively powerless whatever their own view of their situation. I 
shall argue that questions of domestic power can fruitfully be approached 
in other ways. Discussion of the power literature, including that on 
family power, serves to raise a series of general questions: questions 
about real interests and about the relationship between responsible action 
and "structural determination". Having worked through these arguments I 
shall devise a method of approaching the study of power relations in a 
domestic context which, hopefully, avoids the need to specify the "real 
interests" of the parties involved but which goes beyond a simple 
behavioural account of overt dispute. That method hinges initially on a 
"one dimensional" definition of power but demands that instances of overt 
dispute are examined with reference to their "unproblematic" ordering 
context of routine decision-making, habit, and localised patterns of 
authority. 
1. FEMINISM AND THE FAMILY 
Feminist inspired accounts of the family are usually seen to be radically 
different from those which have informed the work of traditional 
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sociological, historical and anthropological work on the family. Though 
there is some truth in this claim, in this first section I want to suggest 
that these different approaches are formally similar in certain respects; 
in particular, the institution of the family figures as a homogenous unit 
of analysis in virtually all areas of feminist and family sociology. This 
basic conceptual similarity has certain implications for the ways in which 
feminist and family analysts have addressed or, more commonly, avoided 
questions of family power. 
By and large, feminist and family sociologists agree that the family-as- 
institution does certain things to, for or against its members and/or 
society. The disagreements are about precisely what those "things" are. 
Such differences of opinion reflect what are essentially different accounts 
of the nature of society's functional requirements or, from the feminist 
view, those of patriarchal society (4). This case can be illustrated with 
reference to two important family/historical debates. Consider, for 
example, debate about the definition of the family. 
Definitions of the famil 
Social groups have been defined and picked out as "family" on a number of 
different grounds. The critical role of these prior and informing grounds 
is clearly illustrated in case of discussion about the universality or 
otherwise of "the family". As Harris (1969), Farmer (1979) and others have 
observed, argument about the universality of the family is essentially 
argument about the defining characteristics of the family as social group 
and so, often, about the functions of the family as institution. Collier 
Rosaldo and Yanagisako (1982) note that the definition of evidence relevant 
to the claim that the family is a universal phenomenon depends on the 
observers' initial model of the institution. They write in support of this 
point: "Malinowski separated questions of sexual behaviour from questions 
of the family's universal existence. Evidence of sexual promiscuity was 
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henceforth irrelevant for deciding whether families existed. " In other 
words, the family is (or is not) a universal institution depending on the 
analyst's vision of what should count as essential family features. 
Similarly, writers identify more or less historical variation in the form 
of the family depending on their vision of what should count as a 
significant change or development. Feminists and family historians, having 
different views of the role of the family as institution, have, not 
surprisingly, produced different accounts of family history. Equally, 
marxist feminist family history is not the same as radical feminist family 
history. Eisenstein attends to this difference in the course of an 
argument in favour of a capitalist patriarchal understanding of the past. 
She writes: "We must take into account two processes. One is history 
defined in terms of class - feudal, capitalist, socialist. The other is 
patriarchal history as it is structured by and structures these periods" 
(Eisenstein, 1979b, p45). Such differences of definition and so of 
analysis are also evident in more "traditional" accounts of family history. 
For example, Zaretsky (1976) identifies aristocratic, early bourgeois and 
proletarian family forms, each of which have a characteristically different 
relationship to the developing capitalist society. Different family forms 
are distinguished with reference to that relationship. In comparison, 
writers such as Anderson (1971) or Laslett (1972) "define family types 
with reference to the quantity of kin relatives in a household" (Poster 
1978) while Stone (1979), Shorter (1977), Branca (1978) and Aries (1973) 
divide periods of family history with reference to the nature of the 
emotional bond between husband, wife and children or, as others might see 
it, in terms of changing ideologies of the family (5). 
What is seen, and what is seen to change, depends on the analyst's 
orientation and theoretical framework. This is nothing new. What is 
interesting is that accounts of family history are typically ordered with 
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reference to an underlying account of the functions of the family 
institution. Accordingly, those who document patterns of residence or 
describe relations between immediate and extended family groups order their 
accounts and their definitions with reference to a more or less explicit 
notion of the family's function. For example, debate about extended and 
nuclear family forms is only deemed interesting in as far as it relates to 
a more general discussion about changes in economic and social function. 
At this point, I am not concerned with the nature of the relationship 
between evidence about actual family and accounts of the family as 
institution. Rather I want to emphasise the importance of a functional 
conception of family institution as a component in many different 
theoretical jigsaws. The peculiarly functionalist character of most 
conceptions of the family institution is especially evident in arguments 
about the "cause" (or consequence) of historical variation in the actual 
family. 
Explanations of change 
To continue the historical example, feminists and family historians have 
set out to write the history of the family as the history of the ways in 
which it fulfils what are defined as its basic material and ideological 
functions and of the ways in which it gains and loses other peripheral 
roles. The resulting patchwork of contradictory family histories reflect 
equally contradictory perceptions of the nature of the functional 
relationship between the family and other social institutions. As I 
observed above, Laslett (1972,1977), Mount (1982), Anderson (1971), Stone 
(1979), Shorter (1977) and Aries (1973) adopt different conceptions of 
family as institution which, in turn, inform different explanations of 
change.. Some writers consequently emphasise economic factors while others 
explain changes in family form in terms of a series of "emotional" 
revolutions (Shorter, 1977). 
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Similarly, feminist writers advance rather different explanatory accounts 
of family history depending on their conception of the role of the family 
in relation to other (oppressive) institutions and, in particular, 
depending on their conception of the oppressive consequence of patriarchal, 
capitalist patriarchal, or capitalist forces. (Zaretsky, 1976; Firestone, 
1970; Mitchell, 1971; Gittens, 1985; Barrett 1980). For example, Mitchell 
writes ".. women's role in the family - primitive, feudal or bourgeois 
partakes of three quite different structures: reproduction, sexuality, and 
the socialisation of children. These are historically, not intrinsically 
related to each other in the present modern family. We can easily see that 
they needn't be. " (Mitchell 1971). Framed in this way, family history is 
seen to be the history of the relationship between those three structures. 
Different feminist writers place more or less emphasis on the role of 
particular components in this or some other causal and oppressive sequence. 
For example, Zaretsky (1976) describes the history of the family in terms 
of the relationship between family (as institution), the "organization of 
production", and personal life. He writes, "While the rise of industry 
largely freed women from traditional patriarchal constraints, the expansion 
of personal life created a new basis for their oppression - the 
responsibility for maintaining a private refuge from an impersonal 
society. " Others agree with the first point but differ in the account and 
explanation of the oppressive consequences. For example, Hartmann agrees 
that "The emergence of capitalism in the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries 
threatened patriarchal control based on institutional authority" but goes 
on to argue that the new basis for women's oppression depended, above all, 
on the resulting "sex-ordered division of labour" (resulting that is from 
a combination of patriarchal and capitalist forces) rather than on a notion 
of the appropriate organisation of personal life. (Hartmann, 1979, p207) 
Feminist explanations of family history (and of the family in general) vary 
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in relation to the analyst's preference for a "radical" patriarchal or a 
"marxist" capitalist account of the role of the family institution. In the 
traditional family history context explanations vary depending on the 
analyst's preference for an economic or "belief centered" view of 
historical development. Either way, working definitions and sub-divisions 
of family type along with explanations and interpretations of historical 
change, are made with reference to a notion of institutional role or 
function. This common "functional" background has certain implications for 
the kinds of questions then addressed. Historians, anthropologists, 
feminist and family sociologists alike, have approached the study of the 
family with reference to such issues as a) the universality or otherwise of 
the family b) the historically variable way in which the family fulfils its 
key functions, c) the relationship between the family and other social 
institutions, and, sometimes d) the relationship between the institution 
and its ideology and/or the relationship between a set of beliefs about the 
family and actual family life. (Flandrin, 1979; Donzelot, 1980; Barrett and 
McIntosh, 1982; Gittens, 1985) 
In these respects, feminist analyses of the family are organised with 
reference to much the same issues (the changing role of the institution of 
the family, the relation between that institution and others etc. ) as those 
which order the accounts provided by family sociologists. This is not 
surprising, for the common emphasis on the functions and roles of the 
family as institution (patriarchal or otherwise) inevitably highlights some 
sorts of questions and obscures others. I shall now consider the feminist 
and traditional sociological approaches to the study of relations within 
the family and suggest that the common functional and institutional focus 
has effectively limited analysis of such relations. 
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Family socioloav and the analysis of relations within the famil 
One of the feminist criticisms of traditional sociological literature has 
been that the vision of the family as an analytic unit precludes discussion 
of the relations between husband, wife, and children (6). Indeed, it is the 
case that traditional family sociology has paid relatively little attention 
to relations within the family, or rather, that it has not attended to such 
issues with a view to establishing or documenting women's oppression. As 
Gittens writes: "The family has generally been treated by sociologists and 
historians as a unit and, as such, it has assumed that all individuals 
within it are, by and large, in a similar situation sharing similar 
resources and life chances" (Gittens, 1985, p2) (7). It is also true that 
many other branches of sociology have taken the family as a basic unit of 
comparison in cases in which the "equivalence" of family members was yet to 
be established. Delphy describes the problem in these terms: "Traditional 
stratification studies consider the family to be a 'solidary unit of 
equivalent valuation', thus the status of the woman is assumed to be 
equivalent to the status of her husband... the fact that women are not 
equal to men in many ways is irrelevant to the structure of stratification 
systems. It is presumed that wider inequalities have no influence on the 
(assumed) equality of the couple, and on the other hand that relationships 
within the couple, because they are seen as equal, cannot be the cause of 
wider inequalities" (Delphy, 1980a). 
Where family sociology has considered relations within the family, relevant 
questions have been defined with reference to general presumptions about 
the family as institution. For example, Bott (1957), Rappoport and 
Rappoport (1971,1976), Pahl and Pahl (1971), Rosser and Harris (1965), 
Edgell (1980), Allen, G (1985) and Udry and Hall (1965) have considered 
the internal structure of the family and the respective roles of husband 
and wife as part of a more general analysis of the way in which the family 
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works as a social system and/or of the way in which it, the actual family 
unit, responds to changing demands and external pressures associated with 
its neighbourhood, its social and geographical location, the fact that the 
wife works, that the husband is unemployed etc. Others have described 
changes in the relations between husband and wife in terms of equality. 
Young and Willmott, for example, document changes in the balance of actual 
family "equality" as that relates to and/or reflects the changing role of 
the family in relation to other social institutions (Young and Willmott, 
1973). In this context "equality" has tended to mean sharing, levels of 
which have been estimated with reference to such indices as the ways in 
which a couple divide their domestic responsibilities (Platt, 1969). 
Whatever the terms used, "joint", "segregated", "symmetrical", "equal", 
"modern" or "traditional", those who have worked within the family 
sociology framework have not, on the whole, been concerned to document 
patterns of inequality or injustice. The task has been to describe whole 
families with reference to the ways in which responsibilities are 
allocated, but not to evaluate the consequences of those different styles 
in terms of the way in which they serve to advantage some family members at 
the expense of others. The informing questions have been "How does 
the family cope? " and/or "How does it respond to changes in the "outside" 
world? " Questions of internal discord, as opposed to difference, are 
therefore bracketed out. There is very little room for the notion that 
family members might have different interests and so no room for a 
discussion of internal family relations in terms of an oppositional account 
of power. 
Feminism and the analysis of relations within the family 
In comparison, feminist conceptions of the family are founded on the 
conviction that husband and wife have opposing interests. What is 
particular to these accounts is the presumption that the family is a major 
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site of women's oppression: that in some way women get a bad deal because 
of the institution of the family. Feminist accounts of the family, like 
those presented by historians and sociologists, rest on a particular 
conception of the functional role of that institution. What is different 
about the feminist version is that it depends on the belief that the family 
works, in some more or less direct fashion, in the interests of men and 
against those of women. Given this initial conviction attention has been 
focussed, not surprisingly, on the nature of what are believed to be 
unequal relations within the family. I shall suggest first, that the 
notion that husbands and wives might have different interests and that 
family members might not share the same resources or life chances provides 
a genuine challenge to traditional sociological conceptions of the family. 
More than that, it opens the way for a discussion of internal family 
relations in terms of power. However, my second point is that the feminist 
literature has failed to realise the potential of this insight and, in 
particular, has failed to take questions of power sufficiently seriously. 
Consider first the ethnographic feminist literature. Writers such as 
Oakley (1976), Pahl (1980), Hunt (1980) and Hobson (1978) attend to 
relations within the family, asking much the same questions as researchers 
working within the traditional family framework (Young and Willmott, 1973; 
Edgell, 1980; Rosser and Harris, 1965). However, their analysis is 
distinctive in that relations between husband and wife are described as if 
they revealed something about power and oppression. For example, Hobson 
writes, ".. in many cases the words spoken by the women are more forceful 
when left to stand on their own. For this reason the article is concluded 
with a long extract, spoken by one woman, left without detailed comment 
because I think the woman speaks her own oppression" (Hobson, 1978, p92). 
Though it is difficult to winkle out the conceptions of power embedded in 
such work, it seems that the implicit argument goes something like this. 
Women are oppressed. This means that there is an imbalance of power either 
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because oppression can only be sustained if that is the case or because 
oppression is founded on some pre-existing imbalance. In addition, many 
feminist writers presume that "women's subjective experience reveals a 
'sense of oppression' (Hobson, 1978, p79). In this context, documentary 
accounts of women's lives are believed to be valuable on the grounds that 
they reveal, to the feminist observers at least, the everyday "reality" of 
the family as a site of oppression and of power. I shall explore the 
characteristics of this particular conception of power later in the 
chapter. At this point it is useful to observe that women's oppression, 
and hence women's powerlessness, is presented as a fixed "given" which 
provides the starting point of the enquiry and which is not itself the 
subject of discussion. In addition, but related to this, such arguments 
depend on a common if implicit assumption that women are the victims of a 
patriarchal power structure whatever their self-avowed view. For example, 
the following quotation embodies the notion that women are oppressed, and 
that (whatever they may think) they are the victims of a power structure. 
"Many of the fiercest diatribes against liberation come from the women 
themselves... A woman's declaration of happiness with housewifery is a 
necessary identification, but as a true statement it must be suspected. 
Women's generally subordinate position in society means that there are 
inbuilt obstacles to the housewife's realization of her oppression" 
(Oakley, 1976) (8). The informing conceptions of equality and justice, in 
relation to which the present situation is judged and with reference to 
which ideologies are distinguished from "innocent" cultural themes, are so 
taken-for-granted by these analysts that they are neither explained nor 
justified. I do not want to get involved with a discussion of the meaning 
of equality here, though it is an important issue and one which deserves 
more attention than it is usually given. As Janet Radcliffe Richards 
notes, "it is all too easy to slide into the convenient idea that whenever 
women make choices which feminists think they ought not to make they must 
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be conditioned, so giving feminists an excuse to discount those opinions. " 
If writers are to avoid this "mistake", she continues, they are obliged to 
arrive at some theoretical conclusion about "what things count as justice 
and injustice. " (Richards, 1980). 
The more "theoretical" feminist literature tends to make almost as many 
unargued presuppositions about power as it does about the notion of 
inequality and oppression. Again power is characteristically presumed to 
be either the medium through which inequality (however that is defined) is 
maintained, or the foundation on which it is based. Because most attention 
has been directed towards the project of understanding the cause or causes 
of women's oppression - and the role of the family as an oppressive 
institution - concepts of power and definitions of inequality remain 
relatively unexplored. As the following statements illustrate, power is 
either seen to be something which is automatically derived from an 
underlying structure of inequality or as something on which such structures 
are based. "Power is dealt with in a dichotomous way by socialist women 
and radical feminists: it is seen as deriving from either one's economic 
class position or one's sex" (Eisenstein, 1979b, p6). "Patriarchy is thus 
both a gender and an age relationship, based on power, and is essential in 
understanding families" (Gittens, 1985, p35). It is a measure of the 
rhetorical rather than analytic use of the term that such fundamental 
differences in the implicit conceptions of power pass unnoticed. Because 
much of the feminist literature has been concerned with the project of 
devising an institutional explanation of oppression and/or exploitation, 
and with the task of isolating the causal role of patriarchy and/or 
capitalism, it has become embroiled in debate about the relative 
explanatory value of patriarchy and capitalism as concepts. Questions 
about the meaning of power (ie. is it a means? a foundation of inequality? 
a personal posession? a property of society? etc. ) do not figure in such 
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debate. As a consequence, the topic has slipped from the feminist agenda; 
a curious development for no-one could deny that concepts of power and 
definitions of inequality are, in theory, crucial to the feminist argument. 
In conclusion, I have argued that family sociology has paid relatively 
little attention to the relations between actual family members, let alone 
to questions of power, in part because of an informing conception of the 
family as particular kind of functional institution. Work which does 
attend to the internal structure of what is normally taken to be the family 
unit has been concerned with the variety of ways in which families respond 
to wider pressures. In the historical or sociological contexts such work 
is based on the presumption that family members share essentially the same 
interests whatever the way in which they organise their domestic lives. 
Either way, questions of power have been bracketed out. The feminist 
literature draws attention to the potential value of an analysis of 
domestic relations in terms of power. However, because that literature has 
the primary goal of documenting, explaining and understanding the family's 
role in relation to what is presumed to be women's oppression, it has so 
far failed to realise that potential. The feminists' institutional 
emphasis, in combination with their implicit assumptions about oppression, 
effectively obscure the need for a conceptual understanding of power (9). 
Indeed real debate about the meaning of power is virtually non-existent in 
the feminist context. In the next section I want to examine the literature 
on power, and in particular on power in the family context, so as to take 
advantage of the opportunity opened up, but not exploited, by the feminist 
work on the family. 
2. CONCEPTIONS OF POWER 
I have chosen to order this discussion of the power literature with 
reference to the argument presented by Lukes in his book Power: A radical 
view (Lukes, 1974). This strategy has two advantages. First, Lukes' 
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classification of "one", "two" and "three" dimensional views of power 
provides a useful framework with which to structure a review of the 
literature on family power relations. Second, his account highlights the 
importance of two key issues; the question of "real interests" and the 
question of the relationship between responsible action and what Lukes 
refers to as "structural determination". As I shall suggest later, those 
who wish to address questions of power have to arrive at some theoretical 
position with respect to both these issues. My initial discussion of the 
work on family power draws attention to a range of alternative responses to 
these two key issues and so lays the foundation for a more abstract review 
of the problems of describing domestic relations in terms of power. I 
shall begin with a brief summary of Lukes' classification before using it 
to order an account of the literature on family power relations. I shall 
then consider the general issues which this review raises and, on the basis 
of that discussion, outline the way in which I approached the study of 
family power relations. 
Lukes and power 
Lukes identifies three different views of power. The first view, routinely 
adopted by those writing about families as well as by those who have been 
concerned with the structure of formal organisations, "involves a focus on 
behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over which there is an 
observable conflict" (Lukes, 1974, p15). Seen in this way power is 
exercised when A gets B to do something B would not otherwise do when there 
is direct and observable conflict between A and B over the outcome. Such 
approaches are described by Lukes as "one dimensional". "Two dimensional" 
analyses of power, mostly but not exclusively provided by those interested 
in the sociology of formal organisations, differ in that they involve 
discussion of "nondecision-making" (10) and "agenda setting" as well as of 
instances of overt and contentious decision-making. In Lukes' words the 
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"two dimensional" view "allows for consideration of the ways in which 
decisions are prevented from being taken on potential issues over which 
there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests" (Lukes, 1974, 
p20). The "three dimensional" view, devised on the basis of a critique of 
the behavioural and decision-making focus of the "one" and "two 
dimensional" approaches, offers the prospect of a "serious sociological and 
not merely personalised explanation of how political systems prevent 
demands from becoming political issues or even from being made" (Lukes, 
1974, p38). Power is still defined in terms of A getting B to do what B 
would not otherwise do, though from the "three dimensional" view this need 
not involve any form of observable conflict. In such circumstances the 
analyst needs to justify the expectation "that B would have thought and 
acted differently from the way he does actually think and act" and to 
"specify the means or mechanism by which A has prevented or else acted (or 
abstained from acting) in a manner sufficient to prevent, B from doing so" 
(ie. from acting differently) (Lukes, 1974, p41) before describing the 
relationship between A and B as one involving power. Only having taken 
these steps is the analyst in a position to present a "radical" account 
which can describe even "the supreme and insidious exercise of power" and 
so account for the ways in which people are prevented "to whatever degree, 
from having grievances" (Lukes, 1974, p24). 
Those who adopt either a "one", a "two" or a "three dimensional" view 
necessarily define instances of power with reference to quite different 
criteria. "One dimensional" accounts are only concerned with instances of 
overt conflict; "two dimensional" work explores conflicts of subjective 
interests; while "three dimensional" analyses examine conflicts of real 
interests which, though evident to the observer, are "invisible" to those 
involved. In other words, the range of social behaviour to be reviewed in 
terms of power varies according to the observer's preference for a "one", 
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"two" or "three" dimensional account. 
In addition, proponents of each view find it more or less easy to specify 
the relevant counterfactual, that is to establish what B would have done if 
it were not for A's exercise of power. As Lukes observes "in general, any 
attribution of the exercise of power ..... always implies a relevant 
counterfactual, to the effect that (but for A, or but for A together with 
any other sufficient conditions) B would otherwise have done, let us say, 
b. " Lukes goes on to note that "conflict provides the relevant 
counterfactual, so to speak, ready made. " Thus analysts of power defined 
in the "one dimensional" sense have a relatively easy life. In 
comparison, advocates of the "two", and especially the "three dimensional" 
views have to take more elaborate steps to establish, empirically, what B 
would have done "under conditions of relative autonomy, and in particular, 
independently of A's power" (Lukes, 1974, p33); they need to establish B's 
interests in order to identify an exercise of power. 
Similarly, the problem of distinguishing between types of social causation 
which can, and which cannot, be described in terms of power depends on 
which of the three views is adopted. For example, those concerned with the 
ways in which A secures A's preference in cases of overt conflict usually 
attribute A's success to a sequence of actions or inactions for which A was 
clearly responsible. It is rather more difficult to be sure that an 
instance of nondecision-making is the product of a responsible action, 
rather than the result of something as general and apparently 
uncontrollable as the "bias of the system". Yet, for Lukes at least, "an 
attribution of power is at the same time an attribution of (partial or 
total) responsibility for certain consequences" (Lukes, 1974, p56). It is 
especially difficult to attribute responsibility in this sense for the wide 
range of action and inaction which might be included in a "radical" 
analysis of power. Again Lukes maintains that this is a "serious but not 
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overwhelming" difficulty, and it is an issue that I shall consider in more 
detail later in the chapter. 
So, Lukes' work serves to highlight the importance of a) the definition of 
the relevant counterfactual and so of the interests of the parties involved 
in an exercise of power, and b) of the need to examine the relationship 
between power and responsibility on the one hand, and structural 
determination on the other. The following account of the family power 
literature is ordered with reference to Lukes scheme of "one", "two" and 
"three dimensional" views of power so as to emphasise the nature of the 
positions taken with respect to these two general questions. I shall begin 
with an account of the literature which adopts a "one dimensional" view of 
family power relations. 
"One dimensional" accounts of family power 
Most of the work on family power wholeheartedly adopts a "one dimensional 
view" of its subject. This literature, much of it produced in America in 
the 1960's and 1970's by writers such as Blood and Woolf (1960), Cromwell 
and Olson (1975), Rogers, M (1973) and Centres, Raven and Rodrigues (1971) 
defines (family) power as the ability of husband or wife to secure a 
preferred outcome in relation to an overtly contentious decision. For 
example, Cromwell and Olson describe family power as "the ability 
(potential or actual) of individual members to change the behaviour of 
other family members. " This ability is most easily recognised in cases of 
overt decision-making in which one party gets their way despite the other's 
opposition. Much of the American family power literature has therefore 
attended to practices of decision-making, to the results of overtly 
contentious decisions and, to a lesser extent, to the means by which 
individuals secured their preferences. Such a conception of power informs 
the work of Blood and Wolfe. Their research, reported in Husbands and 
Wives: The Dynamics of Family Living (Blood and Wolfe, 1960), was based on 
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responses to questions about the outcome of eight common decisions which 
"were selected to provide an estimate of the relative balance of power 
between husband and wife. " Here, as with the "one dimensional" analyses 
described by Lukes, instances of power are identified with reference to 
conflict "between preferences that are assumed to be consciously made, 
exhibited in actions and thus to be discovered by observing people's 
behaviour. " (Lukes, 1974, p14) Here too, then, the evidence of A's victory 
is taken as proof of the fact that B has ended up doing what B would not 
otherwise have done, and that A has therefore exercised power. Whatever the 
limitations of this view, the approach to power is via cases in which one 
party clearly came off worst and in which the other, just as clearly, got 
its way. Instances of the exercise of power, defined in this way, are 
consequently easy to recognise. 
Most of those who define the exercise of intra-family power in terms of the 
outcome of contentious decisions also define potentially powerful 
individuals as those who are likely to be able to get B to do what B would 
not otherwise do because they have the means to meet B's needs. Cromwell 
and Olson write: "The family member with the greatest command of resources 
to meet the other's needs and goals was defined to have the greater power" 
(Cromwell and Olson, 1975). Such a view is much like that presented in the 
work of Blau (1964) and Emerson (1962) and depends on an assumption that 
the members of society, of a family, or of some other social group, share a 
set of common needs. In this context particular capacities, means, or 
goods come to have the status of resources because they are scarce and in 
common demand. Resources are therefore distinguished from other innocent 
capacities on grounds of dependence. As Emerson writes "Power resides 
implicitly in the other's dependence" (Emerson, 1962). X, or more 
precisely, A's control over x, counts as A's resource if B is dependent on 
A for x (whether x is a ten penny piece, a cooked breakfast, or an oil 
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well). From this point of view, then, resources can be treated as 
individual possessions whose value is determined by the other's dependence. 
If the observer can correctly identify the distribution of means required 
to meet what are presumed to be the common family or societal needs then, 
from this perspective, the observer has mapped out the absolute patterns 
of dependence and of (potential) power. 
By definition, then, changes in the balance of mutual interdependence have 
an immediate effect on power structures. Many writers have attended to 
these patterns of dependence on the grounds that they are significantly 
related to levels of marital satisfaction, the presumption being that an 
even balance of power is the most rewarding and satisfying arrangement. 
(Madden, 1981; Cutright, 1970,1971; Pearlin, 1975) (11). However, others 
observe that shifting patterns of exchange and mutual indebtedness, rather 
as in Durkheim's organic solidarity, serve to bind family members (or the 
family institution) together. It is, for example, from the second of these 
two positions that Seanzoni (1976b) documents the impact of a wife's work, 
and of working women, on family life (12). 
A few researchers have attended to historical changes in the position of 
women (in relation to men) in terms of their access to resources likely to 
be relevant in the family context. Such work sets out to map historical 
variation in the nature and availability of the kinds of resources which 
allow women to exercise power (in the "one dimensional" sense of getting 
their way in case of overt dispute). For example, S Rogers (1975) reviews 
the consequences of the changing structure of a village and the cultural 
impact of urbanisation in terms of the structure of domestic dependence. 
She observes that the means which had clearly allowed individual village 
women to secure their (stated) preferences in the past were effectively 
devalued as a result of wider social and economic changes. "The woman, 
still running the household, and with fewer legal and other formal rights 
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than her husband, has considerably less access to crucial arenas and 
becomes heavily dependent upon him both socially and economically.... Her 
informal power is much less effective in the larger world, and her inferior 
formal rights become an accurate reflection of her actual position. " It is 
important to acknowledge that, in this context, it is only possible to talk 
of the power which women (as a gender group) gain or lose if it is also 
possible to establish that they have the same preferences and that the 
capacities to which they have access in fact allow them to secure those 
common (stated) preferences. Though this was no problem for Rogers who was, 
on the whole, content to define domestic power relations with reference to 
the stated preferences of husband and wife and with reference to specific 
outcomes in cases of overt dispute, it can be problematic for those who 
wish to make more far-reaching claims about the position of women in 
general (13). 
In summary, then, it is relatively easy to identify the exercise of power 
if that is defined as A's ability to get B to do what B would not otherwise 
do in cases of overtly contentious decision-making. Such instances are, 
like the outcome, as evident to the participants as to the observer (either 
A did or did not win what was a clearly contentious decison) (14). 
At this stage it is useful to consider two kinds of criticisms of this 
view: those which revolve around the conception of resources which is 
commonly but not necessarily part of the "one dimensional" approach; and 
those which take issue with the conflict centered orientation of this 
approach. 
Many proponents of the "one dimensional" view of power believe that 
resources have value because of the other's dependence, and so argue that 
it is both possible and practical to identify individuals with different 
levels of potential power. Given a conception of societal or family need 
it is, in theory, possible to define what would count as a resource and to 
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then identify resourceful individuals without ever having to take note of 
the way in which that potential is actually exercised (if at all). Such 
dependence/supply/demand accounts of the distinction between innocent 
capacities and useful resources need make no reference to the ways in which 
arguments are won, for the presumed relationship between the possession and 
the exercise of power is straightforward: those who have the most resources 
will get their way whatever the issue and whatever the circumstances of 
debate (15). As I observed earlier, "one dimensional" definitions of the 
exercise of power can stop short of such supply and demand accounts of 
resources and potential power. Those who actually do attend to the 
occasions on which power is exercised (as defined by the "one dimensional" 
view) argue that complex conventions of argument govern the use of 
particular tactics and appeals (resources) and, in part, determine their 
value. In other words, the social context of conflict complicates the 
relationship between possession of the means to meet the other's needs and 
ability to exercise power. While the dependence argument may hold at a 
general level (as advanced by Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962) there is no reason 
to suppose that the value of a resource is simply and exclusively 
determined by an equation of supply and demand. The related notion that 
resources can be simply added together to produce an absolute index of 
power potential is correspondingly simplistic. If these criticisms hold, 
then, it is extremely difficult to recognise necessarily potentially 
powerful groups or individuals or to identify generally relevant resources. 
If capacities only and variously have effect as resources at the moment 
when they in fact allow A to get B to do what B would not otherwise have 
done, that is to say capacities only become resources when they are 
realised, then the definition of power potential must depend on a 
retrospective observation of cases of overtly contentious decision-making 
(16). 
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Critics of the "one dimensional" view also claim that it draws too tight a 
boundary around the core of observable and overtly contentious decision- 
making. Bachrach and Baratz note that "Power is also exercised when A 
devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values 
and instituional practices that limit the scope of the political process to 
public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous 
to All (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970, p7). Similarly, though this time in 
relation to the view of resources characteristically adopted by "one 
dimensional" analysts, Clegg observes, "the assumption of resource based 
explanations of power ought also to entail an exposition of how some people 
come to have access to these resources while others do not. This entails a 
theory of power. " (Clegg, 1979) In pursuit of such a theory, I shall now 
review accounts of power which encompass discussion of the distribution 
and definition of "resources", of agenda setting and nondecision-making 
practices and, at the most general, of the "bias of the system". 
"Two dimensional" accounts of family power 
Those who adopt what Lukes describes as a "two dimensional" view of power 
attend to "the fact that power may be, and often is, exercised by confining 
the scope of decision-making to relatively "safe" issues" (Bachrach and 
Baratz, 1970, p6). Such observers are obliged to "identify potential 
issues which nondecision-making prevents from being actual". More than 
that, they have to show that in making a nondecision, (ie. in deciding not 
to decide) one party was able to secure their preference. Advantaging 
nondecisions are included in the "two dimensional" account of power and are 
distinguished from innocent absences of decision with reference to an 
"observable conflict of (subjective) interests, seen as embodied in express 
policy preferences and sub-political grievances" (Lukes, 1974, p20). The 
means which permit agenda setting and nondecision-making presumably count 
as resources and, implicitly, those who have access to such "resources" 
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have what might be thought of as potential power (17). 
Unfortunately, none of the work on domestic power relations really occupies 
this position. Some writers observe in passing that family rules, rituals, 
and expectations about, for example, the distribution of income or food 
"function to preclude power confrontations through the pre-solution of 
potential problems" (Broderick, 1975) (18). However, discussion of such 
routines is not the same as discussion of non-decisions. First, those 
family rituals are not the product of a discrete decision to avoid debate, 
and second, it is not necessarily clear that the outcome of the ritual or 
routine is in the interests of one party but not the other. Both of these 
criteria must be met if the event is to be described as one involving an 
exercise of "two dimensional" power. While it is useful to attend to the 
way in which decisions come to be made, and, in particular, to take account 
of decisions which "result in suppression or thwarting of a latent or 
manifest challenge to the values or interests of the decision maker" 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1970, p44), it is only possible to describe those 
processes in terms of power if it is also possible to define the interests 
of both the nondecision-maker and of his/her "victim". Even if this were 
possible, the "two dimensional" account of power hinges on a notion of 
individual decision-making and as such could not help with an analysis of 
something as general as patriarchal power. To quote again from Lukes, the 
"two dimensional" account "confines itself to studying situations where the 
mobilisation of bias can be attributed to individual's decisions that have 
the effect of preventing currently observable grievances (overt or covert) 
from becoming issues within the political process. " (Lukes, 1974, p37) 
"Three dimensional" accounts of power 
In comparison, the ways in which beliefs, ideologies, uncontentious actions 
and "social arrangements" work to the advantage of particular groups or 
individuals can all be discussed in terms of Lukes' three dimensional view 
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of power. From this perspective, instances of power are identified with 
reference to "a contradiction between the interests of those exercising 
power and the real interests of those they exclude. These latter may not 
express or even be conscious of their interests. " These interests are 
therefore recognised and identified by the observer who, according to 
Lukes, must take steps to provide "indirect grounds for asserting that if A 
had not acted (or failed to act) in a certain way... then B would have 
thought and acted differently from the way he does actually think and act". 
Instances of power are therefore distinguished with reference to a 
definition of what B would have done if B were exercising choice under 
conditions of "relative autonomy and, in particular, independently of A's 
power". It is important to note that it is only possible to recognise such 
instances, including those in which people are prevented from having 
grievances because "their perceptions, cognitions and preferences" (Lukes, 
1974, p21) are shaped having first "taken steps to find out what it is 
that people would have done otherwise". 
Lukes claims that it is difficult but "not impossible to adduce evidence - 
which must, by nature of the case, be indirect - to support the claim that 
an apparent case of consensus is not genuine but imposed". Though such 
enquiry need not be restricted to an individual level (ie. in terms of 
individual As and Bs), it is difficult to conceive of the kind of evidence 
which would be required to support the general case that the preferences 
and desires of all women were structured in a way which was counter to 
their (common) "real interest". Yet this is a condition which must be met 
before the observer can identify the exercise or possession of power 
defined in terms of the "three dimensional" view. 
In the final section of Power: A radical view, Lukes distinguishes between 
power and structural determination and specifies a second necessary 
condition of power. The observer has to identify the nature of B's "real 
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interests" in order to claim that B is in a position of powerlessness with 
respect to A. In doing that, the observer has to establish what B would do 
in the absence of, specifically, A's power. Lukes writes: "to identify a 
given process as an 'exercise of power', rather than a case of structural 
determination, is to assume that it is in the exerciser's or exercisers' 
power to act differently..... The point, in other words, of locating power 
is to fix responsibility for consequences held to flow from the action, or 
inaction, of certain specifiable agents" (Lukes, 1974, p56). It is 
difficult, though not completely impossible, to imagine how expectations of 
proper family life, patterns of financial dependence etc. (even if they 
could be shown to serve the interests of men/husbands at the expense of 
women/wives) could also be attributable to specifiable agents and so 
described in terms of ("three dimensional") power. I shall return to this 
issue later in the chapter. 
To sum up, Luke's discussion of the "three dimensional" view of power 
highlights the theoretical importance of a) the definition of real 
interests and b) the distinction between structural determination and 
responsibility. These are key issues for those who want to maintain a 
complex yet basically oppositional account of power which does not collapse 
into vacuous generalities. 
The feminist literature and the "three dimensional" view of power 
The feminist literature on the family tends to adopt a conception of power 
which is superficially similar to Lukes' "three dimensional view" but which 
bypasses both the problem of specifying the relevant counterfactual and 
the problem of determining the point at which "structural determination 
ends and power and responsibility begin" (Lukes, 1974, p56). Feminist 
discussions of power are founded on a belief that women are the victims of 
a patriarchal (or capitalist patriarchal) system and that they would choose 
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to behave differently if it were not for this system. Women's present 
position in the family is therefore recognised as one of powerlessness with 
reference to some implicit model of how things would otherwise be, or, to 
be more precise, with reference to a vision of women's real interests (19). 
This account of power and Lukes' "three dimensional" view differ in two 
critical respects. 
First, few feminists have felt the need to justify the expectation that 
women, who are unproblematically agreed to be the victims of injustice and 
inequality, would "but for the exercise of power, strive for justice and 
equality" (Lukes, 1974, p46). In other words, feminist writers do not take 
steps to find out what it is that people (in this case women) would have 
done otherwise in order to then identify the exercise of power, because 
they begin from a conviction that women are in fact oppressed and/or 
exploited. The problem of identifying power relations is, from the 
feminist perspective, no problem at all. It is usually taken-for-granted 
that a) women are oppressed and/or exploited, and b) that this oppression 
and/or exploitation is maintained via an all pervasive medium of 
patriarchal or capitalist patriarchal power. Exactly which depends on the 
writer's conception of the nature and prime cause of women's oppression. 
It is important to note that this position is self-sustaining. Because 
feminist writers hold particular beliefs about the nature of women's real 
interests, they cannot admit counter evidence which "shows" that certain 
women have no genuine grievances. Such claims of consensus are already 
defined as the product of a false consciousness about what the writer 
already knows to be the real position (See note 8). The formal structure 
of the position is the same for those who adopt a patriarchal, or a 
capitalist patriarchal, or a capitalist account of women's position in the 
family. The difference lies in the precise conception of "real interest" 
and so in the precise definition of areas of "false consciousness", but not 
in the structure of the account. 
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The feminist literature has so far had just as little trouble dealing with 
the distinction between power and structural determination. Most feminist 
writers use "power" as a blanket term with which to describe the capacity 
of men to oppress women (20). In this respect the feminist position is 
(usually) the same as that which Lukes takes Poulantzas to represent. 
Here, too, power and structural determination are assimilated such that 
there is, curiously, no special role for the concept of power. Gender 
relations are, just like the class relations described by Poulantzas, "at 
every level relations of power" (Poulantzas, quoted in Lukes, 1974, p55). 
As Gittens writes, "Power relations between men and women cut across every 
aspect of social existence.... Relations of power and authority between the 
sexes and between adults and children permeate, and permeated, society at 
all levels from the simplest household to more complex social and political 
institutions". (Gittens, 1984, p36 and p37). Because such writers do not 
believe that an attribution of power is (or should be) at the same time an 
attribution of responsibility, there is no limit to the range of social 
arrangements, conventions or "biases of the system" which they can describe 
in terms of (patriarchal or capitalist) power. Though of course, such a 
description consequently carries little real meaning beyond a re-assertion 
of the basic analysis of the disadvantaging nature of that structure. 
My suggestion is, then, that the feminist literature on the family makes 
implicit assumptions about the nature of women's real interests and does 
not seek empirical support for its claim that an "apparent case of 
consensus is not genuine but imposed" (Lukes, 1974, p147). Secondly, it 
presumes that patriarchal power is all pervasive, and therefore that the 
question of the relationship between responsible action (or inaction), 
power, and structural determination is not theoretically significant. 
Having located the feminist and family literature on power in the terms 
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provided by Lukes' scheme I shall now consider the issues raised by Lukes' 
own position, first, in terms of "real interests" and second, in terms of 
the relationship between power and "structural determination". 
Family rower. real interests and the auestion of advantage 
"One", "two" and "three dimensional" accounts of power, as well as those 
advanced by feminist writers, rest on a basic definition of power as A's 
ability to get B to do what B would not otherwise do. Different 
methodological solutions to the problem of defining what 'B would otherwise 
do" in turn determine the variety of actions or inactions included under 
the heading of power. So, writers who are only prepared to identify what B 
would otherwise do in cases of overt conflict (ie. cases in which B has 
made B's preference clear) have to limit discussion of power to discussion 
of the outcome of decision-making disputes. Similarly, those who wish to 
describe instances in which individuals or groups failed to realise their 
articulated, if generalised, interests (even if there were no overt 
conflict) in terms of power have to limit their discussion to an analysis 
of a particular sub-section of events or non-events. Finally, all those 
who want to broaden the scope of the term "power" such that it could be 
used to describe or explain particular features of the context of overt 
conflict such as the creation of preferences or the manipulation of 
perceived interests have to decide what it is that B would be doing if it 
were not for A's power. In other words, they have to find a way of 
specifying B's real interests in order to distinguish between advantaging, 
disadvantaging and irrelevant aspects of the social world. If power is 
defined in these oppositional terms, the problems associated with the 
definition of group or individual real interests (given the possibility of 
the manipulation of preferences, false consciousness etc. ) are critical. 
The strategy adopted by the feminist and, in a different context, the 
Marxist literature (21) is clearly only a "solution" to the problem if 
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reader and writer share the same vision of how the world ought to be. In 
this context differences between, for example, socialist and radical 
feminists or between feminists and non-feminists reflect differences in an 
underlying (and essentially moral) view of women's real interests and so of 
the nature of a "better", "non-patriarchal" state of affairs. Unfortu- 
nately, none of this is especially helpful if the aim is to develop a 
sociological account of power relations within the family. It might, of 
course, be useful to temporarily "borrow" a range of alternative 
conceptions of real interests and to order an enquiry with reference to a 
series of "as if" hypotheses of the form, for example, "If women were in 
fact the subjects of a system of patriarchal power, then how might that 
system work? " Although this strategy is potentially more rewarding than 
that adopted by the feminist literature, it still rests on an essentially 
oppositional conception of power. In addition, if the search is for one 
model of power, in the end there would be no choice but to select one from 
the range of alternative hypothetical accounts on what remain basically 
moral grounds. 
In comparison, at times at least, Lukes argues that the identification of 
real interests is an empirical rather than a moral problem (22). He 
claims that the observer can take steps to find out what otherwise would 
have happened and so find empircal evidence which "supports the claim that 
an apparent case of consensus is not genuine but imposed". However, it is 
not at all clear how such an enquiry would proceed if the job were, say, 
that of identifying the real interests of the members of a particular 
family, let alone of husbands and wives in general. If this were, in fact, 
an impossible project, analysis of family power relations (defined in terms 
of A getting B to do what B would not otherwise do) would have to be 
limited to an analysis of instances of overtly contentious decision-making 
or at least to an analysis of particular decisions which, though not 
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necessarily overtly contentious, nonetheless served or worked against the 
explicitly articulated interests of the parties involved. This is a 
problem for those who want to construct an oppositional account of power 
which goes beyond an analysis of instances of overt conflict and which 
incorporates the manipulation and construction of interests as a subject of 
study. The question is, how can uncontentious social action be described 
in terms of an oppositional account of power if it is in fact impossible to 
find evidence in support of a claim about what women would do if it were 
not for a system of power, or if the analyst is unwilling to make general 
assumptions about women's real interests? 
In sum, I have suggested that this "real interests" issue might be 
addressed in one of three ways. First, as in the feminist literature, the 
analyst might make certain presumptions about the interests of those who 
are the subjects of study. Second, the analyst might argue, as at times 
does Lukes, that the identification of interests is an empirical rather 
than a moral issue. Thirdly, one might use a hypothetical notion of 
interests as a device with which to examine the social relations which 
would be said to be relations of power, if that hypothetical account were 
"true". The status of the hypothesis is, from this view, more or less 
irrelevant, it simply serves as a convenient base from which to work. I 
have also observed that the first strategy leads to a self-sustaining dead 
end: women are definitionally the victims of a power structure because 
feminist writers presume that they are oppressed. While it might be useful 
to "borrow" a particular and essentially moral account of real interests so 
as to conduct an "as if" analysis of social relations, that "as if"' account 
would only be said to be an account of power if the observer decided that 
interests were in fact structured in that hypothesised form. Finally, it 
is difficult to imagine what kind of empirical evidence might support the 
case that, in the family context, "an apparent case of consensus is not 
genuine but imposed" (Lukes, 1974, pi7). This is to imply that there is no 
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way out of the problem and that all analysis of power consequently rests on 
the observers more or less explicit vision of, in the family context, the 
real interests of husband and wife. 
Perhaps the solution is to completely reconsider the conception of power. 
As Lukes notes, the "primitive notion lying behind all talk of power is the 
notion that A in some way affects B" (Lukes, 19714, p26). "In some way 
affects" need not, of course, be taken to mean that A gets B to do what B 
would not otherwise do. Affecting could be taken to mean affecting in the 
interests of the collective operation of the whole, as in the work of 
Parsons (1963), or, as in the work of Giddens (1984), it could be be taken 
to mean "In some way to make a difference". Those who adopt a non- 
oppositional definition, that is, those who do not believe that power is 
"intrinsically connected to the achievement of sectional interests" 
(Giddens, 1984, p15) are under no obligation to show how uncontentious 
action or inaction benefits one group or person at another's expense in 
order to describe that behaviour in terms of power. 
One "solution" to the real interests problem, then, is to use the term 
power to describe a sub-set of all uncontentious action or inaction which 
can be seen to further collective goals, a strategy seen at its most 
complex in the Parsonian attempt to develop an understanding of the 
societal media of exchange (Parsons 1963,1964). From this point of view 
there is no need to define sectional interests in order to define power, 
although it is necessary to be able to specify both "collective goals" and 
the nature of action or inaction which would further those goals. Though I 
shall not explore the question here, this is likely to be as much of a 
problem as was that of specifying opposing real interests. 
A second option is to separate discussion of power from all discussion 
of interests and so take power to mean "the ability to achieve outcomes" 
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without regard for the associated sectional or collective advantage or 
disadvantage. From this point of view neither type of interest (sectional 
or collective) plays a constitutitive part in the definition of power. As 
Giddens writes, "Power is not necessarily linked with conflict in the sense 
of either division of interests or active struggle, and power is not 
inherently oppressive.... Power is the capacity to achieve outcomes; whether 
or not these are connected to purely sectional interests is not germane to 
its definition.... In associating power with so-called 'collective goals', 
Parsons sacrifices part of the insight that the concept of power has no 
intrinsic relation to that of interest. If power has no logical connection 
with the realization of sectional interests, neither does it have any with 
the realization of collective interests or 'goals"' (Giddens, 1984, p257). 
If A is said to exercise power when A makes a difference to a "pre-existing 
state of affairs or course of events" (Giddens, 1984, p14) then A's ability 
to get B to do what B would not otherwise do, the distinguishing 
characteristic in instances of overt conflict, merely reflects one part of 
A's ability to exercise power (23). While it is useful to separate the 
question of interests from the definition of power in this way, it should 
also be emphasised that there are forms of social behaviour which "make a 
difference" such that A (in some more or less complicated way) gets B to do 
what B would not otherwise do despite B's overt resistance. 
In conclusion, I do not want to many any presumption about the real 
interests of my respondents on the grounds that such a strategy marks the 
end, rather than the beginning, of a sociological enquiry into the nature 
of family power relations. In addition, I am not convinced that it would 
be possible to find indirect evidence in support of the claim, that in the 
family context, "an apparent case of consensus is not genuine but imposed" 
(Lukes, 1974, p'7)" Yet, I shall go along with Lukes' suggestion that the 
study of power relations should be informed by an interest in "the 
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securing of people's compliance by overcoming or averting their opposition" 
(Lukes, 1974, p31). Accordingly, I shall use the term to describe 
instances in which A got B to do what B would not otherwise do in cases in 
which the interests of A and B were clear, that is, therefore, in cases of 
overt conflict. On the other hand, it is useful to consider those 
instances of overt conflict as a sub-set of a much broader range of action 
which "makes a difference" and it is certainly important to avoid falling 
into an exclusively "one dimensional" position. Thus, to meet these 
various conceptual restrictions, I have sought in my research to situate 
instances of overt conflict in terms of what is, from the social actors' 
point of view, an unproblematic structuring and ordering context. If the 
"real interests" problem is not to be re-encountered, the analysis of that 
ordering context has to be framed in terms other than those of advantage 
and disadvantage. That is not to say that the context of conflict does not 
serve particular sectional or even collective interests; only that the 
question of whether or not that is the case is a separate question and one 
to which I shall not attend here. My present more limited concern is with 
the ways in which domestic routines, habits and patterns of authority 
structure instances of overt conflict. 
Power. responsibility and structural determination 
Lukes claims that "to identify a given process as an 'exercise of power' 
rather than as a case of structural determination, is to assume that it is 
in the exerciser's or exercisers' power to act differently" (Lukes, 1974, 
p55). While Lukes observes that a dichotomous view of structural 
determination and responsible action is misleading in the sense that "the 
future, though it is not entirely open, is not entirely closed either", he 
does "assume that, although the agents operate within structurally 
determined limits, they none the less have a certain relative autonomy and 
could have acted differently" (Lukes, 1974, p54). In other words the 
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social world is not entirely open nor entirely closed; it is, rather, a 
mixture of the two. Nevertheless, this position reflects what is still an 
essentially dichotomous view of the matter, in which responsible action is 
contrasted with structural determination. Indeed, such a view is implied 
in all oppositional accounts of power which take the form "A gets B to 
do... ". 
Definitions of power do not necessarily rest on this particular dualistic 
conception of the social world. If the claim "A gets B to do.. " is not a 
constitutive part of the definition of power then there is no need to 
presume that, as Giddens puts it, "the structural properties of social 
systems,.... are like the walls of a room from which an individual cannot 
escape but inside which he or she is able to move around at whim" (Giddens, 
1984, p174). Or, at least, this is so providing that the definition of 
power is not located at the other, structurally determined, extreme such 
that it is taken to be a property of a social system (24). If the relation 
between responsible action and structural determination is not presented in 
Lukes' dichotomous terms, but rather, if ".. structure is implicated in that 
very 'freedom of action' which is treated as a residual and unexplicated 
category" (Giddens, 1984, p174) it is then impossible to sustain an "A gets 
B.. " account of power in which an attribution of power is at the same time 
an attribution of responsibility. 
In as far as I shall adopt a "one dimensional" account of power, I shall, 
for these purposes, accept the presumption of 'freedom of action'. 
However, the issue of the relationship between structural determination and 
responsible action is of no necessary significance in terms of my account 
of the context of conflict. All I am interested in, in that sense, is the 
nature of the domestic world in which conflict takes place. That is 
undoubtedly a world in which different actors, in different circumstances, 
are faced with a range of more and less "open" options. I am concerned 
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particularly to explore the ways in which that world orders instances of 
conflict rather than to unearth the factors which combine to produce those 
patterns of perceived possibility and impossibility. Needless to say, this 
is not to deny that such factors exist. 
Power and the context of conflict 
Those who define power as "A's ability to get B to do what B would not 
otherwise do" have to specify the relevant counterfactual. This is not a 
problem for those who adopt a "one dimensional" view, though it is for 
those who want to describe the bias of the system, instances of non 
decision-making, and agenda setting practices in terms of power. So, 
advocates of an oppositional conception of power can either limit the 
discussion of power to a discussion of cases of overt conflict or go beyond 
that limited analysis and consider instances of nondecision-making etc. 
having taken steps to identify the relevant counterfactual or having 
acknowledged that their work is ordered by a prior conception of the real 
interests of what can then be defined as powerful and powerless 
groups/individuals. I have tried to devise an alternative to the real 
interests strategies which focuses analysis on discussion of overt conflict 
and of its routinised social context. I shall reserve the term power for 
application to the few cases of overt conflict (ie. power from the "one 
dimensional" view) in which A clearly gets B to do what B would not 
otherwise do. However, I shall go on to consider the context of that 
conflict, the nature of the ordering system, the life history of the 
contentious issue, and so on, in terms other than those of interest and 
advantage. Were it not for that crucial qualification, such an analysis 
would cover much the same territory as that which has concerned those 
working within the "two dimensional" perspective. I am also concerned to 
understand the ways in which those unproblematic relations serve to 
preclude and/or order moments of dispute. Unlike the two dimensional 
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analysts, I shall not attempt to identify the ways in which that context is 
ordered to the advantage of one group at the expense of another. 
I shall elaborate on the implications of this view of power and the 
context of conflict, and describe how it ordered the design and structure 
of the research in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 1: NOTES 
1. By feminist I mean work which primarily aims to understand and explain 
women's oppression. As Delphy writes "A feminist study is a study whose 
objective is to explain the situation of women" - given that this is a 
situation of oppression (Delphy, 1984, p212) 
2. With the exception of some of the American family literature which I 
shall consider later. 
3. Again with the exception of the American work on family power and 
decision-making. 
4. As Kuhn writes "The family is very often invoked as a final catch all 
explanation of the various characteristics of women's position in different 
societies and at different times, constantly referred to but still to be 
analysed without recourse to various forms of functionalism" (Kuhn, 1978, 
p44). 
5. Gittens, for example, claims that "Much of Lawrence Stone's (1977) 
work, for instance, is really an analysis of changing family ideology 
rather than of actual patterns of family life and interaction" (Gittens, 
1985, p2) 
6. The feminist literature itself stands as evidence that those whose work 
is organised with reference to a unified conceptual model of the 
family as institution need not also conclude that the actual family should 
be seen as an undivided social unit. On this point I disagree with Leonard 
who writes "as developed in American and British Sociology such an approach 
(functionalist) will always tend to make us see the family as a unit, 
within which there is presumed to be equality and consensus" (Leonard, 
1980, p2) 
7. Barrett also makes this point "Feminist critiques of sociological 
assumptions about the internal equality of the contemporary family form 
have rightly pointed to a material conflict of interests within the 
household" (Barrett, 1980, p209) 
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8. Most feminist writers explain what is seen as women's collusion with 
their own oppression with reference to the mystifying ideologies of family, 
romance or motherhood. For example: "At first, I found the hold which the 
ideology of romantic love had over the young married women whom I knew 
disturbing in the face of the realities of marital power and their everyday 
married life" (Whitehead, 1976). While some are content to make reference 
to a notion of ideology, others argue that the "misconceptions" go deeper. 
For example, Barrett writes "Gender identity and the ideology of the family 
are embedded in our subjectivity and our desires at a far more profound 
level than that of false consciousness" (Barrett, 1980, p275) 
9. For example, Barrett emphasises the need to provide an "adequate 
analysis of this central institutional site of women's oppression" 
(Barrett, 1980). Of course this institutional focus need not lead 
feminists to bypass questions of power though as Delphy and Leonard argue 
(Delphy 1984), the particular institutional approach adopted by socialist 
feminists does tend to overshadow if not preclude analysis of relations 
within the family (whether or not those questions are framed with 
reference to power). Interestingly, their criticism of the socialist 
feminist work is much like the more general feminist criticism of 
traditional family sociology. In both cases it is argued that the focus on 
the family as institution serves to obscure questions about internal family 
relations. As Leonard puts it when describing Delphy's work, Delphy "has 
continued to stress the significance of divisions within the family, unlike 
those socialist feminists who have taken up the economics of the family as 
a topic, but whose writings have in fact deflected attention from women's 
oppression within it (for example by continuing to focus on the functions 
'the family' performs in relation to the 'reproduction of capitalism'). " 
(Leonard, in introduction to Delphy, 1984) 
10. In Bachrach and Baratz's terms a nondecision is "a decision that 
results in suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to 
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the decision-maker" (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970, p44) 
11. Others have argued that the state of the power balance critically 
affects the stability of the family at both an individual and an 
institutional level (Winch, 1971; GR Leslie, 1976; Blood and Wolfe, 
1960). Such arguments about the health of the family as institution 
refer to evidence about the state of the balance of power in actual 
families on the grounds that this may be taken as a measure of the health 
and stability of the institution. 
12. Those interested in individual access to resources in the family 
context have either set out to explore the impact of such events as the 
wife's employment or the significance of such factors as educational 
background or extra family prestige in terms of the domestic power 
structure. For example, Blood and Hamblin (1957), French and Raven (1959) 
and Beckman and Tavormina (1978) have addressed such issues. Others have 
set out to examine patterns of family power (and hence the partners' 
definitions of and access to relevant resources) in a cross cultural 
context. Writers such as Lee and Petersen (1983), Kenkel (1959), Safilios- 
Rothschild (1967), Conklin (1979), Rodman (1967) and Lupri (1969) have 
explored what were seen to be the different bases of power in, for example, 
Greek, French, Yugoslavian or West German families. 
13. Ridd (1981) and Maher (1981) have considered similar issues but have 
been rather less cautious about the nature of the claims they make about 
the interests of the women who were the subjects of their study. 
14. There is a substantial literature on the problems of measuring, as 
opposed to identifying, family power relations. For example, Allen and 
Strauss (1984), Turk and Bell (1972), Hallenbeck (1966), Herbst (1952), 
Centres (1971), Bowerman (1964) Olson (1969) and Richmond (1976) have 
written on the methodological problems associated with the task of 
producing a measure of family power. However, all such work adopts the 
same "one dimensional" approach to the problem of identifying power. 
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15. Interestingly, those few feminist writers who directly address issues 
about the meaning of power in terms of the lives of individual women often 
adopt a "one dimensional" view as well as a simple dependence based account 
of resources. For example, Yeandle writes "Women typically start from a 
position of relative powerlessness, men from a position of relative 
powerfulness. This is entirely to be expected in patriarchal families 
where marrriage involves the state-sanctioned economic dependence of women 
on men" (Yeandle, 1984, p168). Generalising from this view, men are 
believed to be in a position of power with respect to women because of 
their generally superior, state-sanctioned economic position. 
16. This critical observation has certain implications for the feminist 
conception of power. While men might systematically have access to certain 
capacities, that does not, in itself, necessarily guarantee victory because 
those capacities only have effect as resources at the moment of use. In 
other words, the fact that the wife is formally financially dependent on 
her husband does not necessarily mean that she is powerless. Rather, she 
would only be at a disadvantage if financial independence proved to be a 
relevant capacity (ie. a resource) in case of overt dispute (Note, I am 
here only concerned with power defined within the "one dimensional" frame). 
17. Seen from a "two dimensional" view, the range of capacities which 
might have effect as resources is much wider than that which would be 
included in a "one dimensional" account. Again, individuals with the 
capacity, that is the potential ability, to set an agenda or to make a 
nondecision might or might not be said to be in a position of power 
depending on the analyst's view of the relation between capacities and 
resources and on his/her conception of actual and potential power. 
18. While some of the feminist literature documents family routine (Grey, 
1979; Leonard, 1980; Delphy, 1979; Dobash and Dobash, 1980) the analysis of 
the described practices is typically informed by a "three" rather than a 
"two dimensional" view of power. In effect those routines are seen in 
48 
terms of a general patriarchal structure rather than as detailed and 
specific instances of nondecision-making organised by a responsible 
individual. 
19. In practice it is only the more "philosophically" orientated 
"feminist" literature (Richards, 1980) which directly attends to such 
critical issues. However, some conception of the nature of women's real 
interest is necessarily built into all literature which documents what are 
seen as the oppressive and hence problematic dimensions of women's position 
in the family. The concepts of oppression and/or exploitation only make 
sense in relation to corresponding conceptions of not-oppression or of not- 
exploitation. While Barrett writes "It is relatively easy to demonstrate 
that women are oppressed in Britain... ", that demonstration does not take 
the form of an empirical investigation whose purpose is to "adduce evidence 
- which must, by nature of the case, be indirect - to support the claim 
that an apparent case of consensus is not genuine but imposed.. " (Lukes, 
1974, p47). Rather, that "demonstration" involves implicit comparison of 
what is presumed to be an agreed model of a "better", "unoppressed" 
situation with an account of the present. 
20. In the simplest (but most common) cases, feminist writers use the term 
power to describe an undifferentiated bundle of "resources" or means which 
are believed to allow men to oppress women. For example, Gittens writes 
"In a general sense it is useful to see it [power] as lying along a broad 
continuum ranging, on the one hand, from general acceptance by others of a 
person's or institution's legitimate or natural right to give orders and 
expect obedience and deference, to, on the other hand, the ability to use 
force and violence to ensure that orders or wishes are carried out". 
21. The following statement could be applied just as easily to the 
feminist literature. "The problem here, of course, is that the definition 
of what those "real" interests are is derived from Marxist [or, in this 
case feminist] theory of what man [in the feminist case, of what women] 
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would be like in a state of nature if capitalism [or capitalist patriarchy 
or patriarchy] had never existed" (Cox, Furlong and Page, 1985, p36). 
22. Lukes also argues, in contraditction to this claim, that power is an 
"essentially contested" concept. He writes "I would maintain that power is 
one of those concepts which is ineradicably value dependent" (Lukes, 1974, 
p26) and "the notion of 'interests' is an irreducibly evaluative notion" 
(Lukes, 1974, P32). 
23. This is to simplify Giddens' position. The very phrase "A gets B to 
do what B would not otherwise do" presumes a) that the relationship between 
A and B is one directional and b) that A "gets" B to do... as a result of 
A's "own" action -I will consider this point later. In comparison, 
Giddens describes control, a sub-set of power, in these terms. "It is a 
mistake to treat power as inherently divisive but there is no doubt that 
some of the most bitter conflicts in social life are accurately seen as 
'power struggles'. Such struggles can be regarded as to do with efforts to 
subdivide resources which yield modalities of control in social systems. 
By 'control' I mean the capability that some actors, groups or types of 
actors have of influencing the circumstances of action of others. In power 
struggles the dialectic of control always operates, although what use 
agents in subordinate positions can make of the resources open to them 
differs very substantially between different social contexts. " (Giddens, 
1984, p283) 
24. As Giddens notes,. "conceptions of power in the social sciences tend 
faithfully to reflect the dualism of subject and object .... Thus 'power' is 
very often defined in terms of intent or the will, as the capacity to 
achieve desired and intended outcomes. Other writers by contrast, 
including both Parsons and Foucault, see power as above all a property of 
society or the social community. " (Giddens, 1984, p15) 
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CHAPTER 2 
APPROACHING THE RESEARCH 
This description of the design and structure of the research begins with a 
more detailed discussion of the concept of power and of the context of 
conflict which I outlined in the last section of the previous chapter. I 
shall consider the practical implications of that approach and, in section 
2 of this chapter, go on to describe the research strategy. The third and 
final section sets out the structure of the analysis and hence the 
structure of the subsequent chapters which are based on the interview 
material. 
1. FAMILY POWER AND THE CONTEXT OF CONFLICT 
As suggested earlier, I shall distinguish between instances of overt 
conflict which can be clearly defined in terms of power (A gets B to do 
what B would not otherwise do) and the social context of those disputes. 
Such a context clearly orders the development and course of overt conflict, 
but it can and must be considered in terms other than those of advantage 
and power. In practice, this leads to an analytic strategy in which one 
first attends to cases of overtly contentious decision-making, to the 
stated preferences of each side, and to the resources used to secure the 
final outcome. This provides the basis from which to begin an analysis of 
the context of that conflict, which involves discussion of the opponent's 
definitions of the type of dispute at issue, the perceived relevance of 
particular capacities, and the location of contentious topics in relation 
to a network of "unproblematic" decision-making. As was explained in 
chapter 1, the research was designed to explore the relation between 
instances of overt conflict and their ordering social context. Thus, my 
analysis of the social context of reported instances of domestic dispute is 
framed with reference to the general question "What must the participant's 
social world be like such that these contentious events take place in the 
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way described by those involved? " (1). 1 should emphasise that this enquiry 
is designed to examine the apparent ordering and patterning features of the 
respondents' domestic worlds, regardless of whether those features may be 
construed as advantaging or disadvantaging. Accordingly, the most general 
aim of my research was to apply such a two part analysis of a) instances of 
overt conflict and "one dimensional" power, and of b) the ordering context. 
In this respect, the principal aim was to "try out" a particular approach 
to the study of power relations. The family merely provided a convenient 
location in which to develop and explore issues of power. 
At another level, I was interested in patterns of domestic power as a way 
into a more general discussion of women's position in the family. Given 
the view of power described above, it was possible to set about a study of 
decision-making as a means of, first, specifying areas in which respondents 
were (or were not) able to secure their own preferences, and, second, of 
reviewing the ways in which different family contexts structured those 
outcomes. From this point of view, the interesting questions concerned 
similarities and differences between the power relations and ordering 
domestic contexts of different couples. The task, then, was to document 
patterns of contentious and unproblematic decision-making in systematically 
different family situations. While I could try to map out a range of 
different domestic arrangements, arguments and habits, and so provide an 
outline of a range of power and power-related possibilities, the obvious 
limitiations of research resources meant that I could not seek to identify 
generalised patterns of authority, decision-making convention, definitions 
of relevant resources, or perceptions of dispute which might be common to 
all families. Inevitably research was exploratory in that it was designed 
to plot dimensions of variation with respect to certain decision-making 
issues: not to uncover general contextual regularities. While the 
documented instances of domestic decision-making were evidently part of a 
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broader picture, the research was not designed to address issues about the 
relationship between generalised beliefs about husbands and wives, or 
general material differences in the circumstances of men and women, and an 
individual's ability to secure their preference in case of overt dispute. 
The research was informed by two sets of questions: those about power and 
those about families. The former steered the research towards an analysis 
of the nature of overt dispute and of the types of resources associated 
with particular types of conflict. From this point of view it was also 
important to identify those aspects of the social context which served to 
order the course of domestic dispute. The latter focused on variation in 
form and location of dispute and, more importantly, on the variation in the 
perception of types of decision-making regardless of whether they actually 
ended in argument. It was also necessary to attend to the ways in which 
domestic responsibilities were divided, patterns of authority established, 
and decisions bracketed together and removed from family view. The 
informing argument here was that differences in perceptions of choice and 
patterns of decision-making would reflect significant differences in the 
domestic worlds in which A might get B to do what B would not otherwise do. 
In other words, husband and wife would be likely to occupy different 
positions of power depending on the domestic context in which that dispute 
arose. Differences in the ordering and structuring domestic context would 
therefore correspond to differences in power structure. 
2. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
These informing arguments, whether orientated towards a discussion of power 
or of the family, demanded that I collect detailed information about 
conflict and decision-making routines. This was most effectively done in 
an open depth interview, both because of the detail required and because, 
as with all exploratory research, it would have been too limiting to use a 
closed schedule of questions (2). 1 would have liked to have spoken to a 
53 
sample of both husbands and wives and to have documented the perceptions 
and definitions of both parties. Unfortunately, this was impractical if I 
were to also ensure that I collected information from a sufficently varied 
sample of respondents. The "family" element of my research design required 
me to map the decision-making experiences of those in a wide range of 
different family circumstances. I had to choose, then, between 
interviewing husbands or wives. I decided to concentrate on the wives on 
the grounds a) that I was interested (among other things) in the position 
of women in different domestic contexts and b) that it was likely to be 
easier to contact and interview a sample of wives than of husbands. 
Having decided to intervew only the wives, I then had to find some way of 
collecting a systematically varied group of married respondents. Because I 
needed to maximise the diversity of the "sample" as far as possible, it was 
necessary to carefully structure the selection of respondents. I could not 
rely on a "case study" approach as adopted by, for example, Westwood 
(1984), Poliert (1981) or McKee (1982). Nor could I rely on such tactics 
as "snowballing" or random door-knocking as a means of constructing a 
sample. While all of these strategies would have provided me with 
respondents, none would have allowed me to ensure that those respondents' 
domestic circumstances were systematically variable (3). Given limited 
research resources the only practical solution to this problem was to 
devise a matrix of potential respondent types and set about finding people 
who fitted those categories (4). I aimed to find two respondents for each 
of the 30 cells shown below. 
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Drawing up the sampling frame 
It seemed that the most relevant dimensions of difference (relevant, that 
is, from the point of view of the nature of the respondents' decision- 
making experiences) were age, or rather age of children, the wife's 
employment, and the couple's material circumstances. Because I decided to 
define a sampling framework and then set out to find relevant respondents I 
had to be able to distinguish between potential interview candidates in 
advance. I had to have some way of knowing that I wanted to interview 
person x (who belonged in category a which was currently empty) and that I 
did not need to interview person y because I had already filled the quota 
of two for the category in which y would belong. As will be shown below, 
these practical demands influenced the structure of the sampling frame. 
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Age and "domestic age" 
It seemed important to interview respondents of different ages on the 
grounds that domestic habits and routines, material circumstances and 
definitions of gender appropriate behaviour would differ with respect to 
this variable. However, the presence or absence of children and the age 
of the youngest child evidently also influenced a family's everyday 
domestic routine. Sociologists of leisure have developed a concept of 
"domestic age" which incorporates chronological age, parental status and 
position in the life cycle (Parker, 1976, p56). I shall borrow this term 
and use it to describe the child-related "age" groups defined below. To 
some degree, of course, actual age and child-related age group were likely 
to overlap and, from the decision-making point of view, the child-related 
variable seemed to be the more significant. I structured the sampling 
frame on the basis of this assumption and in the knowledge that it would be 
difficult to establish a potential respondent's actual age prior to the 
interview (5). In detail, I tried to ensure that I interviewed across a 
range including those whose youngest child was over 16, of school age, or 
of pre-school age, as well as those who had no children. I reserved two of 
the five age categories for respondents who had no children as it seemed 
important to attend to the fact that actual age was broadly relevant and 
that some of the childless group were likely to be "waiting" to have 
children while others would feel that they had "passed that stage". The 
first category was therefore designed to contain the "younger childless" 
who were under the (arbitraily chosen) age of 35 while the second was for 
"older childless" respondents. The third, fourth and fifth categories were 
distinguished with reference to the youngest child's age as marked by 
stages in its school career. The five child-related age groups were 1. The 
younger childless, 2. The older childless, 3. Those whose youngest child 
was of pre-school age 4. Those whose youngest child was at school and 5. 
Those whose children had left school. 
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How 
I also needed to ensure that I included respondents from what would loosely 
be thought of as different social classes and unless interviews were to 
proliferate unneccessarily, I needed to be able to place individuals on 
some sort of "class" scale before speaking to them. For this and for 
other reasons husband's and/or wife's occupation, educational or family 
background seemed to be impractical indicators (6). I simply needed to 
make sure that I interviewed respondents whose financial and material 
circumstances differed as widely as possible. Respondents' homes were 
likely to reflect such circumstances, and a classification based on housing 
resolved at least some of the problems. I was obliged to devise a somewhat 
unsophisticated method of classification because I could only afford to 
have three housing/class categories if I were to keep the ideal number of 
respondents to a manageable level. The option of distinguishing between 
respondent's homes in terms of three house types (eg. detached, semi- 
detached and terrace) was practical, but would not have served to reflect 
financial and material differences related to social/geographical area and 
would not have allowed me to place potential respondents before visiting 
the street (7). What was required was an indicator of social/geographical 
area which reflected the residents likely material circumstances. It would 
have been easy to categorise sections of the town with reference to "common 
knowledge" or reputation or to select respondents from just three 
geographical areas chosen with reference to these informal criteria. 
However, I wanted to devise a rather less speculative method of 
distinguishing between housing areas which would also provide me with a 
detailed guide as to where to look for respondents of different 
housing/class types. In addition, I was unwilling to restrict the sample 
such that respondents were selected from one of three chosen geographical 
districts (8). While this would have made my life easier, such a strategy 
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would have limited the very variation which I wished to maximise. 
I finally decided that I would have to devise my own three part 
classification of housing areas. The most recent census data then 
available (1971) provided information on the percentages of owner 
occupation, the ameneties of the housing stock, the distribution of heads 
of household in terms of the Registrar General's definition of occupation 
as well as figures for such variables as the percentage of car ownership, 
the average number of persons per room and the average number of rooms per 
house for all 206 enumeration districts in the City of York. Despite the 
associated problems, the arbitrary location of enumeration district 
boundaries, the social history of the figures and the definitions and 
conceptions which they embodied, I decided to select a range of documented 
characteristics and to combine them so as to create a composite "score" for 
each enumeration district. In detail, I listed the percentage of owner 
occupation, the percentage of council houses, the percentage of homes with 
only 1 to 3 rooms, the number of rooms per person, the number of rooms per 
household and the percentage of heads of household in the "top" three of 
the Registrar General's occupational class categories. Having done this I 
could then rank the enumeration districts on each of these six dimensions 
and divide the six resulting lists into three sections: 1 being the "top" 
third, 2, the "middle" and 3 the "bottom". In this way I was able to give 
each enumeration district a "score" of 1,2 or 3 with respect to each of 
the six dimensions. (For example, a particular enumeration district might 
be in the top third of the hierarchically ordered list of owner occupation 
percentages and would therefore score a1 in that respect, a2 if it were 
in the middle third of the list of the number of rooms per person, etc. ). 
I then took an average of the six scores which described each enumeration 
district, put the resulting figures in hierarchical order and divided that 
composite list into thirds. I labelled the 68 enumeration districts in the 
"top" third Housing 1 areas, the 68 in the middle third, Housing 2 and the 
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remainder, Housing 3. Having marked these on a map I could then select an 
address in the knowledge that the resident belonged in a particular housing 
category. A section of this map is included in Appendix 1. 
The scheme was only designed to produce a rough three part classification. 
While it served that purpose quite adequately it inevitably simplified a 
more complex picture of housing and life cycle mobility. This meant that I 
had to decide how to place young respondents who were, for example, 
currently living in a Housing 3 area but were almost certainly going to 
move on to a "better" district and who shared the lifestyle characteristic 
of Housing 1 respondents. In such circumstances I followed the original 
policy and classified respondents according to their current housing 
status. The second problem was that I was only able to classify 
enumeration districts within the city boundary and so had to decide whether 
to reject those few potential interviewees who lived outside the city. I 
decided to include them, and to locate them (in terms of housing) with 
reference to the general reputation of the area and to their house type. 
My method of classifying housing groups was designed to ensure that I 
interviewed respondents whose material circumstances differed in broadly 
similar ways. Despite the two difficulties described above, it served 
this limited purpose. 
The wife's emDlovment 
The domestic lives of those wives who went out to work (whether part-time 
or full-time) were likely to differ from those who were full-time 
housewives and, clearly, these differences would affect family routines, 
patterns of responsibility, and associated decision-making procedures. It 
was also possible that those who had their own income had access to a 
generally relevant capacity and were therefore able to influence the 
outcome of a wider range of decisions compared with those who were 
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financially dependent (9). I decided to ensure that I interviewed a 
mixture of working and non-working respondents but chose not to distinguish 
between full-time and part-time work on the grounds that this distinction 
would have created another 15 categories on the already large matrix of 
ideal respondent types. The "employed" category therefore contained 
respondents who were currently engaged in some kind of paid work, while 
those at home were full-time housewives. 
It is important to note that the sample frame was designed to ensure that I 
interviewed respondents whose social and material circumstances were 
systematically varied. The resulting sample should not be construed as 
"representative" in any way. Rather, it was structured or "stratified" so 
as to include respondents from different backgrounds (defined in terms of 
work, age and housing) on the grounds that this would allow me to map 
patterns of domestic decision-making in as wide range of family contexts as 
possible. I was, after all, primarily concerned about a range of variables 
in the social practices being researched; research aiming to be 
representative in any meaningful way would require far more resources than 
were available to me. 
Methods of contact 
It did not matter exactly how I located my subjects as long as I managed to 
fill the cells of the matrix and so interviewed a good spread of respondent 
types (10). I was therefore free to adopt a range of tactics, each of 
which led me into different social networks and hence gave access to 
different types of respondents. I began with a list of domestic and 
catering staff, most of whom were employed part-time. This in combination 
with a list of part-time and full-time nursing staff provided an initial 
starting point from which I "snowballed" (11). Respondents volunteered 
friends and relatives who were often in the same housing bracket but not 
always of the same age group or work situation. These "recruits" in turn 
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volunteered others. This strategy ensured a good response rate and, given 
a few lucky encounters, a good mixture of respondents. Having completed 
about 50 interviews and filled, or partly filled, just over a third of the 
cells on the matrix I found that I needed to break out of the self- 
referencing social networks with which I had become involved. I needed 
access to different types of candidate respondents. At this point I turned 
to the Electoral register. While I was able to pick relevant addresses 
(ie. ones in either H1, H2 or H3 categories) I was unable to predict that 
the "candidates" would have any of the other desired characteristics of age 
or work. It was difficult to avoid landing myself with "duplicate" 
interviews and so I tried another method which allowed me to identify the 
candidate respondent's age and housing category if not their work or 
childless/family status. I checked through 4 and 6 year old back copies of 
the local paper, listed the names of people who had their wedding mentioned 
and then looked up the names in the current telephone directory. In this 
way I could locate the addresses of those few who now had a York telephone 
number and who had their wedding "advertised" in the paper (12). Though I 
identified a few "missing" respondents in these ways it was finally not 
worth pursuing the last eight required to complete the matrix of sixty 
(13). 
In detail, fourteen of the hundred and four women who were contacted 
refused to be interviewed and another sixteen of those who were selected 
from the list of catering staff no longer lived at the same address. I 
was also able to "escape" from another ten interviews having discovered, on 
the initial visit, that the candidate respondent fell into a category which 
I had already filled. The final figures were: 
104 candidates contacted by letter and visited a week later 
14 refused to be interviewed 
16 had moved away 
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10 proved to be unnecessary 
64 completed interviews all but two of which were tape recorded and 
transcribed 
7 pilot interviews, all of which were tape recorded and transcribed 
Characteristics of the final sample 
The grid of 30 categories described an ideal sample of respondents. Some 
of the cells were inevitably easier to fill than others. I was, not 
surprisingly, faced with a "glut" of Housing 2 respondents who were at home 
with pre-school children, and a complete absence of Housing 3 respondents 
who were at home with school age children. I decided to stop interviewing 
at the point at which I had "collected" 52 out of the ideal sample of 60. 
By this time I had also interviewed another 12 respondents who fell into 
categories that I had already filled. The diagram below illustrates the 
final spread of respondents, including those in the pilot group. 
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I drew upon all the interviews for purposes of illustration. However, I 
needed to select a more evenly balanced comparative sample on which to base 
my numerical analysis. I therefore selected only two (the first two) 
respondents from each of the "over full" categories to produce the 
comparative sample illustrated below. 
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The interview strategy 
I adopted the same procedure for contacting, visiting and interviewing all 
respondents however they had been selected. I followed up an initial 
"introductory" letter (reproduced in Appendix 2) with a visit, about a 
week later, in which I aimed to fix a time and date for an interview. 
The interviews lasted between one and a half and three hours and took place 
in the respondent's home, sometimes in the company of husband, and/or 
children, and/or relatives, and/or friends not to mention dogs, cats, 
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budgies and goldfish! This was a hazard which I had to cope with, and one 
which clearly affected the nature of the interview. I tried to cover all 
the question areas despite these "distractions" though in some cases the 
responses came from the husband rather than, or as well as, from the wife 
(141). All but two of the interviews were tape recorded and then fully 
transcribed. I was obliged to continue with the interview in both cases 
where the respondent refused to be taped. While I made notes in these 
circumstances, I made very little use of this less detailed material. 
The questions 
I needed to design an interview schedule which would allow me to collect 
the same kind of information from all respondents. This was not easy 
given that the sample was structured so as to provide a varied range of 
interviewees. Whatever else, I could not assume that the respondents would 
have a "sufficiently common vocabulary" such that it would be "possible to 
formulate questions which have the same meaning for each of them" 
(Richardson, 1965, p140). Part of the job was to document the variation in 
patterns of domestic power and in methods of decision-making, but I had to 
do this without inventing a different interview schedule for each case. It 
was not too difficult to select a list of decisions about which I might 
expect all respondents to have had to come to some conclusion. This list 
included, for example, decisions about where to live, which furniture to 
buy, where to go on holiday, what to watch on television, whether or not to 
have children, to work or not to work etc. I decided to ask about 
respondent's perceptions of the alternatives involved, the history of the 
decision, their husband's view, the nature of the, negotiation or conflict 
(if any) and the respondent's view of the outcome. However, it was rather 
more difficult to document common patterns of responsibility. To give just 
one example, the childless sections of the sample would have no need to 
make decisions about the allocation of responsibility for child-care. I 
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chose to modify the schedule to take such differences into account and so 
had a supplementary list of questions which I asked as applicable. Again 
I was interested in how "decisions" were made about issues related to, for 
example, the cooking, the shopping, the family's finances, child-care, the 
decorating etc. I wanted to know what happened, who was in charge, how 
that arrangement had come to be, whether it was the subject of dispute and 
how such dispute (if any) was resolved. Though these were common issues, I 
could not approach the subject in the same way in each interview (15). 
I developed and modified the structure of the interview on the basis of 
seven pilot interviews. This process gave me the chance to experiment with 
different sequences of questions, to anticipate some of the problems I was 
to encounter, and to make decisions about the amount of material which I 
aimed to collect. Though I was prepared to conduct a fairly informal 
interview, to follow up topics which the respondents introduced, and to 
deviate from my "ideal" sequence, I tried to make sure that I covered all 
the issues outlined in the interview schedule (the question areas are 
listed in Appendix 3). Like Spradley (1979) I saw the interview as a 
"friendly conversation with a purpose" and, like Denzin, I concluded that I 
had "the task of taking control of the situation and defining it so that 
the questions ... will be answered" by the end of the interview 
(Denzin, 
1970, p141). "Answering" is perhaps too precise a term, though I did have 
a clear idea of the "subject areas" which I wished to cover. (16) 
The analysis of the interview material 
All but two of the interviews were tape recorded and fully transcribed. 
This left me with an enormous amount of information about the respondents' 
family lives. I made an early decision about the ways in which I wanted to 
use this material. I knew first that I was interested in the ways in which 
different respondents made the same kinds of decisions and I knew that I 
65 
wanted to attend to the different ways in which domestic responsibilities 
were allocated and delegated. I therefore knew that it would be useful to 
be able to assemble, for example, all the interview data on "decisions 
about having children". I organised the transcript such that the details 
about, say, a respondent's holiday were recorded on one sheet of paper, 
while all the information about, for example, shopping habits was recorded 
on a separate sheet. This meant that I could extract and compare all data 
on leisure, holidays, cooking, looking after the pets etc. etc. although I 
had no chronologically ordered record of the interview. This method of 
transcribing facilitated the analysis of the respondent's domestic routines 
and of their decision-making practices. In addition, I coded the 
interviewees' responses to certain common questions so as to to provide a 
picture of, for example, the percentages of His who went abroad on holiday, 
the percentage of those with pre-school age children whose husband helped 
with the washing etc. etc. For these purposes I only made use of the 
material provided by the 52 respondents who "belonged" in the sampling 
frame, and ignored that provided by "duplicate" and pilot interviewees. I 
made sense of the resulting figures with the aid of a home micro (a 
Spectrum) and a database program. This simply speeded up a particularly 
laborious exercise. 
In practice, I began with an analysis of the respondents descriptions of 
overt conflict. These were instances of domestic decision-making in which 
A managed to get B to select what was, from B's point of view, an 
undesirable option. This analysis suggested that respondents' definitions 
of relevant resources (that is of capacities which, in a particular case of 
conflict, would allow A to get B to do what B would not otherwise do) (17) 
varied depending on their perception of the kind of choice associated with 
the subject of dispute. I chose to order my review of descriptions of 
conflict so as to highlight the relationship between perceptions of choice, 
types of argument, and types of resources. Chapters 3 and 4 describe the 
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range of contentious issues and the kinds of resources drawn upon in those 
cases of overt dispute. It is in this context that I shall consider the 
structure of overt dispute and the relationship between types of conflict 
and types of resource in the family context. It appears that the 
respondent's perception of the type of choice involved in what proved to be 
a contentious issue had an important part to play in the development of the 
associated dispute. Arguments about what were seen to be matters of 
"personal preference", for example, about what to watch on television, or 
about the colour of a new bath, characteristically involved reference to 
particular types of resources including, perhaps, appeals to some sort of 
expertise, or maybe reference to personal financial advantage etc. In 
comparison, disputes about matters over which respondents believed they had 
very little control, such as decisions about moving house or changing jobs, 
involved reference to rather different categories of resources. In other 
words, perception of choice appeared to be the key factor linking instances 
of overt conflict to the context of unproblematic decision-making. If 
perception of the type of choice ordered the course of subsequent conflict 
then any systematic variation in the respondents' perceptions of the kinds 
of choice associated with particular domestic decisions would suggest a 
correspondingly structured pattern of potential power relations. In other 
words, if different sections of the sample saw decisions in different ways, 
then the course of any associated conflict would follow a different route 
and would involve appeal to different resources. I ordered the analysis of 
material on unproblematic decision-making and areas of responsibility with 
this theme in mind. One task was therefore that of documenting the kinds 
of choice seen to be associated with the range of decisions which I had 
been able to discuss in the interview. I wanted to find out how different 
sections of the sample saw, for example, the decision to move house, to 
change jobs, to go on holiday, etc. To do this I had to try to untangle 
the component elements of what proved to be very complex issues. The 
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results of this part of the analysis are reported in chapters 5 (Family and 
Career), 6 (House and Home), 7 (Leisure) and 8 (Holidays). In combination, 
these chapters provide a picture of the variety of domestic contexts which 
ordered, and in many cases precluded, family dispute about a range of 
selected decisions. 
Everyday choices about, for example, what to eat for supper, when to hoover 
the floor, or when to clean the car, rarely attained the status of a clear 
cut family decision. They were simply made by whoever happened to be "in 
charge" of that particular area of domestic labour. The identity of 
legitimate decision-makers, and the boundary of areas of decision-making 
which were properly under the control of an authoritative figure, varied 
according to how the couple chose to allocate their domestic 
responsibilities. It was important to document the ways in which different 
sections of the sample allocated and delegated those responsibilites 
because the associated patterns of authority served to remove whole areas 
of routine choice from family view and hence from the arena of potentially 
contentious decision-making. Chapters 9 (Family Finance) and 10 
(Housework and Child-care) review the ways in which different respondents 
allocated and delegated responsibility for domestic finance, for the 
shopping, the cooking, the cleaning, the decorating and, where relevant, 
the child-care. Those chapters therefore describe the ways in which 
different respondents define the boundaries of "localised" areas of 
domestic authority. 
Finally, discussion of the few cases of reported conflict, presented in 
chapters 3 and U, provided the starting point for the subsequent analysis 
of the context of conflict. In addition, those two chapters present a 
general case about the relationship between types of choice, types of 
conflict and types of resources. Chapters 5 to 10 also fulfil two 
functions. First, they highlight ways in which the respondents' 
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perceptions of choice served to structure normally unproblematic decision- 
making thus illustrating the similarities and differences in the domestic 
worlds in which respondents made decisions. Second, they stand as an 
example of a method of addressing the relationship between "one 
dimensional" power, instances of overt conflict, and the context of those 
contentious issues. In effect they provide something resembling a "two 
dimensional" analysis of the context of overt dispute. However, because 
that account is not framed in terms of advantage and disadvantage (or 
"interests") it is, perhaps, better seen as an analysis of the ordering and 
structuring context of domestic conflict and not as an analysis of power 
(18). 
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CHAPTER 2: NOTES 
1. Bhaskar writes "The various social sciences are concerned with the 
structural conditions for particular types of social activity" (Bhaskar, 
1979, p56). Taken out of context and presented in a more limited form, the 
question "What must the world be like... " provides a frame for enquiry 
about the social world. 
2. Most of the standard texts on survey research make the following point 
about the use of an interview as opposed to a questionnaire based research 
strategy. "As is generally recognised, one of the principal reasons for the 
use of interviews rather than questionnaires is to uncover a diversity of 
relevant responses, whether or not these have been anticipated by the 
inquirer" (Merton, Fiske and Kendall, 1956) 
3. I was not, of course, concerned to produce a "representative" sample. 
I wanted to explore the range of differences, not to produce a picture 
which would mirror the "actual" pattern of particular types of domestic 
circumstances. 
4. Such quota sampling techniques are described in, for example, Moser and 
Kalton (1971) and Hoinvill and Jowell (1978). 
5. Of course, I could not always determine a candidate respondent's 
position on a child-related scale. However, it was likely that individuals 
would know and be able to suggest friends who had, say, school age children 
even if they did not know that friend's actual age. 
6. I do not want to get too involved with theoretical or practical debates 
about the meaning of "class". What I faced was the much more mundane 
problem of finding a method of categorising material differences. However, 
there is much literature on the problem of defining class, and more 
specifically, on the problem of defining women's class position. As Acker 
(1973), Delphy (1980), West (1978) and others have observed, indices of 
class based on the occupation of the "head of household" incorporate 
certain assumptions about the class or status equivalence of other members 
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of that household unit. This is a problem for those who want to describe 
the "class" postion of women or of families. From my point of view, an 
occupation based index would, in any case, prove to be impractical because 
I would have no way of placing possible respondents on such a scale prior 
to an interview. Measures of educational background, income, social 
standing, life-style or a combination of all four, were, on the same 
grounds, equally impractical. 
7. Rex and Moore (1967) adopt the term "housing classes". However, those 
classes were distinguished on grounds of ownership and, to a lesser extent, 
geographical area. I had no way of identifying patterns of ownership in 
advance and, in any case, reliance on one such index would have produced 
its own problems. I needed a method of theoretically dividing the total 
area of the City of York into three even categories which would reflect 
material differences. Classifications based on such features as owner- 
occupation alone would not produce this result. 
8. This is, of course, the strategy adopted by Willmott and Young (1957), 
Bott (1957) and Oakley (1974). However, none of these writers were 
concerned to interview a systematically varied group of respondents. 
9. See chapter 3 on money as a resource and chapter 9 on patterns of 
financial management. 
10. Hoinvill and Jowell make this point in their description of quota 
sampling. "Interviewers are supplied with quotas or set specifications 
regarding the number of people of various kinds that they must interview. 
Providing that the specification is fulfilled, they are free to interview 
whom they wish within the designated area". (Hoinvill and Jowell, 1978, 
p87) 
11. It is important to note that such "snowballing" was effective as long 
as it produced respondents of the type which I needed. I was "snowballing" 
as one amongst other means of finding the types of respondents already 
defined by the sampling frame. In other words, I was not using the 
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technique as a means of generating a sample in the way described by, for 
example Coleman (1970). 
12. As Leonard notes, ".. drawing a sample from those whose engagements and 
weddings appeared in the local paper would give a very partial sample" 
(Leonard, 1980). Not only was I selecting respondents from this already 
selective list but I was then only able to trace and so interview those who 
a) still lived in York and who were b) listed in the current telephone 
directory. This might have been a problem if I were doing anything other 
than trying to find interviewees who would belong in a currently empty, or 
partly empty cell of an existing sampling frame. 13. Some of the respondent 
types described by the matrix, such as housing 3 respondents, at home, but 
with school age children, were inevitably hard to find - there were likely 
to be fewer women in this position than were, say, at home, with pre-school 
age children, and living in a housing 2 area. I stopped interviewing at 
the point when the effort involved in collecting yet more duplicate 
interviews and the risk of inadvertantly contacting duplicate respondent 
types was no longer justified by the demands of the sampling frame. Given 
the limited resources available I had no choice but to conclude that I had 
done as well as I could expect. Only two of the thirty cells remained 
completely empty and although housing 3 respondents were slightly under- 
represented the differences were not such as to invalidate the limited 
comparisons which I wished to make. 
14. Denzin describes similar interviewing "hazards" in these terms "... but 
what about the woman who insists on fixing her dinner or feeding her child 
during the course of the interview? .... These represent, from the 
interviewer's perspective, illegitimate activities that detract from the 
dominant activity - the interview" (Denzin, 1970a, p114). I had no choice 
but to make the best of what were occasionally difficult situations. 
15. As Richardson and others have noted, ".. if the meaning of a question is 
to be standardised, the question must be formulated in words familiar to 
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and habitually used by each respondent". In addition, "no fixed sequence 
of questions is satisfactory to all respondents; the most effective 
sequence for any respondent is determined by his readiness and willingness 
to take up a topic as it comes up" (Richardson, 1965, p47) 
16. In this sense I was seeking to elicit information. This, in 
combination with the need to limit the length of the interview, meant that 
I actively ordered the course of the discussion. Leonard describes her 
interviewing strategy in similar terms "... the conversation needed to be 
semi-structured around an interviewing schedule so as to collect as much 
information as possible. This also fitted in with my informants' 
expectations of how social research is done". (Leonard, 1980, p286) 
17. See chapter 3 
18. See chapter 1 
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CHAPTER 3 
TYPES OF CONFLICT 
In this chapter I shall review the interview material concerning cases of 
reported conflict. Although this discussion documents the occasions on 
which husbands or wives appeared to secure their preferences in cases of 
overt domestic dispute, it does not set out to characterise the 
circumstances in which husbands or wives were likely to "get their way". 
Rather, it is designed to review the types of reported conflict so as to 
provide the basis for subsequent discussion of the relationship between 
overt dispute and the uncontentious contexts of decision-making. By 
documenting the form and location of family arguments described in the 
interview material I hope to identify the points at which routine and 
unproblematic decision-making procedures broke down. There are two levels 
of analysis inovlved. I am interested in the general relationship between 
conflict and an ordering social context: the family is one among other 
possible contexts in which such enquiry might take place. At the same 
time, however, I am also interested in the structure of distinctively 
domestic dispute and in the ways in which family context orders described 
instances of overt conflict. 
This review is therefore informed by two concerns. On the one hand I 
needed to develop an account of the relationship between types of conflict, 
definitions of relevant capacities (ie. resources) and the social world in 
which different types of dispute took place. From this "power" oriented 
view, the family provided a setting in which to explore what might prove to 
be generally relevant connections between instances of "one dimensional" 
power and their structuring, if not necessarily advantaging, context. As I 
shall suggest later, the notion that perception of choice provides a 
critical link between the worlds of overt dispute and of unproblematic 
decision-making could prove relevant in a wide range of quite different 
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decision-making contexts. On the other hand, I needed to document the 
range of domestic decision-making issues which were reported to end in 
overt family dispute and to review the ways in which those involved 
attempted to overcome opposition and so secure their own preference. I 
needed to find out what my respondents claimed to argue about and to find 
out how they "resolved" such specifically family disputes. This strand of 
the enquiry therefore emphasised questions about "family" as distinct from 
questions about "power". 
In order to advance on either front I had to devise some relevant method of 
classifying the interview material which described instances of overt 
dispute. As I shall explain in the first section of this chapter, I 
ordered respondents' accounts of overt dispute with reference to the kind 
of choice seen to be associated with what proved to be a contentious 
decision. This produced a three part classification of a) conflicts about 
"matters of preference", b) conflicts about "appropriate behaviour" and c) 
conflicts related to decisions in which there was apparently "no choice". 
Sections 2,3, and u of this chapter review the characteristics of each of 
these three categories of dispute. In those sections I shall explore the 
relationship between the type of conflict under discussion and the kinds of 
resources employed by those involved. Throughout this and the following 
chapter I shall draw on the interview material as a means of illustrating 
general characteristics of a particular category or type of decision, 
conflict, or resource. I have selected examples from the whole body of 
interview material and, in this chapter, used them to illustrate types of 
conflict rather than types of respondent. For these purposes, details 
about the child-related age group and the housing or work status of the 
respondent cited are of secondary importance. Such information is, of 
course, critical in later discussions of the ways in which different 
sections of the sample defined particular domestic decisions and of the 
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ways in which different respondent types oganised their domestic routines. 
For now, however, the aim is to classify kinds of conflict so as to 
facilitate subsequent comparative analyses. 
1. A TYPOLOGY OF CONFLICT 
I have defined instances of overtly contentious decision-making as those in 
which the respondent claimed that both parties held clearly opposed 
preferences about the outcome of a particular decision. The body of 
interview material thus distinguished could be approached from any number 
of different positions; my strategy reflects a particular set of informing 
assumptions and interests. 
1. I am presuming that decisions involve the selection of one option from 
a range of perceived alternatives (1). 
2. I am interested in domestic decision related conflict, that is in 
arguments about which of a range of viable alternatives the couple 
should select. 
3. I am interested in respondent's perceptions of the type of choice, 
that is, in the range of viable alternatives associated with what turn 
out to be contentious decisions. 
4. I am assuming that A's chances of successfully getting B to pick an 
option which B wouldn't otherwise choose depend on A's capacity to 
marshall sufficient capacities to overcome B's opposition. 
5. The relevance of particular capacities depends (in part) on 
respondent's definitions of the type of choice associated with the 
contentious decision. 
These informing assumptions clearly resemble those of the "one dimensional" 
approach to power. However, there are two important differences. First, I 
am concerned to categorise sub-types of "one dimensional" power so as to 
situate instances of overt dispute within their perceived context of 
unproblematic decision-making, a concern represented in assumptions 2 and 
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3. Second, as I shall explain in the following chapter, I have adopted a 
rather different view of resources to that found in traditional "one 
dimensional" approaches (2). To make sense of my typology of conflict it 
is necessary to consider what is meant by "range of alternatives" 
(assumption 3). The interview material on overt conflict covers a wide 
range of topics. To some degree, each dispute took a different course 
depending on the nature of the actual alternatives from which the 
respondent and her husband made a final selection. While it was not 
practical to order types of dispute according to the list of actual 
alternatives which the respondent believed to be involved (3), it did prove 
possible to describe types of dispute in terms of the range of options from 
which a selection had to be made. In other words, I could classify cases 
of conflict according to the respondent's perception of the type of choice, 
ie. their perception of what counted as appropriate alternatives. 
Types of choice range from the "open", as in cases where the list of viable 
alternatives was believed to be determined by personal preference to, at 
the other extreme, the "closed", as in cases in which there were apparently 
no alternatives. Types of decision-making depend on the type of choice 
involved, and types of conflict arise in relation to these different types 
of decision-making. Accordingly types of conflict include, at one extreme, 
disputes associated with decisions about "open" matters of preference and, 
at the other extreme, arguments associated with "closed" decisions about 
which there was apparently no choice. Because it is founded on a 
distinction between types of choice and hence of types of decision, this 
scheme can also be used to describe instances of uncontentious decision- 
making. Accordingly it provides a method of relating instances of overt 
conflict to similar, but undisputed, decisions. 
I reviewed the interview material with reference to this kind of conceptual 
scheme and identified three major types of choice; the "open"; the 
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"limited" and the "closed". In this chapter I shall be concerned with the 
three associated categories of conflict, namely: conflict about matters of 
preference; conflict about appropriate behaviour and conflict about what 
appeared to be an inevitable outcome. The key characteristics of each type 
are outlined below. 
1. Conflict about matters of preference 
These arguments were related to decisions in which the range of possible 
options was seen to be determined by factors of individual taste or 
preference. 
2. Conflict about appropriate behaviour 
These arguments were related to decisions in which the range of viable 
alternatives was seen to be limited by normative conventions of appropriate 
and inappropriate behaviour. As I shall explain later, I shall only 
consider arguments about the allocation, delegation and control of domestic 
responsibilities. 
3. Conflict about matters in which there was "no choice" 
These cases of token conflict arose in relation to "decisons", or, rather, 
decision-like situations, in which those involved believed that there was 
only one viable alternative. 
The next three sections of this chapter document respondents' descriptions 
of each of these types of conflict and examine the relationship between 
definitions of a particular type of choice (and so of a particular type of 
decision) and perception of relevant capacities. Note that these are all 
cases where that decision proved to be contentious. 
2. CONFLICT ABOUT MATTERS OF PREFERENCE 
The descriptions of overt argument included in this section share two 
defining characteristics. 
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1. The respondents acknowledged that husband and wife had equal right to 
an opinion in relation to the subject of conflict. Each agreed that the 
other was entitled to argue for their own preference. 
2. Each believed that their own preference represented a practically 
viable option. 
The range of issues associated with this form of conflict was enormous. 
Respondents described "preference type" arguments in relation to decisions 
about, for example, whether or not to go to Thailand on holiday, about 
which TV channel to watch or about whether to have a pink or a blue 
bathroom suite. While. it is impossible to pin down a set of subjects or 
issues which typically generated this type of conflict, it is clear that 
respondent's perceptions of "matters of preference" varied in inverse 
proportion to their perception of matters about which there was "no choice" 
or about which there was some conventionally appropriate outcome (4). 
At first sight it seemed that there were almost as many kinds of relevant 
capacities as there were instances of preference conflict. For example, 
arguments about the TV might involve reference to notions of "turn taking" 
or justice, while those engaged in disputes about the choice of a bathroom 
suite might try to take advantage of, for example, a superior financial 
position. On closer inspection, however, there did appear to be some 
general pattern. 
Though the range of possible alternatives was seen to be the product of 
factors such as personal preference or taste, the universe of actual 
options varied from subject to subject. While, for example, the choice of 
a TV programme and the choice of holiday were both believed to be matters 
of personal preference, the actual range of possible options from which the 
respondent had to select varied dramatically; there were only 4 possible TV 
programmes compared with hundreds of theoretically viable holiday resorts. 
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It seemed, then, that the number of possible alternatives had certain 
implications for respondent's perceptions of relevant capacities. 
To some extent, the range of possible alternatives varied depending on the 
location of a particular "preference" issue in terms of a broader sequence 
of decision-making. For example, some of the reported "preference" 
conflicts were associated with first-order choices which took the form "I 
want a... " while others were associated with subsequent second-order 
choices of the form "I want x out of all the possible als". The 
relationship between first and second order choices was extremely 
complicated. Indeed, the distinction is only useful in that it allows the 
observation that the way in which a first-order choice was resolved ordered 
the respondent's perception of the second-order choice and to some degree 
ordered what were then defined as relevant capacities. In this case, for 
example, the way in which the wife won the first-order issue (to have a 
cat) literally precluded all further debate about the colour, age or sex of 
the creature. 
"He doesn't agree with it, he went mad I kept asking for one and he 
said he wouldn't get one. Anyway I went to see one of my cousins, 
they live on a farm and so thats where I got it. You know I came home 
with it... he went mad. " 
Not all first-order choices precluded subsequent debate. Indeed most 
generated further choices. Much of the relevant interview data concerns 
decisions about financial expenditure in which the first-order issue was 
about whether or not to buy an item, while second-order choices related to 
the detail of the purchase. 
"We bought that, which was er, well its a Canon [cooker], and it was 
er well it was an expensive... well it was over £400, but there was an 
allowance you see so it made it straight £400. He thought that it was 
ridiculous paying all that money. He said 'what's wrong with the old 
one. ' Well we had had that since we were first married. Anyway, he 
said 'well if you have to get one, what is wrong with that one, that 
is only £200. ' Er well, it was not as, I didn't like it as much, the 
features on it were not as convenient, and it was, the quality wasn't 
as good I didn't think, and so I said I was going to buy it you see 
and so well fair enough, he didn't argue any more so I chose this 
one. " 
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In this case it seems that the wife won the first-order decision because 
she had her own financial resources. She had her own money and she was 
free to spend it as she wished. This meant that she was also able to 
determine the outcome of all-second-order decisions about the detail of the 
purchase. However, as illustrated by the following example, those who "won" 
first-order decisions did not necessarily control the outcome of associated 
second-order choices. 
"We used to have two cars, when we got married, well they were both 
old cars and he said shall we... his was getting beyond the stage where 
it could go to Northallerton every day so he suggested that we sell 
both cars and get one good one which we did. I didn't want to, I 
didn't want to sell my old car, it was a sensible thing to do, it was 
just that I was rather attached to my car at the time, and it meant 
that I had to get up earlier in the morning. Anyway we did, we got a 
new Mini, which I well, he wanted something a bit bigger, but I said 
well if I've got to drive it, then I want to have something small that 
I will feel comfortable with. So he let me have my way there I 
suppose. " 
Here, the husband's victory did not give him the right to choose the colour 
or make of the car. The wife seemed to have more say in these matters in 
part because she did not get her way in relation to the first-order issue. 
I am not especially concerned to establish a hierarchy of importance, 
though first-order decisions were usually seen to have a greater impact on 
the respondents' lives. Rather I want to observe that conflict related to 
first-order decisions of the "I want a.. " type tended to be resolved with 
reference to a different set of "relevant" capacities (often money) 
compared with conflict related to second-order choices of the form "I want 
x of the range of possible a's". Predictably, the outcome of second-order 
conflicts typically depended on the use of such tactics as persuasion, 
compromise, or appeal to some special area of expertise. I shall discuss 
the differences between "normative" and "material" capacities in Chapter 
4. At this point I only want to note that respondent's perceptions of 
relevant capacities seemed to vary according to the first or second order 
status of the decision under debate. Some capacities, (for instance, 
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financial advantage) are likely to have relatively unlimited relevance and 
thus an influence which crosses this boundary. However, in as far as the 
subject of conflict orders the perceived relevance of different capacities, 
and in as far as first and second order issues concern characteristically 
different subjects (or different aspects of the same subject), there is 
some general relationship between the first or second order status of a 
decision and the respondent's definitions of relevant capacities. 
In sum, conflicts about matters of preference could be resolved with 
reference to all kinds of appeals except those which depended on a notion 
of individual authority. If the issue was a genuine matter of preference 
such appeal would, by definition, be irrelevant. In practice the range of 
capacities which allowed A to get B to do what B would not otherwise do 
appeared to vary depending on the participant's perception of the first or 
second order status of the decision as well as on the actual subject of 
dispute. >By implication, different individuals were better placed to 
secure their preferences in relation to different stages of decison-making 
depending on their access to what were seen to be relevant capacities. To 
give just one example, if it were the case that the ability to win a 
particular first-order decision depended on access to a source of 
independently disposable money, a wife would appear to have more chance of 
securing her preference in relation to that decision if she were working 
and if the fact of her employment meant that she had what she could use as 
"her own" money. However, this is not to suggest that working wives had 
more power than housewives. Such a claim could only be sustained if it 
could be shown that all wives had the same preference in relation to, say, 
first-order decision x, that all faced the same opposition, and that in all 
cases independently disposable money was seen to be a relevant resource. 
Finally, I would also have to assume the fact of working meant that a wife 
would necessarily have access to independently disposable money (5). 
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Similarly, the ability to invoke notions of family interest or of proper 
behaviour could variously work to the advantage of either husband or wife 
depending on each individual's preference and on the participant's 
definition of the decision as one in relation to which such appeals might 
be relevant. Again that is not to say that the "ideology" of the family 
and the associated normative resources necessarily or even systematically 
allowed husbands rather than wives to secure their preferences in cases of 
dispute about second-order "matters of preference". The point is that the 
respondent's perception of the nature of the decision as being a matter of 
preference, and of its location in a sequence of other related decisions 
ordered the definition of relevant capacities and so influenced the course 
of the argument. This meant that initial perception of the type of choice 
associated with a decision, and its location in what was seen to be a 
sequence of other decisions, ordered each party's ability to secure their 
own preference and so ordered the course of the dispute. I shall attend to 
the respondents' actual perceptions of choice in the later chapters on 
specific areas of domestic decision-making. 
3. CONFLICT ABOUT APPROPRIATE BEHAVIOUR 
I was unable to identify more than a fraction of the routine disagreements 
in which one side claimed that the other should (or should not) behave in a 
particular way. Disputes involving reference to a convention of proper 
behaviour were so common, so various, and so fleeting, that they were hard 
to pin down in an interview context. I had to accept that I would only be 
able to collect information about a sub-section of all possible 
"appropriate behaviour" related disputes. However, I was able to consider 
respondents' accounts of domestic arguments which shared the following 
defining characteristics. 
1. The conflict concerned either the allocation of some sort of domestic 
obligation or the regulation of "work" associated with such an obligation. 
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2. The. definition of viable alternative options depended on a conception 
of socially appropriate behaviour. Arguments were therefore about what 
should happen, rather than about what individuals would personally prefer 
to happen (as in the previous section). 
Most of the reported disputes which fitted this description were about 
matters of responsibility. Curiously, the family and feminist literature 
which makes use of the concept of responsibility rarely sets out to unpack 
the meaning of this term (6). I shall define what I mean by responsibility 
and consider the particular characteristics of domestic responsibility 
before reviewing the respondent's accounts of associated conflict. 
Responsibilit 
First, if someone is responsible then they are obliged, usually to another 
but sometimes to themselves, to satisfactorily complete a more or less 
clearly defined area of work (7) or decision-making. If they are 
responsible, they are also answerable to that other (or themselves) if they 
fail to fulfil those obligations. Second, responsibility is always 
limited. Responsible individuals are obliged to do the work x but not the 
work y. The boundaries of work x and y, and the definitions of a 
satisfactory performance are, in principle, established at the point when 
an individual takes over responsibility. Responsible people are therefore 
obliged to complete a specified task to a specified standard. However, 
they also have the right to do that work and to make all the associated 
decisions without undue interference from the other. In other words they 
have a defined and restricted area of authority. They alone have the 
right to decide about the particular set of issues for which they are 
responsible (8). Third, a responsible person can delegate aspects of a job 
for which they have responsibility. In these circumstances the boundaries 
of delegated and non-delegated responsibility, and the standard expected of 
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the "delegated to", have to be defined. 
Related arguments can therefore take one of four forms. They can be about 
the allocation of responsibility (or of delegated responsibility), or they 
can be about the control of standards which the responsible person (or the 
person to whom responsibility has been delegated) is obliged to maintain. 
In practice, the course of all four versions of responsibility-related 
dispute is structured by a set of beliefs which inform the initial 
processes of allocation and definition. If responsibilities are allocated 
in a certain way on the grounds that this is what should happen, then the 
first appeal in case of, say, a dispute about the limit or boundary of an 
area of responsibility will be to that conception of what should have 
happened. The diagram below illustrates the location of possible conflict 
and the role of the informing beliefs. 
FIGURE 4 
Beliefs about what should happen, which can be used as resources and which 
inform the allocation and regulation of responsibilities 
LOCATION OF DISPUTE 
ABOUT THE ALLOCATION OF 
RESPONSIBILITY OR OF 
DELEGATED RESPONSIBILITY 
(IF ANY) 
Definition of 
the area of 
responsibility or of 
delegated responsibility 
Specification of 
standards required 
.......................... 
LOCATION Either Or 
OF 
CONFLICT Failure in the terms 
ABOUT defined above 
STANDARDS No problem 
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This diagram describes a structure of potential responsibility-related 
dispute. Though the content of the informing beliefs will vary from 
context to context, the diagram describes what are, in principle, 
generalised relationships. What is different about arguments about matters 
of responsibility in the family (as opposed to those set in, for example, a 
formal organisational context) is the nature of the informing beliefs. 
Accordingly, I shall examine the beliefs and expectations which appeared 
to inform respondents' accounts of conflict about matters of domestic 
responsibility. These can be grouped under three headings: beliefs about 
sharing, equality and justice, beliefs about gender and role appropriate 
behaviour; and, finally, beliefs about the circumstances of legitimate 
delegation. 
Beliefs about sharing, equality and justice 
All respondents believed that husband and wife should "share" the total 
burden of domestic labour, though it should be noted that "sharing" does 
not necessarily mean "equal sharing". While the actual definitions 
differed, all believed that there should be a just division of domestic 
responsibility and most presumed that this balance depended on an "equal 
but different" allocation of domestic work. Husbands and wives took on 
work for each other in what was seen as a kind of exchange relationship. 
The detail of division and the degree to which the terms of the exchange 
were formally or even overtly regulated varied from case to case. However, 
all systems of exchange and division produced patterns of mutual 
dependence. Once the system was established, the wife relied on the 
husband to do x just as the husband relied on the wife to do y. Both would 
suffer (though in different ways) if the system were to collapse as a 
result of an individual failure and so each was under some pressure to keep 
their part of the bargain. Patterns of dependence and indebtedness 
associated with second order expectations of help and delegation 
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complicated the already intricate network of mutual obligation established 
by the "major" divisions of domestic responsibility. Appeals to notions of 
fairness, justice and equality were made in the context of this complex 
background of interdependence and proved to be more or less effective 
depending on the combatants definition of the current balance of 
indebtedness. It seems that, for example, a husband had more chance of 
making a sucessful appeal of the form "its my turn to decide" if his wife 
had recently secured her preference in relation to what was seen to be a 
similar decision (I shall consider such "turn taking" practices in the 
following chapter). 
Beliefs about gender and role appropriate behaviour 
Expectations of sharing and justice demanded that the total domestic burden 
was shared. Beliefs about gender and role appropriate behaviour ordered 
the way in which that balance of domestic responsibility was achieved. 
Responsibilities were most commonly allocated to either husband or wife on 
the grounds of gender and/or role. Though the content of these gender/role 
expectations varied throughout the sample, all respondents described their 
domestic arrangements with reference to some such theme. Some observed 
that these expectations informed even the detail of their domestic lives. 
One respondent believed, for example, that it would be quite acceptable for 
her husband to take his son out in a pushchair, but quite peculiar for him 
to push the pram. Similarly, others expected their husband to help bring 
in the washing, but not to help hang it out. These kinds of expectations 
limited the respondents' perceptions of appropriate alternative courses of 
action both for themselves and for others in the family context. The 
domestic burden could only be divided in certain ways. Several respondents 
went on to identify what they saw as an extremely important relationship 
between the performance or non-performance of particular domestic tasks and 
a perception of themselves, or of their husbands, as appropriately 
masculine or feminine, motherly or fatherly. In this case, for example, 
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the respondent associates the performance of particular jobs with the 
fulfilment of a particular role. 
"Its my job [cleaning the kitchen] isn't it. Though I don't 
particularly always want to do it its my job. Its how we work 
together. We wouldn't swap jobs, no, no, no, indeed no. I mean no, I 
think if you have a task and you do it well its more satisfying than 
say except for fun just to swap over... if Ian wants to hoover and I'll 
do the garden then .... but why should I wallpaper? I think it takes 
something off a man if you were to take all of his jobs. " 
The perceived inter-relation between gender/role identity and the 
allocation of areas of domestic responsibility radically altered the nature 
of any associated conflict. Presuming that the couple agreed about the 
definition of "appropriate behaviour", failure to fulfil allotted 
responsibilities represented failure to behave as a "proper" wife/husband/ 
mother/father. Worse, if one party failed to fulfil his/her allotted 
duties the other (through no fault of their own) had to take over an area 
of. gender inappropriate responsibility. Attempts to "interfere" with what 
was deemed to be the other's responsibility were equally significant. If 
the husband does and should do x and the wife tries to take over all or 
some of that work the husband may interpret her move as a threat to his 
"masculinity" as well as evidence of gender inappropriate behaviour on her 
part. The respondent quoted in the following example expresses just such a 
fear. 
"I've seen too many marriages where in order to stress their equality, 
women have gone overboard and I think once you start chipping away at 
a man's masculinity... like I've got a sister who her husband isn't as 
good at managing money as she is, but instead of having a joint 
account and keeping an eye on it, she insists she has all the money 
and she gives him what she refers to as pocket money. Well I think 
she is asking for trouble. " 
This association of gender/role identity with the proper performance of 
appropriate domestic tasks has certain implications for the course of 
responsibility related conflict. First, the association is likely to 
ensure some degree of stability. As long as the performance of specific 
tasks is equated with perception of a proper wife/mother/father/husband 
role there will be some extra, diffuse pressure to behave in the 
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appropriate fasion. Secondly, the association provides each party with an 
instantly relevant appeal. Either can claim that the other is not behaving 
as a proper wife/mother/father/husband. Such appeals are, of course, only 
effective if there is some fundamentally shared definition of proper 
behaviour: nearly all respondents believed that they and their husband had 
the same general conceptions of gender and role appropriate behaviour. 
Thirdly, these beliefs served to preclude debate and hence dispute. The 
range of acceptable ways of allocating domestic responsibility was often so 
limited that there was (from the respondent's point of view) literally "no 
choice" about who should do what and hence no room for domestic conflict 
about those issues. 
Beliefs about the circumstances of legitimate delegation 
When responsibility is allocated, that allocation is typically seen to be 
made without reference to the respondent's immediate domestic circumstance. 
The arrangement is not expected to vary in response to changes in other 
aspects of the family's lifestyle. If, for instance, the wife is in charge 
of the cooking she will probably remain responsible for this work even if 
the couple move house, have another child, etc. However, such variations 
in family circumstance did order respondents' perceptions of the occasions 
on which it was seen as legitimate to delegate specific areas of domestic 
responsibility. In some circumstances, conventions of proper behaviour 
demanded that normal definitions of gender or role appropriate conduct be 
ignored or reversed. To give just one example, many husbands were expected 
to look after the house if their wife was ill: this was what a good and 
caring husband "should" do in the circumstances. Involvement with normally 
"inappropriate" work was unproblematic providing that the helper obeyed the 
rules of delegation. As the next quotation illustrates, beliefs about the 
circumstances of legitimate delegation specified the meanings of "too much" 
and "too little" help in some detail. 
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"If I am ill ... which touch wood isn't very often, but if I am ill 
then he would look after himself, he could cook enough to look after 
himself, chops he does, he is very good at chops but that is about it. 
He wouldn't bake or anything like that, he'd draw the line there, I 
wouldn't want him to anyway. There is never any need for that 
anyway. " 
In conclusion, husbands and wives do expect the other to help (in certain 
circumstances) with what are properly their own responsibilities. These 
expectations of help gave rise to a second order system of exchange and 
indebtedness and provide both parties with legitimate reasons why, in case 
of confict, the other should give way. 
Whatever the circumstances of delegation, the standards expected of 
"helpers" were "lower" than those expected of the person who was normally 
responsible for a particular area of domestic work. Indeed, "helpers" who 
performed "too well" undermined the normal pattern of responsibility and 
marked themselves out as "inappropriately" equal to or better than the 
person who was rightfully in charge of that area of domestic work. 
"If I ask him to do something, if I ask him to clean the bathroom then 
he will be there for hours and when he's finished it will be spotless, 
and that is how .... he thinks the whole house should be like that, but 
I've not got the time to do that really, not every day .. he doesn't 
realise that you can't do that if you have got a whole lot of other 
jobs that need doing" 
Those who temporarily took on what was normally defined as gender 
inappropriate work are therefore expected to "fail" by not "too much", and 
not "too little". The actual meaning of "perfect failure" depended on the 
context of delegation. 
Described domestic disputes about matters of responsibility were clearly 
structured by beliefs about sharing, about gender appropriate behaviour and 
(where relevant) about the circumstances in which delegation was 
legitimate. Such beliefs had the dual role of setting the scene in which 
different alternatives were seen to be more or less viable and hence in 
which decisons did and did not arise, and of providing a wealth of 
normative support for particular courses of action and so for particular 
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preferences in cases of disagreement. Having considered some of the 
general features of family disputes about matters of responsibility I shall 
now review the respondents accounts of each of the four possible forms of 
conflict outlined earlier. These four categories were 1) conflict about 
the allocation of responsibility, 2) conflict about allocation of delegated 
responsibility 3) conflict about the standards demanded of the responsible 
person and 4) conflict about the standards demanded of the person to whom 
responsiblity had been delegated. In their different ways, all four kinds 
of argument highlight areas in which codes of proper family behaviour were 
doubtful, vague, or even contradictory and in which there was scope for 
dispute about what should happen. The following review of each of the four 
kinds of responsibility related dispute therefore reveals as much about the 
normal workings of the system of informing beliefs and conventions as about 
the structure and form of domestic conflict. 
1. Conflict about the allocation of domestic responsibilities. 
Interestingly, all the reported instances of this type of conflict 
concerned the allocation of responsibility for overall financial control or 
for more specific areas of domestic budgeting, and all arose as a result of 
what was seen as a failure (something did not happen which one party 
thought should happen) or because of some form of interference (someone 
took over what should have been the other's responsibility). In all cases, 
then, the respondent and the husband appealed to what were essentially 
contradictory definitions of "appropriate" behaviour. In the following 
example, the respondent and her husband held contradictory definitions of 
the way in which financial responsibility ought to be allocated. 
"I think for things like money it's normally the man that would lose 
sleep over it and I don't honestly thing that Steven would care 
whether we had money or not as long as he could spend something, so 
with regard to that yes, we are different. He doesn't really have any 
idea about money... I think one of you has got to be in charge, you 
know because otherwise you don't know what the other one is spending 
and then all of a sudden you look in your account and there is nothing 
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in it... if a husband can't manage the money then I suppose the woman 
has to do it but really I think it is the man's responsibility. " 
Other disputes arose when expectations of "joint" partnership contradicted 
beliefs about gender or role appropriate behaviour. In the next case the 
husband believed that his wife should be in charge while the wife thought 
that financial control should be a joint affair. 
"He really blew his top. He said 'Well don't you know how much you've 
spent? ' And I wasn't bothering it wasn't my money, it was our money 
and I was writing cheques blithely, no track at all, and he, he went 
really mad. 'What do you think you are playing at? Why can't you work 
out where your money's gone. ' I'll show you, he makes me fill in a 
little red book every week. I have to account for everything because 
when he gets a statement he's real careful now, he likes to check that 
it ties in. I have to fill in my little book to prove I'm trying. It 
keeps him quiet, it makes him feel nice and masterful, he feels that 
he is in control then, its funny really, I'm in control but he likes 
to think he is. It was silly really, I thought we were managing fine, 
but he thought I was doing it all, well I didn't get married to worry 
about how my cheques are going through. I thought that all that was 
over and that we'd do it together, but really, neither of us was doing 
it, that was why we got into such a messP 
This debate about financial responsibility illustrates the contradiction 
between beliefs about marriage as an equal partnership and conventions of 
separate and different areas of gender/role appropriate responsibility. 
Many respondents were aware of this contradiction, presenting their 
financial arrangements as "joint" while also acknowledging that they had 
to behave according to gender/role specific prescriptions of appropriate 
financial behaviour. Contradictory conventions of proper social and wifely 
behaviour had similar consequences. In the next example the wife 
interfered with what was properly her husband's responsibility in order to 
resolve an embarassing social dilemma. Her husband did not agree that the 
"outside" social circumstances justified her "disobedience". 
"He thinks if a man takes his wife out it is up to him to provide the 
drinks. I paid, I got a round of drinks on er New Years Eve. Oh he 
went mad. He says 'Whats the point in you spending your money, you 
might as well save yours and pay you know put it towards something 
else and we'll spend mine. ' Which is if you think about it, it is 
right enough you know. So I say '0h alright then', but I, you know, I 
felt obliged to buy a round of drinks for everybody... If I'm out on 
my own I usually use my own money you know because I feel guilty about 
using his. " 
All those who argued about the proper allocation of domestic responsibility 
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presented claims of the form "You should/should not have done.. " Each set 
out to justify the rightness of their own view and the propriety of the 
conventions which informed it. When such strategies failed, as in the 
first case, one side was able to "win" by default. In that example the 
husband was able to abandon what his wife saw as his financial 
responsibilities because she would rather take over what she saw as gender 
inappropriate work than allow the family to get into debt. 
While all reported arguments about the allocation of domestic 
responsibility concerned the allocation of financial responsibility, it is 
significant that neither party made use of such material capacities as 
financial advantage. Differences in income may generate or inform the 
dispute, as in the second and third examples. However, the resulting 
arguments were about definitions of appropriate behaviour and not about 
differential use of the family's finances. Curiously, family finance 
seemed to be the only area in which there was any real doubt or 
disagreement about the identity of the properly responsible person. Only 
here was there sufficient sub-cultural variation that husband and wife were 
likely to have developed even slightly different expectations of normal 
family life. I shall describe the actual range of different methods of 
financial management in chapter 9 so as to examine the domestic worlds in 
which this form of dispute did or did not arise. 
2. Conflict about the allocation of delep-ated responsibilit 
Arguments about helping were more common than those about allocation of 
responsibility and were described in relation to a wider range of issues. 
These disputes took one of two forms: a few arose because A had not offered 
enough help, while the rest were a consequence of what was seen as 
interference or "too much" help. Those which arose in response to what was 
defined as illegitimate indifference took various forms depending on the 
respondent's conception of the kind of expectation which had been 
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infringed. For example, some respondents argued that their husband had 
contravened what they saw as normal standards of social conduct, while 
others reported arguments in which reference was made to a set of 
expectations about specifically family behaviour. In the following case, 
the wife believed that parents should support each other and take a joint 
interest in the children. Her husband's failure to meet even this standard 
of proper family behaviour was taken to represent a generalised form of 
non-cooperation. 
"I think he [husband] should help [with son], I don't expect him to 
change nappies but just to play with him and take him out sometimes, 
you know, there is a park ... he could take him round there sometimes, 
but he is just not interested. " 
However, most of the reported disputes about a lack of help arose in 
relation to more concrete issues and involved reference to a 
circumstantially specific conception of appropriate assistance. To take the 
most commonly reported example: those who believed that a wife's domestic 
responsibilities should demand her full-time attention typically expected 
that a husband should help out in the "unusual" event that the wife went 
out to work. 
he: "I clean up in here, I wash the pots every night so er I just I think 
it is my right sort of to chip in with her because she is going out to 
work. Blokes at work say '0h you are a fairy you know er you are not 
supposed to do that' well I don't think that is right. That is how 
marriages split up. I wouldn't do the ironing though, no you wouldn't 
catch me dead doing ironing" 
Though expectations of appropriate help varied widely, all respondents 
acknowledged that they were obliged to fulfil their domestic 
responsibilities whether or not they went out work and whether or not they 
got any help. If their husband did not like doing a particular type of 
delegated work or chose not to get involved that was too bad. In these 
cases, and in others like them, the "delegators" were unable to ensure that 
the other helped out. Even if the circumstances allowed delegation, they 
did not necessarily demand it. 
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Arguments about interference made reference to similar beliefs about 
"appropriate" behaviour, but in a different context. These disputes arose 
when A beleived that B had illegitimately taken over what was rightfully 
A's responsibility. Several of these disagreements were described by those 
who were still in the process of defining areas of domestic responsibility. 
"He tends to think it is his job now, we used to argue a lot and now I 
sort of leave it to him and he gets on with it he hasn't sort of got 
me saying that piece [of wallpaper] isn't straight... It was because I 
tried to take part in it. I'd say 'thats not right'. Now I am not 
anywhere near. " 
This argument, for example, served to establish the identity of the 
rightful wallpaperer. More commonly, arguments about interference followed 
what was clearly and unambiguously defined as A's encroachment on what was 
agreed to be B's job. If that job was properly B's because of B's status 
as wife/mother/husband/father, the act of interference prevented the 
innocent party from fulfilling the responsibility appropriate to someone of 
their gender or role. For example, a husband could not paper the living 
room if his wife had already finished the job. Even "third party" 
interference proved to be a problem in this respect. In the next example 
the respondent was unable to be a "proper wife" because her husband had 
his washing done "for him" by an hotel. 
"He is very good. I keep saying 'where is your washing? I want to do 
it you know, it is my responsibility, you should have clean undies, I 
don't want some hotel doing it for you' but he said 'no, it's alright 
dear, it will save you the work'. It makes me feel, he does a lot for 
me and I think well if I can't keep his underwear clean and iron his 
shirts er I've failed a bit. " 
Though there was some room for initial doubt and debate, established 
beliefs about proper domestic behaviour usually served to preclude domestic 
dispute about the definition of legitimate and illegitimate help. Disputes 
about interference or indifference almost always served to re-define the 
boundaries of normal responsibility. Providing that the offender and the 
criticizer shared the same basic model of appropriate behaviour and the 
same conception of the circumstances in which help would be justified, 
delegation arguments were essentially "border skirmishes" in which each 
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party argued in favour of a particular interpretation of an agreed code of 
conduct. 
To sum up, then, dispute about the ways in which domestic responsibilities 
should be allocated was extremely rare. Though conflict about the 
allocation of delegated responsibility was rather more common, such debates 
never really undermined what seemed to be a shared conception of normal 
family arrangements. Indeed, once resolved, boundary disputes about 
appropriate help and delegation reinforced a definition of acceptable 
procedures. Conflicts about proper helping roles were clearly ordered by 
the respondent's conception of the circumstances which justified deviation 
from the usual arrangement. The few described cases of argument 
highlighted what were otherwise invisible expectations of who should help 
with what in what circumstances. I shall document the range and context of 
such taken-for-granted expectations in chapters 9 and 10. 
3. Conflict about the performance of work for which individuals were 
responsible 
Arguments of this type followed what was defined as an inadequate 
performance and were initiated by the "criticizer" who, presumably, aimed 
to prevent future "misbehaviour". The "criticized" either accepted the 
reprimand, explained why it was impossible to meet the normal standard in 
the circumstances, or set out to challenge the "criticizer's" definition 
of a proper performance. In this example the wife shared some but not all 
of her husband's definitions of proper cleaning. 
"Trevor gets upset when things aren't straight. I'm not really 
bothered... If he came home and I said '0h I've worked really hard, 
I've done this room out properly', he'd check, and one of the ways 
he'd check would be to run his finger along the top of the door and 
say 'well you havn't done it have you'.. Well I'd say it's done. He'd 
just shout... it used to upset me, he still says I'm a slob. It 
annoys him that I am, that I don't clear up after him all the time. I 
do clear up after him a lot more now that I am at home. " 
The husband believed that his demands were "normal" and so felt that he had 
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the right to criticise his wife's failure. However, failure (so defined) 
was as routine as the cleaning work itself. Neither side clearly won or 
lost what was effectively a ritual dispute about the nature of the wife's 
proper domestic role. Other reported conflicts about standards of 
performance were just as habitual. 
Complaints about timing arose because something had not yet happened which 
the "criticizer" believed "should" have happened. In most cases the 
responsible person (usually the husband) failed to complete an apparently 
skilled and hence irregular and specialist task on time. The "criticizer" 
(usually the wife) aimed to get the "criticized" (usually the husband) to 
fulfil their domestic obligation and finish the job. Different forms of 
pressure or persuasion were more or less relevant depending on the context 
of dependence, on the reason why the "criticized" should be responsible and 
on the time scale involved. If, as in this next example, it was the 
husband's job (as husband) to dig the garden, the wife could try to shame 
him into action on the grounds that the delay was evidence of inappropriate 
husbandly behaviour. 
"After much pushing and prodding, that part [of the garden] has been 
dug over. At the front my dad did all that, he dug that over to try 
and shame him [husband] into doing it [the back]. 
However, these "taking over" strategies had their limitations for if A has 
to take over the whole of B's job the "shaming" element has little effect. 
In the next case, for instance, the wife took over the work but did it so 
inappropriately that there was no danger that the normal boundaries of 
responsibility would shift. She aimed to provoke her husband but not to 
resolve the problem herself. 
"All those pipes need painting and filling in and the pipes in the 
hall need boxing in. In fact I thought of doing it myself, it does 
sound ridiculous but I thought er I'd get some cardboard and bend it 
there sort of down in a little narrow bit. I'm going to bend it in and 
then do it with paint and paper it. I'm not going to tell him, I'll 
see if he notices it. You see if he does that he'll do it in wood. 
If I didn't do that or if I didn't ask him to box it in, the day he 
dies it will still be there. " 
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Arguments about when work should be done may continue for a long time. 
This means that the "criticizer" can adopt tactics which are expected to 
have a cumulative effect. For example, some respondents tried to "wear 
away" their husbands' resistance through continuous nagging or sulking. 
As I shall explain in the next chapter, these measures were unreliable in 
that they depend on a potentially variable opponent's reaction. However, 
they were often reported to be the only means open to "criticizers" who 
were completely dependent on the "criticized" in relation to the subject of 
dispute. Several respondents observed that they were literally unable to 
do the offending work themselves, or noted that such action would be "more 
trouble than it was worth" and so had no choice but to live with the 
problems caused by what they saw as an inappropriate delay. 
"The toilet was making the horriblest noise and it was going on for 
weeks and this week-end he was off work this weekend and he got so 
sick of hearing it that eventually he did do it ... it took him three 
or four minutes. I didn't even know where to start. " 
Husbands were typically expected to be responsible for work which demanded 
relatively specialised and rarely needed skills, while "women's work" 
tended to be routine and relatively unskilled. The distribution of cases 
of reported conflict about the performance and timing of domestic work was 
clearly ordered by these characteristic patterns of responsibility: 
husbands complained about issues of performance while wives complained 
about delay and inaction. Though distributed in this way, such disputes 
were rare. This was hardly surprising as those who had to control the 
performance and timing of work for which the other was responsible 
necessarily lacked the immediately relevant knowledge and experience on 
which to base their criticism. This lack of knowledge was in part a 
product of the patterns of mutual dependence associated with a "separate 
but equal" division of domestic responsibility which perpetuated 
differences of expertise, skill and knowledge. The resulting system of 
independent specialism therefore guaranteed a degree of autonomy. Both 
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husband and wife could get on with their own work in their own way without 
fear of interference or detailed criticism. 
4. Conflict about the performance of delegated work 
The standards by which delegated work was judged were more or less 
stringent depending on the circumstances of delegation. Whatever these 
circumstances, standards were "lower" than those expected of the normally 
responsible person though it seems that the more routine the delegation, 
the less the difference. 
"You know he is capable enough. He baths them [children] every night, 
and puts them to bed, he is nearly as good as I am. " 
"I went into hospital for 48 hours and when I came back he was trying 
to do it [hoovering] but ... it was terrible. I must be honest with 
you, I felt like taking it off him. " 
However, routine delegation was seen to be temporary and in this context, 
few thought that it was worth worth trying to offer constructive criticism 
so as to improve the helper's performance. In any case much of the 
delegated work was seen to demand gender specific skills which were 
literally un-teachable. Several respondents described past failures and 
cases of associated "token" conflict in order to illustrate what they saw 
as the absurdity of trying to behave in a gender inappropriate fashion. 
"I was ill, and he had to do the washing. Well, he put everything in 
that there was, and I don't know, there was a nightie of mine which 
was a very dark blue, and all the white underwear, and he put the 
automatic on 6... the whole thing.. Well... they came out, everything 
was ... well not blue, they were yuk, you know terrible. I said to him 
'Fred I1' 'Well I did my best... I tried my best'. He has never done 
it since though, I have made sure of that. " 
"He can't bake, but he would try if he had to. It is a family joke 
because when he baked me a cake once on my birthday, it was like a 
brick. Even the birds didn't eat it. " 
"I painted one door once, and Graham came home and there was loads of 
runs in it. He sanded it all out. I was raving, he didn't have to do 
it, but it was all runny I suppose. He had to do it again, so I know 
my limitations you know so I do the things I can do, and he does the 
things that he can do. " 
Interestingly, a couple of those who only occasionally delegated work 
(usually cleaning or tidying-up work) found that their husband went 
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"overboard" and did much too perfect a job. 
"He is actually the fussiest, but I am actually the tidiest. I'll 
tidy, and to me it will be tidy but to him it is no good, he'd have to 
straighten all the books up. If we have got visitors and I say right 
do the lounge, he'll spend hours getting all the books just right and 
he'll dust all the little bits, but he won't just dust quick round" 
Either way, the delegator had very few means of effectively controlling 
excessive or inadequate performances. Arguments about the timing of 
delegated work were often precluded by the very circumstances which 
justified delegation in the first place. Work was frequently delegated 
because the normally responsible person was for some reason unable to get 
the job done on time. If the hoovering had to be done before the visitors 
arrive, delay was impossible. In any case, the person who was "delegated 
to" was, by definition, doing a favour. 
"If I said anything he'd just turn round and tell me to get on and do 
it myself. " 
The level of necessary caution and tolerance was in part determined by the 
degree to which the delegator depended on the "delegated to's" assistance. 
Responsibilites could only be legitimately delegated in particular 
circumstances which meant, in most cases, that the delegator had some 
commonly recognised "need" for help and was therefore likely to be grateful 
for any help however inappropriate that proved to be. 
In summary, disputes about the standards of performance or timing in 
relation to work for which individulas were normally, or only temporarily, 
responsible seemed to be ordered by the following factors. First, 
husbands and wives were unlikely to have the necessary knowledge to 
criticise any but the most obvious inadequacies. In this context it is 
important to observe that the visibility of an individual's failure to 
fulfil a particular responsibility depended in part on the nature of the 
work in question. It seems that, typically, wifely responsibilities were 
more routine and more visible than husbandly types of work. Second, 
husband and wife were likely to depend on each other to do certain jobs and 
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to help each other where appropriate. These netwoks of mutual dependence 
are founded on, and reinforced by, a basic willingness to conform to the 
associated expectations of proper behaviour. Failure to do so could set 
off a sequence of complex reactions and counter reactions which would cause 
a "disproportionate" amount of damage to the whole of the normally 
effective network of obligation. Third, but only in relation to delegated 
responsibility, normal definitions of gender or role appropriate behaviour, 
in combination with a conception of the nature of the present extenuating 
circumstances, served to define a "perfect" helping role in which the 
assistant was expected to try his or her best to complete what was by 
definition an "impossible" task. Assistants who performed "too well" 
threatened their own gender or role identity and that of the normally 
responsible person, while those who did not even meet the minimum standard 
expected of a helper undermined the values of sharing and cooperation on 
which family life was expected to be based. Finally, it is important to 
remember that help was given as a favour. This was so even if assistance 
was routine or positively expected in the circumstances. In this context, 
any criticism would seem to represent ingratitude on the part of the 
delegator, who, as I observed earlier, may have to depend on the 
assistant's cooperation. 
Conflict about appropriate behaviour 
There was very little reported disagreement about the ways in which 
domestic responsibilities were performed or allocated. This seemed to be 
because husband and wife shared much the same model of normal family life. 
The few described disputes developed at the margins of otherwise 
unproblematic working arrangements which were founded on equally 
unproblematic conceptions of appropriate behaviour. In fact, most 
disputes concerned the allocation of delegated rather than normal 
responsibility where there was apparently more scope for debate. Standards 
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of expected performance were as well defined as were normal patterns of 
allocation. This was so even in the context of rather more complex 
situations in which responsibilites were delegated. In other words, 
respondents seemed to maintain very clear conceptions of how family life 
should work. Given that they and their husbands held very similar models 
of family life, and given that their behaviour was informed by those 
models, there was very little room for dispute. 
In the few cases of overt conflict, each side made instant reference to 
what was expected to be the shared definition of what should happen. 
Though some versions of what should happen clearly had greater cultural 
support than others, it is not possible to conclude that general visions of 
proper family life systematically worked in either the wife's or the 
husband's favour. Appeals to such general notions were only valuable if 
individual preference and general conception of what should happen 
coincided and if the opponent accepted the basic model of family life to 
which reference was made. 
I have tried to describe ways in which models of proper family life order 
and preclude conflict about the allocation and performance of domestic 
responsibilities. I shall consider 
_the 
content of those models in chapters 
9 (on family finance), chapter 10 (on housework and child-care), and, to 
some degree, in chapters 5 to 8 (on specific areas of domestic decision- 
making). 
4. CONFLICT ABOUT APPARENTLY INEVITABLE DECISIONS 
The conflicts included in this section arose in relation to a curious type 
of "decision" in which the outcome was apparently inevitable and in which A 
had no chance of getting B to do what B would not otherwise do. 
Accordingly, such instances of overt dispute could not be described in 
terms of a "one dimensional" definition of power. Indeed, the "conflict" 
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involved was better described as a token form of resistance to what was 
believed to be an already determined "fate". The instances of reported 
"disagreement" discussed in this section, therefore, concern "decisions" in 
which there was apparently only one possible course of action, but in which 
one party disliked the seemingly inevitable outcome while the other party 
either liked it, or was indifferent. The conflict (such as it was) arose 
because the one unavoidable course of action was clsoer to A's preference 
than to B's. In such circumstances, those involved did not have recourse 
to resources, to means of overcoming the other's opposition, or to methods 
of securing their own preference. While B might have ended up doing what B 
would not otherwise do, this was seen to be because of some external 
factor, and not because of presssure from A (10). In this section I want 
to consider the nature of disputes which arose in relation to "decisions" 
in which the outcome was apparently determined by factors beyond the 
control of either A or B and to document the location and apparent cause of 
such argument. 
Some of the described conflicts were "token" in the sense that one party 
simply registered their displeasure at what was agreed to be an inevitable 
outcome. Others were "real" disputes in that one party challenged the 
other's definition of "no choice". Each type was more or less likely 
depending on the perceived cause of the "no choice". The describe "causes" 
of what were seen to be an "inevitable" outcome fell into three groups. 
"No choices" were variously believed to be the product of 1) social 
obligation, 2) "external" pressure and/or 3) some prior decision. 
1. "No choice" because of some form of social obligation 
Obligations to other people (within and outside the immediate family group) 
were reported to have "unavoidable" and sometimes unpleasant consequences 
for respondents and their husbands. For example, several respondents 
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accepted that they had certain immovable domestic obligations and were 
resigned to the fact that they had to live with the implications. This was 
often difficult but not especially contentious. Overt dispute only arose 
when, say, a husband disliked the effects of what were basically his wife's 
obligations (or vice versa). In these circumstances, the wife/husband 
might challenge the significance of the other's commitments and so try to 
redefine their perception of "no choice". 
"He's doing stores work for the TA, they are short of volunteers so he 
has to go in every week. If they could get more volunteers then he 
wouldn't have to go in so often. I go on every now and again, 'I feel 
a bit lonely, we don't get much time to ourselves', and he has a 
weekend off. " 
Several of those involved in the sort of conflict described above adopted 
the strategy of reminding their husband/wife of other competing yet equally 
"inevitable" obligations. When family obligations were juxtaposed with TA 
obligations there had to be some choice. While the husband "had to go in" 
he also "had to" spend some time with his family. The perceived 
"inevitability" of each option depended on the individual's evaluation of 
the relative priority of different social obligations. "Family" obligations 
were normally expected to take precedence over others. In such a cultural 
context conflicts involving competing "family" obligations were 
particularly fraught. In the next case, the contradictory demands and 
complex dilemmas of "no choice" nearly disrupted the respondent's family 
life altogether. 
"When me mother-in-law died, he [father-in-law] said 'what is going to 
happen to us? ' and of course we had him up here. He was my husband's 
dad so I accepted it but ... he wasn't a likeable man. When he came 
here I must be honest it nearly broke my marriage. " 
While husband and wife were expected to acknowledge that each had certain 
"outside" commitments there were limits to the degree to which those other 
obligations could legitimately disrupt immediate family life. Arguments 
about the definition of legitimate disruption were therefore "real" whilst 
those related to the consequences of what were agreed to be "legitimate" 
obligations were "token". As the following example illustrates, it was 
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often difficult to make such clear-cut distinctions between "token" and 
"real" conflict. 
"We realised she couldn't look after herself [the respondent's 
mother]. We tried various flats and warden's apartments and of course 
they just hadn't the places, and I wouldn't really have liked to put 
her in a home... I had this idea one day, I thought well I wonder if 
we could make her a flat of some sort... the three bedrooms were 
standing empty.. He [husband] wasn't happy with it because he never 
did get on with her ... it was the usual mother-in-law situation 
anyway... so we thought of this idea of bringing her here and whilst he 
wasn't happy he felt it was, we had no choice really. He has problems 
with her now because she's getting up and he's got to make sure she's 
got back to bed... I try to ask her down to eat with us. I feel that 
gives her a bit of stimulation .. for her, not for us I might add, and 
he doesn't like me to do it. " 
While the husband had no choice but to accept the presence of his mother- 
in-law, he did have the chance to influence the degree to which that 
presence disrupted his daily family life. There was therefore scope for 
"real" choice about whether or not to invite the mother-in-law to eat with 
the family though there had been "no choice" about whether or not to have 
her to stay. This example, and those quoted above, illustrate the 
potential complexity of what might at first seem to be simple, inevitable 
decisions: much depended on the couple's definition of family and other 
priorities for it is these which determined the perception of different 
degrees of inevitability. 
2. "No choice" because of "external" pressure 
Family members may be forced to make certain decisions because of 
circumstances seen to be beyond their control. If they can only see one 
practical alternative they have "no choice" about what to do. In practice 
these definitions of "no choice" were made with reference to a system of 
"rational" family priorities. If, for example, an individual is offered 
the choice of becoming unemployed or moving to another part of the country, 
the definition of "no choice" can only be made with reference either to a 
notion that unemployment is out of the question or to a belief that moving 
house is impossible. Most of the reported cases of "no choice" because of 
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some kind of external pressure arose in this context. Respondents who 
believed that they had to follow their husband's job had "no choice" but to 
move (or to stay in the same place) though they disliked the consequences. 
"I find York a bit claustrophobic. It doesn't affect my husband, it 
does me. I think a move would be nice but we've been very much tied 
to his career, I think most people are, so where we have lived, it has 
been just really because of his jobs. " 
However, a few found that there was scope for "real" decision-making about 
this issue because other equally rational family requirements came into 
conflict with the "need" to follow the promotion trail. In the following 
example, the children's educational needs countered the husband's need for 
promotion, so producing a real (if currently hypothetical) dilemma. 
"You've got to move, you havn't any control over it at all, not if you 
want promotion. He says he is the one that's got to work till he's 
65, and you've got to make sacrifices. I don't know, we will have to 
think about where we'd go more now, and at what time. When your 
children are a certain age I think it should be a decision, an actual 
decision rather than a yes we must go if it is promotion. " 
These were the exceptions. Most of those who had "no choice" but to do x 
because of some external pressure had no doubt about the nature of their 
fate and were only able to offer "token" resistance to what was seen to be 
the obvious course of action. 
3. "No choice" because of a prior decision. 
These "no choices" arose when one decision excluded the possibility of 
another. If family decision-making sequences were neatly structured and 
routinely recorded it might be possible to attribute a perception of "no 
choice" to a prior decison. Such projects are entirely impractical in the 
family context, however, in which choices pass un-recorded and they are in 
any case difficult to describe in terms of an ordered temporal sequence. 
However, several respondents identified decisions which they believed to 
have had clearly identifiable "no further choice" consequences. 
"Well I get housekeeping and I've got to buy food and stuff like that 
from there, I don't pay any bills or anything, I'm not badly done to 
really but I think I made a mistake from the beginning ... I should 
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have insisted on my own money you know what I mean if I want anything 
other than run of the mill I've got to ask for it. Which goes against 
the grain .... it's not the same as having your own money. I don't 
think he'd like it [a different arrangement], no, not now, he wouldn't 
change now. " 
Having "mistakenly" gone along with the inital decision to have 
housekeeping money the wife now has "no choice" but to accept the 
consequences. Arguments about events which have already happened represent 
a particular sub-type of this form of "no choice" conflict. Those who act 
independently and against the others wishes leave that other with "no 
choice" but to accept that the offending action has happened. In these 
circumstances, opposition to a particular historical instance of 
"misbehaviour" is inevitably "token", although, of course, that "token" 
opposition may effectively deter future "misbehaviour". Finally, continual 
repetition of a particular choice may produce a situation in which there 
are, apparently, "no choices". If, for example, a family "always goes" on 
holiday to the same place, they have "no choice" about where to go. The 
decision, if it arose at all, would be a decision first about whether or 
not to break the tradition and only subsequently a debate about where to 
go. In such circumstances a perception of inevitability develops 
regardless of the range of "original choice". A few respondents found that 
they resented certain family habits but were unable to dislodge the routine 
and so re-introduce the possibility of "real" decision-making. 
Conflict about apparently inevitable decisions 
Many of the respondents' definitions of "no choice" proved to be the 
product of a particular set of family priorities or beliefs. Here, as in 
relation to beliefs about appropriate behaviour and the allocation of 
domestic responsibilities, most respondents claimed that they and their 
husband agreed about the definition of family priorities. In this context, 
token conflicts were expressions of distaste for what was nonetheless 
acknowledged to be the proper way of life. Other definitions of "no 
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choice" were related to a particular set of family routines or rituals. 
These habits, like the beliefs of proper family priority described above, 
served to bracket together otherwise debatable issues and to limit 
respondents' perceptions of alternatives. However, particular domestic 
routines were seen to be of the respondent's own making, and while that 
ritual structure served to alter the course of subsequent decision-making, 
it did not necessarily mean that all dispute was "token". 
By definition, the parties involved in a "token" conflict could not attempt 
to secure their own preference or to get the other to behave in a certain 
way. This meant that neither side could make use of what would normally be 
described as "resources" (that is as means which allowed A to get B to do 
what B would not otherwise do) unless the conflict developed into an 
argument about the nature of the choice involved. Such "real" disputes 
only arose when those beliefs and priorities produced contradictory 
definitions of "no choice" (as in the father-in-law example) or when 
husband and wife happened to have different priorities and so different 
conceptions of the nature of the inevitable outcome. In these cases, 
appeal was made to an informing vision of proper family life in an attempt 
to get the opposition to redefine their conception of inevitability. 
Types of conflict 
In the three preceding sections I have tried to describe the location and 
form of each of three types of described conflict: conflict abut matters of 
preference; argument about appropriate behaviour; and dispute associated 
with apparently inevitable decisions. I have also identified the kinds of 
capacities typically drawn upon as resources (that is as means which would 
allow A to get B to do what B would not otherwise do) in each of these 
types of contentious situation. 
I began with a discussion of arguments related to decisions in which the 
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range of viable alternatives was "open" in the sense that the list of 
possible options apparently depended (given certain material limits) on 
personal preference or taste. In these cases both parties agreed that each 
had the right to argue for their own preference. While appeals to some 
kind of authority were, by definition, impossible, those involved made use 
of a wide range of resources. In practice, first-order decisions ("I want 
a") tended to be about expenditure and were therefore resolved with 
reference to such material capacities as independently disposable money. 
The course of second-order decisions of the form "I want x out of the range 
of possible a's" varied depending on the way in which the first-order 
decision had been resolved, but often involved appeal to "normative" themes 
of family interest, sharing or justice. 
I then considered the course of reported dispute related to decisions in 
which the range of possible options was limited by a convention of 
appropriate behaviour. Analysis of the four forms of conflict related to 
the allocation and control of domestic responsibilities highlighted aspects 
of the relationship between notions of proper family behaviour and the 
course of associated dispute. It seemed that beliefs about gender 
appropriate behaviour and sharing served to minimise the contexts in which 
overt conflict was likely to occur and structured the course of the few 
arguments which did develop. 
In the third section I considered respondents' accounts of arguments in 
which the range of alternatives was so limited that there was apparently 
only one possible option. This allowed me to identify yet more areas in 
which family beliefs, priorities, and rituals limited respondents' 
perceptions of choice and so structured the range of potentially debatable 
issues. If there was "no choice", the respondent had no chance of 
influencing the outcome of the decision. Appeal to normative or material 
resources was therefore irrelevant. 
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As I explained at the start of this chapter, this discussion of conflict 
types was ordered with reference to the perceived range of possible 
alternative choices. Decisions involving the selection of one from an 
apparently "open" range of alternatives were therefore associated with 
conflicts about matters of preference. If a decison involving selection of 
one from an "open" range of possible alternatives were to prove contentious 
then the resulting conflict would be of the preference type described in 
the first section. Similarly, decisions involving a selection from a range 
of alternatives limited by a notion of what should happen would be 
associated with the second type of conflict, while those involving only one 
possible option would (if they were to prove debatable) result in the last 
type of "no choice" dispute. In the course of this chapter I have 
suggested that respondents tended to make appeal to different sorts of 
capacities in relation to each of the three types of conflict. It seems 
then that the definition of relevant capacities was in part determined by 
the respondent's perception of the nature of the contentious issue, that 
is, their perception of the range of possible alternatives from which a 
final selection had to be made. In other words, the currency or likely 
relevance of particular capacities or appeals appeared to be related in 
some way to the pattern of conflict types described above. Having 
documented the described instances of overt conflict I can now examine the 
means which the respondents and their opponents employed in their attempts 
to secure their preferences. In the next chapter I shall review the range 
of resources used by respondents and their opponents. However, I shall 
structure that review so as to highlight the relationship between perceived 
relevance of particular capacities and particular kinds of conflict. If 
the hypothesised relation between types of conflict and types of perceived 
choice were broadly accurate, it would obviously be useful to explore 
respondents' perceptions of the type of choice associated with a series of 
unproblematic decisions since these perceptions would order the course of 
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any associated conflict, should that arise. Chapters 5 to 10 thus document 
variations in the described perceptions of the kind of choice associated 
with a series of common domestic decisions. 
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CHAPTER 3: NOTES 
1. This definition is the same as that used by Lukes. He writes "Decisions 
are choices consciously and intentionally made by individuals between 
alternatives" (Lakes, 1974, p21) 
2. As I observed in chapter 1, many of the "one dimensional" analysts 
adopt a scarcity/dependence based definition of resources. From this view, 
resources are defined as the scarce means needed to meet common goals. 
They can therefore be identified without reference to their "use" in cases 
of actual conflict or dispute. In comparision, I argued that capacities, 
which might have more or less potential relevance, only had effect as 
"resources" at the moment of use. From this view resources could only be 
defined retrospectively. 
3. This strategy was impractical for two reasons. First it was impossible 
to establish exactly what the respondent believed to be, a "viable" 
alternative (Indeed, the question of the viability of a particular option 
might itself be the subject of a secondary dispute. For example A might 
conclude that x was a real option whilst B might rule out x on the grounds 
that it was, for example, "too big", "too yellow" or "too expensive"). 
Second, even if I could produce lists of what were believed to be viable 
alternatives and lists of final outcomes, I would have got no further with 
the task of ordering cases of reported conflict so as to facilitate 
discussion of the structuring domestic world. Rather, I would have as many 
categories of conflict as there were contentious issues. 
4. For example, if someone was expected to be responsible for a particular 
set of decisons, then those decisions could not be defined as issues about 
which both 'A' and 'B' had equal right to express and to try to enforce 
their personal preferences. 
5. This was not always the case: see chapter 8 on family finance. 
6. Such literature sometimes distinguishes between work, which is the 
performance of a particular task, and responsibility, which is the job of 
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ensuring that the task is completed. As Leonard writes "within marriage, 
though the division of tasks is less rigid (husbands may push a pram or do 
the washing up), the division of responsibility is as before (they do it to 
help their wives; and wives who go out to work do so because they 'choose 
to', and they have to make such arrangements as necessary to accomodate to 
it)" (Leonard, 1980, p267). However, the complexities of the relationship 
between obligation and performance and the even more elaborate relations 
associated with patterns of delegated responsibility are not explored 
further. 
7. I am defining "work" in the broadest sense so as to include, for 
example, dish washing and lawn mowing as well as making decisions about the 
child's education, walking the dog, or arranging a trip to the theatre. 
8. Which means, as I shall use the term, that they have authority. I am 
therefore defining authority as the legitimate right to decide, and am 
acknowleding that an attribution of responsibility is at the same time an 
attribution of "localised" or limited authority. 
9. The difference in the standards expected of the responsible person and 
the helper needs some explanation. If someone is responsible they are 
responsible and answerable to another. Because delegated work will not be 
completed to the require standard, the responsible person will have failed 
to fulfil that particular domestic obligation. If the person they have 
delegated that work to is also the person to whom they are answerable, 
things get very complicated. Should a husband criticise his wife for 
failing to make a good cake (and so failing to fulfil her domestic 
obligations) when in fact he made the cake at her request? It seems that 
the very fact of delegation alters the definition of an acceptable 
performance. If A accepts that delegation is (in the circumstances) 
legitimate, then A absolves B of the need to meet the normal standards. If 
the husband agrees to make the cake, he accepts that the resulting product 
will be perhaps harder, lumpier or blacker than he would normally expect. 
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10. A may manipulate B's perceptions of choice such that B "mistakenly" 
believes that a particular outcome is inevitable. In such cases A is able 
to get B to do what B would not otherwise have done. However, I have no 
way of distinguishing between those situations in which relevant 
perceptions of choice were "deliberately" manipulated and those in which 
the definition of "no choice" was the product of other "innocent" factors 
which coincidentally determined the selection of a course of action which 
happened to suit A rather better than it did B. This means that I will 
consider the nature of "no choice" conflicts without reference to the 
"accuracy" or otherwise of the respondents' perceptions of inevitability. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CAPACITIES AND RESOURCES 
Chapter 3 described the kinds of reported conflict associated with 
decisions in which the range of viable alternative options was either 
"open" (as in the case of "preference" type conflicts), "limited" (as in 
the case of conflicts about "appropriate" behaviour) or "closed" (as in the 
case of conflicts about apparently inevitable outcomes). I shall structure 
chapters 5 to 10 with reference to that same typology, and so attempt to 
situate instances of overt conflict in terms of their described context of 
normal and unproblematic domestic decision-making. Before embarking on 
that discussion, however, I want to take the analysis of instances of overt 
dispute a stage further. This chapter considers the kinds of resources 
utilised in different types of contentious situation and examines the 
likely relevance or "currency" of particular sorts of capacities. 
Much of the literature uses the term "resources" to describe the means 
which allow individuals or groups to exercise power. It is important to 
note, first, that the range of abilities/capacities/means/qualities which 
are counted as resources varied depending on the analyst's informing 
definition of power (1). For example, few "one dimensional" analysts would 
define the means used to manipulate preferences as resources. From that 
view, resources would be the means, such as physical, strength, money etc., 
which allowed A to secure A's preference in case of overt dispute. In this 
context it is important to note that authority (2) is typically thought of 
as a resource by those "three dimensional" analysts who conclude that A is 
able to get B to do what is not in B's real interests through the use of 
(amongst other things) A's authoritative position. In comparison, Bachrach 
and Baratz reserve the term authority to describe a distinct set of social 
relations which, because they are based on legitimacy, are "antithetical" 
to those of power. They write: "While authority is closely related to 
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power, it is not a form thereof; it is, in fact, antithetical to it" 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1970, p32) (3). 
The status attributed to "resources" varies just as widely. As I 
observed in chapter 1, most of the "one dimensional" analysts adopt a 
dependence based account of resources. Those who have access to the scarce 
means required to meet common needs have resources and, so the argument 
goes, have power. From this view, power is seen as some kind of personal 
posession whose (absolute) value is determined by the scarcity of the 
resources on which it is based. Other writers argue that "power is 
relational, as opposed to possessive or substantive" (Bachrach and Baratz, 
1970, p21). Accordingly, the "value" of particular sanctions or resources 
is relative and, perhaps more important, dependant on a series of 
circumstantial conditions (44). Alternatively, "resources" can be seen as 
properties of systems which, as in Parsons' account, contribute to the 
achievement of collective goals, or which, as in the various oppositional 
versions of a "three dimensional" view systematically favour the interests 
of one group at another's expense. 
I shall use the term "resources" to describe those "capacities" which 
allowed, or which were expected to allow (5) A to get B to do what B would 
not otherwise do in cases of overt conflict. A's capacities, then, are the 
means which might allow A, rather than B, to secure A's preference. 
Individuals therefore only have capacities relative to each other. While 
capacities may be systematically and differentially distributed, it is 
important to remember that access to such means does not, in itself, 
guarantee success. Capacities are as yet unrealised "resources", they are 
means which might have effect in cases of overt conflict depending on a 
range of circumstantially specific factors. From this view, then, those 
who have authority, money, or physical strength have capacities (not 
resources) which might, or might not, permit them to secure certain 
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decision-making preferences. So, for example, A's reference to A's 
status as an "expert" would count as a resource if that appeal was made 
explicit and accepted in the course of some kind of overt dispute. In all 
other contexts, that expertise is merely a capacity. Although I shall use 
the term power to describe instances of overt conflict and so, in a sense, 
adopt a "one dimensional" view, I clearly do not want to claim that 
resources have any absolute value or that they can be identified in 
advance. Rather, I shall suggest that resources are those capacities which 
were deemed to be relevant, and which had effect in a particular case of 
overt dispute. In other words, resources are capacities which, by virtue 
of certain circumstantial conditions (in particular, the participant's 
definition of relevance), allowed, or were expected to allow, A to get B to 
do what B would not otherwise do. 
This definition highlights the importance of the participant's perception 
of relevance. In a sense, "resources" do not exist until the moment of 
their use: the conversion of a "capacity" to a "resource" and the 
identification of its value as such critically depends on the participant's 
definition of relevance with reference to a particular case of conflict. 
Prior to that defining process, each party merely has access to a range of 
potentially effective capacities. Analysis of the interview material 
suggested that there were systematic variations in respondents' definitions 
of relevant capacities depending on the nature of the contentious situation 
with which they were involved. Capacities which were relevant in cases of 
preference conflict were often irrelevant in cases of dispute about 
appropriate behaviour (6). In this chapter I want to consider the 
characteristics of three groups of capacities, each of which was typically 
reported to have a different sort of "currency" or potential relevance. 
The first section of this chapter focuses on the "capacity" with the most 
widespread "relevance" or "currency": indifference. In the second 
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section I shall document the range of "material" resources drawn upon in 
cases of overt dispute and examine the circumstances in which such 
capacities were effective. The third section, on "normative" resources, 
reviews respondents' accounts of the use and potential value of capacities 
which depended on some kind of conventional or normative expectation. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the relationship between access to 
particular types of capacity and potential power, so bringing together 
themes from this and the preceding chapter. 
1. INDIFFERENCE 
Indifference is an interesting capacity. It cannot be controlled by those 
who benefit from it (although it can be cashed in upon); it cannot be used 
to secure a preference, nor can it be used to reward, threaten or sanction 
the opposition yet, in some respects, it is the most generally relevant 
capacity of all. The effort required to secure a preference depends in 
part on the kind of resistance which has to be overcome. If B offers very 
little opposition it will be comparatively easy for A to get B to do what B 
would not otherwise do. In this sense B's indifference can be counted as 
one of A's resources. Patterns of indifference therefore structure the 
context in which other more conventional capacities are expected to have 
effect. 
Issues about which both parties were relatively indifferent were, by 
definition, relatively uncontentious. Some respondents concluded, for 
example, that particular subjects were just too "trivial" to bother arguing 
about. 
"I'd rather turn it [TV] off if it were going to cause an argument. " 
However, in most cases of reported conflict one side was more concerned 
about the outcome than the other. Though individual involvement was 
relatively unpredictable in relation to dispute about matters of 
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preference, patterns of domestic responsibility were clearly associated 
with patterns of indifference. If A was responsible for x, then B accorded 
A the right to make certain decisions relating to x (ie. A had authority 
over matters relating to x). In this context, B's involvement would count 
as interference. In other words, particular allocations of responsibility 
produced particular expectations about who should and who should not be 
involved with particular areas of decison making. This relationship 
between indifference, responsibility and authority is extremely important. 
Because of this connection, decisions which might otherwise be the subject 
of domestic conflict become issues about which only one party has the right 
to decide. Routines of sharing and taking turns produced similar, if less 
systematically structured, expectations of appropriate indifference. If, 
for example, it was the wife's turn to make a decision, the husband had no 
right to interfere. In this context he was obliged to be (or to pretend to 
be) relatively indifferent. 
Thus, patterns of indifference or involvement determined the levels of 
resistance which the opposition has to overcome in cases of conflict. This 
was so whatever the type of conflict and whatever the preferences 
involved. Though at times effective as a peculiar kind of resource, 
indifference, or rather systematic patterns of indifference associated 
with, for example, patterns of authority and responsibility, also served to 
structure the world in which power (in the "one dimensional" sense) was 
exercised. This meant that the domestic contexts in which As got Bs to do 
what Bs would not otherwise do were already coloured by a set of common 
expectations of appropriate indifference. To some degree, then, these 
expectations determined the levels of resistance which A or B would have to 
overcome in order to secure a preference in case of overt conflict. 
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2. MATERIAL RESOURCES 
I shall define material resources as those capacities which could be used 
to directly alter the physical or material environment; which could be 
used as threats, rewards or sanctions; and which were potentially relevant 
in a wide range of contentious situations. The respondents described four 
different forms of material resource: the threat of some kind of physical 
sanction; financial advantage; the ability to act independently; and 
nagging, sulking or shouting. Each of which were used in 
characteristically different circumstances. 
Physical threat 
Several respondents described instances of overt dispute in which they 
and/or their opponent made threatening statements of the form "you do that 
or else. ". In these cases the dispute was apparently resolved before the 
threatened sanction was in fact realised. Indeed, in some instances, 
arguments were conducted with reference to what was presented as a 
"language" of symbolic rather than "real" violence. In the following 
example, the respondent describes how she and her husband "manage" their 
rows. 
"We've had lots of them [rows]. He has thrown paint brushes at me and 
all sorts and so I've thrown rolls of wallpaper at him and we've both 
stormed out... We are not one of these couples that bottle everything 
up, we have a jolly good row and get it out of our system.. " 
Perhaps not surprisingly, there were no descriptions of the actual use of 
physical force or of sex as a resource (7). However, there is no logical 
limit to the range of issues which could, in theory, be resolved with 
reference to physical or sexual rewards or sanctions, and the threat of 
such reward or sanction could inform all kinds of contentious decision- 
making. While such strategies have this theoretically unlimited 
potential, much of the relevant literature emphasises the need to "consider 
violence in its social and cultural context" (Dobash and Dobash, 1980, 
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p15). It is not simply that husbands are likely to have superior access to 
the relevant physical capacity (ie. strength). What is important is that 
access exists in a world structured by certain beliefs and expectations 
about marriage and the family. To quote Dobash and Dobash again, "The 
husband... feels he has a right to control his wife's behaviour and 
authority over most, if not all, areas of her life; it is these beliefs, 
coupled with his desire to maintain authority, that lead to his first 
assault" (Dobash and Dobash, 1980, p914) (8). Though none of my respondents 
described the use of such resources as physical force or sex (a few making 
reference to threats of violence), it is important to acknowledge that, as 
writers on domestic violence have noted, such strategies are used in a 
highly ordered social context. 
Financial advantage 
While money was certainly used as a material capacity, its efficacy varied 
with other social factors. The mere possession of cash (say, the 
housekeeping) did not in itself give an individual a financial advantage. 
Such advantage depended on the right to spend what was seen as individually 
disposable money (9). Definitions of individual rights to spend what was 
normally presented as "our" money varied depending on an individual's 
personal income and on methods of financial management. The following 
example illustrates the relationship between earning and the right to make 
financial decisions about the use of the "family's" money in the context of 
a personal preference dispute. 
"He's talking about getting a video but we havn't got round to it yet 
we are just looking at the prices and hopefully that is as far as it 
is going to get. I think they are a waste of money. I keep thinking 
of what else we could do with our money, but he has earned it I 
suppose so if he wants a video then it is up to him really.. " 
As will be seen in chapter 9, respondents' perceptions of independent 
spending capacity depended on their method of financial management as well 
as on their actual income. For example, wives who had an allowance paid 
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into a separate account usually found it much easier to think of that money 
as "their own" compared with those who had to use a joint account. Though 
neither group had their own independent income those with an allowance were 
able to behave as if they did. The following examples illustrate the 
point. 
"If I want anything I just buy it. I have my own cheque book and my 
own account. I get an allowance every month... once the money is in 
my account he thinks of it as mine. I suppose it is his really but we 
don't think of it like that. " 
"If I want anything I would say "Oh I've seen ... is it alright" and 
then I'd just get it. It is a joint account, he, he doesn't say, he 
just gets whatever he wants. " 
As was seen in the previous chapter, "individually disposable" money could 
be used to determine the outcome of certain kinds of "matter of preference" 
spending decisions and was a necessary precondition for particular forms of 
"unauthorised" behaviour. However, the ability to pay was not usually 
enough to secure an individual preference in the context of a debate about 
a major item of expenditure, or about expenditure related to areas of 
domestic responsibility. These arguments involved appeal to the family 
interest, personal expertise, and/or experience, as well as to rightful 
financial advantage. In practice, the efficacy of an ability to spend was 
often modified by these normative themes of proper behaviour. Though money 
was clearly a material capacity, its conditions of use were hedged around 
by a set of conventions about legitimate methods of resolving particular 
types of dispute. In theory, those with money could spend it as they 
wished. However, it seems that independent spending power was in fact used 
much more cautiously, and often only as a means of securing a desired 
outcome in relation to disputes which were seen to be of the "matter of 
personal preference" type. 
It is, of course, difficult to identify occasions on which A's knowldege of 
B's financial dependence (or independence) informed the outcome of a 
particular dispute. However, there is some evidence that an awareness of 
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financial superiority (or inferiority) had effect as a generalised resource 
in relation to conflict not directly related to questions of immediate 
expenditure. In the next example, for instance, the respondent describes 
how she made use of the fact that she earned more than her husband when she 
was in a "nasty mood". 
"All the money goes in together so there is no [problem], unless I 
tell him like unless I start getting into a nasty mood, no but we 
don't argue about money. " 
Though difficult to demonstrate, it is likely that knowledge of financial 
dependence (or independence) also informed the way in which routine 
spending decisons were presented. For example, those who had to ask 
permission to spend the family's money had no choice but to discuss their 
buying plans. Such decisions might pass unnoticed, and so remain 
unchallenged, under a different system. In such circumstances, the nature 
of the associated advantage varies depending on the nature of the husband's 
and the wife's preference. In other words, the fact that the wife has to 
discuss her spending plans need not necessarily mean that she is put at a 
disadvantage. Such a financial system only has the effect of 
disadvantaging the wife if she is unable to secure a particular preference 
because of that system. If she is able to by all she wants then the system 
has no particular advantaging or disadvantaging status. I shall consider 
such issues in more detail in chapter 9. 
In conclusion, then, superior access to independently disposable money 
allowed individuals to get their way in relation to certain arguments about 
"matters of preference". The value of such a capacity was limited in 
relation to more complex spending issues which involved reference to 
notions of expertise or the family's interest. Though difficult to detect, 
it seemed that an individual's knowledge of their position of relative 
financial dependence also informed the course of a wider range of domestic 
disputes and, perhaps more important, served to order the way in which 
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choices were presented for joint discussion. 
The ability to act independently and against the other's wishes 
The interview material contained several examples of "token" conflict about 
events which had already happened. In some of these cases, the argument 
concerned what B defined as A's illegitimate behaviour. A's ability to 
behave in this illegitimate fashion usually depended on a series of 
"material" resources which, in combination, allowed A to directly affect 
B's material environment and to get B to do what B would not otherwise do: 
namely, accept A's "misbehaviour". In the following example the wife was 
unable to prevent future "misbehaviour" on her husband's part because she 
was apparently unable to produce any effective deterrent. Her husband was 
able to secure his preference because of his generalised ability to act 
independently and without regard for his wife's wishes. 
"We have a lot of arguments because he drinks a lot really. It is a 
row everytime about drink, nothing else, always drink. He comes home 
late, drunk and can't see anything wrong. It's gone on for 10 years.. 
it won't change, and he's always said well he says "I don't have to 
rule him" really he can do anything he wants so I have to do as I'm 
told. We both won't give in, neither of us will give in. " 
Other respondents described how they (or their husbands) booked holidays, 
chose pets, or bought new furniture, all against the other's stated wishes. 
The ability to act in these ways was a particularly effective resource as 
the action literally secured the desired option. Opponents could merely 
respond with claims about what should and should not have happened, with 
threats about the nature of their response in case of a re-offence, or with 
immediate recrimination, none of which did anything to alter what had 
already taken place. Providing the offender retained the ability to act 
against the other's wishes, the other could do nothing but register his/her 
objection to every such event. Not surprisingly, then, arguments which 
followed the "use" of this form of generalised resource tended to recur. 
In practice, this sort of "fait accompli" tactic allowed individuals to 
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behave in ways which the other deemed to be "wrong" and was 
characteristically "used" as a means of securing a preference in the 
context of an argument about appropriate behaviour. Several respondents 
described occasions on which they had lost disputes about matters of 
responsibility or delegated responsibility because of their opponent's 
ability to simply misbehave. 
"I lose my temper because I can walk in the room and not be able to 
sit down because there are books and there is a paper, there now look, 
books and papers on every chair" 
"There are lots of jobs that never get finished. I keep on at him but 
it doesn't seem to make much difference. " 
Thus, the ability to act independently and against the other's wishes 
allowed victory in relation to disputes about matters of preference as well 
as in relation to disputes about appropriate behaviour. In theory, the 
relevance of such an ability was only limited by the availability of issues 
which could be resolved by an "unauthorised" individual action. 
Nagging, sulking and shouting. 
I have chosen to describe nagging, sulking and shouting as "material" 
resources on the grounds that such behaviour has an immediate impact on the 
other's domestic environment. While the content of a nag, a sulk or a 
shout usually involved some kind of "normative" appeal of the form "You 
should/shouldn't do .... ", the style of that critical comment meant that 
the challenge also made some material difference to the home environment. 
To sulk, nag or shout was to "deliberately" contravene normal codes of 
conduct as a means of disrupting the other's social world and so "wearing 
down" their resistance. The difference between, say, nagging and "reasoned 
argument" is that the nagger offers the opponent a negative kind of reward 
for compliance. If the opponent gives in the nagging will stop. The 
style therefore adds a "material" dimension to the challenge, whatever the 
"content". 
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Though all were able to nag, sulk or shout, the value of such action 
depended entirely upon the opposition's reaction. If the opposition 
ignored the sulking or was indifferent to the nagging, the style of the 
appeal had no additional value. The following examples illustrate the 
extremes of effective sulking and apparently ineffectual shouting. 
"I win. I just sulk and then he'll turn it (TV) over and that is it. " 
"He doesn't do anything about it, no, he'd just shout about it .. but 
him shouting, no, that didn't ... it used to upset me, he still says 
I'm a slob, it annoys him that I don't clear up after him all the 
time, but no, he just used to shout.. It didn't do any good. " 
Such characteristically unreliable resources were typically used as a "last 
resort" (or as the only resort) when all other methods failed. The need to 
behave in this way was therefore partly determined by an individual's 
access to, or lack of, more effective methods of securing their 
preference. The use of one tactic rather than another (ie. sulking rather 
than nagging or shouting) varied depending on the contentious issue's 
location in the past, present or future. Nagging was used as a future 
orientated resource in what was ususally an attempt to get the opposition 
to do something or to behave in a certain way. 
"I just nag. I've been going on about a coffee table for a long time. 
You know "I want a coffee table. " That is all I say. I just keep 
saying it. " 
In comparison, sulks were characteristically used in response to a past 
event. Some followed occasions of non-compliance and were presumably 
"intended" to deter future "misbehaviour"; others simply provided the 
sulker with a means of expressing displeasure at what was seen to be an 
inevitable outcome. 
"I have my moan. I have to have my little moan. I mean it wouldn't 
be fair if I didn't have. I usually give in because it is only fair 
but I have to have a little moan. I have to voice my opinion. I 
wouldn't be trodden down. " 
While nagging and sulking were both used as generalised means of expressing 
displeasure, shouts were typically tied to an immediate issue. 
"I just sat and shouted at him. I said 'It's none of your mother's 
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business what we do. "' 
Although I was unable to examine the ways in which different sections of 
the sample went about their arguments in any detail, it is important to 
observe that there were stylistic differences. None of the respondents in 
the H1 category (10) claimed to have shouted at their husbands, just as 
none of the husbands were reported to have adopted the nagging strategy. 
It is, of course, difficult to tell whether these patterns reflect 
individual access to other more effective capacities, general sub-cultural 
expectations of the way in which domestic dispute should be conducted or 
assumptions about what should be confessed to interviewers! 
Characteristics of material resources 
By definition capacities which could be used as material resources had a 
direct impact on the opponent's physical environment. Yet their effect was 
not independent of any social or cultural context. Definitions of relevant 
"material" capacities were "made" with reference to conventions of 
appropriate arguing style, a conception of the subject at issue, and a 
knowledge of the opponent. Second, and perhaps more important, all 
material capacities had effect as resources as a consequence of an 
elaborate cultural process which specified, for example, the meanings of 
independently disposable money, of nagging as opposed to rational 
discussion, of legitimate and illegitimate volumes of debate, etc. etc. 
That is not to say that there was no genuinely material base line of, say, 
physical, material or financial advantage. That may well have been so. 
Nonetheless, the material resources described in relation to domestic 
disputes about matters of preference, and, to a lesser extent, in relation 
to arguments about the meaning of appropriate behaviour, were defined and 
used in a highly ordered context of beliefs about acceptable methods of 
dispute. 
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3. NORMATIVE RESOURCES 
In this section I shall consider use of appeals to what were believed to be 
shared conventions of what ought to happen. In making such an appeal, A 
emphasised the "rightness" of A's position and (presuming that B shared the 
same beliefs about appropriate behaviour) illustrated the illegitimacy of 
the position adopted by B. If B could be convinced of the justice of A's 
claim, B had no choice but to give in. 
The interview material illustrates the use of two types of normative 
appeal. First, there were appeals to what were conventionally agreed to 
be good reasons why one particular option should be chosen and not another. 
These beliefs were about proper decision-making styles and procedures. 
They did not prescribe one rather than another particular outcome though 
they did specify the kinds of reasons which could be used to justify 
preferred options. Second, there were appeals to what was presumed to be a 
shared definition of proper behaviour. These appeals directly referred to 
a model of what should happen in the circumstances and were used in 
arguments about the allocation and control of domestic responsibility. In 
both cases the efficacy of a normative appeal depended in part on the 
degree to which husband and wife shared the same conventions of appropriate 
procedure or behaviour, and in part on their relative abilities to resist 
normative pressures. 
cýýa ýýýýýýý 
The interview material provides evidence of the use of three types of "good 
reason" in cases of conflict about what were usually "matters of 
preference". These were: 
a) appeals to a notion of mutual interest and/or convenience 
b) appeals to some kind of special knowledge or expertise 
c) appeals to a procedure of turn taking or compromise 
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Mutual interest and convenience 
The definition of a sensible, rational or convenient option depended on 
establishing a common interest in relation to which that option made sense 
or was convenient. Described appeals to themes of rationality or 
convenience were made with reference to what was expected to be a shared 
notion of the family's interest. If A can claim that only one choice makes 
sense from "the family's" point of view there should be no further debate. 
The outcome of arguments involving claims about more or less convenient or 
rational options therefore depended on what could be deemed to be in the 
"family's interest". 
The definition of an option which was in the "family's interest" was the 
product of an evalutation of the range of perceived alternatives with 
reference to a set of "family priorities". In this context conceptions of 
mutual interest and convenience were strongly influenced by expectations of 
gender/role appropriate behaviour and informed by a very general vision of 
normal family life. As illustrated by the following example, an appeal to 
the "family's interest" was expected to have more effect than an appeal to 
a personal preference. In this case, the wife argued that she was able to 
contribute to the family income without having to delegate "too much" 
gender inappropriate labour, and was therefore able to portray her personal 
"need" to work as a "need" which was in fact in the family's interest. She 
was able to secure her preference with the aid of this normative appeal. 
"He doesn't particularly care for me to go out to work but what choice 
have you got? He said he'd pack up smoking rather than me go out to 
work but I just said '0h I'm starting Monday'. He had the children to 
look after, so he wasn't very pleased ... I just thought well I'll just 
have to get on with it, we need the money and that is it. Actually I 
needed the job as much to get out a bit as for the money. The money 
is still necessary, it still goes. " 
Those who were able to present their own preferences as preferences which 
were "in the family's interest" were able to use this notion to their own 
advantage, for opposition was, by definition, either selfish or irrational. 
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Expertise 
Those who were able to claim some kind of special knowledge or expertise 
were also able to argue that they were in the best position to make the 
most rational choice (ie. the choice that was in "the family interest"). 
It is important to distinguish such claims of expertise from generalised 
patterns of authority based on expert status. If someone is known or 
expected to be an expert and is accorded authority on that basis then they 
already have the right to decide. This serves to preclude debate. Here I 
am concerned with specific appeals to expertise in cases in which there was 
no already established pattern of authority and hence no model of who 
should decide or what should happen. In other words, I am only concered 
with appeals made in the context of a dispute about what began as a matter 
of personal preference. It is only in this context that both sides 
believe, at least to start with, that neither have any special right to 
make the final choice. Individuals who referred to their expertise in 
relation to a preference conflict therefore either revealed a previously 
unknown skill or found themselves embroiled in a dispute about the 
relevance of particular areas of expertise. The case quoted below is an 
example of the latter. 
"Well this three piece suite is totally wrong for here. It was the 
best we could afford at the time but it is quite wrong for this house 
so we are looking for another but like I said he has got no sense of 
what would be suitable. If we go and look at one all he is interested 
in is the joints. He wants to turn it over and see where it was made 
and all this sort of thing wheras I would be thinking how will it fit 
in the room. I found one that would do nicely but he said it wasn't 
very well made so we are still looking" 
Because husband and wife have different kinds of suite buying expertise, 
each has access to a set of different but equally "good reasons" why the 
couple should choose one rather than the other option. Unless they find a 
piece of furniture which fits both criteria they are likely to have to 
upgrade their disagreement into a debate about the relative priority of 
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what the husband sees as "good craftsmanship" versus what the wife sees as 
"good design". 
Revelations of previously unknown skills almost always served to secure the 
claimants preference provided that the opponent accepted the expert claim 
and the notion that such expertise was, in this case, relevant. Here, for 
example, the husband managed to secure his preference having made reference 
to a newly acquired area of expertise. 
"He chose the washing machine. He'd just bought one for his mother, 
well not bought it but he'd found one for her and so he knew what 
there was and so I just left it to him that time. The one before that 
I chose but this time I just left it to him really. " 
Compromise and turn-taking arrangements 
Those who agreed to take turns to make decisions agreed to give way on the 
promise of the right to expect the other to give way in relation to some 
future, equivalent decision. If there was dispute about the outcome of 
that equivalent decision, one party could claim that they had a legitimate 
right to decide (ie. they had a localised form of authority) because it was 
"their turn". The formality of the described turn-taking arrangements 
varied enormously. Some respondents had very rigid "deciding rotas", 
others described such practices with reference to a more diffuse notion of 
"give and take". 
"That is what it (marriage) is all about isn't it? Share and share 
alike, a bit of give and take. Well it should be. 11 
Even informal systems justified a particular outcome on the grounds that it 
was the preference of the temporarily legitimate decision-maker. 
Compromise agreements were rather different. If A compromised, A gave way 
on one aspect of a decision in return for an equivalent concession from B 
with respect to another aspect of that same decision. If one side was 
prepared to modify their preference a little, it was seen to be unjust if 
the other did not behave similarly. Provided that husband and wife could 
define the meaning of "equivalent" concessions, they were able to negotiate 
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around otherwise insoluble problems. Of course, compromise was only 
possible if the issue was such that preferences could be modified, and if 
the couple agreed about the boundary of the decision in question. For 
example, those who viewed a decision about lounge furnishings as a single 
issue had to negotiate a different form of compromise compared with those 
who treated the acquisition of each item of furniture as a separate event. 
These next two quotations illustrate just such different forms of 
negotiated concession. 
"We managed to compromise over the lounge really because he has liked 
older traditional things and I sort of like contemporary things. The 
lounge is a sort of mixture really. The suite is his. There is a 
wall unit in there that is mine, and that [chair] is mine as well.. " 
"I'd been planning to have maybe a Chesterfield, something like that 
and er when we went to the Ideal Home exhibition we saw a leather 
swivel chair which Brian liked. I would never have picked that in a 
million years and so we ended up buying a leather settee. So I 
adapted a bit so, you know, it does work both ways a bit. " 
Arrangements of the form "If you give in on x I'll give in on y" were 
temporally isolated and, unlike turn-taking arrangements, had no future 
implications. 
Having considered the forms of "good reason" which were expected to justify 
the selection of one rather than another viable option, I shall now 
consider the described use of direct appeals to models of what ought to 
happen. 
Proper behaviour 
Instances of domestic deviance or misbehaviour were identified with 
reference to what was presumed to be a shared model of proper behaviour. 
Appeal was made to this same model as a means of reforming the deviant and 
was effective only in cases in which the other shared the same set of 
beliefs. The outcome of arguments about appropriate behaviour which were 
not solved by such appeal, for example, those in which husband and wife 
held different conceptions of proper behaviour or in which those 
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conceptions were internally contradictory or vague, varied depending on the 
ability of one to persuade the other of the justice of their position, of 
one's ability to resist the other's normative pressure, or of one's ability 
to resort to more effective strategies of "persuasion". These are the key 
characteristics of all types of normative appeal. In practice, of course, 
the content of the appeal varied from subject to subject and from 
respondent to respondent. I shall review the respondent's conceptions of 
appropriate behaviour in chapters 5 to 9 and so document the range of 
beliefs which could be used or appealed to in case of overt dispute. For 
now, it is enough to make the above observations about the general 
character of appeals to a notion of proper behaviour. 
Characteristics of normative resources 
Accepted procedures for identifying "good reasons" for the selection of one 
from the range of viable alternatives clearly ordered the outcome of 
certain preference disputes. For example, those who could claim that their 
preference was in the family's interest had immediate access to one of the 
most culturally effective arguments in favour of that particular outcome. 
Though the described models of family interest, the specification of 
expertise, and the turn taking arrangements varied widely, all served to 
label one option as the "better" or, in some cases, as the "only" practical 
or sensible alternative. Similarly, appeals to a notion of what ought to 
happen were effective provided that both parties shared the same definition 
of proper procedure or proper behaviour. The fact that most couples did so 
does nothing to modify the theoretically limited utility of all such 
normative appeals. 
I shall end this chapter with two rather different kinds of conclusion. 
The first set of concluding remarks concern the relationship between types 
of choice, types of decision, types of conflict, and now, types of 
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resources. These observations effectively take the case presented in the 
conclusion to chapter 3 one stage further. The second set of remarks 
revolve around the meaning of potential power, and the relationship between 
access to potentially relevant capacities and an ability to secure a 
preference. Both strands of argument are informed by the preceding 
analysis of empirical material about domestic decision-related dispute, and 
by an underlying argument whcih is of relevance in a much wider range of 
decision-making circumstances. 
The relationship between types of choice, types of decision-making, types 
of conflict and types of resources 
In this chapter I have described the contexts in which material and 
normative capacities were reportedly used and considered some of the 
characteristics of each strategy. Material capacities, especially 
financial advantage, nagging, sulking and an ability to behave 
independently were typically used in attempts to secure a desired outcome 
in cases of dispute about matters of personal preference. Disputes of this 
"preference" type were also ordered with reference to a set of normative 
conventions about proper decision-making criteria. Those who could present 
their personal preference as one which was supported on grounds of 
expertise, convenience, or rationality were expected to be at an advantage. 
Provided the other accepted the legitimacy of that appeal, the claimant was 
likely be able to secure his/her chosen preference. Not surprisingly, 
arguments about appropriate behaviour almost always involved reference to a 
model of proper behaviour. Given that both parties shared the same model, 
one was usually able to persuade the other to modify what was agreed to be 
deviant or inappropriate behaviour. In cases where such normative 
strategies failed, A and B were likely to make use of material capacities 
whose efficacy did not depend on the other's views or beliefs. Disputes 
about decisions in which there was apparently "no choice" only involved 
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reference to anything like a resource if there was disagreement about the 
"no choice" status of the decision itself. In those circumstances, each 
side made reference to a model of family priority which produced what 
seemed to be the inevitable (or less than inevitable) outcome. In other 
words, each made reference to a vision of proper family behaviour. 
I can now relate this account of the kinds of capacities typically used in 
particular forms of domestic argument to the earlier discussion of types of 
conflict and types of choice (chapter 3). Essentially, I want to suggest 
that it is useful to review decision-related conflict with reference to a 
logical sequence of structuring factors. I began by classifying choices 
according to the initial perception of the range of viable alternatives 
from which a final selection had to be made, thus arriving at a list of 
three types: the "open"; the "limited" and the "closed". I then ordered 
types of decision according to the type of choice involved. This produced 
a list of three types of decision: those about matters of preference which 
involved an "open" type of choice; those about appropriate behaviour in 
which the type of choice was "limited" and those in which there was 
apparently "no choice". I went on to identify three types of decision- 
related conflict, each of which was associated with a different type of 
decision. Finally, I considered the kinds of capacities which were 
typically believed to be relevant in relation to each of the three types of 
decision-related conflict. On the basis of this analysis I want to argue 
that the respondents' definitions of relevant capacities varied depending 
(in part) on their initial perception of the type of choice associated with 
what proved to be a contentious decision. This is really no more than 
saying that perception of the means which might allow A to secure A's 
preference relate to perception of the kind of dispute at issue. Though I 
have explored the stages of this argument with reference to material on 
domestic decision-making, the following diagram could be used to describe 
decision-related conflict in any number of social contexts. 
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FIGURE 5 
Types of decision Types of conflict Types of resources 
(defined in terms (which arose in (which were used 
of perceived choice) relation to types of in the context of 
decision) different types of 
conflict) 
Open Matters of Preference Material or 
normative - good 
reasons 
Limited Appropriate Behaviour Normative - proper 
behaviour 
Closed No Choice None or 
normative - proper 
behaviour 
The diagram maps the relation between types of conflict, types of 
resources, types of decision-making and types of perceived choice. In 
practice, of course, the actual issues, beliefs, expectations, and material 
capacities which inform the course of family decision-making combine to 
fill out this abstract framework in a particular way. Later chapters will 
explore these characteristics of specifically domestic decision-making. 
For now the point is to present an essentially abstract way of viewing 
instances of overt conflict which incorporates an analysis of resources, 
that is of the capacities deemed to be relevant as means which allow A to 
get B to do what B would not otherwise do, and which therefore permits 
subsequent analysis of the context of dispute with reference to a basic 
typology of kinds of choice. 
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The relationship between power, potential power, capacities and resources 
I observed earlier that resources were the means which actually allowed A 
to get B to do what B would not otherwise do and that capacities were means 
which might or might not count as resources depending on the nature and the 
circumstances of conflict as seen by those involved. A can be said to have 
exercised power when A gets B to do what B would not otherwise do, and A 
can be said to have potential power if it can be shown that A could get B 
to do what B would not otherwise do. We can think of two levels of 
potential power. In a general sense, those who have access to capacities 
are likely to be able to control others. This is an extremely broad 
conclusion for capacities, in this sense, would include almost all 
abilities to affect others, only some of which, in certain circumstances 
could be used to get B to do what B would not otherwise do. More 
immediately, we can think of potential power as a situation specific 
ability: in circumstance x, A would be likely to get B do do what B would 
not otherwise do. Provided that expectations of relevance and of 
legitimate styles of argument remain more or less constant, it would be 
possible to conclude that those who had access to capacities which were 
likely to count as resources in relation to particular kinds of dispute had 
potential power, at least in relation to those kinds of decision-making 
contexts. If there was dispute over y, and if A had more of capacity x 
than B (11), then A would be likely to be able to secure A's preference. 
Following this line of argument, those who have more of capacity x 
(compared with their potential opponent) have what might be described as 
potential power with respect to decisions y and in typical circumstances z. 
It is important to be clear about the meaning of capacities if I am to 
reach any conclusion about the relationship between the distribution of 
potentially relevant capacities and the distribution of potential power. 
First, and as I described above, there are certain social limits to the 
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potential value or relevance of particular kinds of capacities. For 
instance, appeals to a vision of what should happen are quite ineffective 
if the other does not share the same definition. In comparison, material 
resources, which by definition allow A to directly alter B's environment 
without reference to B's beliefs or views, have almost unlimited potential 
relevance. At a very general level, different types of capacities have 
social qualities which determine their potential as resources and, by 
implication, those who have superior access to capacities with a relatively 
unlimited potential (eg. material resources) might be said to be in a 
potentially powerful position. In practice, the described use of both 
material and normative resources was rather more complex. To have formal 
access to, say, independently disposable money was not to have the right to 
use it as a means of securing a preference wherever theoretically possible. 
In the domestic context, the use of both material and normative resources 
appeared to be ordered by a set of conventions about appropriate styles of 
argument. Though I did not have enough information to explore these 
conventions in any detail, it was clearly necessary to take them into 
account when describing the reported use of such capacities as financial 
advantage or the ability to behave independently and against the other's 
wishes. Particular capacities, though potentially relevant in any number 
of contentious contexts, were in fact used very selectively. 
This means that I would need to know about the conventions which ordered 
the actual use of such capacities before I could estimate their likely, if 
context specific, relevance, and hence before I could begin to consider the 
"potential power" (in the immediate sense) of those who had access to such 
capacities. If I had such knowledge I could conclude that superior access 
to certain capacities would probably allow an individual to secure (or to 
try to secure) their preference in cases of a particular type of domestic 
dispute. For example, an individual who had more independently disposable 
138 
spending money would be likely to be able to overcome opposition in cases 
of conflict about a matter of preference. They would have potential power 
with respect to certain specific issues. 
However, it is not possible to leap from this position to the conclusion 
that certain categories of person who tend to have superior access to 
certain capacities (with respect to others) are likely to realise their 
potential power. After all, the ability to use independently disposable 
money is only a resource if this allows an individual to secure his/her 
preference in opposition to the other. Those without such means were only 
at a disadvantage if they were therefore unable to get their way in case of 
overt dispute. Furthermore, that capacity, independently disposable 
spending money, is only a source of potential power (in the immediate 
sense) if there are, or are likely to be, opposing preferences. Access 
to independent spending money was immaterial to those who never wanted a 
new coffee table, or a "better" winter coat, or whose husband never opposed 
such wishes (12). While I can document the distribution of capacities (and 
shall do so in later chapters, especially chapter 9), I have to acknowledge 
that there is an enormous and complex gap between potential power and its 
realisation in case of overt dispute. Two of the most obvious factors 
which order the realisation or otherwise of potential power are the 
respondent's preference and the nature of the opposition. Given that I 
cannot presume that all respondents shared the same preferences or that all 
faced the same type of opposition, I cannot presume that in documenting the 
distribution of capacities I am thereby documenting patterns of power. 
While a review of the distribution of capacities might allow me to conclude 
that certain individuals or even certain categories of person would be 
likely to secure their preferences, either in general or in particular 
circumstances, I am unable to reach any conclusions about the likely 
realisation of that potential on the basis of that survey alone. In sum, 
the above discussion of resources is valuable in as far as it draws 
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attention to the complexity of the relationship between potentially 
relevant capacities and effective resources, and the relationship between 
potential and actual power. 
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CHAPTER 4: NOTES 
1. It is often difficult to identify the conceptions of resources which 
lie behind accounts of power, not least because different writers variously 
classify sub-types of power including those which are based on influence, 
authority, force etc. (Wrong, 1979) or choose to incorporate "power" as one 
amongst other methods of "significantly affecting" others. From this view, 
alternative methods might include, for example, authority, force, influence 
etc. etc. (Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950). Those who adopt the first strategy 
equate resources with the bases of power while those who adopt the second 
define different means of securing compliance with reference to different 
"bases" and so have no need for a separate conception of resources. I am 
not especially concerned to document these differences for it seems that 
they are essentially symptomatic of more fundamental differences in the 
analysts' view of power in the sense described by Lukes (Lukes, 1974). 
2. If A has authority (in relation to decision x), then, as I shall use 
the term, B has accorded A the right to make decisions about x. 
3. B may well end up doing what B would not have otherwise done because of 
A, or rather, because of A's status as an authoritative figure. However, 
to say that is not to say that B necessarily ends up doing what is against 
B's interests because of A's authority. Relations of authority do not 
neccessarily equal relations of power if power relations are defined in 
terms of A's ability to get B to do what's not in B's interests. 
Similarly, relations of authority do not necessarily equate with relations 
of power if power relations are defined in terms of A's ability to get B to 
do what B would not otherwise do. After all, B might have done x 
regardless of A's authority. Relations of authority are therefore neither 
the same as, nor necessarily opposed to those of power unless, as Bachrach 
and Baratz argue, the very fact of their legitimacy precludes incorporation 
in an oppositional account of power. Rather, relations of authority 
generate capacities which might, or might not be used to further particular 
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interests. 
4. Bachrach and Baratz suggest that capacities only have effect as 
resources if the following conditions are met "the person threatened is 
aware of what is expected of him.... the threatened sanction is actually 
regarded as a deprivation by the person who is so threatened" and the 
person threatened is "fearful that A will deprive him of a value or values 
which he regards more highly than those which would have been achieved by 
noncompliance" (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970, p23 and p24). 
5. I have defined resources as capacities which were "expected to allow" A 
to secure A's preference so as not to distinguish between the threat of a 
sanction and its actual application. As can clearly get Bs to do what Bs 
would not otherwise do "even in circumstances where those who "threaten" 
the sanctions [ie. As] have not actually invoked them" (Bachrach and 
Baratz, 1970, p26). At a more general level, capacities can be seen as 
means which might conceivably allow A to get B... whatever the particular 
circumstances of that event. 
6. Some capacities were potentially relevant (in the immediate sense) in 
relation to a range of different types of conflict. In addition, there was 
evidence that different sections of the sample adopted different styles of 
argument and so drew upon different resources in relation to otherwise 
similar types of conflict. 
7. Dobash and Dobash write "Most women do not tell anyone when their 
husbands first begin to slap, shove, and hit them, and in our sample over 
half also remained silent when the beatings became more systematic and 
severe. " (Dobash and Dobash, 1980, p165). There was no reason to suppose 
that I would uncover the use of such violent strategies even if they were 
in fact adopted. A similar silence was to be expected in relation to the 
use of sex as a means of control. 
8. Dobash and Dobash use the term "authority" rather loosely. Authority, 
if defined as the legitimate right to decide, cannot be maintained with the 
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aid of physical force. 
9. This point is often overlooked by writers who presume that those who 
have formal access to money also have the right to spend that money. 
(Pahl, 1980; Yeandle, 1984; Chesler, 1976; Hunt, 1980; Stamp, 1985) 
10. As described in chapter 3, I shall use the terms H1, H2 and H3 to 
locate respondents in terms of their housing category. 
11. A's capacity is, of course, judged relative to that of B and not with 
reference to some absolute measure. 
12. Of course, A might never get as far as wanting a coffee table because 
that was "known" to be an unrealistic preference given the current 
financial position. However, I cannot explore the processes which 
structure the creation of overtly recognised wants without also making 
certain presumptions about what people would want if it were not for 
certain apparently fixed features of the social and material world. In 
other words, I would need to presume that A would want a new coffee table 
if A had the money and if that were seen to be a realistic proposition. 
As I have said earlier, I do not intend to take such steps or to make such 
definitions of my respondent's "real interests". 
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PART 2 
INTRODUCTION TO PART 2 
In this short introduction I want to relate the themes developed in 
chapters 3 and 4 to those which are the subject of chapters 5 to 10. So 
far I have tried to present respondents' descriptions of overtly 
contentious decision-making in such a way as to develop an abstract account 
of the relationship between types of conflict, types of resources and types 
of decision. Essentially, I have argued that perceptions of choice set the 
scene for particular types of conflict, in relation to which particular 
types of capacities were likely to count as relevant resources. 
Accordingly, initial perceptions of choice type structured the course of 
associated conflict and hence of particular applications of power. In 
addition, certain beliefs and expectations served to order described 
perceptions of choice such that the chances of debate, let alone dispute, 
were minimised. For example, patterns of authority (informed by beliefs 
about family and gender appropriate behaviour) bracketed together otherwise 
debatable domestic issues, removed them from family view and so ordered 
both the occurrence and the form of family argument. The case, then, is 
one about the structure of conflict and about the relationship between the 
elements of perception of choice, course of conflict and definition of 
resources. I have tried to explore the general role of beliefs and 
expectations about family life and to examine the theoretical significance 
of the respondent's initial perception of choice, but as yet I have had no 
need to describe the content of those beliefs or perceptions. 
The next four chapters are designed to address those issues of content with 
reference to the case presented in the preceeding discussion. They are 
informed by the belief that a review of described perceptions of choice, 
along with a survey of relevant expectations of proper family behaviour, 
will reveal something of the world in which domestic decision-making 
disputes do and do not develop.. By implication, variations in reported 
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perception of choice reflect variation in the context of power. For if x 
was seen to be a matter of preference, and if there was disagreement, then 
capacities a and b would be likely to count as resources. Alternatively, 
if x was seen to be an argument about appropriate behaviour then capacities 
c and d would be likely to count as relevant. So, the next task is to 
attend to respondents' perceptions of the kinds of choice associated with a 
set of common decisions and to describe their definition of the proper 
allocation of domestic responsibility, so as to map the similarities and 
differences in the family contexts in which conflict did and did not 
develop. Having outlined the theoretical importance of perceptions of 
choice I can now describe the substantive content of those reported 
perceptions. 
As mentioned earlier, I chose to ask respondents about the ways in which 
they dealt with a series of discrete family decisions. The next four 
chapters provide an account of those responses under the headings of Family 
and Career (chapter 5), House and Home (chapter 6), Leisure (chapter 7), 
and Holidays (chapter 8). Discussion of respondents' accounts of such 
clear cut decision-making is followed by an analysis of interview material 
relating to the allocation and control of areas of domestic responsibility. 
Chapter 9 reviews decision-making practices and patterns of responsibility 
associated with family finance while chapter 10 documents the ways in which 
different sections of the sample allocated areas of domestic 
responsibility and so demarcated areas of normally taken-for-granted 
decision-making. 
In the first part of the thesis I have developed an account of the 
relationship between types of conflict, types of decision-making and types 
of resources. I have consequently had no need to systematically describe 
variation in the responses provided by different sections of the sample. 
However, that variation is critical in chapters 5 to 10. Although I 
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completed and transcribed 64 interviews, 12 of these were "duplicates" in 
the sense that I had already met the quota of two for that particular 
category. I excluded these 12 duplicates from all percentage calculations, 
though I drew upon all 64 transcriptions when selecting illustrative 
quotations. Of course, there were also times when only a sub-section of 
the comparative sample of 52 had first-hand experience of a particular 
decision. In these cases I have stated the size of the relevant sub- 
sample. 
The following chapters, then, are concerned with variation: the task was to 
find out how respondents' perceptions of choice or beliefs about proper 
family behaviour differed, and to explore the areas of overlap and 
similarity. As described in chapter 2, the sample was structured with 
reference to the variables of housing (which notionally stood for material 
difference), child-related age, and wife's employment status. In principle 
I was able to order my analysis with respect to some or all of these 
dimensions. In practice I chose to review the interview material with 
reference to "housing", "age" or "work" on strictly pragmatic grounds. For 
example, the material on decisions about furnishing and accomodation 
differed more dramatically with reference to the "housing" variable than 
with reference to wife's employment status. Chapter 6, on decisions about 
house and home, is structured accordingly. In comparison, chapters 7 and 
8, on holidays and leisure, include sections on child-related age 
differences as well as on those related to housing categories. 
Whatever the method of organising particular chapters or particular 
sections of chapters, it was important to locate respondents in terms of 
their position in the sampling frame. I shall reference the illustrative 
quotations used in the next four chapters with the aid of the following 
terms (see chapter 2 for fuller details). 
H1 = respondents in the Housing 1 category 
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H2 = respondents in the Housing 2 category 
H3 = respondents in the Housing 3 category 
No children, younger = childless respondents under the age of 35 
No children, older = childless respondents over the age of 35 
Pre-school age = respondents whose youngest child was of pre-school age 
School age = respondents whose youngest child was of school age 
16+ = respondents whose youngest child was over 16 
Where relevant I have also noted the wife's employment status, though most 
quotations are simply concluded with a reference of the following type: 
[H3, no children, younger], [H2,16+], etc. 
To sum up, chapters 3 and 4 highlighted the importance of initial 
perception of choice as a factor which orders the course of domestic 
decision-related conflict. The typologies of kinds of choice, kinds of 
decision, kinds of conflict and kinds of resources reflect that informing 
conception. The value of ordering analysis of overt conflict with 
reference to that theme will become clearer in the following chapters which 
borrow the same scheme of classification but use it to order analysis of 
uncontentious decision-making. The argument is that variations in 
described perceptions of choice, and in conceptions of appropriate 
allocations of domestic responsibility, reflect variations in the domestic 
worlds which structure the course and occurence of domestic dispute. 
Chapters 5 to 9 are designed to document those variations. 
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CHAPTER 5 
FAMILY AND CAREER 
This chapter examines the interview material which concerned decisions 
about family and about career. Such decisions had untold consequences in 
terms of many other aspects of the respondents' domestic lives and so 
provide a convenient starting point for the following analyses of less 
evidently influential types of family decision-making. Essentially, the 
chapter documents respondents' perceptions of choice associated first with 
decisions about having children and second, with decisions about paid work. 
As I shall suggest below, the literature on parenthood, work, and 
especially on womens' work rarely attends to the associated decision-making 
processes. This chapter focusses on these issues, and sets out to explore 
variations in the perceptions of choice described by different sections of 
the sample. The aim is to discover how different groups perceived the 
"same" issues, on the grounds that those who believe their choices to be 
either "open", "limited" or "closed" would (if there were any disagreement) 
become engaged with a correspondingly different sort of conflict, and 
would, furthermore, count different sorts of capacities as relevant 
resources. More pragmatically, I have chosen to combine analysis of 
decisions about family planning with discussion of employment related 
choices because it seemed that both were informed by a similar vision of a 
"proper" family career. Part of the task, therefore, is to explore the 
meanings of a "proper" family life cycle and to consider the ways in which 
those visions variously affected choices made by husband and wife. 
Curiously, the relevant literature on parenthood, motherhood, family 
planning, paid employment, dual career families, womens' working lives, and 
husbands' careers, very rarely attends to the question of how individuals 
come to be in the position of working mother, factory worker, doctor, 
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manager etc. etc. Rather, the common task of this decriptive work is to 
explain or understand how individuals cope with their current position as 
incumbent of one or more of those roles (1). Attention has mostly been 
directed towards the kind of question: "How do married women workers/ 
pregnant women/managers/factory workers/doctors etc. manage their domestic 
lives? ", rather than towards the question "What were the decisions involved 
in becoming a pregnant woman, a doctor, a factory worker etc.? " (2) 
Accordingly, relatively little of that literature directly relates 
discussion of domestic decision-making. 
However, in as far as writers such as Oakley (1979), Graham (1977), Poliert 
(1981), or Callan and Ardener (1984) attend to the ways in which domestic 
strategies are informed by underlying ideologies of family and work, they 
give some insight into the world in which those unexplored decisions must 
have been made. Thus, in my own research, respondents' decisions to try 
to conceive, and subsequent decisions about trying to have more children, 
were clearly ordered by a set of beliefs about the nature of a proper 
family. Equally, choices about changing jobs, stopping work, and returning 
to it, were described with reference to a notion of normal career, and, 
more important perhaps, with reference to a notion of the relationship 
between that normal career and a normal family life. There is, therefore, 
some connection between the existing literature and the material presented 
in this chapter in the sense that both explore the relationship between 
described or observed behaviour and an informing culture or ideology (3). 
I shall consider respondents' accounts of decisions about starting a family 
and about final family size in the first two sections of the chapter. 
Decisions about employment, about changing, stopping and returning to work 
were apparently informed by a related but different set of generalised 
expectations about family life. These are the subject of the third and 
fourth sections which explore the relationship between conceptions of 
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family obligation and the kinds of choice seen to exist in relation to 
decisions about the wife's and the husband's employment. Throughout the 
chapter I shall be concerned to explore the detail of the described 
decision-making processes and, at the same time, to document the beliefs 
and expectations which variously informed the choices made by different 
sections of the sample. 
1. THE DECISION TO START A FAMILY 
No one can decide to start a family in the knowledge that they can and will 
consequently have children. In this section I shall review respondents' 
accounts of what were really decisions to take all possible measures to 
maximise (or minimise) the chances of conception. Of course, those who 
wanted a family, as well as those who wished to remain childless, were 
unable to predict whether or not they would be able to realise their goal 
(4). Respondents who turned out to be unable to have children had 
therefore made just the same decisons as those who actually produced a 
child. Though there was always an element of uncertainty, choices were 
made "as if" the outcome was predictable. Given this "as if" context the 
decision-making alternatives were clear. The couple simply had to decide 
whether or not to try to have a child. Those who decided to try then had 
to make choices about the exact timing of that attempt. 
The two key questions were therefore a) whether or not to try to have a 
child and b) when to try to have it. The respondents described only two 
different perceptions of choice about these issues. They either chose to 
(or chose not to) start a family or, more commonly, they simply presumed 
(ie. they did not believe that there were any alternatives) that they would 
become parents. Similarly, they either "planned" when to have their first 
child or they discovered that they had "no choice" about that issue. 
There were, therefore, four described positions. 
1. There was "real" choice about whether or not to have a child and "real" 
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choice about when to have it. 
2. There was "real" choice about whether or not to have a child though the 
timing came as a surprise. 
3. There was "no choice" about whether or not to have a child (ie. 
respondents simply presumed that they would) though the actual event was 
deliberately planned. 
4. There was "no choice" about whether or not to have a child (either 
respondent's presumed that they would, or they found that they couldn't) 
and "no choice" about when to have it. (ie. they "became" pregnant. ) 
The described positions can be presented in diagrammatic form: 
FIGURE 6 
DECISION TO HAVE 
A CHILD 
DECISION ABOUT WHEN 
TO HAVE A CHILD 
POSITION 1 CHOICE CHOICE 
POSITION 2 CHOICE NO CHOICE 
POSITION 3 NO CHOICE CHOICE 
POSITION 4 NO CHOICE NO CHOICE 
I shall consider the characteristics of each position in turn. 
1. Perceptions of "real" choice about both whether or not to have a child 
and about when to have it 
Only eleven respondents (all H1s) said that they had any real doubt about 
whether or not to start a family: the rest of the sample simply presumed 
that they would. Those eleven therefore faced the unusual prospect of 
actually choosing between what were seen as the real alternatives of 
childlessness and parenthood. Six of the eleven decided that they would 
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try to have a family while the other five concluded that they would prefer 
to remain childless. The six who positively chose to have a child 
necessarily believed that they were able to control their fertility. 
Because they made the "in principle" decision to have a child from a base- 
line of "chosen" childlessness, they conflated the issues of when and 
whether to have a family. In other words, to decide to have a child was 
also usually a decision to try to do so now, as in the following example. 
"It was a joint decision, yes, we did think about it, we didn't just 
rush into it... we did think about it and we decided that we did want 
a child, so we had Anna. We just went ahead. " 
[H1, school age] 
Four of these six decided to alter their default couple status before it 
was emotionally and/or physically "too late". As they described it, the 
prospect of remaining childless "forced" a decision about both issues. 
"I think if we'd have left it much longer we wouldn't have had a 
family at all because we'd have decided that we enjoyed our lifestyle 
too much to give it up" 
[H1, no children, younger] 
"I was 30 when I had my first child which was quite late to start a 
family. He would have been quite happy to just have gone on and had 
none because we had been married 6 years and had a very good time and 
we had done a lot of travelling and we had a very good social life. I 
think he was quite, you know, it was a bit of a shock when he 
discovered that I thought that I'd like all that to come to and end. " 
[H1,16+] 
Though all claimed that the decision to start a family was a "matter of 
preference", and hence one which was potentially contentious, none 
described any real disagreement. The decision to have children was made in 
a social context which positively favoured that choice, and while a couple 
of husbands were reported to have had slightly different preferences (both 
were more in favour of the childless option) neither attepted to interfere 
with what seems to have been seen as essentially their wife's decision. 
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"Well we weren't going to have any children er and then I decided that 
perhaps we ought to, but we decided that we'd only have one which 
we've got. We aren't having any rnore... I just felt that it was a, 
sort of an experience that seemed sort of a shame to miss out on 
really er so we thought we'd just have one. I think he would have 
been quite happy to have done so so it was really me but he is not er, 
he is a good father. " 
[H1, pre-school age] 
Those five who "deliberately" chose not to have a child had made one of two 
types of decision. One respondent described what was seen as a permanent 
and principled decision in favour of remaining childless. 
"The only reason that I'd have to stop work would be if I had any 
children but I don't intend to have any, so really as far as I am 
concerned I am working for all of my life unless anything critical 
came up like I was put out of work or something. But we've decided 
that we aren't going to have any children, so I won't have to give up 
for that reason. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
The other four had made this "decision" without ever having reached such an 
"in principle" conclusion. This sub-group simply never arrived at a point 
at which the the "family" alternative seemed more attractive than the 
continued state of childlessness. Two of the four claimed that they had 
put off the decision until it was "too late" and so, in a sense, had "no 
choice" about the matter. That "no choice" was, of course, the product of 
a sequence of "real" choices, each of which had favoured the childless 
option. 
"Well that's something we've never been able to make our mind up 
about, that's why we haven't got any,... I think once you get past the 
early 30s you've left it too late. I used to think that I wanted 
children but at first I couldn't think how they would fit into Brian's 
life. He's not very patient with children. I think he'd love the 
idea of a son to teach things to but I don't honestly think he could 
tolerate all the trouble that children cause,... I just don't think 
he'd adapt to it... I couldn't, I just couldn't make my mind up about 
it, er when I was about 21,22 I was dying to have children, to get 
married and have kids ... I loved the thought of it, but as you get 
older I suppose you get sort of set in your ways.... I don't think we 
ever discussed it [before marriage] it was just afterwards and we 
couldn't make up our minds. We always said that it would be a great 
help if birth control wasn't ever introduced because then if it 
happened it happened and if it didn't it didn't you know when you've 
actually got a decision in your hands you think '0h dear'... I mean I 
like children but I've never thought that that was the only thing in 
life. n 
[H1, no children, older] 
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The above example illustrates the arguments and counter arguments typically 
advanced by those who had so far put off the decision to start a family (in 
effect, these respondents decided not to decide) while the previous 
quotations illustrate the views of respondents who had made what they saw 
as a rather more positive decision about their family planning. In all 
cases the respondents believed themselves to have personal control over 
their family or childless status. 
2. Perceptions of "real" choice about whether or not to have a child, but 
"no choice" about when to have it 
This was an unlikely combination. Most of those who claimed to have made a 
positive choice to have children believed that they could control the 
timing of that event. In any case, many of the positive "in principle" 
choices to have children were made in relation to some kind of imminent 
deadline. Only two respondents had definitely chosen to have children but 
had been so unspecific about the timing that the fact of their pregnancy 
was reported to have come as a "surprise", as in the following example. 
"I decided that I wanted to stop taking the pill because I'd been 
taking it for 10 years and Dave agreed with me and we weren't entirely 
happy with other forms of contraceptive so by a gradual sort of 
process of elimination er the baby [the respondent was pregnant at the 
time of the interview] came along and er we weren't entirely surprised 
although sometimes its difficult to anticipate. It wasn't a conscious 
decision and in a way it happened sort of slightly askew you know it 
wasn't entirely the best timing. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
3. "No choice" about starting a family but "choice" about the timing 
Those who presumed that they would have children usually had a fairly broad 
idea about when they would begin their family. Decisions about timing were 
apparently made with reference to a model life plan which set out what 
"ought" to happen, in what order, and by when. Though the content of the 
models varied, their effect was the same. All served to specify conformity 
and deviance and to mark out the points at which controlling pressure 
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and/or criticism should be directed to those who had started their family 
either "too early" or "too late". Respondents from all housing groups 
believed, for example, that couples should spend some time together before 
embarking on full family life. All those in the H1 and some of those in 
the H2 category expected husband and wife to wait until they "knew each 
other better" before having their first child. This was supposed to take 
something between three and five years, as described below. 
"Certainly I wouldn't want them for a few years yet, we have only been 
married for 2 years. I think you need time to get to know each other. 
Not that we don't already but I'd like to enjoy a few more years of 
just us being together I think, and be able to do things that we 
obviously won't be able to do together when we've got children. That 
is the main reason. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
"I think we probably assumed at that stage that we would have children 
eventually although not in the immediate future I think we thought of 
it as a long term decision and certainly we wanted to get fairly well 
established. I think that it can be very tricky suddenly being a 
threesome before you have got used to being a couple er... I do really 
feel that it is important that you should establish a relationship 
with your partner before you start introducing somebody else into it. 
I know its not always a matter of choice but it can be nowadays. " 
[H1, no children, older] 
Many of the remaining H2s and nearly all the H3s also expected to wait 
before they had a family. However, these respondents believed that couples 
should not start a family until they were materially, as opposed to 
emotionally, established. The length of the waiting period partly depended 
on the time it took to acquire a suitably furnished home and, perhaps, some 
capital. Because the decision to start a family was also a decision to 
sacrifice the wife's wage, aspiring parents had to be able to stand that 
drop in income and yet maintain what was counted as an adequate standard of 
living. These demands produced a more or less precise definition of the 
point at which it was "possible" to have a child. As the following 
examples illustrate, the exact meaning of "being able to afford" varied 
from case to case. However, many of the H2 and H3 respondents presumed 
that prospective parents would have to save up for a family. 
"Ian is saving his [wage] for the future when I leave work when he 
takes the mortgage on he will have to reduce it a bit, you know with 
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only the one wage coming in er and well it will be a struggle, we 
are trying to save it up and Ian is working out budgets and what we 
will need. I think we should get by. I think we'll have to cut back 
a lot,.. but next year we should be able to [start a family], by next 
year. " 
[H2, no children, younger] 
"Well at the moment we are saving for the rest of the stereo, then I 
would like a colour telly before I finish work,... I don't know when 
I'm going to finish work, I'm not very good at saving,.. but we've 
talked about it, we've discussed it and we've decided that well we've 
got a rough idea [when to start trying]. It's September at the 
moment. " 
[H3, no children, younger] 
Both those who waited until they "knew each other better" and those who 
felt that they had to save up before having a child were highly critical of 
people who "rushed in" and started a family before they were "ready". 
Those who waited "too long" were subject to just as much disapproval. 
Several currently childless respondents were aware that others had 
concluded that they had established a home "by now" and hence expected them 
to have started a family. 
"Well I think you are always under a social pressure aren't you. 
People look at you and think why haven't they got any, how old is she? 
Ooh poor thing perhaps she can't have any er I suppose you always get 
that don't you from everybody. I must say our parents have never been 
that bad. You get some that are don't you. I mean some parents do, 
but ours have just let us get on with it I suppose, hoping that 
eventually we will [start a family]. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
"There's none from him [husband] but my mother keeps on. She always 
says 'Have you got anything to tell me dear, you are looking a little 
plump and I do want to be a grandmother before I die'. There could be 
nothing more direct. And my grandmother, she is another one she is 
always saying 'You'd make a good mother, you are the mothering type'. 
So I don't know, there is a lot of pressure from the family, but not 
so much at work. I think if I lived closer [to family] I'd have to 
get cracking but I can fend them off for an hour or so every month. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
Providing that both husband and wife expected to have a child within the 
agreed period (ie. not "too early" or "too late"), the decision about 
actual timing was seen to be relatively unimportant and was usually left up 
to the wife. Most said that they had picked one moment rather than another 
on the grounds that it seemed to be a good point at which to interrupt or 
finish their career. The following examples were typical. 
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"We always said 2 or 3 years, and I'm getting peeved off at work, 
that is one reason, I hate work. " 
[H3, no children, younger] 
"We just drift on because I enjoy my work, my friend's just had one 
[child] but she never liked her job. " 
[H2, no children, younger] 
In conclusion, expectations of "proper" timing were usually vague enough to 
leave the couple with a "real" decision about precisely when to begin their 
family. While that choice was seen to be a matter of preference it was 
also seen to be a relatively unimportant decision and one which could be 
left up to the wife. 
4. Perceptions of "no choice" about whether or not to have children, and 
"no choice" about when to have them 
Respondents who had no choice about either issue presumed that they would 
have children at some time and had then found that "time was running out", 
that they "were" pregnant, or that they could not conceive. Those who 
claimed that their children "just came along" or that they came as a 
"surprise" concluded that they had been unable to determine the outcome of 
the decision about whether or not to start a family and/or the decision 
about when to start trying. Given the inevitable element of uncertainty, 
even those who set out to maximise the chances of a pregnancy were 
"surprised" when they actually conceived. The retrospective perceptions of 
family "planning" varied depending on the degree to which events went 
according to schedule. For example, several respondents, including the two 
quoted below, argued that their children were not "planned" although they 
had taken steps to maximise the chances of conception. 
"Well neither of them were planned. We'd only just moved in here 
actually. We had decided we were going to have them. I wanted them I 
think a bit more than Tony did but we could have done with another 
year. We decided to try for a family after Christmas and I caught on 
in September so I wasn't... I'd come off the pill and everything but it 
was a bit I don't know it was a bit of a shock, but it didn't really 
matter. " 
[H2, pre-school age] 
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"Er right from the start we said we were going for a family as soon as 
possible but we didn't expect it to happen so soon and we got married 
in August and I was expecting him in November it all happened so 
quick... No, how people can plan their families I don't know because we 
couldn't. " 
[H3, pre-school age] 
Though surprised, this group retained at least some belief in the 
theoretical possibility of family planning. Respondents who failed to 
conceive in the time "expected" had to revise their whole notion of 
"decision-making" and were forced to re-examine what had been a taken-for- 
granted expectation that they would have a family soon after they had 
decided that that was what they wanted. Because the planning and decision- 
making were so clearly separated from an essentially unpredictable outcome, 
the event, when and if it happened, was almost always seen to be 
accidental. In this context, conception was both unexpected and yet 
planned; the greater the deviation from the plan the greater the eventual 
amazement. 
"It was one of those things, he went, he was in the Navy and of course 
we hadn't had a .. We were married 10 years before we had Jennifer and 
er as I said he was abroad and I wrote and said I would go for the 
doctor. He said 'No, let nature take its course'.. Well when he came 
back from abroad nothing happened then but it happened on the next 
leave and er so that is how it happened. I never had any more before 
nor since, never any more... I wouldn't have minded a boy but you know 
we got one [child] and I think I was lucky to get one. You see 
Jennifer, now she has been married 12 years and she's no family. She's 
off a family that haven't had families you see, two of my aunts haven't 
had a family. 
[H2,16+] 
Most of those who failed to fulfil their family plans according to schedule 
presented themselves as unlucky or unfortunate because they were unable to 
control the outcome of their family decision-making in what they believed 
to be the "normal" way. Others were less concerned about what they came to 
see as their lack of choice. Indeed, some had "deliberately" abandoned the 
notion of rational planning and had chosen to leave the "decision" up to 
nature. These respondents may have taken just the same actions/inactions 
as those who saw themselves to be positively trying to have a child. The 
point is that their perceptions of choice differed. Some of those who "let 
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nature take its course" claimed that they had chosen to forego what they 
saw as their freedom to decide exactly when to start a family and had so 
resolved the dilemma of when and whether or not to give up their childless 
existence. The following quotations provide an illustration of this 
position. 
"We keep considering it and we keep putting it off. I was brought up 
to a career.. Well I've got quite a successful one, you know, I've got 
quite a way. It is a lot to give up er, actually making the 
decision... A happy accident would be nice, but to actually force it, 
but I wouldn't be disappointed or upset, just rather pleased.. I think 
we'll try, well not really try, just wait and see, then you don't 
actually really decide do you? " 
[H2, no children, younger] 
"Yes, that [the decision to have children] is sort of fairly mutual, 
the door is neither open or shut, its ajar. We'll just wait and see 
what happens. As I say the door is ajar, so I suppose we'd cope 
because that is when you sort of, I mean you sort of lose your 
independence. Especially the woman, and unless she's got a good career 
that is sort of worth keeping on so she can sort of earn lots of money 
to pay for nannies or things like that... I mean if I had a wonderful 
career I don't know whether that door would be ajar or not I really 
don't know, its difficult to say" 
[H2, no children, younger] 
Others had simply "waited to see" in the expectation that "something would 
happen". The decision to leave it up to nature, or to not take all 
possible precautions against becoming pregnant was as much a decision as 
any other although, in this context, all outcomes were, by definition, a 
"surprise" (5). Those who claimed that they had decided to "wait and see" 
usually chose to abandon their family planning responsibilities in a 
context in which the "accident", if it happened, would be "happy". In 
other words, these respondents, including the one quoted below, had chosen 
when to be "negligent", if not when to try to have a child. 
"No, no that wasn't planned, no neither of them were planned. They 
just appeared.... We weren't in that situation really well with Brian 
being in the RAF we knew that if we did have a family, we lived in a 
flat initially which we knew we couldn't have children in but we knew 
that if we did have children then we could have a quarter. So I mean 
we, there were no worries about that. We had no worries about setting 
up a home, or no worries about anything really I mean in that sense we 
weren't setting up a home. I mean otherwise we would have been a little 
bit more worried about having a family but really it didn't bother us. " 
[H2, school age] 
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In comparison, respondents who had what they described as "total accidents" 
found themselves at one extreme of the "no choice"/choice spectrum. This 
group "became" pregnant at a time when they were trying not to have a 
child. Only H3 respondents and the older His and H2s described such 
complete surprises. All of these expected to have a family at some point 
but found that the timing came as a more or less inconvenient "shock". 
These two respondents describe such an experience. 
"Well I caught on. Well I mean we didn't have to get married you know 
but I caught on with him [son] in the March and when I told him he.. we 
were just living together and he said er I says to him if he wanted to 
go he could. Anyway we decided to get married in March so we did. " 
[H3, pre-school age] 
"No there was no decision. They came along. No, they came along 
that's maybe why the great big gap in the middle of them. No, really, 
if the truth be known we never planned any of them. They came along and 
so they were to be looked after and that was it. I did my job but I 
won't say that I .. er I loved them that was it but I've never 
considered myself to be cut out to be a mum" 
[H3,16+] 
Some expected to have such an accident (6). This group did not believe 
that they could control their family planning such that they could 
realistically select options and expect to realise those goals and so felt 
unable to make decisions about what was seen to be an essentially 
unpredictable event. 
So far, I have considered accounts of "no choices" which were associated 
with some kind of "accident". However, five respondents observed that they 
had "no choice" about when to start their family yet believed that they 
were in complete control of their family planning. This group concluded 
that they had "no choice" but to have a child straight away because "time 
was running out". Either the couple had reached what they saw as a "now or 
never" crisis or, as in the following example, felt that they "needed" to 
produce a child of their own as soon as possible. 
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"So when I got with Pete [husband] and Gary was four and a half when I 
had Mark, and he has children from his first marriage, so it was, with 
me losing the other baby [second child of her first marriage] and with 
him [first son] at the age he was we more or less had to have a child 
straight away you know, after we were married. We obviously wanted one 
between us so.... " 
[H3, pre-school age] 
Finally, those who presumed that they would have a family but who found 
that they could not conceive, had "no choice" but to accept that they had 
selected an impractical option. In theory, the options of adoption and 
abortion might have complicated perceptions of "no choice" about the issue 
of when and whether or not to have a child, though not of course about when 
and whether or not to become pregnant. Though three of the involuntarily 
childless respondents had thought of trying to adopt a child, their 
husbands had refused to consider the idea. 
In conclusion, then, most respondents presumed that they would have a child 
at a time when they were "ready" but before it was "too late". In this 
context neither the "to have or not to have", or the "when to have" a child 
decisions were particularly contentious. Those who deviated from the 
normal pattern either made an overt decision to do so (ie. they decided not 
to have a child or chose not to have one until x.. etc) or found themselves 
to be the subject of a family planning "accident". All of those who 
believed that they were able to make definite family planning decisions and 
who had positively decided to have, or not to have, children (ie. those who 
saw the decision as a matter of preference) were from the H1 section of the 
sample. At the other end of the scale, those who said that they had "no 
choice" about whether or when to start a family were from the older 
sections of the sample and/or from H3. As will be seen in the next 
section, these perceptions of control parallel those described in relation 
to decisions about final family size. In that context too, His typically 
believed that they could "design" their family whilst Has were 
characteristically convinced that family planning decisions were more or 
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less beyond their control. 
2. DECISIONS ABOUT FAMILY SIZE 
50% of the sample had more than one child and many more respondents had 
made an "in principle" decision to try to achieve that goal. Such 
expectations and desires were described by those who had already started a 
family as well as by those who were currently childless. Despite the 
inevitable uncertainty, decisions to have more than one child, like 
decisions to start a family, were made as if the desired outcome were more 
or less predictable, although the degree of anticipated predictability 
varied depending on the respondent's previous family planning experiences. 
In general, though, most respondents presumed that a family consisted of 
two children and most presumed that they could make family planning 
decisions "as if" the outcome were predictable. In this section I shall 
consider accounts of decisions to have what was commonly agreed to be a 
"normal" family of two children, and descriptions of decisions to deviate 
from this basic model. 
Decisions to have two children 
30% of His, 63% of H2s and 57% of Has had or expected to have a family of 
two children. Even these figures under-represent the extent of the two 
child ideal, for some respondents had "unwillingly" produced more than two, 
had been unable to have children at all, or had been unable to have a 
second child although that was their aim. Most parents argued that they 
had "no choice" but to try to have a second child since it was necessary to 
protect their first from being spoiled and/or lonely. Parents were 
presumed to be dedicated to their child's welfare and were therefore 
expected to try to save it from both these "unpleasant" fates. The 
following examples illustrate such beliefs. 
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"Two not one, no, because it would be lonely, twins preferably, I 
fancy twins and there's twins on both sides of the family. That'd get 
it all over with in one go. h 
[H3, no children, younger] 
"Two or three, I don't just want one, I think they tend to get spoiled 
if they are only ones. No I'd not have an only one. " 
[H2, no children, younger] 
"Oh no I didn't want him to be an only child, no, no. I always had 
brothers and sisters and I felt when he'd got to school and they all 
had brothers and sisters, it would be hard for him to accept that he 
didn't have anybody.. " 
[H3, pre-school] 
Only three respondents re-considered their initially taken for granted 
expectation of a two child family and so had any real doubt (and hence any 
"real" choice) about whether or not to try to have another baby. All 
reviewed the position after the wife had an especially difficult time 
giving birth to the first child. 
"Well we'd decided to have two but I think we will have this one first 
and see how things go. I can't say I've enjoyed being pregnant but I 
might feel different in two years time. " 
[H3, no children, younger - but pregnant at the time of the interview] 
"We both decided when I was having Peter that we wanted another one, 
er, and it was my decision to have Sarah you know. It was after I had 
Peter, I had a rough time with him. Then when he was about three I 
decided to try for Sarah. He [husband] said he wasn't bothered either 
way because I'd had such a rough time with Peter. He wasn't 
bothered. " 
[H3, pre-school age] 
Those who presumed that they would have a second child, plus those few who 
actually considered the only child alternative but who chose to try to have 
a second, then had to decide when to try to increase their family. 
Decisions about spacing, like decisions about when to start a family, were 
informed by a set of conventions about appropriate timing. These 
conventions specified a fairly broad period within which parents were 
expected to produce their second child. Most thought that a two year gap 
was ideal. 
"Oh yes, when he is about two, [the respondent plans to have another 
child]... it is nice when they are young together. I wouldn't leave it 
any later than that. " 
[H2, pre-school age] 
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While the ideal family models set the outside limits of a normal or proper 
"gap" between first and second children, there was still room for real 
choice about exactly when to start trying. However, providing that the 
parents planned to have their second child within the relevant period, the 
precise timing was not generally seen to be particularly important. At 
this stage, some respondents discovered that they could not be sure that 
their family plans would work out. While they had their first child 
according to schedule, the second did not arrive as predicted. This group, 
like those who had failed to start a family in the way they expected, had 
to revise their perception of family planning decision-making. What had 
been seen as a matter of preference, or taken-for-granted as a stage in a 
normal career, was re-defined as something about which there was really "no 
choice". 
"It was about 18 months after we started trying for her I took that 
long to catch on with her. We'd started giving up we said 'Oh we are 
just going to have one, and that's it' you know, and the next thing I 
fell pregnant with her. But we were happy when it happened and we 
were even more happy when we found out that it was a girl. " 
[H3, pre-school age] 
Finally, a few of the older respondents and the H3s were as surprised by 
the "arrival" of their second child as they had been by the first. 
In conclusion, decisions to have a second child were typically made with 
reference to a notion of the proper family. This consisted of a mother a 
father and two children, one girl, and one boy, born about two years apart. 
Decisions to have more than two children and decisions to have only one 
were described with reference to this model. 
Decisions to have more than two children 
The contexts in which this decision was made (both "in principle" and in 
detail) varied so widely that it would be impractical to document the 
associated perceptions of choice. However, different sections of the 
sample advanced characteristically different reasons for having more than 
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the "normal" quota of two children. H2 and H3 respondents were 
particularly concerned to have both a son and a daughter. The fact of 
having either two sons or two daughters therefore constituted a "good 
reason" for having a third in the hope of properly "completing" the family. 
This is the view advanced by the respondents quoted below. 
"If it's a girl [planned second child] then that would be it. If it 
is another little boy then we might have one more because I think I'd 
like a little girl. Yes I think we'd probably try for a girl. " 
[H2, pre-school age] 
"We had two girls and then we had Julie who I'd hoped would be a boy 
at the time and it was a girl. He said 'That is it, we could go on 
forever like this'... waiting for a boy because I'd have liked four 
then. " 
[H1,16+] 
Those whose first and second children were of different sexes had achieved 
what was seen as the ideal. If they went on to have another child that 
was, from this view, a matter of personal preference rather than a kind of 
family "duty". These "lucky" respondents, as well as those His who were 
not especially concerned about the sex of their children, were simply able 
to choose whether or not to have a larger family. In these cases, the 
husband tended to go along with what was presented as the wife's preference 
provided that the couple agreed that the option was financially viable. In 
this context, reported debate centered on the question of the financial 
sacrifice involved. Three H1 respondents gave priority to the idea of "the 
family" and argued, as in the following case, that money should be a 
secondary consideration. 
"Oh yes it's a lot of work. Yes. Oh but I loved it. I would have had 
six if the economics were alright. Yes, I like large numbers-it's a 
lot of hard work, physical hard work, not much sleep at nights ... but 
the finances are only a small part, finances are the thing yes but you 
know you sort of think of the finances but you adjust your lifestyle. " 
[H1, school age] 
Others were less convinced of their ability to manage without also 
infringing what they saw as their existing children's rights. In this 
context family planning decisions were effectively decisions about the 
meaning of appropriate child care and about the family's financial 
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priorities. Interestingly, this financial theme ordered the decisions of 
those in the H1 as well as the H3 categories. Consider, for example, these 
two cases. 
"[money].... thats the main reason why [why she'd not have any more 
children]. I'd rather educate them privately because you can be a bit 
more sure of that. If they were at a state school you'd be able to 
move them if it wasn't a very good one.. but I'm a bit torn because I'd 
really like quite a lot of children. I'd really like four children 
and I feel this really strongly. It seems to be really sort of deep 
well, we could manage to ... particularly if the children went to 
local schools and were day children. It is a lot cheaper and also it 
means that you've still got an influence on them ... so I feel really 
that the sort of not so grand private school in York when we live so 
near would be perfect. If Queen Annes goes comprehensive and the 
staff stay on, if it is a good comprehensive then perhaps we could 
have four children and send them all there. I can't see us managing 
to afford to send four to all private schooling.. we might manage to 
pay for two so I must admit but I think ones gut reaction to have more 
of a family is a stronger more important thing because schooling isn't 
just going to private schools it is how much the parents put into it 
as well and I think unless you're very unlucky with the state school 
you can influence your child quite a bit. " 
[H1, pre-school age] 
"No thats it for now, isn't it? Taking everything into account, 
financially, and our freedom isn't it? If we had another we'd be back 
where we were before. No, I want to give them the best we can and go 
on holiday and things like that so no. " 
[H3, pre-school age] 
Though the specific meaning of "afford", "reasonable sacrifice", and 
"adequate child care" varied, all sections of the sample expected to make 
decisions about having "extra" children with reference to such 
considerations. The key issue was the welfare of the child. Those who 
wanted more than two children and who were able to make what they saw as a 
planned choice had to balance "family" and "financial" costs. Because it 
was wrong to let the children "suffer", family ambitions could only be 
appropriately fulfilled if there was proper financial backing. However, 
some respondents had "no choice" and went on to have more than two children 
whatever their financial circumstances. Several of the older H3 
respondents expected that they would have large families whether or not 
they could "afford" it in the sense described above. In this case, for 
instance, the respondent simply observes that she "had" her family, which 
happened to consist of seven children. 
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"I've had five girls and then my two boys, I've worked all my 
life .... every time I was having a baby I stopped off and had me baby 
and then went back you see.... I haven't had a very exciting life but 
I've enjoyed it.. you make the best of it dont you .. I've had my 
family they grow up and you get your enjoyment out of them and then 
you've got your grandbairns and you enjoy them its like having your 
family all over again watching them grow up... I wouldn't be without 
them they are good to me and if I need anything they are there. " 
[H3,16+1 
These H3 respondents never faced a decision about whether or not to have 
more children, and hence never had to make a choice about the nature of 
their family and financial priorities. They just had to cope as best they 
could. 
In conclusion, most decisions to have more than two children followed a 
sequence of related decisions about family finance and sacrifice. The 
notion of acceptable sacrifice was critical. Though I cannot compare 
different conceptions of what respondents believed they could, or could 
not, "afford", it was clear that different sections of the sample had 
different family priorities. Two respondents had, for example, given 
priority to the "need" to try to produce the "missing" son or daughter and 
had modified their perceptions of what they could afford accordingly. 
Others made what was seen to be an essentially financial calculation. His 
mostly concluded that they could have as many or as few children as they 
wanted, while H2s and H3s observed that their family plans were positively 
constrained by their present material circumstance. 
Decisions to have only one child 
Five His chose to have no more than one child, as did one H2 respondent. 
Four explained that they felt unable to bring up more than one child in the 
way that they would like and, as in the next example, presented their 
decision with reference to a notion of the child's welfare. 
"Once Helen arrived, we felt that we really had to give her the best 
life that we could so therefore we felt we could never really afford 
to have any more because Ian's salary has never been particularly high 
er,.. especially in the forces so er we felt that it really wouldn't be 
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fair to her .... it's a big thing it is and they can be very expensive 
as they get older. I feel they become social outcasts if they've not 
got you know they want the same as everybody else... if they've not 
got a bike, if they've not got whatever the other kids have got and if 
they haven't got the frilly petticoats and the ... you know its 
important to them and I wouldn't want her to think she was an odd one 
out. " 
[H2, school age] 
"We'd like him [son] to have a good start. I mean you can't rely on er 
I mean I havn't been in touch with the schools but I mean its such a 
waste of time going to er well I don't know about it here but I mean 
as I say if you have to if you want them to have a good start in life 
you have to pay don't you.. " 
[H1, pre-school age] 
In both these cases the principle that parents should give their child as 
good a start in life as possible outweighed the perceived disadvantages of 
spoiling and loneliness. The conceptions of welfare which informed the 
decision to have just one were clearly different from those which 
influenced decisions to have two children. The idea of spoiling (being 
both a social and a financial issue) highlights the contradiction. Those 
who chose to have two children were able to ensure that financial resources 
were not concentrated on one child to its social disadvantage. From the 
"one child" point of view, such a strategy worked to the financial 
disadvantage of both. Though they had to share (which was "good"), each 
got less than it would have done if it had been an only child (which was 
"bad"). It seems, then, that the parents of a single child felt obliged to 
either increase their family or to ensure that they had no more children 
depending on their interpretation of the child's welfare. Only two 
respondents, both His, advanced what they presented as an alternative 
"selfish" argument in favour of having just one child. 
"I don't think so [she doesn't think they will have any more 
children]. I intend returning to work and that is very important to 
me. If I'm seriously considering continuing my career I don't think I 
would really be able to arrange it successfully.... It is a selfish 
decision to make but I mean I know families with two or three children 
where it has proved more than difficult [for the wife to continue her 
career]. " 
[H1, no children, younger - but pregnant at the time of the interview] 
Both these H1 respondents were unwilling to give up the time and energy 
which would be required to bring up another child and decided to limit 
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their family on these grounds. 
Decisions about having children and about family size 
Although respondents' models of a proper family career varied and although 
some were more flexible than others, all implied an ideal sequence: 
marriage, a proper gap, the birth of the first child, another proper gap, 
followed by the birth of the second child. Choices in line with this model 
were often so taken-for-granted that they barely figured as genuinely 
debatable issues. Most respondents simply presumed that their family 
careers would follow this or some very similar pattern. Accounts of 
deviation from such a sequence, and hence of "real" decision making, were 
presented with reference to the normal model, and, in particular with 
reference to the informing themes of selfishness and of the welfare of the 
child. The descriptions offered by those who finally decided that they 
ought to start a family, like those of the few who chose not to become 
parents, were coloured by the notion that the decision to remain childless 
was, simultaneously, a selfish decision and a decision to deny oneself the 
pleasures of parenthood. "Selfishness" was also a theme in reports of 
those who had chosen to have only one child on the grounds that they simply 
did not want a larger family. In this context, the charge of selfishness 
was related to equally prevalent claims about the welfare of the child. As 
I have shown, interpretations of the meaning of welfare varied, some 
producing "no choice" but to have another child, others leaving just as 
little choice in the matter of limiting the family. Either way this issue 
ordered respondents' definitions of possible and viable family planning 
options, and, as I shall suggest in the next section, of possible and 
viable employment opportunities. 
Though the notion of the ideal two child family and the less specific 
informing conceptions of the welfare of the child and of individual 
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selfishness were common and generally relevant themes, detailed perceptions 
of choice varied depending on respondents' views of their ability to 
control fertility and on their previous experience of the outcome of family 
planning decisions (7). The patterns of described uncertainty varied with 
respect to both housing and age: His and younger age groups typically 
believed that they were more in control than, at the other extreme, Has 
and older age groups. In combination, general conceptions of family 
career, associated areas of choice and taken-for-grantedness, and 
particular definitions of the ability to control the outcome of family 
plans, produced a context in which H1 respondents seemed to have rather 
more room for real debate about the design of their family than either the 
H2s or Has. 
In the next section I shall consider the ways in which themes of 
selfishness and of the welfare of the child/ren permeated respondents' 
visions of the relationship between home and work and their perceptions of 
the types of choice associated with decisions about their own and their 
husband's employment. 
DECISIONS ABOUT EMPLOYMENT 
In the second half of this chapter I want to consider the relationship 
between perceived family obligations and perceptions of choice about 
employment related decisions (8). To some extent these perceptions of 
choice reflected what are undoubtedly general cultural and material 
patterns. Respondents' definitions of viable options were, for example, 
clearly ordered by beliefs about appropriate forms of employment for 
husbands, wives, and mothers, as well as by the immediate and practical 
characteristics of a particular kind of labour market. However, such 
structural characteristics and such general beliefs had different 
implications for different sections of the sample. In other words, the 
cultural and material "constraints" (9) described in the feminist and other 
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literature were "filtered" by respondents' particular domestic and cultural 
circumstances, and so had systematically different implications for 
employment decisions. In the next two sections I shall consider variations 
in the domestic contexts in which such general factors had effect. 
Section 3 documents respondents' accounts of choices about their own 
employment while section 4 reviews their accounts of choices relating to 
their husbands employment. 
3. DECISIONS ABOUT THE WIFE'S EMPLOYMENT 
This section, on decisions about respondent's work, tangentially attends to 
some of the same issues as those which have engaged such authors as Zweig 
(1952), Scanzoni (1978), Rapoport and Rapoport (1971,1976), Yeandle (1984) 
and Poliert (1981). These writers have mostly been concerned to examine 
the effect of women's work on the family, or, from a slightly different 
perspective, to document women's experiences of paid employment. The focus 
has been on the ways in which women cope with their work, or with their 
work in combination with their family obligations, rather than on 
associated decision-making processes. The other strand of relevant 
literature is that which sets out to document or explain women's position 
in the labour market and/or to review the characteristics of what has come 
to be called "women's work" (Breugel, 1979; Barron and Norris, 1976; Mackie 
and Pattullo, 1977; McNally, 1979; Burman, 1979). This literature, which 
identifies and sometimes sets out to explain the structural problems faced 
by working women, like that which considers the ways in which women cope 
with these difficulties, provides a general background against which to 
view the decision-making experiences described by my respondents. While 
the social world is no doubt ordered in the ways described by these 
writers, there is still room for social actors to make choices. I am 
interested in described decision-making processes and in respondents' 
perceptions of choice in as far as those perceptions order the form and 
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course of related domestic dispute (if any). In addition, I am concerned 
to document systematic variations in described perceptions of choice, for 
these reflect systematic differences in the ways in which general cultural 
and material patterns inform domestic decision-making processes. 
I shall explore these questions with reference to the interview material on 
choices related to wife's employment (10). Respondents described four 
kinds of work related decisions, each of which was informed by a 
characteristically different set of criteria and each of which was seen in 
a typically different way by the different sections of the sample. The 
work related decisions were: 
1. Decisions associated with the initial "choice" of work 
2. Decisions about changing jobs 
3. Decisions about stopping work 
4. Decisions about whether or not to return to work 
I shall consider each in turn. 
1. Initial "choice" of work 
All respondents had first hand experience of this choice and all had made 
it before they were married. By definition, then, the decision could not 
have been the subject of domestic conflict (in the family of marriage) nor 
could it have been directly informed by a notion of current family 
responsibility. However, there seems to be some relationship between 
initial perceptions of choice about employment and subsequent perceptions 
of work related decisions, and some variation in the views described by 
different sections of the sample. 
75% of H1 respondents claimed to have chosen a particular field of work in 
advance of any detailed knowledge of local job opportunities. Most of 
these respondents expected to complete some form of specialist education 
before they began their chosen career. Hypothetical careers were therefore 
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selected from a range of what were seen to be equally distant, yet, in 
theory, equally viable possibilities. 
"I wanted to do it [become a biologist] from being very young actually 
because er my friend, her father worked in a lab and I well initially 
I think it was because it sounded ever so romantic, you know, all sort 
of floating around in white overalls and of course it wasn't at all 
romantic but I did enjoy it. " 
[H1, no children, older] 
Though the plan did not always work out, these respondents believed that it 
was normal and possible to choose a "career" and to make a whole sequence 
of educational and work related choices with reference to some ideal model 
of the future. They had a fairly well defined notion of what they wanted to 
do and set out to realise those aspirations. By comparison, 84% of 
H2 and H3 respondents claimed that their first job choice was determined by 
the state of the labour market at the time when they left school. These 
initial differences of approach were reflected in all accounts of 
subsequent employment related decision-making. Most His described their 
employment decisions, even those which represented a change of heart, with 
reference to that ideal career. Some, as in the case quoted below, were 
also positively committed to a work-related identity and saw themselves as 
doctors, teachers etc. even when they were not working. 
"I went through training and then did house jobs really I worked full 
time until my pregnancy.. I don't want to stop work completely because 
you really do get out of touch and it would be very difficult to go 
back you know and it seems such a waste of my medical training, and 
also I think your, sort of, your brain rots. " 
[H1, pre-school age] 
In comparison, H2 and H3 respondents usually continued to make employment 
decisions with reference to the range of job opportunities which happened 
to exist at the time when they were looking for work and had no permanent 
work-related identity. The following account is typical. 
"I was originally a supervisor telephonist. Well no, when I first 
left school I went into a factory for three years, then I left there, 
then I went to tech to train as a typist, then the girl who was 
switchboard went sick where I worked. They couldn't get anybody else 
to do it so I had to stay on telephones and now well this is the only 
job I can find [as a shop assistant]" 
[H2, pre-school age] 
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To sum up, His, like their husbands, saw themselves as independent agents 
who were able to "choose" a career and then find suitable work. H2s and 
Has, on the other hand, tended to believe that their working lives were 
determined by factors beyond their control. 
2. Decisions to change jobs 
Forty respondents had first hand experience of this decision. The 
remaining twelve of the comparative sample of fifty-two were either working 
in their first job or had given up work after it. 
Decisions to change jobs were made in a variety of employment contexts and 
for a variety of different reasons. It is useful to distinguish between 
choices about changing jobs which were primarily presented with reference 
to the respondent's wish or need to change: 
a) hours of work 
b) type of work or the "content" of the job 
c) place of work 
This division highlights what were presented as the main reasons for 
changing jobs, though inevitably it simplifies a complex range of inter- 
related issues. Nevertheless, it does serve an heuristic and expository 
purpose, permitting discussion of the form and subsequent implications of 
particular sorts of decisions (11). I shall begin with a discussion of 
choices which were made with primary reference to hours of work. 
a) Decisions to change jobs in order to work different hours 
Nine respondents had changed their job on these grounds. Of these nine, 
six chose to change their jobs in order to reduce their working hours, 
while the other three did so in order to work full-time. 
Four of the six who chose to reduce their working hours were from the older 
childless section of the sample. These women had worked full-time after 
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leaving school/education in order to help establish a home and save for a 
family. They, like many others, expected to "have to" stop work when they 
became pregnant. Because they were denied this "natural" interruption they 
had to make a "real" decision about their working future. In comparison, 
those who chose to take part-time employment as a half way stage between 
full-time work and retirement made what was seen as an entirely normal 
decision in the course of an entirely normal career. H1 respondents in 
either situation (older childless or pre-retirement) claimed that their 
final decision to give up full-time work was determined by factors of 
personal preference. The following quotation is from a respondent who 
based her decision on purely personal grounds. She changed jobs because 
she was "fed up". 
"I felt I'd done enough. I got gradually more and more fed up with 
teaching and I just thought if I don't get out of this soon I shall go 
completely round the bend like most teachers but I was in a fortunate 
enough position that I was able to do that so now I'm a part-time self 
employed person earning not very much. " 
[H1, no children, older] 
Both H2's who had experience of this decision claimed that they had "no 
choice" but to reduce their working hours because they presumed that it was 
inherently undesirable for wives (themselves included) to work full-time. 
This was something that only had to happen while a married couple saved up 
for a house and family, or when there was extreme financial need. In all 
other circumstances wives were expected to work part-time, if they worked 
at all. 
"Well I was working at Rowntrees. I was working full time but well I 
found that it was too much with a house and a husband to look after 
and then I looked for work which was only mornings and I must be 
honest, my husband went into management at about that time so my wage 
wasn't so important. I could afford to only work mornings. " 
[H2, no children, older] 
The three women who chose to change jobs in order to work longer hours only 
contemplated this option when they felt that they would still be able to 
meet what they saw as the "fixed core" of their domestic obligations. Each 
had a different definition of that "fixed core" and hence each perceived 
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the option of full-time work differently. In addition, the need to fulfil 
at least some basic domestic obligations limited the range of what was seen 
as "possible" full-time work. 
b) Decisions to change jobs in order to change the type of work 
Twenty-five respondents had first hand experience of this type of decision. 
Only two H1 respondents claimed to have even considered changing their 
chosen field of work. Both described their perception of alternative work 
options as a consequence of a "change of heart" and, as in the following 
example, saw that decision as one which demanded, or was the consequence 
of, some kind of self examination. 
"I decided to do psychiatric nursing well I started to. I went on a 
training course but after a year I decided that I wasn't cut out for 
that. I didn't really like it very much so I gave that up then I got 
a job as a dental nurse as a dental assistant which suited me much 
better. " 
[H1,16+] 
H2 and H3 respondents had much more frequent "changes of heart", so much so 
that the term hardly applies. Several of the young childless H2s and H3s 
chose to change their jobs and their type of work when they got "fed up". 
They switched, as in the next example, from shop assistant to office work 
to seasonal work as a means of generating excitement. 
"I've been in offices, I've been in shops, I've done all sorts of jobs 
to get by, all sorts of things-yes I've had a go at anything, I like 
the variety. " 
[H2, no children, younger] 
"I've done thousands of different jobs. I've done clerical work, er 
assistant librarian, er I've done a lot of selling work, I've worked 
for a double glazing company, I've been an insurance agent for two 
companies, er the Pru, and then a company out of York. I've done 
just what I fancy really.. " 
[H3, no children, younger] 
Those who saw "no choice" but to take the first suitable job they found 
tended to define "suitable" with reference to the number of hours, the 
location of the job, and the rate of pay, but not with reference to the 
type of work. H2 and H3 respondents consequently found that they had "no 
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choice" but to change the kind of work they did because such change was an 
inevitable by-product of some other employment related decision. The 
following examples were typical. 
"Night work was hard to get, I just took the first job that came 
along, jobs were so hard to get it was just a matter of taking what 
there was. " 
[H2, pre-school age] 
"When she was 18 months I decided that I'd just go in the evening you 
see, so that they (family) aren't neglected... but now they are growing 
up I would really prefer more hours.... its only, well its mainly 
Rowntrees or the hospital that's got a 6pm to 9pm shift, and that's 5 
nights a week. " 
[H3, pre-school age] 
c) Decisions to change the place of work 
Seventeen respondents had decided to change their place of work. 
Few of the H1 respondents were prepared to take on work other than that for 
which they felt that they were especially suited because of their training 
and/or educational background. These specialist demands limited the range 
of what were seen to be possible alternative employers. Some, as in the 
case quoted below, were literally "unable" to change their employer 
without also moving to another part of the country. 
"I just feel like I could do with moving but I think we'll probably 
stay put for a bit now. I still fancy staying in Operational Research 
and well this is the only Operational Research department in York. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
In comparison, H2 and H3 respondents tended to have less specialist 
occupations and were therefore able to define a broader range of suitable, 
alternative employers. As the next case illustrates, there were, for 
example, plenty of alternative sources of cleaning work. 
"I've done just cleaning work in shops and at the Department of the 
Environment. I was cleaning offices there you know its been more or 
less cleaning generally. Before this last one [job] I had you see I 
was on contract work and these contractors the pay was very poor so I 
put my name. down at the University.. " 
[H3,16+] 
In this context it is not surprising to find that all those who positively 
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chose to change their place of work were from the H2 and H3 sections of the 
sample. The remaining eleven of the seventeen claimed to have "no choice" 
but to change their place of employment either because they had moved house 
or because they had to change jobs for some other reason, most commonly 
because they needed to work fewer hours. 
In conclusion, it seems that respondents' decisions to change jobs were 
informed by a wide range of family obligations. Few changed jobs on 
grounds of personal preference alone and, unlike their husbands, few made 
choices which were primarily informed by the "need" for more income or for 
promotion. Wives' decisions were informed by the "need" to keep up with 
changing demands of family life and to find "suitable" work which would fit 
in with and/or around those obligations. Decisions which were presented 
primarily with reference to the place or type of work rather than the hours 
were less overtly informed by family demands though7/many such changes were 
the consequence of other decisions made with reference to the "family's 
interest". For example, none of the working wives felt that they had any 
choice but to change their jobs if the family moved so that the husband 
could get promotion or a better job. While respondents' working careers 
and their perceptions of possible employment related opportunities 
reflected changes in their family career and in the nature of the 
associated obligation, those common family related demands took different 
forms depending on the respondents' view of the importance of their 
employment as well as on such material factors as their education, their 
qualifications, and their notional "career". Of course such factors 
ordered choices in an already structured world of "opportunity", and it is 
important to remember that respondents could only select jobs which were 
actually available and for which they were formally suited. Accordingly, 
notions of family obligation affected the work related decision-making of 
different sections of the sample in different ways. 
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Family obligation also ordered perceptions of choice associated with 
decisions about stopping work and about returning to paid employment. 
Respondents' interpretations of their family obligations and the reported 
role of those commitments (in terms of the relevant decision-making 
processes) varied just as widely in these contexts as in relation to the 
decisions about changing work described above. 
3. Decisions about stopping work 
Forty-one respondents had first hand experience of this decision. 
62% of them observed that they "had to" stop work because they were 
pregnant. In these cases the decision was seen to be more or less 
significant depending on the respondent's long term "career" plan: those 
who returned to work as soon as possible barely recognised a discrete 
"stopping work" decision while those who decided to devote themselves full- 
time to home and family acknowledged that they had literally given up paid 
work. Whatever the respondent's intention, there was "no choice" but to 
have at least a short break from paid employment. Another eight 
respondents claimed that they had "no choice" but to stop work when they 
got married. Five of these claimed that at that time there was no work for 
married women, while the other three observed that they had to give up work 
because their husbands expected them to be full-time housewives. The 
following quotations illustrate both positions. 
"You see when we got married you see you couldn't go back to work. You 
had to finish and that was it, and then when you'd had any children 
you couldn't go back after your children were born either so no, I 
have never worked.... Well you couldn't you see, there was no other 
jobs, you couldn't, they wouldn't accept married women, they wouldn't 
have them back you see, I couldn't have done even if I had wanted to. " 
[H3,16+] 
"No, my husband objected to me going to work. I went to work at, 
seasonal, at Terrys for two years when we were first married. Just for 
a month. My husband didn't like it at all. It was a pal of his that 
said let her go, and er of course the money was very poor in those 
days and er there was one year I brought a machine [sewing], and 
another year I brought him a greenhouse so that we got the benefit. 
It wasn't much because in those days things were different.... anyway, 
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he would have objected. He wouldn't have allowed me to be, he wouldn't 
allow me to carry on, I was quite happy, quite happy about it" 
[H2,16+] 
Only three respondents had positively chosen to give up their job. One, 
from the H1 section of the sample, made this move on the grounds that she 
no longer enjoyed her work, while the other two, both H2s, decided to stop 
work because they no longer "needed" the money. These two had missed what 
they saw to be the "normal" opportunity to stop work to havea family and 
so had to make some "real" decision about their working future. Because 
they presumed that no one would want to work if it were not for the money 
they chose to become full-time housewives. 
In conclusion, decisions to stop work were almost always made with 
reference to an immediate family obligation. Accordingly, few respondents 
believed that they had any choice about the matter. 
4. Decisions about returning to work after a period at home 
Thirty-four respondents had made a decision about whether or not to return 
to work. Twelve of these decided to stay at home while the other twenty- 
two went back (12). 
Decisions to return were easy to identify. They had a real impact on the 
family's daily life and were apparently easy to remember and certainly easy 
to discuss. The point at which someone decided not to return to work was 
much less clear. However, most respondents advanced some view about when 
mothers could return to work and about whether or not they should do so if 
the opportunity existed. These general policy positions ordered individual 
perceptions of viable alternatives. Though the meaning of "adequacy" 
varied, all believed that mothers could only think of returning to work if 
they were able to ensure that they had made "adequate" child care 
arrangements. It was therefore impossible to separate judgements about the 
possibility of returning to work from definitions of "adequate" childcare. 
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In other words, a mother's perception of the returning to work option 
depended above all on her image of proper child-care, of a "good mother", 
and of normal family life. Accordingly, I shall first explore perceptions 
of adequate child-care and then respondents' definitions of the 
circumstances which did or did not justify a return to work. The described 
definitions and expectations advanced by different housing sections of the 
sample varied quite dramatically. I have chosen to order the following 
discussion so as to highlight these differences thus emphasising variation 
in the detail of the domestic contexts in which choices about returning to 
work were set. 
Five of the nine His who had returned to work were able and willing to pay 
a child minder or to put their children in a nursery. To quote just one 
example: 
"I worked in Malaya because you see we had two servants and one 
gardener, and Jeremy had to go to the nursery because it was so hot, 
so it would have been that [work] or playing cards or you know, and 
that just didn't suit me so... 
[H1,16+] 
This arrangement, unlike most others, allowed wives with both school and 
pre-school children to work during the day time. Though the other four of 
the nine worked whilst their children were at school, all the returning His 
were prepared to delegate their child-care and some of their household 
responsibilities to "non-family" employees and, in that way, to free 
themselves from at least some of their domestic responsibilities. The 
following quotation illustrates the point. 
"I always used to be terribly worried about whether I should go on 
working because I didn't have time to keep the house even reasonable, 
you know, and then if I did do some housework, Jack [son] always 
wanted to play and I felt that, you know, you should play while they 
are still young, and if I said I couldn't, he would cry and get upset 
and I felt, you know, I'm getting my priorities wrong you know. What 
on earth does the house matter compared to the children ... you've 
only got them such a short time... so I would leave the house-but at 
times, especially when people come in and you know you feel really 
ashamed of it being so sort of dirty and unpleasant. I would be very 
torn.... now everything really slots together... I do really very little 
housework on top of what Mary does... er its more just tidying up. " 
[H1, pre-school] 
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Such characteristically H1 arrangements were only possible given a) an 
ability to pay (or a willingness to define such expenditure as a financial 
priority) and b) a definition of "adequate" child-care which could 
encompass care by "non-family" members. Though the non-returning His 
believed that they, too, could make formally adequate child-care 
arrangements, they argued that their performance as a good mother would be 
impaired if they took on paid work. The claims made in the next two 
quotations were typical. 
"I don't think it would be fair to my own children. Especially 
teaching because it is too draining. " 
[H1, school age] 
"I think you should be there if they need you" 
[H1, school age] 
In any case, "good mothers" (as defined by the non-returners) should 
positively enjoy their child-care responsibilities and, as the next 
respondent argues, should therefore choose to stay at home in order not to 
miss out on that enjoyment. 
"Well I think really you should enjoy them They grow up so fast and I 
think well if you go out to work you miss such a lot. " 
[H1,16+] 
Those who shared these very general conceptions of "adequate" child-care 
and proper motherhood concluded that only a committed and full-time mother 
could provide the service which they believed was necessary. In summary, 
then, most H1 respondents believed that non-family members could provide 
adequate child-care and only a few concluded that the mother's role 
demanded full-time attention. 
In comparison, H2 respondents were unable and/or unwilling to pay for 
child-care. This meant that those with pre-school children could only 
think of returning to work if they could find an appropriate free child- 
minder and a "suitable" job. The husband was usually the only candidate 
babysitter so, as in the next case, "suitable" work was work which "fitted 
in" with his working hours. 
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. 
"I was thinking about going to Asda [supermarket] because me friend 
does that, and she works Wednesday, Thursday, Friday night, but you 
see I couldn't do that Friday night because my husband is out" 
[H3, pre-school age] 
Those who had school-age children were able to consider day work provided 
that they could resolve the school holiday problem. Some worked school 
hours (as dinner ladies), others were able to take their children along 
with them (cleaners) and a couple, including the next respondent, managed 
to organise friends or family to "babysit" for the holiday periods. 
"My sister in law used to come and stay, or my mother in law, or she 
(daughter) has gone to my sisters. One time she went to my sisters for 
her holiday. " 
[H2, school age] 
Those who could not devise an "appropriate" solution were either "stuck" 
with evening work or were unable to work at all. The following quotation 
illustrates the nature of the problem. 
"Oh I'd have to go evenings, I don't believe in going during the day, 
I couldn't anyhow because I've got nobody to look after them during 
the school holidays. I'd never be able to got out during the day 
really unless I got a9 to 12am job, and put them in school and picked 
them up... I couldn't go in the afternoon because they come home for 
lunch and as I say I've no one I could turn to and say can you have 
them for 6 weeks, I've no family around, and I couldn't ask anyone 
else. " 
[H2, school age] 
Even these few quotations reveal a range of different opinions about proper 
child-care. Some of the H2 mothers of school age children were prepared to 
work during the day provided that they could find someone to take care of 
their child/ren in the holidays. Others refused to contemplate even this 
possibility on the grounds that they were obliged to be at home at lunch 
time and/or at other key periods of the day. Indeed, some of the non- 
returning H2 respondents believed, like some of the non-returning His, that 
the mother's role demanded full-time attention. While it would be possible 
to make adequate child-care arrangements, the fact of the mother's outside 
commitments would, they argued, preclude the proper fulfillment of her more 
general child related obligations. These respondents believed that mothers 
should stay at home however good the possible child-care options. 
183 
Though Has and H2s subscribed to much the same definition of "adequate" 
child-care there were three areas of reported difference. First, several 
of the H3 husbands worked shifts. Accordingly, a couple of H3 mothers of 
pre-school children, like the one quoted below, were able to go out to work 
for a few hours during the day time. 
"I always gave my children a year to 18 months and then I used to work 
it with my husband that there was always somebody here with the 
children. " 
[H3,16+] 
Second, several of the H3 respondents had been willing and able to rely on 
their mothers for full-time child-care. This arrangement allowed the wife 
to look for full-time day time work. 
"My mother took care of Angela. She was her first grandchild, and my 
mother sort of more or less brought Angela up till the age of 5 so 
therefore I was able to continue working. " 
[H3,16+] 
Finally, Has were more restricted in acceptable babysitters than H2s. 
Most of the H3 respondents were only willing to delegate this job to 
members of the immediate family. As the following dialogue illustrates, 
some of the older Has positively disapproved of those who were prepared to 
allow "strangers" to look after the children. 
she: "I've worked all my life really. Yes, well we had an auntie living 
here for a while when they were small. She helped us. We never 
thought of a child minder did we? " 
he: "No, no. Oh no, that wasn't on the cards at all. No I wouldn't have 
stood for that. No, you've never had a job that has meant the 
children were being neglected have you? You've had to work in with 
them. " 
[H3,16+] 
Though definitions of possible child-care arrangements were 
characteristically more specific (no strangers, no friends etc. ), Has 
seemed to have more working opportunities than H2s as they tended to have 
more available kin and they seemed to find it easier to get work which 
fitted in with their husband's working hours. While a couple of the non- 
returning H3 respondents thought it was wrong to work before the youngest 
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child went to school, none had any principled objection to the notion of 
returning to work. Indeed many expected that they would do just that. The 
only issue was when. 
"When he is older I'd like to go back full-time if I could er, when he 
is about school age then I'll go back you know I don't believe in 
leaving them when they're that young. " 
[H3, pre-school age] 
In the three preceding sub-sections I have outlined what each housing 
section of the sample defined as "adequate" child-care. However, the mere 
provision of "adequate" care was not, in itself, enough to justify a return 
to work. Those interviewed went on to advance a whole array of arguments 
about returning to work. I shall review them so as to complete my account 
of the cultural world in which respondents' made choices about whether or 
not to return to work. 
Arguments in favour of a return to work 
Most of the H1 respondents who went back to paid employment claimed that 
they did so in order to further their career or because they wanted some 
sort of intellectual stimulation. Indeed, several of those with "careers" 
had viewed their non-working status as temporary. Their return to work was 
therefore one stage in what was seen to be a long-term career plan. 
"I think any longer than that [a year off] and there would be a danger 
of losing contact with the profession so it is a compromise you have 
to accept if you want to continue your career. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
Other His argued that it was better for the family if the wife/mother was 
happy, interested, and at work. This could be used as "good reason" for 
returning whether or not that decision was seen in career terms. 
"I think it is better for all of us if I do a bit of work. I am clued 
into what Robert is talking about and doing and I feel a bit more self 
respect .... I think you sort of feel a bit of a dead loss if you 
don't do something else as well [that is as well as being a mother]" 
[H1, pre-school age] 
In comparison, H2 respondents usually referred to "money" as a, if not the, 
key argument in favour of a return to work. Though this additional income 
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usually had particular advantages for the wife all those who went back to 
work claimed that they were working for the "family" rather than for 
themselves. The following example is typical. 
"When they were both at school I though well what shall I do now and 
then this job turned up and it fits with the hours so I took it. It 
is nice to have the money. " 
[H2, school age] 
Nearly all H3 respondents expected to work again because they expected to 
"need" the money. 
"I think I'll have to get a part time job. I think finances would 
force us to go back. I think most folks have to go back now. " 
[H3, pre-school age] 
As I observed earlier, these respondents did not really have to decide 
whether or not they should return to work. All they had to decide was when 
to go. 
Given that a return to work was a possible option, respondents from each of 
the three housing groups presented the choice of returning or not in 
characteristically different ways. All His felt able to make the choice on 
grounds of personal preference. H2 respondents were also able to choose, 
though these choices were made in a context in which the financial 
advantages of returning provided a "good reason" for selecting the work 
option. Most H3 respondents saw "no choice" about the matter; they simply 
expected to return. 
Arguments against a return to work 
Non-returners were especially keen to define the circumstances which, in 
their view, did and did not justify a return to work. Though there were a 
range of alternative arguments, there was no obvious housing related 
pattern to their use. His, H2s, and Has alike drew upon one or more of the 
following themes when talking about why they believed that mothers, 
themselves included, should stay at home even if they could make adequate 
provision for their children. Most commonly, non-returning respondents 
186 
observed that, in their view, "boredom" did not constitute a sufficient 
reason for a return to work. The implied argument was that those who 
fulfilled their domestic obligations "properly" would have no time for such 
feelings. 
"This is my job, to keep the house clean. It is my job to see the man 
who comes to the door and to pay the milk man. Really it is my job. 
If I ever got bored I'd have to start making toys or something. I've 
no time to get bored though. " 
[H2, school age] 
"I am usually busy actually like Jan [friend] she says the same about 
all these women going out to work. She says they can't find enough to 
do at home. She says I do. She has enough and I mean she has no 
family you know what I mean. " 
[H2, school age] 
Others concluded that they would not return to work because they would not 
choose to land themselves with the "double burden" of domestic and outside 
work. Though this was presented as a personal choice rather than a 
"should" position, it does presuppose a view of the "proper" standard of 
domestic work or, as in the case quoted below, an acknowledgement of the 
husband's view of that standard. 
"I don't think he would like me to work and he would never come home 
and prepare the meal. There would be no way that I could work and er 
not have a meal ready and not have the house clean and tidy. I think 
to be honest, he has often said that he thinks it is a good thing, but 
I think if it came to the crunch he well it wouldn't work now. I 
think if I had done it earlier on in life then well perhaps... " 
[H1, school age] 
Finally, a couple of respondents claimed that they would not return to work 
even if they had the chance because their husbands would disapprove. This 
expected disapproval seems to be, in part, a reflection of a general view 
about working women and, in part, a specific formulation of the belief 
described above. 
"Peter says "get your own house in order before you go out to work". 
And I think that is the sensible thing to do isn't it. I'm sure its 
easier since I've got that attitude. " 
[H2, school age] 
While most of the non-returners accepted that some mothers had to work for 
the money, they argued that this was only legitimate in cases of "real" 
financial need. Several housewives presented very rigid definitions of 
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the types of "need" which would and would not justify a wife's return to 
work. 
"I would like to see more mums at home, the young mums. It is sad to 
leave the children. Unless sometimes they fit a job in on a night but 
even then money isn't everything is it? I mean the money isn't, you 
wouldn't expect to... well you could cope without it. There is always 
a way to manage so really there isn't always a need for money. Cars, 
cars, that is it mainly and holidays. I hear people say to me they 
need it to keep going and a lot of it goes on smoking which is sad but 
why should I work. You know there is no reason for me to really is 
there? I'd enjoy working, yes, but I shouldn't be bored at home 
should I? " 
[H2, school age] 
However, some acknowledged that extra income could benefit the family as a 
whole and the children in particular. This group were prepared to 
consider work provided that financial advantages could be shown to outweigh 
child-care and other domestic disadvantages. 
"I don't want to work because I'm career minded or because I'm bored 
with my house or bored with my children. I only want to work to 
provide us with the well not extras but things for the children and 
holidays because we will not do without our holidays. So that is the 
only reason why I'd go back. " 
[H2, pre-school age] 
Arguments in favour of and against a return to work evidently drew upon 
similar themes. Some respondents believed that it was for the good of the 
family and/or the children if the wife went out to work. Others marshalled 
just the same notions in support of an argument in favour of staying at 
home. What is interesting is the prevalence (in whatever form) of claims 
about a) interests of the family, and b) welfare of the children. 
In conclusion, then, debate about returning to work, like much of that 
about changing jobs, was, in effect, a debate about the meaning of 
respondents' family responsibilities and hence about the point at which 
they were free to engage in paid employment. Different housing groups 
tended to define their child-care obligations in different ways, and to 
have different types of financial "need". As a result they perceived 
different sorts of employment related choice. H1s, for example, tended to 
believe that they had some real choice about their career. Their 
188 
definition of child-care was such that there was scope for delegation, and 
their vision of parenthood typically allowed for the wife to work should 
she wish to do so. Finally, they rarely saw themselves to be under such 
financial pressure that the wife's wage was "essential". H2s and, even 
more, Has were unwilling to pay for child-care services, and perhaps unable 
to do so anyway. Yet these groups were also likely to acknowledge the real 
financial advantages of a second income. The resulting practices reflected 
the variety of ways in which respondents coped with the competing strains 
of "no choice" but to return to work and "no choice" but to stay at home. 
H2s usually faced the most complex decisions, believing both that they 
ought to be at home for the sake of the children and, equally, that they 
ought (though, perhaps, did not "need") to increase the family income for 
the same reason. The choices described by H3 respondents were simpler 
because of what was seen as an unavoidable financial "need". In this 
context there was no choice but to return to work, though there might have 
been some choice about the timing of that event. 
Decisions about the wife's employment were clearly ordered by what were 
seen as her family obligations. Viable working options changed as the 
children got older, and, to a lesser extent, as the family's financial 
position changed. Though these changing perceptions of possibility took 
different forms in each of the housing sections of the sample, all 
acknowledged that the family/work relationship was more complex for wives 
than for husbands. Only the wives had to ensure that their home was 
properly cared for and their children adequately looked after before they 
could consider going out to work. Only they made decisions about stopping 
and returning to work, and only they chose to change jobs in order to find 
work which fitted in with a complex set of family demands. 
I shall now consider the ways in which family obligation informed 
perception of choice about the husband's working career. The following 
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account is short, partly because I was only able to interview the wives and 
partly because husbands seemed to make fewer work related decisions. 
4. DECISIONS ABOUT THE HUSBAND'S EMPLOYMENT 
In this section I shall consider respondents' accounts of decisions about 
their husbands employment. Again there is very little literature which 
directly attends to this sort of decision-making, though there are plenty 
of studies of occupations and of occupational communities. As with the 
literature on women's employment, attention has focussed on the experience 
of doing particular kinds of work (13), and/or on broader questions about 
changes in the occupational structure (144). In this context an 
individual's occupation is taken as a fixed feature rather than as the 
product of some kind of decision-making process. In addition, much of the 
literature attends to the world of employment in isolation. Exceptions to 
this pattern (15), like literature which explores the relationship between 
work and leisure or which examines workers' conceptions of the relationship 
between family life and paid employment, typically attends to the "effect" 
of one area (work) on another area (family) with reference to general 
questions about expenditure, lifestyle or attitude, but not with reference 
to more precise questions about domestic decision-making. Other writers 
consider the impact of husbands work on the family and/or on the wife (16). 
While this literature attends to certain areas of decision-making, 
especially to career decisions involving geographical mobility, it does so 
with a view to documenting the ways in which wives and/or families cope 
with what is typically presented as a given fate. In this section I want 
to consider the kinds of choices seen to be associated with decisions about 
husbands employment. The fact that most respondents concluded that there 
was, in practice, "no choice" about such issues does not alter the 
distinctive decision orientated nature of the enquiry. Once more, the 
point of the discussion is to establish the nature of the decision-making 
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context which would order instances of overt conflict should they arise. 
Husbands reportedly made fewer kinds of decision about their work than did 
their wives. For instance, none of the respondents' husbands had decided 
to stop work or to return to work having had a spell at home. While nearly 
all had decided to change their job, none had done so on the grounds that 
they wanted to reduce or increase the hours which they spent in paid 
employment. So, described decisions were about changing jobs in order to 
change employer or in order to change occupation, or at least the type of 
work. 
Such choices, like those relating to the wife's employment, were almost 
always presented with reference to a notion of family obligation. Of 
course, that obligation had different implications for the employment 
related decisions of husband and wife. As described by respondents, their 
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husband, as breadwinner, was obliged to earn as much "for the family" as 
was possible. In this context income was the key priority, although one 
which might be modified by other family considerations: a couple of 
husbands had refused to consider night work, despite the better pay, on the 
grounds that it would disrupt their home life. However, the informing 
family/financial priority did not vary in direct relation to, for example, 
the birth of a child, or with respect to the child's position in the 
educational cycle. In other words, husbands were seen to work for money, 
whatever the state of their "family" career. Virtually all decisions about 
employment were presented with reference to that theme. 
In this context, then, there was "no choice" but to accept a higher paid 
job providing that there were no overwhelming disadvantages. Accordingly, 
89% of described decisions were seen to be matters about which the couple 
had "no choice" because it would not have been in the husband's (and hence 
not in the family's) interest to refuse promotion and/or the opportunity to 
advance his career. Seen in this way, there was no difference between the 
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husband's interest and that of the family. Indeed, wives almost talked 
of "our" job when describing their husband's career. 
"He wanted to be a GP so we moved to Macclesfield. Then we thought 
well we'll go into the RAF while we sort out what we wanted to do" 
[H1, school age] 
Although this was a common view, the domestic worlds in which it had effect 
varied widely. While details varied depending on the actual occupation in 
question, most H1 respondents expected their husbands to change jobs in 
order to progress up some kind of career ladder. Husbands from other 
housing sections, however, were less likely to encounter such a structured 
sequence of work related choices. Although all changed jobs in order to 
increase their income, their opportunities to do so varied systematically. 
In detail, 60% of those who claimed that their husband had "no choice" but 
to change work because he was offered promotion or because he had found a 
"better" job were from the H1 category. While other respondents shared the 
same financial/work related priorities, only this group had the opportunity 
to realise their ambitions on such a scale. Indeed, some of the H1 
husbands, as in the case quoted below, worked in a context in which there 
was a recognised career ladder with recognised job moving obligations. 
"You have to be prepared to move around when you are taking junior 
jobs, then you get to be a senior registrar, then you start looking 
for a consultancy then that is about it. " 
[H1, pre-school age] 
"To get anywhere you've got to move. So we moved. Basically it is 
dead mans shoes, you know, so you haven't got any control over it at 
all, not really if you want promotion. " 
[H2, pre-school age] 
Not all "obligatory" moves involved promotion. Some employers simply moved 
their employees "sideways", leaving them with the choice of unemployment or 
employment in another part of the country. Three H2 respondents and three 
His had this experience. Those whose husbands worked for the armed forces 
were able to predict the move; others had to go at a moments notice. 
Either way, the breadwinning priority produced a perception of "no choice". 
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The following examples illustrate the position, and mirror the picture 
described by Finch (1983) and Cohen (1977) (17). 
"We moved every two years till Andrew was six. Then we thought we 
ought to settle down so we came out [of the army] and he applied to do 
teacher training. " 
[H2, school age] 
"They said you are going to the shop in York. We had been in Whitby 
for 4 years but they are like that they just send you where they want 
you. " 
[H3, pre-school age] 
H1 and H2 husbands who had no choice but to change jobs, either as a 
condition of employment or in order to get promotion, usually had to change 
their place of work and perhaps their employer but not their formal 
occupation. In comparison, several H3 husbands found that they had to 
change their occupation if they were to look for a better paid job. The 
described careers were consequently varied, as in the case quoted below. 
he: "I came out of the airforce. I came out, I did a series of jobs. I'd 
never had a trade that I could use outside so I wandered from job to 
job. I've got very different experiences but mainly in the building 
trade. " 
she: "He finished up as a messenger at the corporation offices taking 
messages" 
he: "I've done a variety of jobs you know I've worked at Rowntrees to no 
great success. It was no good to me working indoors. I didn't like 
it. No, apart from that I just took what I could. Just what was if 
it was a bit better pay then I'd get that. " 
[H3,16+] 
In the cases documented so far, respondents have claimed that their 
husband had "no choice" but to change his job because that was what was in 
the family's financial interest. However, there were a couple of instances 
(both Has) in which the husband was able to choose between alternative 
equally paid jobs. In these cases the decision was seen to be a matter of 
"preference" rather one about which there was "no choice". 
"He was a butcher at Wrights but then he heard about this job at the 
railway carriage works and he fancied doing that so that is where he 
is now. " 
[H2, school age] 
Interestingly, one of the H1 husbands had also made what was seen as a 
"preference" type choice about his career and had elected to take what he 
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expected to be a more satisfying, but lower paid, job. This was believed to 
be a viable alternative because the drop in income was reported to make 
very little difference to the family's lifestyle: they could still afford 
all that they wanted. 
"He works in private practice in Leeds. He did work with the railway 
but he had some personal clashes and it [the work] didn't suit his 
temperament. He changed jobs for personal reasons, not for financial 
reasons really. In fact he had to take a drop in salary. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
In conclusion, decisions about the husband's work, like those about the 
wife's employment, were made with reference to a particular notion of 
family commitment and obligation. The husband's breadwinning obligation 
clearly informed most of the decisions about career and job and the 
apparently self evident value of earning more money produced a perception 
of "no choice" in nearly all circumstances. While this was a common theme, 
the range of occupations, career opportunties, and work related perceptions 
of identity structured the detail of the way in which that general belief 
had effect. 
FAMILY AND CAREER 
In the first two sections of this chapter I described the ways in which 
models of proper family life informed respondents' perceptions of choice 
about family design. The outcome of the relevant decisions was in part 
determined by these models, in part by the respondents' ability to control 
their fertility, and in part by housing specific variations in conceptions 
of proper behaviour. Much the same could be said of decisions about paid 
employment. Again, themes of child welfare and of family and domestic 
obligation were generally relevant, and, again, they had different 
implications in different domestic contexts. For a variety of complex and 
inter-related reasons, H1 respondents tended to have what they saw as more 
room for choice about both family and working careers than either of the 
other sections of the sample. At the other extreme, H3s described 
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themselves to be in the most limited position of all. Few concluded that 
they had ever had a set of clear personal family or employment ambitions 
which they then went out of their way to realise. Rather, their accounts 
of decision-making were filled with reference to things which "happened" to 
them, leaving them with "no choice" but to cope or respond as best they 
could. In theory, then, His, perceiving more choice, had rather more scope 
for genuine domestic dispute than other sections of the sample. However, 
in this context, as in others, husband and wife appeared to share the same 
basic model of ideal family and working career, even if that model was more 
"flexible" than others, and even if it allowed for personal interpretation 
at the edges. Indeed, the decisions of nearly all respondents were made 
with reference to a set of various, but equally taken-for-granted, beliefs 
about what should happen. Accordingly, they only faced what was seen as a 
"real choice" if they deviated from this normal career. These general 
beliefs effectively minimised the chances of real decision-making and so 
left respondents with little scope for overt dispute even though their 
influence was variously filtered by individual domestic and material 
circumstances. Finally, what is perhaps most striking about described 
decision-making processes relating to choice about family and career, is 
the degree to which informing conceptions of proper family life overlapped 
and so mutually reinforced each other with respect to what might appear to 
be quite different kinds of choice. At a very general level, decisions 
about both work and family careers were made with reference to a similar 
model of family life. In detail, the inter-relation was even more evident. 
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CHAPTER 5: NOTES 
1. There is, of course, a body of literature which is concerned with 
historical and/or demographic questions about occupation and about family 
size in addition to that which considers issues of family and work as part 
of an analysis of class structure. Not surprisingly, this work does not 
attend to patterns of decision-making. 
2. See, for example, Oakley (1979) Bernard (1975), La Rossa and La Rossa 
(1981), Comer (1974), Graham (1977), Finch (1983), Callan and Ardener 
(1984), Poliert (1981), Westwood (198+), Scanzoni (1978), Yeandle (1984), 
Breugel (1979), Barron and Norris (1976), Pahl and Pahl (1971), Rapoport 
and Rapoport (1971,1976,1978), Gerber (1983), Cain (1973), Goldthorpe and 
Lockwood (1969), Salaman (1974). 
3. Much of this literature, especially that produced by feminist authors, 
describes expectations about family life, parenthood, motherhood, womens' 
working lives etc. with reference to a notion of family ideology and an 
account of the ways in which that ideology systematically works against the 
interests of women. Accordingly, it presumes that such beliefs and 
expectations have a mystifying role which serves to maintain gender 
inequalities. While beliefs about proper family careers etc. evidently 
order and inform choices, they can only be defined in terms of inequality 
if the observer is prepared to make some kind of presumption about the 
nature of social life in the absence of these particular ideologies. As I 
have said earlier, I do not wish to make such a claim. Rather, I am 
content to discuss patterns of ordering and structuring without reference 
to the advantages or disadvantages such patterns might be said to produce. 
4. Most respondents believed that there was less certainty about becoming 
pregnant than there was about preventing a pregnancy. 
5. In theory, there are two possible outcomes. Either the respondent 
could become pregnant, or she could remain childless. However, given that 
the childless state was a continuation of the present it was not defined as 
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"surprising" or "accidental". 
6. This is not as paradoxical as it seems. The respondents were simply 
sure that they could not be sure about their family planning. 
7. As Owen writes "reproductive ideologies can only be the background 
against which individual couples will make decisions-the translation of 
cultural ideologies into individual action is always mediated by the 
subjective interpretations of these ideologies, situational exigencies, 
negotiation and consequently, change. " (Owen, 1982, p85) 
8. I shall focus on respondents' perceptions of possible jobs rather than 
on the detailed decision-making process associated with the selection and 
rejection of particular job offers. 
9. Again I do not intend to classify these ordering cultural and material 
factors as necessarily "constraining" or as necessarily limiting, though 
that is, of course, the position taken by many feminist writers. 
10. Different sections of the sample had experience of different types of 
employment related decisions, and respondents from different age and 
housing brackets had made employment choices in a range of different social 
and economic circumstances. Because I was interested in respondents' views 
of the range of possible options and not in the "actual" list of 
alternatives, that inevitable social/historical variation was not 
particularly important. However, because I had caught respondents at 
different stages of their employment careers, the volume of relevant "first 
hand" interview data inevitably varied from employment topic to employment 
topic. I have stated the size of the relevant sub-sample where 
appropriate. 
11. If, for instance a respondent changed her job because she was unable 
to continue working full-time, she had "no choice" about that move, and 
only limited choice about subsequent work options. In comparison, those 
who simply wanted to work for some other employer had a rather more "open" 
choice about whether or not to change jobs, as well as about their 
197 
subsequent employment. 
12. In fact I shall review the accounts provided by the thirty-two 
respondents who had had a child (or children) in their time away from work. 
Another two gave up work with a view to having a family but returned when 
they failed to conceive. 
13. See, for example, Cain (1973), Hollowell (1968), Gerber (1983), 
Dennis, Henriques and Slaughter (1969), Tunstall (1962), Beynon (1973), 
Lockwood (1958). 
14. See, for example, Salaman (1974), Goldthorpe et al. (1969) 
15. See, for example, Rapoport and Rapoport (1975,1978), Bailyn (1978), 
Salaman (1974), Goldthorpe et al. (1969) 
16. See, for example, Callan and Ardener (1981), Finch (1983), Cohen 
(1977) 
17. Finch writes, "The pressures upon a wife to acquiesce to a mobile 
lifestyle are both cultural and economic. If the husband is the sole or 
principal breadwinner, there are powerful economic incentives for a wife to 
adopt a mobile lifestyle, either to continue to make his breadwinning 
possible, or to enhance his earning capacity. Thus where the choice is 
between staying immobile with a lower standard of living or increasing it 
by moving around, the pressures are all upon the wife to accomodate herself 
to a mobile lifestyle, rather than deny a better standard of living not 
only to herself but also (and perhaps more powerfully) to her husband and 
children. " (Finch, 1983, pZ8) 
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CHAPTER 6 
HOUSE AND HOME 
This chapter attends to essentially the same kinds of questions as those 
addressed in chapter 5. Here, too, I shall be concerned to identify 
respondents' perceptions of the kinds of choice associated with a series of 
common decisions, and to explore the factors which appeared to inform 
those described perceptions of choice. Once more, the aim is to document 
the domestic worlds which order the occurrence, form and course of overt 
decision-related conflict. In particular, this chapter reviews 
respondents' accounts of decisions about moving house, about the selection 
of a particular house, and about interior decoration and furnishing. 
There is very little literature which, even indirectly, concerns processes 
of choice associated with the selection of a house and/or with decisions 
about furnishing. That is not to say that housing has been neglected (1). 
In their different ways anthropologists and sociologists have continued to 
emphasise the social significance of housing, neighbourhood, and community. 
In addition, many studies incorporate residential area as a crucial 
variable on the grounds that housing type, in combination with 
social/geographical location, reflects and generates certain important 
cultural and material differences (2). Whatever the primary focus of this 
work (family networks, community relations, class structure, etc. ) 
housing, or, more precisely, residence, is taken as a fixed given. 
Researchers study the contents of a neighbourhood, a village, or an estate 
with very little regard for the decision-making processes which led Mr and 
Mrs x to that address. Implicitly, those families live in that area 
because that is where they "belong". An area is taken to represent a 
certain sector of the population,, and residents are therefore presumed to 
belong to that sector. From this perspective, details of the personal 
housing careers of individual residents are, typically, irrelevant. 
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Although no one under-emphasises the social importance of the final outcome 
(neighbourhood and community relations etc. are significant issues), 
questions about individual choice and decision-making are rendered 
invisible. 
Much the same could be said of the sociological and economic literature, 
where housing is treated as a commodity. Some of those who emphasise the 
significnance of the home as a site of consumption are concerned to 
decipher the conventions of what is seen as a "language" of social 
comparision. Accordingly, writers such as Veblen (1899), Douglas (1979) 
and Goffman (1971) attend to the ways in which individuals are placed in 
relation to others with reference to such complex status symbols as 
address, furnishing, and decor (3). Many more writers attend to the 
"home" with reference to a particular argument about the economic role of 
the family (4). This literature explores patterns of acquisition and 
examines issues such as the creation of demand for, and the financing of, 
"consumer" items. Both the "social" and the "economic" versions of 
consumer based accounts take as their subject themes which the 
neighbourhood/community style literature takes for granted. From this 
view, the social meaning of residence and of furnishing style, as well as 
the financial and economic structure of property and commodity markets, 
are real and significant topics. However, while the resulting accounts 
emphasise the importance of consumption (necessarily identified after the 
event), there is still no discussion of associated decision-making 
processes. Accordingly, even this literature is of indirect relevance to 
the following discussion which centers on decision-making involved in the 
selection of what are acknowledged to be socially important posessions. 
In this chapter I intend to consider decisions associated with the 
selection of a house and of its contents. The task is to map the domestic 
worlds which would order the form and development of instances of overt 
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conflict related to decisions about house buying and furnishing. Choices 
about housing were characteristically believed to be determined by factors 
beyond the individual's control, while choices about furnishing and 
decoration were described with reference to a set of taken-for-granted 
conceptions about appropriate colour, style, and design. As I shall show, 
different sections of the sample tended to present different conceptions of 
house and home and these various informing visions of appropriate style had 
the common effect of ordering respondents' conceptions of possible 
alternatives. Paradoxically, most respondents believed that their house and 
its contents reflected what were essentially personal tastes, yet, at the 
same time, they acknowledged that choices about these items were were more 
or less constrained (5). In the three following sections I shall consider 
described perceptions of choice and the various views of house and home 
which informed decisions about moving house, about the selection of a 
house, and about interior decoration and furnishing. 
1. DECISIONS ABOUT MOVING HOUSE 
Forty-six of the comparative sample of fifty-two respondents were owner 
occupiers, five were council tenants and one lived in privately rented 
accomodation. In most cases, then, the decision to move was also a 
decision to sell a house. 
83% of the sample had first hand experience of the decision to move house. 
All but two of these respondents claimed that they had "no choice" but to 
move either because of their husband's job or because they had changed 
space requirements. Different sections of the sample explained what they 
retrospectively saw as their housing "fate" with reference to 
characteristically different causes. Not surprisingly, most of those who 
had to move because of the husband's job were from the H1 and H2 sections 
of the sample. Given that these respondents agreed that the husband had no 
201 
choice but to change jobs in search of promotion, and given that the 
opportunity existed, there was no choice but to accept the consequences. 
If that job move meant that the family would have to live elsewhere, then 
that was what would happen. In these circumstances the decision to move 
was, in effect, a part of the decision to change jobs: those who did not 
want to move house could only offer token opposition to what was basically 
agreed to be an inevitable fate. 
The second most common reason for having to move house was that the present 
accomodation was "too" small. In some cases the definition of overcrowding 
was made with reference to the belief that brothers and sisters should not 
share the same bedroom. This view, held by the housing department of the 
local council as well as by many of the H2 and H3 respondents left some 
with no option but to move to a larger and more "suitable" form of family 
accomodation. The following quotations illustrates the position. 
"We're living out of suitcases at the moment, waiting for the council 
to move us. When we got married we went to the council and told them 
that my mum had turned us out and we got the keys the next day to a 
guest house owned by the council. Then we moved to St Mary's then we 
got this house. We are going to have to move eventually with having 
one of each so we might as well move now before she [daughter] starts 
school. We are hoping that the house we get this time is the one that 
we shall have for good. " 
[H3, pre-school age] 
"We had to go because we had David. If we had two lasses then we 
could have stayed where we were but that is the way it worked out. " 
[H2, pre-school age] 
None of the H1 respondents advanced this particular reason for having to 
move, but then, none of them lived in less than a three bedroom house. 
Others moved because they felt that they "needed" more space though they 
had no clearly identifiable "problem" as in the cases described above. Not 
surprisingly, then, definitions of need reflected respondents' expectations 
of a normal and practical life style and their perceptions of possible and 
desirable types of accomodation. For example, the two H1 respondents 
quoted below presented their "need" for a larger house with reference to 
the neccessity of more spare room or a larger mortgage. 
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"After Lucy was born we only had one spare bedroom so we had to look 
for a bigger house. We couldn't really have anyone to stay or 
anything in that house. We always knew we would have to move fairly 
soon anyway. " 
[H1, pre-school age] 
"Well we thought this was ridiculous. We were paying so much tax we 
thought we might as well get a bigger mortgage so we looked around for 
a five bedroom house. There was no point in getting anything 
smaller. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
In comparison, H2s typically described their housing requirements with 
reference to the "need" to have less cramped living space. 
"It was too cramped. Helen did not have her own room and she was 
getting to an age where she wanted to see her friends and play records 
and that sort of thing so we thought well can we afford to move? " 
[H2, school age] 
Given that respondents were committed to doing what was in the family's 
interest, they concluded that they had "no choice" but to move to a larger 
house if that was what was required and if that was a viable option. Moves 
to smaller houses, occasioned, for example, by the husband's retirement, 
were presented with reference to just the same themes of self-evident logic 
and hence inevitability. In sum, few respondents believed that they had 
had any real choice about whether or not to move. If it made sense for the 
family to move, not to have done so would have been perceived as 
irrational. Almost all decisions about moving were couched in these terms. 
2. DECISIONS ABOUT CHOOSING A HOUSE 
Having "decided" to move, respondents were then faced with a set of 
decisions about exactly where to live. As I observed earlier, most were 
living in owner occupied accomodation. Those who moved house therefore 
faced decisions about buying new accomodation. Such choices appeared to be 
located in a characteristic sequence of review, rejection, definition and 
re-definition of criteria, and finally of selection. I shall consider the 
implications of this procedure before examining the ideals which informed 
the decisions of different sections of the sample. 
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The character of house buying decisions 
In theory, house buyers always had some choice, at least in the sense that 
there was always more than one house for sale within a given price bracket. 
However, few respondents believed that they had had any real alternative 
but to pick the house that they did. House buying decisions were clearly 
the product of a whole string of related factors producing what were 
retrospectively seen to be inevitable decisions. The end result was 
therefore seen as both accidental (this was for sale, that was what they 
could afford, this was the area, that the type of house available at the 
time) and, yet, inevitable: no other option made sense. The apparent 
discrepancy between choice, and retrospective definitions of "no choice" 
was in part a product of the "looking around" procedure. The "final" 
decision represented the culmination of a sequence of negative choices and 
only rarely involved the selection of one from a range of immediately 
available options. Respondents defined and re-defined their house hunting 
criteria as they "looked around", finally choosing the house which best 
fitted their latest specification. The process of choice therefore varied 
depending on the length of the "looking around" period. Several with very 
little room for manoeuvre, usually those who had to move because of their 
husband's job, had "no choice" but to select whatever seemed to be the best 
option that week or that week-end. The following quotations illustrate 
such a view. 
"That decision was a bit pushed because my husband was starting work 
in January and by November we still hadn't found a big enough four 
bedroom house. We'd seen this one from the outside but I didn't like 
it on sight. It was drizzling. My husband came up two weeks later 
and said it is the biggest one inside that we'd seen and in fact we 
moved before I'd even seen it inside. " 
[H1, school age] 
"I don't know really, we didn't choose really. We were told about 
these houses being built and we went down to the office to see about 
them. All the two bedroomed ones had gone and we had set a wedding 
date for the 3rd of April and we didn't want to live with either of 
our parents so we decided well we'd put our name down for this and 
then before we knew it it had all happened. It was more or less a 
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joint decision but we didn't really do a lot of talking about it. " 
[H3, no children, younger] 
Those who decided that they would like to move to a bigger house, or to a 
house in another area of York were in a position to wait until the "ideal" 
property came onto the market. 
"When we bought this one we looked around for quite a long time. We 
looked at quite a lot but we knew what we were looking for so when we 
saw this one we knew really, we knew that that was what we wanted. " 
[H2, school age] 
However, when these respondents found a "suitable" house they concluded 
that they had just as little choice about whether or not to buy it as those 
who "had to" take the first viable alternative. If it met the ideal then 
that was it. "Looking time", then, ordered the range of alternatives which 
the respondents were able to consider and to some degree informed their 
definition of possible alternatives, but it did not alter respondents' 
retrospective perceptions of the inevitability of the final choice. 
House buying criteria 
Although all respondents chose what seemed to be the "best" house, there 
was considerable variation in the definition of the informing ideals. The 
definition of "possible" alternatives primarily depended on the amount 
which the couple felt that they could afford to spend. Though the range of 
perceived choice and the actual list of options were, in theory, separable 
(one depended on the time spent looking, the other on house hunting 
criteria and the state of the housing market) both were ordered by 
financial definitions of "possible". There were literally more houses in 
some price brackets than there were in others. In theory, then, the more 
money available for house buying, the wider the range of choice and the 
longer the list of possible options to consider at any one moment. 
However, if the richer sections of the sample wanted to buy the most 
expensive house that they could afford, they had relatively few to choose 
from compared with, say, those whose spending limit put them in the market 
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for small terrace houses. These two quotations illustrate the point. 
"It just came onto the market. It is not very often that a house 
comes onto the market. There were four or five people interested in 
the house. There aren't many houses in York. It is very difficult, 
there isn't a selection really so we were lucky to get this one. " 
[H1, pre-school age] 
"Oh there was loads and loads that we were looking at and eventually 
we got sick of looking because there were that many and they'd got 
that many different faults and different prices and all that. It was 
ridiculous. In the end we just got this one. " 
[H3, no children, younger] 
Although the outer limit of the "possible" range was set by price, there 
was usually room for further specification. At this point, the general 
aesthetic traditions which ordered detailed decisions about interior 
decoration appeared to play some part in respondents' accounts of house 
buying decisions. His and a few of the H2s were, for example, concerned to 
buy a house which had "character" and/or which had some kind of special 
feel or quality which they liked. More than that, they wanted to live in 
a house on which they could "make their mark", which seemed, in some way, 
to be a reflection of themselves or for which they felt some kind of 
instant affinity. The following quotation is typical. 
"Well we wanted something, we did not want a perfect house. We wanted 
something that had not been knocked about; something that had lots of 
old features and that we could do ourselves bit by bit. We were 
really lucky. This one has all the old tiles on the floor and the 
original staircase. It is just as it was reallyP 
EH1, pre-school age] 
These respondents therefore gave precedence to the criteria of personal 
attraction, feeling, and atmosphere. Several observed that they had "no 
choice" but to buy this house because this was the only one for which they 
had "fallen". 
"We both knew what we were looking for. We came to see this oneand 
without saying anything to each other we both knew that this was what 
we really wanted. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
"Well this was just what we were looking for. We tried a lot and 
didn't ever feel that they were sort of quite right and as soon as we 
came in here we saw that it was just what we wanted. " 
[H2, no children, younger] 
The chosen house was the one which best met these "emotional" conditions, 
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and which was situated in what was counted as a "suitable" area. His and 
some of the H2s had their own transport and were unlikely to feel that they 
had to live near their immediate family. For these and other reasons they 
were more concerned with an area's reputation and status than with its 
actual geographical location. 
"One we went to look at was a big old semi with a beautiful garden 
which is what we both wanted. A nice big garden but it overlooked the 
council houses on Tang Hall, really run down scraggy houses, so we 
didn't even bother to go in. We just saw the area it was in and 
thought Oh God and went away. " 
[H2, no children, younger] 
In comparison, the remaining H2 and nearly all H3 respondents selected 
their homes with reference to such pragmatic features as the location of 
the intended house in relation to their work place and their immediate 
family. 
"I wanted to be down this way because I had a sister over here. They 
gave you three areas you could pick and I wanted to be down this way. 
He didn't. At first he didn't because I mean he had got his own local 
and he had all his mates from the railway. Then when he saw the house 
and he saw the district, it was different then to what it is now, he 
liked it and he said alright we'll move then, and then he made another 
local. " 
[H3,16+] 
"We wanted something round this area. My mum lives in South Bank so 
we wanted to live here. In any case say I got a puncture or Barry got 
a puncture we wanted to be able to walk to work and you can walk into 
town and it is near enough to both our parents. " 
[H3, no children, younger] 
Of course, "real" and "reputational" geographies often overlapped. In 
practice, Has chose to live, for actual geographical reasons, in the very 
areas which His and H2s avoided on grounds of status. For now, however, the 
point is that house-buying criteria varied. In this respect, as in others, 
Has emphasised factors of convenience at the expense of almost all else. 
This theme was also evident in accounts of preferred house types. Two of 
the H3 respondents and two H2s refused to live in anything but a new house. 
This was in part because a new house fitted a conventional definition of 
"nice" and in part because it was thought to be less "trouble" to run. 
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he: "We looked at a few second-hand houses didn't we? But we were not 
really sure about that were we? " 
she: "No, no, I didn't want a second-hand house, no, I wanted a nice house. 
This was the first one that we found that fitted with what we could 
afford. " 
[H2, no children, younger] 
As the following quotations illustrate, few of the Has and only some of the 
H2s believed that the final selection of one rather than another house was 
especially important. Provided that the intended property was of the 
right type, in the right place and in the right price bracket, there was no 
reason not to buy it. 
"We came in and I said '0h I like this one' but it was a bit damp. We 
said 'Well a bit of damp won't make any difference' and I liked the 
kitchen and bathroom with them being tiled so that was it. We got 
this one. " 
[H3, no children, younger] 
"When we were talking about getting married we just started looking 
for a house and it you know the wages he was on this house just suited 
our price you know. " 
[H3, pre-school age] 
It seems, then, that the different housing groups made choices with 
reference to a different model or vision of an ideal house. His wanted 
something on which-they could make their mark or which they felt was 
distinctly "theirs". At the other extreme, Has appeared to adopt a more 
functional view: the ideal house was one which "worked" and which was in a 
convenient location. Either way, almost all respondents observed that they 
had "no choice" about the selection of their home. This retrospective 
account is not surprising given that all were likely to claim that they had 
opted for the best possible alternative available at the time. That is not 
to say that there were in fact "no choices". As I have shown, different 
sections of the sample made decisions with reference to different financial 
and aesthetic criteria. What is interesting is the degree to which these 
prior and potentially debatable decisions about criteria are rendered 
invisible in the typical retrospective descriptions of "no choice". 
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a. DECISIONS ABOUT FURNISHING AND INTERIOR DECORATION 
Choices about furnishing were evidently common domestic decisions which had 
important consequences in terms of the nature of the family's home 
environment (7). Unfortunately, there is barely any popular cultural 
analysis of styles of furnishing or types of interior design (8). Because 
there is no background against which to review the conventional themes 
which appeared to inform the choices described by my respondents, this 
section of the analysis is especially "exploratory". 
While respondents believed that the contents of their homes reflected what 
were essentially personal tastes and preferences, furnishing choices were 
nonetheless informed by notions of appropriate style. In other words, 
choices were made from a selection of design options which were already 
structured (and more or less limited) by a particular conception of 
decorative propriety. In this section I shall consider respondents' 
accounts of choices about furniture and interior decoration with reference 
to two alternative conceptions of design: the "abstract" and the 
"concrete". This strategy allows me to consider variation in detailed 
perceptions of choice and in definitions of viable alternatives and, 
finally, variation in described expectations of interior design expertise. 
In the course of this discussion I shall inevitably touch on questions 
about cultural conceptions of "the home" and questions about the role of 
the wife as "home-maker". However, my main purpose is to explore the 
nature of the domestic worlds which structured choices about furnishing and 
so ordered more general choices about the nature of the domestic 
environment (9). 
In detail respondents' accounts of possible furnishing and decorating 
options varied widely. This was hardly surprising. Much depended on the 
nature of the house or room in question and on what many saw as personal 
factors such as taste or style. Yet these apparently idiosyncratic choices 
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were structured by a general underlying pattern. His and about half of the 
H2s adopted what I shall describe as an "abstract" approach to interior 
decoration. In comparison, the decisions of Has and the remaining H2s were 
ordered by what I shall describe as the "concrete" approach. Each of these 
two informing perspectives on interior design produced characteristically 
different definitions of the status of particular decorative components 
(eg. pictures or pieces of furniture) and characteristically different 
definitions of appropriate ordering themes. 
The "abstract" approach 
Those whose choices were informed by this approach to furnishing expected 
component items to have some sort of inherent quality. In other words, 
such objects were believed to have a certain value in themselves. This 
point is easiest to illustrate with reference to respondents' accounts of 
decisions about the selection of pictures and furniture. Because an item 
was expected to have some independent and timeless quality of style or 
design, and because aesthetic judgements were unlikely to alter, His and 
some H2s were able and willing to buy "expensive" pieces of furniture in 
the knowledge that they would always appreciate those items and that they 
would always fit in with the decorative order of the home environment. In 
other words, each component could stand on its own as an abstractly 
desirable object though all were united in a common, unchanging, 
conception of "good taste". In addition, those whose decorative decisions 
were informed by an abstract vision of style tended to select pictures with 
reference to a related and equally abstract notion of "art". Most His 
believed that pictures had (or should have) some "artistic" quality which 
transcended the detail of subject matter, colour scheme, or size. Because 
these respondents could not conceive of, say, a slightly less yellow 
version of Van Gogh's sunflowers or a rather more cheerful Munch, there was 
no scope for compromise over the image itself. Either respondents secured 
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their preferred picture or they did not: there were no half measures. 
While decorative items were believed to have some sort of inherent quality, 
and therefore had some kind of separate status, they were typically 
arranged with reference to a general and abstract coordinating principle. 
His and some of the H2s attempted to create rooms with a certain 
"atmosphere" or "mood". Decorating decisions were therefore informed by a 
general theme of the kind described below. In this case the respondent 
aimed to create a room which was "friendly" and "spring like", rather than 
simply green or yellow. 
"This was a very dark dingy room. It's only got that one window which 
doesn't let in much light and I said I'd like to make it sort of, you 
know, almost like a garden room. You know, sort of spring like. I 
love the French Impressionists so I got these big posters framed and 
I've put this green strip round and.. I saw that [the green strip] in 
a magazine and I sent off for it. We already had the bamboo table and 
I was really thinking of it around the bamboo but it would also suit 
my grandma's old curtains. I think it has worked quite well it is a 
nice sort of friendly easy room. n 
[H1, pre-school] 
Decorating and furnishing choices were clearly inter-related and were made 
as part of the more general project of controlling the ambiance of a whole 
room or even a whole house. The aim was to combine particular fixed and 
inherently desirable elements (eg. the bamboo table or grandma's old 
curtains) with easily manipulable background features such as the colour of 
the walls and floor so as to show off the particular items and at the same 
time create a generalised effect or feel. 
In sum, the abstract approach emphasised the inherent qualities of 
particular items and demanded that they be incorporated into an overall 
decorative theme. Such decorative themes were designed to produce a 
generalised atmosphere and did not depend on a specific combination of 
colour or pattern. Furnishing decisions which were informed by such an 
approach shared the following characteristics. First, component decisions, 
for example, those about the paint, the paper, the carpet etc., were made 
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with reference to the goal of realising an abstract effect. Accordingly, 
options were reviewed with implicit reference to a vision of an overall 
integrity, rather than in terms of, for example, a colour specific notion 
of matching (10). Second, and perhaps more important, husband and wife 
were believed to have equal right to determine the outcome of interior 
design decisions. Because these choices were believed to involve questions 
of aesthetic taste, and because individuals had a right to their own 
opinion on such artistic issues, there was no reason why, for example, the 
wife should be able to determine the form of the home environment (11). 
Patterns of involvement were consequently described as if they reflected 
patterns of interest in the aesthetic qualities of the home environment 
rather than some inherent home-making talent. 
"My husband chooses all them [pictures]. I mean I wouldn't bother 
about pictures as such. I like things on the wall to break it up but 
I would say Dave chose all those. " 
[H2, school-age] 
Despite this theoretical equality, however, many of the H1 and H2 
respondents had greater influence over the course of a wide range of 
interior decoration decisions than did their husbands. This was because 
they took on the job of doing the relevant "homework" and, as 
"researchers", were able to set the agenda for the family discussion. The 
next two quotations illustrate this process. 
"Well I go around when he is away and have a look. We are looking for 
a carpet at the moment, for the hall. I went round and saw this 
lovely carpet so he came home and I took him to the shop 'gorgeous' he 
says 'lovely .. great', and while he's been away I've been round the 
carpet places, getting quotations and working out which is the 
cheapest and would do a nice job. Then he will come home and I will 
give him a list of all the carpet people. We pretty much agree on 
most things I don't think there is very much that we disagree about. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
"That's quite good fun actually ... I quite enjoy going round antique 
places, these places in sort of barns and places outside York. That is 
where we tend to go and I, we might have sort of discussed what kind 
of furniture might be nice and I would go, you know, with the children 
in the week and have a look. Then if I saw something that I thought 
was nice I would go and tell Roger and then at that week-end we'd sort 
of go and look at it and buy it if we thought it was... It is sort of, 
er, we tend to agree on that quite well" 
[H1, pre-school age] 
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This sort of "responsibility" was allocated on what were believed to be 
temporary, expedient grounds of convenience rather than with reference to 
what were thought to be inherently womanly or wifely qualities. 
Accordingly, the husband retained the right to an opinion about the 
aesthetic qualities of the proposed purchase even though the wife was 
usually left to determine the list of options which were in fact 
considered. Although the explanations differed, these described decision- 
making practices were much like those reported below. 
The "concrete" approach 
Those whose furnishing and interior decorating decisions were informed by 
the "concrete" approach considered different options, evaluated them with 
reference to different criteria and went about the decision-making in a 
characteristically different fashion. In this perspective, component 
"items" had no special status and no intrinsic "artistic" quality. Pieces 
of furniture and/or pictures were therefore selected with reference to 
immediate physical demands (size, shape etc. ) and/or to a temporally 
variable colour scheme. Decisions to replace key items of furniture were 
more frequent and of a different order to those described above. For 
example, H3s and a few H2s typically looked forward to buying a new suite 
on the grounds that this would have a revitalising effect on the whole 
home: partly because of a "knock-on" effect on other decorating decisions 
and partly because these respondents tended to value the "newness" as much 
as the style of their furniture. 
"I want a new suite. That one, well it is not that bad. It is going 
a bit at the edges but we've had it ages and I want another one. He 
says there is nothing wrong with what we've got. But I don't know. It 
is time we had a new one really, we need a change in here. " 
[H2, school age] 
Decisions about the selection of pictures, ornaments and furniture were 
informed by a notion that the spaces in a house or room should be 
"properly" filled. This meant that particular items were selected with 
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reference to such physical criteria as size, overt subject, and colour. 
The following examples all concern pictures and illustrate the importance 
of such criteria as size and overt subject. 
"We are looking for a big one for that wall there. Trevor likes all 
these ships being wrecked and these tigers' heads which,.. I just say 
Oh its absolutely diabolical.. you know .. I suppose we will end up 
with my choice there. There's not a lot that would really fit there. 
We've not really started looking yet" 
[H3, no children, younger] 
"Er those well those he sent for, those ship ones and, er, the train 
he chose, and all the rest ... we've loads and loads of odds and ends 
and pictures and all sorts, it's just what fits in the space sort of 
thing and I don't mind. I quite like them, though it is usually he 
that chooses them. " 
[H2, school age] 
The meaning of "properly filled" (12) (as described in relation to the 
selection of pictures) also varied depending on a conception of a room- 
appropriate image and on a more detailed notion of colour scheme. In the 
next example, the wife objected to the image proposed by the husband on 
that grounds that it was inappropriate for a living room. 
he: "That's crap what we've got up there, we got that bought for us I 
don't like it. " 
she: "Well I do but it is.. " 
he: "I want that spitfire" 
she: "He wants an aeroplane well I don't I like something like that, but 
I'd like something a bit bigger, we both decided on them pictures,.. " 
he: "We bought them when we were engaged didn't we? But she won't let me 
have my aeroplane. " 
she: "I will not have a spitfire in the middle of our living room. " 
he : "It's a spitfire turning to the clouds and its sort of sunshine. I've 
seen it in this shop. She won't let me buy it its only £33 and we 
could have it up there it is great. It's all I want. " 
she: "You can have it in the bedroom or the bathroom you are not having it 
in here. " 
he: "I'll have it eventually" 
she: "He eventually might. It'll not be in this house it will be in 
another house. " 
[H3, no children, younger] 
In this context it was possible to argue about both subject and colour in a 
way which would have been inconceivable to those who adopted an "abstract" 
view of art. It was, for example, quite possible that husband and wife 
could compromise and so agree to accept a third picture which combined the 
qualities of subject and colour which both desired. In the next case, for 
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example, an image of a moving animal might well fit the bill. 
"Oh we can't agree on that.. no... we are looking for a picture for the 
fireplace and I like this one with a stag just standing looking at 
you... gorgeous... I'm animal crackers, Ian said 'no, it is too still'. 
He wants something with a bit of movement in it. He doesn't know 
exactly what, but something a bit more active sort of thing. " 
[H2, no children, younger] 
Those who held this "decorative" conception of interior design were usually 
concerned to select components which "matched" their existing furniture, 
wallpaper, suite or carpet. Several respondents made reference to the 
proposed location of a picture as a real argument in favour of one rather 
than another option. In other words they did not just like it, they liked 
it because it went with x in the dining room, or y in the living room, or 
because it matched the bathroom carpet. 
"It was in a sale in Boots, yes, that's right I thought that it would 
go rather nicely with this wallpaper that's the only reason .. I mean 
I'm not into art or anything like that I just thought, you know, 
things match. He always wanted a big picture there because it's a big 
expanse .... in fact he wanted to buy two but I said 'Ooh no it would 
be too much', but of course when we got it back and put it up I 
realised that he was right we should have had the other one. " 
[H2, no children, older] 
As I have already suggested, component items were valued because of their 
relation to other decorative objects rather than because of any special or 
inherent quality. In other words, elements were very definitely arranged 
and selected with reference to a co-ordinating theme. However, that theme 
was almost always one of colour or pattern and was often determined by the 
key of the suite or carpet. While it was important that components 
"matched" there was no attempt to inter-relate discrete items (whatever 
their colour or pattern) so as to create a particular ambience. 
In sum, those who adopted the concrete approach to interior design accorded 
no special aesthetic status to pictures or pieces of furniture; their 
emphasis was on colour, size and pattern. Accordingly, elements were co- 
ordinated with reference to a specific notion of "matching" (13). 
One of the most important decision-making implications of this perspective 
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was that it permitted, and even favoured, gender-specific allocation of 
responsibility for all furnishing choices. Because choices were made with 
reference to an absolute notion of propriety (things either did or did not 
match) it was possible to "evaluate" suggestions with reference to that 
baseline and so conclude that husband or wife were "better" at making such 
decisions. In other words, there was, implicitly at least, always a 
"right" combination rather than a series of combinations each of which met 
different but equally valid aesthetic criteria. In practice, almost all 
those who adopted a "concrete" approach to interior design concluded that 
women were likely to be better judges of matching than men. This meant 
that the wife was usually expected to take charge of the actual selection 
of pictures, furniture, carpets, and curtains even if the husband had a say 
in debate about whether or not to buy or replace those items. The 
following examples were typical. 
"We'd talk about it [suite] and if I really needed it then he'd sign 
for it. He'd not pick it no, no, I'd go out and pick it and come home 
and tell him about it and if he thinks we can afford it then he'll say 
OK you go and get it. " 
[H3,16+] 
"Matching things like that I'd have to say 'Oh all the nets want 
changing' I don't think men notice things like that, he does take an 
interest but not that much of an interest. I mean if I wanted 
ornaments he'd never notice that I wanted them if I had a spare place 
he wouldn't think to put an ornament in where I would... these things 
just to finish the room off. We would choose the basic things 
together but making it look homely then I would be thinking of it. 
I've usually chosen the colours and things like that. Things that 
have to go with other things, you know, carpets to go with wallpaper, 
things like that" 
[H2, pre-school age] 
"He'd say '0h any colour suits anything', you know, and I'll say '0oh 
no II that colour won't go with that'. He'd have red and white and 
blue or something like that. But no, I choose the colours and he lets 
me get it, and it is always suitable, so that is it. " 
[H3,16+7 
Those who presumed that women were better at making the necessary 
judgements often concluded that the wife ought to be responsible in her 
capacity as "homemaker". A few described a modified version of this 
position and expected their husband to take an interest in the selection of 
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"major" items (suites, carpets etc. ) but to take a properly indifferent 
attitude towards decisions about wallpaper, paint colour, pictures and 
ornaments. Husbands who took "too much" of an interest infringed these 
conventions of appropriate indifference and, as illustrated in the next two 
quotations, threatened to undermine what was expected to be the normal 
relationship. 
"He has a big interest. Maybe sometimes, you know, I think maybe too 
much.. It tends to be large things but he also likes wallpaper because 
he thinks well I'm living here as well. But there again I've gone out 
and bought wallpaper and he's trusted my judgement. This time round I 
did that, the time before he came with me. " 
[H2, no children, younger] 
"Carpets, all new carpets we had to buy all new kitchen units, we 
bought the suite, curtains you know we bought them all. We chose them 
all together-sometimes I think maybe he takes too much interest but 
he does.. I saw this suite and I thought it was too expensive I showed 
it to him and I wanted it in mink so he said well you know we stood 
and talked about it and then I kept looking at it and I thought well 
maybe that colour [green]. Now whether he talked me into it I don't 
know but I did like it. We sort of chose everything together" 
[H2, pre-school] 
To conclude, the "abstract" and "concrete" approaches to interior decor- 
ation structured respondents' perceptions of possible alternatives and led 
to the adoption of particular organizing colour or stylistic schemes. 
Decisions about the selection of decorative components were made with 
reference to such schemes or ideal models. For example, the H2 respondent 
quoted below describes how the informing colour scheme limited subsequent 
choice about the range of viable lampshades. 
"My main design was a pale rose coloured bedroom, with pierrot designs 
on the bedspread. Once we'd settled on that I got the curtains and 
the lampshades to match. " 
[H2, school age] 
Once established, such ordering principles of colour or design left little 
room for subsequent choice. Respondents reviewed the range of possible 
options with reference to that model and selected whatever came closest to 
the ideal. As with the selection of a house, the decision was structured 
so that, in the end, there seemed to have been little choice but to select 
the best of the available options (ie. that which came closest to the 
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ideal). As outlined above, each informing approach to interior design also 
ordered the nature of the decision-making process and structured the world 
in which individuals took over responsibility for making decisions about 
the family's furniture. 
So far I have presumed that respondents had some choice in that they were 
able to select one from a range of alternative furnishing options. This 
was not always the case. Different sections of the sample presented 
characteristically different accounts of their inability to refuse gifts of 
furniture or pictures and of their obligation to display such items as 
family photographs, souveniers or trophies. The described problems varied 
depending on the informing aesthetic approach. For example, many of the 
His had to try to incorporate inherited objects into their overall design 
scheme having bad "no choice" but to continue the family tradition. 
"Er well a lot of the stuff has come to me from the family. There is 
my Welsh dresser, the clock ... antique old chairs and things like 
that. Things that I hope will stay in the family. You know what 
comes from the distaff side will go to my daughter and what comes from 
the male side will go to my son... whether they chop them up for 
firewood is their affair, once we've finished with them. 
[H1,16+] 
In comparison, Has and some of the H2s presented what were apparently 
similar "no choices" in a rather different way. They too had "no choice" 
but to accept furniture or pictures from their family, though in these 
cases the sense of obligation was often a consequence of a pragmatic 
decision that this furniture was the best that could be acquired. This 
group of respondents had no intention of keeping "old" furniture "in the 
family", rather, they expected to dispense with donated, second-hand items 
as soon as they could afford "better" replacements. The following 
examples illustrate what appeared to be a common pattern. 
"In our home is merely what we've been given and we've just had to 
build our home on that. " 
[H3, no children, younger] 
"A lot of it we've been given. We chose the fire. I think really 
that is all we've bought, that and the screen. We've had a lot of 
furniture given. We scrounged it. Because we haven't been married 
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that long we are still sort of replacing it. Well I'm getting another 
suite, another second hand one, a better one than this and this one is 
going to me sister's sister-in-law. It didn't cost us anything so we 
might as well give it to somebody who'll get some use of it. With 
having a big family you get a lot bought you see" 
[H3, no children, younger] 
Other perceptions of "no choice" were clearly ordered by rather different 
cultural conventions. For example, only H2s and H3s expected to display 
professional style photographic portraits of their family in the main 
living room. Though the content of the photographs varied (the younger 
respondents had pictures of their own weddings while the older ones had 
pictures of their children or their childrens' weddings), the location of 
such key images, as well as of other family trophies (football cups, school 
prizes or certificates) was constant (14). His did not share this 
particular set of expectations, though some felt obliged to display 
selected family snaps and/or their children's artistic efforts in such 
"private" spaces as the kitchen or the hallway. 
In conclusion, few respondents believed that they had much "real" choice 
about the selection of a particular decorative component (15). The 
informing conventions of appropriate style and/or colour, in combination 
with the need to select components which were either "in sympathy" with 
each other or which "matched", produced a fairly clear "ideal" model with 
reference to which actual options were judged. The review and rejection 
sequence involved in the selection of furniture, wallpaper, paint colour, 
curtains, pictures, and ornaments as well as houses led to a final choice 
which was then cast as the only possible option. Looking back, it was the 
best approximation to the ideal. 
However, different aesthetic principles systematically ordered perceptions 
of choice and definitions of the nature of the decisions faced by different 
sections of the sample, while conceptions of interior design also 
determined the way in which respondents were likely to allocate 
responsibility for the associated decision-mating. Those who adopted an 
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"abstract" view equated decisions about furniture with decisions about 
"art" and so expected both husband and wife to have their own opinion. 
Those who adopted what I have characterised as the "concrete" approach 
believed that component items should be selected with reference to an 
absolute colour or pattern specific definition of "matching". This group 
also tended to believe that wives were better judges of this than husbands, 
and that they should, on this basis, be left in charge of such decision- 
making 
Whatever the general perspective, debate about interior design, and about 
the selection of a house was likely to take place, if at all, in the form 
of a debate about relevant criteria. There were remarkably few accounts of 
such discussion, perhaps because retrospective perceptions of "no choice" 
but to select the best possible option obscured prior choices about the 
meaning of "best". In any case, there was some evidence that wives were 
characteristically left to make the necessary decisions about criteria. 
Although the terms of explanation varied, prior decisions about the grounds 
on which furnishing decisions should be founded were often taken-for- 
granted and what remained was a vision of an apparently inevitable outcome. 
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CHAPTER 6: NOTES 
1. Bassett and Short emphasise the importance and the complexity of the 
issue in the following terms. "The diversity of approaches to the study of 
housing is partly a manifestation of the complex nature of the topic. 
Housing is a heterogenous, durable and essential consumer good; an indirect 
indicator of status and income differences between consumers; a map of 
social relations within the city; an important facet of residential 
structure; a source of bargaining and conflict between varous power 
groupings; and a source of profit to different institutions and agents 
involved in the production , consumption and exchange of housing. Such 
diverse characteristics make the study of housing a complex matter amenable 
to various interpretations" (Bassett and Short, 1980, p1) 
2. See, for example, Young and Willmott (1957), Rosser and Harris (1965), 
Bott (1957), Edgell (1980), Goldthorpe et al. (1969), Shaw (1954), Tallman 
(1969) and Cohen (1977) on neighbourhood, estate life and community and 
family networks. The work of McDowell (1983) and Saegert (1980) provides 
an interesting background analysis of women's position in urban 
environments. 
3. Douglas disginguishes what she calls "consumption classes" with 
reference to styles and patterns of expenditure. She argues that housing 
represents one amongst other indices of expenditure used to discriminate 
between different levels of an extremely complex social hierarchy. She 
writes "Food is a medium for discriminating values, and the more numerous 
the discriminated ranks, the more varieties of food will be needed. The 
same for space. Harnessed to the cultural process, its divisions are heavy 
with meaning: housing, size, the side of the street, distance from other 
centers, special limits, all shore up conceptual categories. ... Goods, 
then, are the visible part of culture. They are arranged in vistas and 
hierarchies that can give play to the full range of discrimination of which 
the human mind is capable. " (Douglas, 1979, p66) 
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4. See, for example, Weinbaum and Bridges (1979), Zaretsky (1976) and Comer 
(1974) on the family as a site of consumption and the work of Busch (1983) 
and Cowan (1985a, 1985b) on the marketing of domestic technology, if not 
directly on the economics of furnishing. There are also surveys of 
expenditure; for example, the annual Family Expenditure Survey, and other 
essentially economic analyses which make mention of spending on housing and 
furnishing. In addition, there is a body of social/geographical 
literature on the housing structure of urban areas. The work of Bassett 
and Short is particularly interesting in that it also attends to the 
structure of the property market and to the process of financing, buying 
and selling houses. 
5. As Coward writes, "Personal style -a strange paradox, individuals have 
it but we can all copy it. .... Personal style is, in reality, nothing other 
than the individual expression of a general class tasteP (Coward, 1984, 
p65) 
6. That is not to say that Has "ignored" such variables, only that they did 
not explicity present social area as a significant criteria, perhaps 
because their price limit left them with less choice about this issue. As 
Packard observes, "People .... used street names to designate social class" 
(Packard, 1960, p81). While all sections of the sample made reference to 
"imaginary" maps of reputation, only H1 and H2 respondents claimed that 
their residential choices were directly ordered by such factors. 
7. Coward claims that the question of interior decoration is one which is 
especially important for women. She writes "Because the home has been made 
so important for women, the decoration of the home matters a lot to women, 
perhaps more than to men. " (Coward, 1984, p71) 
8. The work of Painter (1982) and Coward (1984) is virtually unique. 
9. Accordingly, I shall not emphasise questions about the "concepts of art 
existing in relation to the works discovered" (Painter, 1982). Nor shall I 
attempt to provide an analysis of the ideology of the home, or of the ways 
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in which "taste" is constructed (Coward, 1984, p68). 
10. Coward characterises the non-working class style of decor in these 
terms: "The walls are plain; there is minimal furniture; an absence of what 
is seen as clutter; and light, open rooms. Indeed the ideal home is very 
much directed towards a visual impact, and within this visual impact, 
towards a display of possessions.... Walls are painted with an eye to how 
to display an original painting or a framed print. Shelves and tables are 
arranged to show off expensive objects to their greatest advantage. " 
(Coward, 1984, p68) 
11. In this context it is interesting to observe that His rarely gave or 
received presents of pictures. It seems that they were typically unwilling 
to impose their personal artistic tastes on others and so only gave 
pictures when they were sure that the recipient would appreciate the gift. 
'"This picture my husband saw it, it is painted by a doctor and they 
had a medical hobbies exhibition and this GP had painted it. I 
thought I'd love to buy it for him... we'd just moved to York, because 
I know he likes it, it reminds us of one of our walks in Derbyshire 
when you look down on the mill towns and it's Halifax down there, and 
Rachel [daughter] said 'Oh well why don't you buy it because you will 
regret it if you don't' ... I'd never spent that much ever!! So that 
gives me a lot of pleasure because it reminds me of Derbyshire" 
[H1 school age] 
12. As Painter notes "Another factor in deciding what to put on the 
walls... was the contribution a work made to the decoration of the room". 
However, as he points out, the "acquisition of objects was generally 
carried out only once. The walls having been filled there tended to have 
to be a special reason for replacing things - moving house, for example. 
So, though the purchase of a picture may be influenced by the decor, the 
priorities may be reversed when the room is redecorated. " The meanings of 
"properly filled" informed the selection of "new" decorative objects but 
were rarely so precise as to demand the rejection of an existing stock of 
pictures. 
13. Again this picture corresponds with that described by Coward. "In 
working class homes, the pictures and colour are often on the walls, as 
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wallpaper, not framed as possessions. Items are often displayed not to 
demonstrate wealth but because they have pleasurable associations. Here 
are souveniers - memories of a good holiday; snapshots - memories of family 
and friends; and pieces of furniture chosen, not for overall scheme, but 
because they were liked in someone else's home. This is a different 
modality of furnishing, not necessarily concerned with the overall visual 
effect. " (Coward, 1984, p69) 
14. As Painter observes, "many things that people had on their walls were 
there out of obligation rather than personal choice. There is a very real 
sense in which these objects tell us about what people have chosen to give 
to each other as distinct from what they have chosen to surround themselves 
with - more accurately, perhaps, they tell us about the things people have 
chosen to retain from among the gifts received, with all the associated 
pressures that that involves. " The obligations associated with the "need" 
to display family photographs are similar. 
15. Some had "no choice" in the sense that they felt obliged to display a 
gift or an object which had some special association with a person or a 
place (Painter, 1982). This is a rather different interpretation of "no 
choice" compared with that which informed say the selection of matching 
wallpaper although the decision-making implications are similar. 
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CHAPTER 7 
LEISURE 
In this chapter I shall consider respondents' accounts of decisions about 
the use of family leisure time. Again, I am interested in the described 
decision-making processes and in respondents' perceptions of choice on the 
grounds that these perceptions structure the occurrence and form of any 
associated domestic dispute. My task is to document the various ways in 
which different sections of the sample perceived choices about the use of 
leisure time (1). As I shall use the term, family decisions about 
"leisure" were decisions which involved both husband and wife and which 
were about the use of uncommitted time (2). Of course leisure decisions 
were made in a domestic context already structured by individual and family 
commitments, routines and habits. This chapter explores the 
characteristics of the domestic worlds which ordered respondents' 
perceptions of choice associated with decisions about the use of the 
remaining spaces of uncommitted time. 
Such a decision-centered approach allows me to bypass many of the questions 
which have occupied sociologists of leisure. All I am concerned with is 
respondents' perceptions of the kinds of choice associated with the use of 
what was believed to be uncommitted time. This means that I have no need 
to explore the relationship between work and leisure (3), the history of 
leisure in general (4) or the history of particular leisure activities (5). 
Equally, there is no need to define "leisure" as a sort of activity, or as 
a quality of experience (6), although it is important to acknowledge that 
respondents' perceptions of possible uses of uncommitted time were broadly 
structured by such factors as the length of the working week, the 
availability of transport, the existence of particular sorts of "leisure" 
options (7) and the existence of particular conceptions of relaxation, 
"going out" and a "good time" (8). Literature on the sociology and history 
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of leisure therefore provides a general background against which to view 
respondents' accounts of their normal week-end and evening routines and 
their conceptions of appropriate ways of spending their leisure time, 
though it does not directly address the decision-making processes involved. 
If I am to define "leisure choices" as choices about the use of uncommitted 
time, I shall have to consider the meaning of "uncommitted". As Dumazedier 
and others have noted, time is ordered by more and less demanding 
obligations. At one extreme, individuals have "no choice" about what to 
do. For example, they "have to" do the washing up after the evening meal. 
Other rather more "elastic" obligations may be fulfilled at any one of a 
number of possible times. As Dumazedier writes: "Domestic work splits up 
into a multitude of activities varying greatly in their obligatory 
character.. ". He goes on to note that some of these activities are "done 
willingly and considered by the individuals themselves as a form of 
relaxation. These semi-obligatory, semi-pleasurable activities we call 
semi-leisure... They do not fall into the same class of strict obligations 
such as cooking, dishwashing, and the like. They count, in varying 
degrees, as both obligations and as leisure; they overlap" (Dumazedier, 
1967, p93). While I am not especially concerned with issues of pleasure, I 
have to acknowledge that different respondents will have more and less 
fixed obligations and so more and less room for choice about the use of 
time depending on the nature of their domestic routine. To quote 
Dumazedier again, "They who have and use leisure regard it as part of the 
dialectic of daily living, where all elements operate and interoperate" 
(Dumazedier, 1967, p14). The location and form of choices about the use of 
time therefore varied with respect to networks of more and less fixed 
obligation. Different sections of the sample had characteristically 
different conceptions of fixed and semi-fixed obligation and different 
week-end and evening habits. The "location" of leisure choices (that is 
choices about the use of uncommitted time) varied accordingly (9). Choices 
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about the actual use of such uncommitted time were evidently informed by 
taken-for-granted expectations and conventions about "normal" behaviour. 
It was as important to document these expectations as it was to consider 
the location of potentially debatable decisions about the use of evening 
and week-end time in relation to a context of routine, commitment and 
habit. 
I shall suggest that different sections of the sample and, in particular, 
different housing groups, inhabited significantly different domestic 
worlds, both in the sense that each had a different view of what counted as 
a viable leisure option and in the sense that patterns of jointly 
committed, semi-committed or uncommitted time were systematically varied 
(10). In order to make this case I shall explore two separate but related 
issues. First, I shall consider respondents' descriptions of the ways in 
which they spent their week-end and evening time, so as to identify the 
ways in which that time was variously accounted for by individual or family 
commitments. This allows me to locate areas of joint uncommmitted time and 
to pinpoint issues about which there could be real domestic debate. 
Second, I shall consider respondents' accounts of the way in which they 
would "normally" use such spaces of jointly uncommitted time (11) so as to 
find out what each section of the sample counted as a viable "leisure" 
option. Sections 1,2,3 and 4 of this chapter review the ways in which 
H1, H2 and H3 respondents, and respondents of different "domestic" age 
groups, reportedly spent their evenings and their week-ends thus addressing 
both of the two issues described above. 
These sections outline the domestic contexts in which leisure decisions 
were made. Section 5 goes on to consider accounts of those few genuinely 
debatable decisions about the use of uncommitted time. In that final 
section I shall examine the relationship between domestic debate about 
leisure time and the ordering context of taken-for-granted habits, 
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routines, commitments and expectations about normal evening and week-end 
activity. 
1. H1S' USE OF EVENING AND WEEK-END TIME 
It is difficult to determine the degree to which individuals believed that 
their time was accounted for by more and less "elastic" social and domestic 
obligations. However, it seems that H1 respondents were less likely to 
organise their family lives with reference to a fixed domestic routine than 
were other sections of the sample. This meant that they had greater scope 
for time-tabling their obligations and their semi-obligations and so more 
room for debate about the use of actually or potentially uncommitted time. 
In general, His presented accounts of their evening and week-end activities 
as if these were selected on grounds of personal preference and as if such 
individually determined selection were in fact possible. In other words, 
these respondents suggested that their week-ends and their evenings varied 
depending on individual choice and were only marginally ordered by routine 
and obligation. In detail, spaces of jointly uncommitted time were 
structured by a network of individual as well as family expectations, 
obligations, and habits. Some of these routines and beliefs affected the 
use of time spent at home while others ordered the form and frequency of 
the couple's social life. In this section I shall consider H1 respondents' 
accounts of home based leisure and semi-leisure time as well as their 
descriptions of the choices and taken-for-granted routines and expectations 
which structured their social lives. 
ulý -f- i,. tio 
It seems that respondents from the H1 section of the sample were able to 
make time and to re-arrange obligations and semi-obligations to suit what 
were presented as their own preferences. Despite this "unusual" 
flexibility, His chose to fill their "spare" time with what, on the surface 
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at least, seemed to be the same kinds of home-based activities as those 
described by H2 and H3 respondents. For example, all sections of the 
sample chose to watch television. More specifically, however, both the 
pattern of leisure (routine or otherwise) and the nature of the viewing 
varied considerably. Only a few H1 respondents had any established 
television viewing routine. Indeed, His were characteristically concerned 
to emphasise the degree to which they made conscious decisions about the 
"watchable" status of each and every programme. In this context it is 
interesting to note that a couple of H1 respondents felt that they ought to 
make a special effort to resist the inexplicably addictive appeal of 
television and to ensure that their viewing was "properly" selective. In 
the next case, for example, the couple went out of their way to re- 
introduce decisions about precisely what to watch in order to avoid falling 
into what they saw as bad (ie. indiscriminate) habits. 
"We didn't have a TV for a very long time we just never got round to 
it. We finally got one in Harrogate and we used to watch it because 
it's so easy. You just put it on if you are tired in the evening and 
so we got into the habit of watching it and we both of us really 
didn't like that. So when we moved here we decided we weren't going 
to have one. We didn't have one for quite a time and then for some 
reason, either it was autumn coming on or there was something coming 
up that we thought'd be really good you know a good serial or 
something. I don't know what the reason was but anyway we did 
eventually get one. We have got a little portable which is a sort of 
gesture, one that didn't dominate our lives and it lives upstairs 
partly because the reception is better up there and partly because we 
don't particularly like it sitting dominating the room in here so if 
you have to watch it, if you want to watch it, you have to really make 
a big effort to climb up all the stairs and go up there. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
Programmes which His deemed to be "worth watching" typically included 
"serious" documentaries, plays or serials. The following quotations 
illustrate their organising categories and associated emphasis on joint, 
organised and selective viewing. 
"Well we do like serials we are dreadful suckers for serials, by which 
I do not mean Crossroads but I mean things like say Brideshead. Any 
of the serialized plays the classic serials like Barehester and all 
those we enjoy those. We get involved in them and I like to make a 
mental note that they are going to be on at such and such a time". 
[H1, no children, younger] 
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"We only watch after 9.30 pm, then we look to see what's on unless 
we've got into something like Barchester Chronicles or the Irish RM, 
which we make a point of watching. We like good dramatized stories 
especially period ones" 
[H1, pre-school age] 
Other than "serious" drama, H1 couples usually watched the later news and 
sometimes sport. The rest of the television menu was characteristically 
condemned as "rubbish", and sometimes even seen to be "bad for you". Those 
who held this view routinely faced decisions about turning the television 
off on the grounds that the available menu was "not worth watching" and/or 
that they had better things to do. Interestingly, associated debate was 
pitched at a general level and concerned the meaning of "worth watching". 
Because this category was seen to be defined with reference to general 
aesthetic criteria, and because husband and wife usually claimed to share 
the same aesthetic values, overt dispute was rare. 
Given that His were only prepared to watch what came under the jointly 
agreed heading of "serious" television there were never enough appropriate 
options to fill a typical evenings viewing (12). Accordingly, television 
viewing was seen as just one amongst other possible ways of spending an 
evening at home together. In this context respondents made what they 
described as special choices about whether or not to select this rather 
than some other leisure option. 
"We are not avid TV watchers, we watch specific things-it often goes 
off after the news. Most of it is not worth watching. " 
[H1, school-age) 
"Its such a time waster, its not important is it? We really dont watch 
it very much at all. " 
[H1, pre-school age] 
As the above quotations illustrate, several His presented a somewhat 
disparaging view of television as a form of proper family entertainment and 
appeared to place as much if not more value on alternative activities. For 
example, many H1 respondents and their husbands had their own hobbies. 
Unlike the casual interests which occupied H2 and H3 wives (eg. knitting or 
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reading), H1 hobbies demanded full-time attention and a degree of personal 
commitment. 
"I'm very keen on upholstery and patchwork so I sit and do patchwork" 
[H1,16+] 
"I usually sew or do my lace, I do a lot of lacemaking in the 
evenings, and Ian has his painting, he paints up in the attic, well 
not the attic, the top bedroom. Oh yes we are very busy. " 
[H1,16+] 
There was a clear division between the interests of H1 wives and those of 
their husbands. Most of the wives' hobbies were home-based and occupied 
evening rather than week-end time. In comparison, their husbands tended to 
devote week-end time to what were usually outdoor pursuits such as sailing, 
bee-keeping or fishing. Either way, such pursuits demanded individual 
rather than joint time and commitment and so indirectly structured the form 
of family leisure. Some of the His counted entertaining as a joint hobby, 
though one with which the wife was typically rather more involved than the 
husband. Others entertained as a "way of life" and did not distinguish 
this as a special or personal interest. However such events were defined, 
all H1 respondents were involved in a self-perpetuating cycle of fulfilled 
and unfulfilled dinner giving obligations and indebtedness. This ensured 
that the providing and receiving of meals was a joint and a more or less 
regular social commitment. 
"At least once a week, sometimes twice we have friends here for 
dinner. So I'd say that that was what we did most often, having people 
for dinner and then we are also invited by friends to their houses for 
dinner parties. " 
[H1, pre-school age] 
"We have formal dinners about once a month and then we are always 
being invited out to friends" 
[H1,16+] 
"We go out to see other people you know and we often, well I say 
often, we sometimes have other people round for meals, and people have 
us round for meals which we enjoy very much. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
Whatever the scale and formality of the occasion, His concluded that 
entertaining was an entirely normal home based leisure activity. In sum, 
H1s' decisions about home based family leisure were made with reference to 
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a) a shared notion of appropriate television viewing, b) a network of joint 
social obligation and c) a pattern of individual commitment to particular 
interests or hobbies. 
His and the meaning of "going out" 
Most H1 respondents presumed that they could go out in the evening if they 
wished to do so. Those who had small children had to plan such events in 
rather more detail than others but even they expected to be able to find 
suitable babysitters. His therefore expected to go out without their 
children and expected to be able to make the necessary arrangements to 
"uncommit" time as required. Few had a highly routinised social life and 
so most faced discrete and genuinely debatable choices about what to do and 
where to go. Of course, such choices were set in an ordered context of 
belief and expectation about the nature of a normal social life. For 
example, reciprocal entertaining obligations ensured that all His were 
invited out to dinner. Indeed, few visited their friends on any other 
occasion. Some respondents described "casual" visiting of the "coffee 
morning" variety, but even these encounters were set in a reciprocal cycle 
of being invited and then inviting back; the obligation was the same even 
if the enterprise was less time consuming than a full scale dinner party. 
"We might pop out to a friends house just for a coffee, or a drink in 
the evening its easier than having to keep inviting people for dinner, 
and especially with neighbours it gets to be too much to keep up with 
so we might just go for a drink, or a coffee, or they might come 
here. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
It is possible that respondents' accounts under-estimated the scale of 
routine visits to friends or neighbours, since, for example, some evidently 
met up with friends when their children went out to play. Even so, His 
appeared to order their social world in a rather more formal way than the 
other sections of the sample. There was very little evidence of 
unannounced "popping in" on either friends or relatives and, in any case, 
232 
most His lived some distance away from their immediate family. So, His 
typically chose to make separate one-off arrangements to meet friends or 
relatives even if such arrangements were made with reference to a general 
expectation of reciprocity. 
Eating out was another "normal" H1 leisure option although only a few had 
anything like a regular night for such entertainment. Most ate out when 
they "felt like it". 
"We try to go out and eat in a restaurant once a week" 
[H1, pre-school] 
"We do go out quite a lot, especially in the summer when we just can't 
be bothered to cook so we do that. But even just going to ordinary 
places it can mount up and we do have to watch the money a bit. 
Fortunately we don't have high tastes anyway. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
It was hard to define the types of restaurants which His normally 
frequented. This section of the sample seemed to be prepared to eat a 
wider range of food types but some found that York had a limited number of 
what they would count as interesting and appropriate restaurants. Choices 
were therefore ordered by personal taste and by the actual range of 
alternative restaurants. 
"For a meal in York we'll go to an Indian, or a Chinese, we like to 
try different places" 
[H1, no children, younger] 
"We like to go out somewhere where the food is good, we don't go to 
these places that provide "tourist" food. There is not much choice in 
York" 
[H1, pre-school age] 
Although familiar restaurant goers, His only rarely went out for a drink. 
Some, like the respondent quoted below, saw pubs as quite alien places 
only occasionally frequented by people like themselves. 
We don't go into pubs er because they are, they tend to be sort of 
noisy and hot and expensive and smelly and smokey and all the things 
we don't particularly like-r 
[H1, no children, younger] 
While a few went out for a drink on such unusual occasions as a sunny 
lunchtime or when they had visitors to stay, only one couple had anything 
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like a regular local. Occasional H1 drinkers consequently faced decisions 
about where to go, though none saw these to be especially important. 
Nearly all His counted joint trips to the theatre or to concerts as viable 
leisure options. Interestingly, many expected to go (especially to the 
theatre) regardless of the actual programme on offer. The respondents 
quoted below had, for example, fallen into a kind of theatre or concert- 
going routine. 
"I like the theatre, we both go to the city opera, concerts they put 
on one or two times a year because usually they are more serious than 
the things the amateurs do. " 
[H1,16+] 
"Our main extravagance is opera. If there is an opera on, we will go 
to that, as I say that is our main extravagance nowadays. " 
[H1,16+] 
"We like going to concerts, we are going to two next week, and the 
theatre, we like going to the theatre. " 
[H1, no children, older] 
This apparently unspecific approach to going out did not apply to trips to 
the cinema. His, like other sections of the sample, took a typically 
disparaging view of the movies on offer and only chose to go to the cinema 
if they and their husband especially wanted to see a particular film. The 
following quotations were typical. 
"It has to be something special, there isn't a great choice now. We 
don't go regularly. I want to see ET whilst its here. I might go 
this week. " 
[H1,16+] 
"Suddenly they are starting to have good films on, we went last week 
to Heat and Dust. " 
[H1, school age] 
The definition of films which were and which were not "worth seeing" 
consequently ordered perceptions of the possibility of cinema going. In 
this respect, His, like other sections of the sample, believed that there 
was a general category of films which might be "worth seeing" from which a 
final selection would be made with reference to such factors as personal 
preference or taste. Finally, many H1 respondents were independently 
occupied with meetings and/or other related events for at least one night a 
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week. Though some clubs/societies/courses were more "organised" than 
others, membership was usually associated with an obligation to perform, 
attend or get involved (13). Because husband and wife tended to belong to 
different clubs/societies/courses these organisations provided individuals 
with a chance (and sometimes an obligation) to go out on their own. 
"For two years now I've gone to the Castle museum courses, the ones 
that they do for the WEA. It is a bit sort of, he calls it Noddy 
history. I have a habit of going to history things as well. The last 
one was the Georgians, they have different speakers... and the time 
before that it was Queen Victoria to the Beatles. They drag all the 
exhibits out of the museums so its quite good just anything really 
that takes my fancy. It is a nice break really. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
"Well I belong to the Welsh society. We have meetings and arrange 
trips and that sort of thing and John is involved with Probus you know 
that it is for professional people, so he has meetings. " 
[H1,16+] 
Joint membership was rare, but a few respondents, like the one quoted 
below, shared a particular interest with their husband and so belonged to 
the same club/organisation. 
"Recently we both joined the Georgian society. We found out that it 
enabled you to go and visit some of the smaller houses .. rather than 
the big stately homes which are just show pieces ... you could go and 
visit houses where people actually lived and get inside places where 
people don't normally see. That seemed interesting and we've been on 
two of their outings and we enjoyed them enormously. We've booked up 
quite a few more and during the winter of course they have lectures at 
the King's Manor. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
Some were so involved with meetings and committees that it would be 
difficult to describe their activities in terms of a chosen use of "free" 
time. If individuals felt that they were "required" to attend, their joint 
leisure lives had to fit around these personal obligations. Even those 
whose commitment was minimal were "tied" to a weekly or monthly schedule of 
events and/or meetings and so, as in the following example, had "no 
choice" about what to do on, say, Friday night. 
"I usually have at least one meeting a week that I have to go to, yes 
we are both very involved with meetings. He is in the Masons, so he 
always goes to a meeting on Fridaysr 
[H1,16+] 
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Or rather, if there was a choice it was a choice of "Shall I go to the x or 
not? " rather than "Where shall I go tonight? " Although true of all 
"membership" arrangements, His tended to belong to philanthropic 
professional or educational organisations which demanded a particular type 
of devotion and commitment. 
Generally, then, His claimed that they spent their evenings engaged with a 
set of "appropriate" activities, selected on grounds of individual or 
family interest and programmed such that no two weeks were the same. Most 
were also entangled in a series of more or less complex networks of 
obligation which ensured that there was only limited room for choice about 
the use of at least some "spare" time. While husband and wife expected to 
have their own interests, they mostly expected that they would go out 
together as a couple, and without their children. This meant that they 
had to fit a joint social life around their independent activities and 
their domestic obligations. 
His and the week-end 
His tended to fill their "free" week-end time in much the same way as they 
filled their "free" evening time. Many "normal" leisure options such as 
eating out, going to the theatre, or entertaining were saved up for the 
week-end when there was more time to prepare and no need to get up early 
the next day. As mentioned earlier, several H1 husbands had outdoor 
hobbies which took up week-end rather than evening time. Because many of 
the H1 respondents believed that the family should be together at the week- 
ends, wives (and children) often chose to "tag along" and, if possible, 
join in with their husband's/father's hobby rather than stay at home or go 
out on their own. The next two respondents describe such expectations. 
"We've got a boat on the Humber. He enjoys it a lot more than me. He 
is actually besotted with boats and I originally, I must admit I went 
along because I thought well there are so many husbands that go down 
there by themselves and their marriages break up and I think you know 
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when they are ... when a husband is away every available week-end I 
think it puts too much strain on your marriage. So I started going. 
I've got to like it better. I didn't at all at first actually I used 
to make myself enjoy it, but I enjoy it now. We had a lovely week-end 
down there this week-end and the social life is good and we've made a 
lot of friends. " 
[H1, no children, older] 
"We are country people at heart. We tend to go out for walks over at 
Hareham and Helmsley you know where we always go for holidays. Graham 
is a member of a fishing club there so if the weather is reasonable we 
all go over there for the day. We try to be together at the week-end" 
[H1, pre-school] 
Finally, nearly all H1 respondents expected to spend some of their week- 
ends away visiting friends or relatives. As with entertaining, the 
visiting arrangements were expected to be reciprocal. Those same 
friends/relatives came for return visits and so occupied yet more week-end 
time. 
"We go away one week-end in four, or we have friends to stay. " 
[H1,16+] 
"We have friends to stay, we have lots of friends from Cambridge, 
where we used to live they come up to see us and we try to get down to 
see them as often as we can. My brother and his family sometimes come 
to stay for a week-end. They live in Birmingham so its too far to 
just come for the day. " 
[H1, no children, older] 
Only H1 respondents had a) the space, b) so many distant friends and 
relatives and c) the means and transport necessary in order that week-end 
staying could constitute a normal and practical use of free week-end time. 
Only they were therefore engaged in such networks of social obligation. 
Accordingly, few His had an unchanging week-end routine. Rather, they 
arranged their time so as to accomodate the interests and activities 
described above. While some had more "uncommitted" time than others, all 
felt that they could, if necessary, abandon their domestic responsibilities 
and go away for the week-end, or at least go out for the day. As will be 
shown later, this was a fairly uncommon view. 
2. H? -S' USE OF EVENING AND WEEK-END TIME 
In this section I shall review H2 respondents' accounts of the ways in 
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which they spent their evening and week-end time. This suggests first that 
their time was rather more organised than that of the H1 respondents, and 
second that, in detail, their described conceptions of normal leisure 
options differed from those documented in the previous section. 
H2s at home 
H2 respondents, like His, claimed that they were selective about what they 
were prepared to watch on television. While they did not divide all tele- 
vision into the two categories of "serious" and "rubbish", as did the His, 
H2 respondents were usually keen to observe that they did not watch just 
anything. In detail, H2 perceptions of possible television watching were 
ordered by the less openly evaluative categories of "something" and 
"nothing" on. Some chose to turn the television off if there was "nothing 
on". 
he: "The televisison goes off if she doesn't want to watch anything and I 
don't. We only watch what we want to watch" 
[H2, no children, younger] 
"We don't watch for the sake of watching. No, we'll come in here and 
watch the TV unless there is nothing on in which case we'll turn it 
off" 
[H2, no children, younger] 
Others bad the television on all the time but only chose to "watch it" when 
there was "something on". 
We watch very little TV. It is always on but my husband will be sat 
reading, I'd be sat knitting, or whatever I'm doing, and Sarah will 
be reading. I'm bored with it now it is not really interesting. It 
is not often that there is anything onn 
[H2, school age] 
As I observed earlier, His tended to watch television together. In 
addition, husband and wife expected to share the same definition of a 
"watchable" television programme. In comparison, H2 husbands and wives 
often watched different television programmes and indeed, often expected to 
have different definitions of "worth watching" (14+). Choices about joint 
viewing were therefore made in a rather different social context. For 
example, H2 husbands characteristically counted sports programmes and the 
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early news (5pm to 6pm) as "something on". The following examples provide 
an illustration of such viewing habits. 
"He likes the newses, he'll sit and watch the newses, one comes on 
just after 5, then he'll catch the ITV and Tyne Tees news" 
[H2, no children, older] 
"Sport, thats what he watches. All the sport; every Saturday 
afternoon, and all the sports quizzes, he watches all of them. " 
[H2, pre-school age] 
While H2 respondents occasionally watched these programmes as well, they 
observed that in doing so they joined their husbands in watching what were 
defined as "his" programmes. In the following quotations, the subject of 
the "joint" viewing was apparently determined by the husband rather than by 
the wife. 
"Ah you see football, I'll watch that with him... cricket, anything, 
but not war films. Not because I don't agree with war, but I think 
its noisy. " 
[H2, school age] 
"I'd sooner watch sport with him than all these things they put on, 
like er we've stayed up at night recently watching snooker. We both 
like that. " 
[H2,16+] 
The category "war" mentioned above, along with other "factual" categories 
such as documentaries or "enquiry" type programmes also counted as 
"something on" for the husbands. H2 respondents expected their husbands to 
have these tastes in television and expected to have different preferences 
themselves (15). 
"Terry likes anything to do with war and nuclear weapons. I can't 
stand it. " 
[H2, pre-school] 
"Mike watches shooting films and I don't like those. He usually wants 
to watch television and he's been at work all day so he has right of 
way. I love a love story but I don't watch war. Mike will watch it 
and I might bake a cake. I dont mind watching if there is love in it 
but if it is sort of hammering guns going then what is the point? 
[H2, school age] 
The respondents' own definitions of "something on" nearly always included 
one or more of the soap operas. Some were committed to following each 
episode of what became "unmissable" television. This commitment accounted 
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for regular slots of their evening time in the same way that the early 
evening news typically held the husband's attention for some time between 
5pm and 6pm. Both types of committed followers had "no choice" about how to 
spend those half hours of what might otherwise have been "free time (16). 
"I watch all the soap operas, Coronation Street, Crossroads, 
Emmerdale Farm. Its just a form of habit. I like all sorts of 
fictional stuff, he prefers the fact type of things. " 
(H2, pre-school age] 
"I am not that bothered unless it's Dallas or something like that, 
something that I can get interested in and that I really want to 
watch. " 
[H2, school age] 
H2 husbands and wives were typically committed to different types of tele- 
vision and video viewing (17). Nonetheless, the nature of the commitment 
was the same. Interestingly, those few programmes which received 'off int 
attention - for example, "comedy" or "family shows", wildlife programmes or 
"good" series - also tended to become established in the family routine. 
Again, H2s committed a regular period of time and so, compared with His, 
faced far fewer discrete decisions about what to watch. Similarly, the 
content of what were defined as "watchable" programmes varied between these 
two sections of the sample, as did the meaning of "viewing". His were 
reportedly turning their televisions on at the very times of day at which 
H2s (both husband and wife) had lost interest. Compare, for instance, the 
following remark with that provided by the H1 respondent quoted earlier. 
"Its not very good is it? After about 8.30, or 9 pm we don't bother 
[to] keep looking after that. I'd never stop in to watch television, 
only if its any good" 
[H2, no children, older] 
"We only watch after 9.30 pm, then we look to see what's on... " 
[H1, pre-school age] 
Conceptions of the nature of television viewing varied just as 
dramatically. When His chose to watch a programme they intended to do just 
that. In comparison, several H2 respondents claimed that they gave the 
television only part of their attention even when there was "something on" 
(18). As I shall consider later, this expectation of partial attention 
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altered the respondent's perception of the significance of the "what to 
watch" issue. 
Like His, several of the H2 respondents chose to pursue their hobbies 
rather than watch television. The following examples illustrate some of 
the reportedly "normal" home based leisure alternatives described by the H2 
respondents. 
"We tend to play records more than watch the television. We 
occasionally play cards or scrabble and we might open a bottle of 
David's home made wine. " 
[H2, pre-school age] 
"I read a lot, if there is nothing on television I will read. " 
[H2,16+] 
Interestingly, none of these H2 home leisure options received the same kind 
of commitment which His claimed to devote to their chosen crafts or 
hobbies. While many of the 112 respondents knitted, this "interest" fitted 
around other activities and was not seen as a hobby in its own right. 
Altogether fewer H2s (compared, that is, with H1s) expected that they or 
their husband would be committed to specific and time consuming home based 
interests. 
His and H2s also described characteristically different expectations of 
entertaining. Only 53% of the H2s counted this as an ordinary way of 
spending their free time, and nearly all of these described the decision to 
have people to dinner with reference to the economic advantage of this 
option compared with the "normal" alternative of eating out with friends. 
While the reasons for entertaining differed, the associated obligations and 
commitments were the same: those who were invited out to dinner had to 
invite their hosts back. 
"Quite often, not regularly, we don't like regular arrangements, but 
well, they came last week, I can't remember when we went there but we 
go there for a meal or they come here for a meal to save on 
babysitters. Also we find it works out a lot cheaper than all of us 
going out for a meal. Your money goes a lot further at Hillards 
[supermarket] than if you went out for a meal. I begrudge paying a 
lot for a meal. I'd, rather buy something nice and cook it at home. " 
[H2, school age] 
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It seems that the remaining 47% of H2s did not even contemplate entertai- 
ning. Some implied that the option was inconceivable, while others, like 
the two quoted below, went out of their way to explain that they did not 
entertain. 
"We tend to stay in now. We don't drink at all not even at home. 
Only if we have someone in. If, say, my brother-in-law comes he'll 
[husband] say 'Do you want a drink? ' but no, we don't have anyone that 
comes here like for a drink or anything like that we keep ourselves to 
ourselves. " 
[H2,16+] 
"No we don't have many friends. I've friends at work of course, but 
no, we don't have people calling in. No I couldn't stand that. We 
are just prepared to be friendly and that's it. " 
[H2, school age] 
In sum, H2 respondents and their husbands appeared to have separate home 
based leisure lives. Certainly most had different television related 
commitments and a few had their own hobbies. While all His were engaged 
with a joint cycle of entertaining and being entertained, only some of the 
H2s were committed to such a sequence. In addition, His and H2s had quite 
different conceptions of exactly what might count as joint home based 
entertainment. Perhaps the most striking difference was the degree to 
which H2s evening time was structured by a series of what counted as 
"unmissable" television programmes. In this respect the accounts provided 
by H2 respondents were similar to those presented by the 13s. 
H2s and the meaning of "going out" 
H2s did not presume that they could go out as and when they felt like it. 
Indeed, some of those with young children faced insurmountable babysitting 
problems and were literally unable to create spaces of jointly uncommitted 
time (19). The respondents quoted below describe just such situations. 
"There's no one to leave him [son] with. He [husband] won't even have 
him so I don't go out. We havn't been out together since well the 
last time his parents came to stay. " 
[H2, pre-school age] 
"Sometimes we go out and visit grandmas, or friends but we have to be 
back. He [son] has to be in bed by 8pm or so, so you have to be back 
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by then. We go out once a month. We pay for a babysitter one Friday 
a month. " 
[H2, pre-school age] 
Others were able to go out as a couple (or on their own) having made the 
necessary child-care arrangements. In this sub-section I shall review the 
kinds of normal "going out" alternatives routinely described by H2 respon- 
dents: providing that they could make the time, then, what might H2 respon- 
dents count as "going out"? 
It seems that many expected to make more or less regular trips out to visit 
their relatives. Such visiting constituted a large part of the typical H2 
family social life and most presumed that at least some of the evening or 
week-end time would be spent in this fashion. 
"Friday we go and visit his mum, and every other week we go and visit 
my mum. " 
[H2, no children, younger] 
"Visiting parents we do that quite a lot they live quite near, so we 
visit them, not every night, but well at least once a week. " 
[H2, school age] 
This leisure option was physically possible because many of the H2s still 
lived only a few miles from where they grew up. However, as the accounts 
provided by those who had moved away illustrate, relative visiting was also 
an important part of the H2 culture. The respondent quoted below clearly 
misses the type of support such arrangments were expected to provide. 
"All my family are in Scotland, his mum lives in Fulford, so we see 
her quite a bit. I get on fine with her but I miss like my sister she 
lives just near [her mother] and she can always get babysitters and 
she can just pop in for anything well we have to drive for hours to 
get there. " 
[H2, pre-school] 
While H2s made regular visits, these were almost always "organised" in the 
sense that they took place at a pre-arranged time. None lived so close as 
to make "popping in" of the kind described by some of the H3 respondents a 
possible or socially acceptable practice. In terms of more formal 
excursions, H2s were much less familiar with restaurants than were the His 
and only ate out (if at all) on special occasions such as birthdays, 
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weddings anniversaries or mother's day. The following example was typical. 
"We occasionally go for a meal. We went last night because I heard 
that I'd passed an exam. We went to a hotel because there aren't that 
many places in the town that do good what we call ordinary meals. 
Colin doesn't like all these like Indian places and all that, so if we 
go out to celebrate anything we usually go to Hudsons. " 
[H2, no children, younger] 
However, this section of the sample often ate out as a couple in a bar or 
pub. Such meals were either seen as a part of an evenings' drinking or, 
more commonly, as events in their own right. 
"What we do, we like to go out. We may meet some friends and go for a 
meal and a drink. We'll go out to one of the pubs and have a meal" 
[H2, pre-school age] 
This arrangement especially suited those who were on "their" (ie. husband 
and wife only) night out. As defined by the H2 respondents, this night out 
had to fulfil certain conventional requirements. Essentially, wives 
expected their husbands to take them out for a "good" meal. Given that 
meals which met the H2 definition of "good" (20) were served in pubs, and 
given that H2 husbands, and sometimes wives expected to drink beer with 
their food, there was really no better combination than that described 
below. 
"If we go out on our own (ie. independently) we'd just go for a drink 
with friends but when we go out together on Friday night we often go 
for a meal. He treats me to a meal, just a basket meal. We try out 
different places its just finding a nice one isn't it really? We do 
like going for basket meals though don't we? " 
LH2, no children, younger] 
Those who were unable to have this sort of "night out", perhaps because of 
the child/ren, tended to make do with a substitute take-away meal. This 
way the wife was released from her cooking obligation for one night per 
week even if she was not taken out "properly". 
So, most H2s went for a drink (and/or meal) on the occasions when they were 
able to go out together. Choices about exactly where to go were informed 
by a mixture of routine and experimentation. Those who were able to go out 
fairly frequently claimed that they liked to "try different places" whereas 
those who went out less often tended to be less experimental. 
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We usually have a drink on Friday night and on Sunday. We might go 
out to the country if the weather is nice otherwise we tend to go to 
the Dick Turpin round the corner but we like to try different places 
and we like to go out in the car round all the villages you know. " 
[H2, pre-school age] 
"We go to the pub every Friday night, for the raffle. They have a 
raffle at 10.30 so we just go for a drink at about 10. He's won three 
times now. " 
[H2,16+) 
The frequency and context of these drinking and/or eating and drinking 
outings usually depended on the opportunity to go out together at all: 
there was little competition from any other form of outside entertainment. 
Those few H2s who went to the theatre, to concerts, or to the cinema went 
because they decided that they especially wanted to see/hear what was on. 
"I go to the theatre any time there is Agatha Christie on. " 
[H2, no children, younger] 
The cinema, in particular, was subject to "value for money" scrutiny. 
"There is no pictures worth going to, we used to love the pictures, we 
used to go a lot. " 
[H2, school age] 
"A11 you get is flipping X's" 
[H2, school age] 
"We're not really bothered about seeing a film. Occasionally we go to 
the pictures but it is so expensive now that you may as well wait till 
it comes on telly. " 
[H2, school age] 
Those who occasionally went to the cinema did so because they felt that a 
few exceptional films crossed this barrier and were in fact "worth paying 
to see". 
We don't go to the theatre and we havn't been to the cinema in Ooooh 
years but er we are planning to go to Ghandi next week. " 
[H2,16+] 
"We don't go to anything but Disney films. Like we went to ET on your 
birthday [son] didn't we, but no we don't go I might take him to a 
Disney film but apart from that we don't bother. " 
[H2, school age] 
Though H2 respondents were much less involved with meetings associated with 
clubs or societies than were the His, patterns of membership reflected the 
same gender divisions. There were no reported cases of joint membership. 
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H2 wives were typically involved with organisations associated with the 
church or with exclusively female groups such as the Townswomens Guild, the 
Ladies Fellowship or the Guides/Brownies. 
"Monday I've a guide meeting, Wednesday I quite often have another 
meeting because I'm a Commissioner, and I'm going out on Saturday 
because another Guide district is putting on a play at Heworth. Sunday 
we have got a church parade because it has just been Thinking Day. And 
on top of all that I have a lot of work associated with being a 
commissioner, it is not so bad now, I have got it so that it more or 
less runs itself, but you have to keep up with it or it builds up very 
quickly. " 
[H2, school age] 
"A week next Tuesday we have got a lady coming to talk about 
embroidering cushions, that should be interesting, so I'm planning to 
go to that. " 
[H2, no children, older] 
In comparison, H2 husbands tended to belong to sports clubs, either as fans 
or as players. 
"He's out all the time in the season, every Sunday morning, and all day 
Saturday, and then sometimes in the week as well. I'm a hockey widow 
from Autumn to Spring. " 
[H2, no children, younger] 
H2 couples also expected to have their own social lives, their own friends 
and their own independent pattern of leisure. In practice, husbands and 
wives were more or less able to go out on their own or with their own 
friends depending on their ability to "uncommit" the necessary time, and on 
the existence of what were seen as viable independent leisure 
opportunities. Some respondents (and some respondents' husbands) were 
able to organise weekly nights out "with the girls"/"with the lads" (21). 
"Wednesday I go out with the girls. We just do a round of the pubs in 
town. " 
[H2, no children, younger] 
"I keep in touch with the girls I worked with 13 years ago. We've 
always kept in touch and we try to go out for a drink and sometimes a 
meal every now and then. About once a month or so we go. It's not 
always that. It depends it's not always easy to arrange a day. We've 
all got children now so you know some of them have to find 
babysitters. " 
[H2, school age] 
Others went out alone much more irregularly and consequently described a 
different balance of independent and joint leisure. 
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In conclusion, H2s tended to have rather more routinised leisure lives than 
did the His. In addition, H2 husbands and wives expected to spend more 
time engaged with independent rather than joint leisure activities. For 
both reasons, H2s faced fewer potentially debatable decisions about the use 
of joint uncommitted time. In any case, there was, it seems, a rather more 
precise ideal of exactly what constituted a "good time". 
H2s and the week-end 
The notion of being together at the week-end was not as important for the 
H2s as it was for the His and H2 husbands and wives routinely spent much of 
this time doing quite different things. This was in part a product of such 
domestic rituals as the Saturday shopping and the Sunday lunch. Those 
women who were involved with such routines had very little truly 
"uncommitted" time as their week-end schedule was to some degree pre- 
determined and even those with a more flexible time-table expected to order 
their own activities around those of their husband and/or children. 
"We have our Sunday lunch at tea time if he is away or if he is going 
to be real late back. If they've been to Doncaster we might have our 
Sunday lunch on SaturdayP 
[H2, school age] 
"They aren't supposed to have a big meal before they go [children go 
rowing] so I usually do an early breakfast and then we all eat later 
with just a snack at lunch time. " 
[H2, school age] 
While H2 wives were typically committed to their week-end specific domestic 
duties, H2 husbands were relatively free to pursue their own leisure inte- 
rests. Most involved going out. 
"He goes motorcycling. It usually involves Saturday morning because 
he is an instructor sand it involves Saturday morning and occasionally 
Sundays er about two times a month, it isn't every week" 
[H2, school age] 
"He is in the TA so he is away with that at week-ends. I'm in the 
Guides so that takes up time, or I'm clearing up" 
[H2, school age] 
The husband's and/or children's local or home based leisure obligations, in 
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combination with the wife's fixed conception of domestic obligation, 
typically precluded "family" days out of the type described by His which 
were not, in any case, an especially important part of the H2 notion of 
week-end family life. 
"We can't go away for the day at the week-end because Penny goes 
riding on Saturday and Steven is in the church choir on Sundays. " 
[H2, school age] 
None of the H2s were engaged in a cycle of going away at the week-end and 
of having visitors in return. Few had the material capacity to do so even 
if they wished. Thus, H2 week-ends were even more "organised" than the 
evenings, and such organisation effectively precluded debate about the use 
of family leisure time. 
3. H3S' USE OF EVENING AND WEEK-END TIME 
H3 respondents described very few choices about the use of joint 
uncommitted time. Their lives were usually so structured that there was no 
room for debate or choice about what to do in the evenings or at week-ends. 
In this respect the described pattern of choice was similar to that 
outlined in the previous section. However, H3 respondents held 
characteristically different definitions of normal evening and week-end 
activities. While H3 leisure lives were as structured as those of the H2s, 
these two sections of the sample made characteristically different use of 
their uncommitted time. 
H3s at home 
Nearly all H3 respondents claimed that they watched, or, at least, sat in 
front of, the television if they were not otherwise engaged in some form of 
domestic labour. The same, it seems, was true of their husbands. That is 
not to say that H3 husbands and wives watched television together; having 
the television on and watching it were, as described by the H3 respondents, 
two quite different things. Most Has had the television on all the time 
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but only "watched" it if they concluded that there was "something" on. In 
this context, Has' television related decisions were about what to watch 
rather than about whether or not to turn the television on or off. The 
nature of these discussions varied depending on the commitment and interest 
of those involved. While television was important in that it provided a 
continuous stream of entertainment and because individuals had what they 
saw as "their own" programmes, in another sense, it was less significant 
because of its very continuity (22). 
he: "I watch the telly, a lot of telly. I just watch whatever's on. I'd 
watch a dot meP 
[H3, pre-school age] 
"If its on I'll sit and listen to it. I just take it as it comes if 
it's on it's on, if it isn't, it isn't. As I say I just do my 
knitting and listen to whatever's on and, well I just try to imagine 
what it looks like. You see if you're doing an arran pattern you have 
to keep your eye on the pattern" 
[H3,16+] 
Like H2s, H3 respondents expected that they and their husbands would have 
different viewing preferences. The following examples could just as well 
have come from H2 respondents. 
"He likes horror stories but I won't watch them I'm a coward" 
[H3, no children, younger] 
"He likes murder, and blood and gore, but we like the same comedy 
things, and he likes a lot of sport" 
[H3, pre-school age] 
"I watch telly, Coronation Street, Crossroads and Emmerdale Farm, I 
always watch all of them. " 
[H3, school age] 
"I like Coronation Street, harren can't stand that but I always watch 
it. " 
[H3, no children, younger] 
Though husbands and wives were expected to have different preferences, 
neither evaluated the other's choice as "rubbish" or inherently "not worth 
watching". Rather, it was just that what men/husbands or wives/women 
would watch was likely to be boring and/or distasteful to the inappropriate 
sex. 
None of the Has had alternative home based interests equivalent to the H2 
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and HI's hobbies and none invited friends round for meals. 
H3s and the meaning of "going out" 
H3 respondents were often able to rely on relatives (usually their mother 
or mother-in-law) to look after the children for at least one night a week. 
The joint night out was a normal part of the H3 respondent's lifestyle 
whatever their family status and, in this respect at least, the Has were 
much like the His. However, unlike the His, H3s nearly always had routine 
nights out. While they were free to go out, that freedom only existed on, 
say, Friday night or Friday and Saturday nights. Again unlike the His or 
H2s, many H3 respondents had entirely predictable nights out with their 
friends instead of, or as well as, with their husbands. In this routinised 
context Has had "no choice" about when to go out, "no choice" about who to 
go out with and "no choice" about where to go. They always went on 
particular nights, always with their husbands or with the same set of 
friends and, in many cases, always to the same place/s. Some of the H3 
leisure habits were so entrenched that respondents (or their husbands) 
could almost guarantee meeting up with the same people at the same place 
each week. Though such groups of regular attenders did not actually 
constitute a formal "club", "members" of either type of social group had 
little choice about what to do with at least a portion of their "free" 
time. As with His and H2s, H3 husbands and wives tended to "belong" to 
different formal or informal groups. Formally, several H3 respondents 
were members of church related organizations or of single sex groups such 
as the Brownies or Guides. 
"I'm a Brown Owl, so Mondays its Brownies, and Wednesdays its Bible 
class" 
[H3, no children, younger] 
"I help with the lunches for the pensioners. I we do sewing for 
bazaars and I belong to the church fellowship and we have sewing 
evenings. " 
[H3,16+] 
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Informally H3 wives tended to belong to informal groups of bingo or whist 
playing regulars or to the working mens clubs of which their husbands were 
also members. As the following example illustrates, those who went out to 
the same place together (ie. with their husbands) kept different company 
and took part in different activities. 
"We used to go to the club quite a lot, you know if there was a turn 
on on a Wednesday or a Sunday or a Saturday, or we'd just go for a 
drink with our friends you know. He'd have his friends and they'd 
play dominoes or something and I'd sit with all my friends but since 
he started to get a bad chest and the smoke affected him we stopped 
going" 
[H3,16+] 
H3 husbands formally belonged to sports clubs, for whom they played, 
(usually football) or informally to a group of friends who met at a club or 
pub. Membership of sports clubs usually committed the husband's week-end 
rather than evening time, although those who were most involved, such as 
the one described below, were also occupied during the week. 
"He is out on Wednesdays training, and Mondays is badminton. Mainly 
it's just training, he doesn't go drinking, he's just concentrating on 
the football now. When you've got a family you can't it's better if 
you stick to one [sport]. " 
[H3, pre-school age] 
In comparison, trips to the club involved a different sort of commitment. 
The following examples illustrate the different ways in which such 
facilities were be used. 
"He is a clubman, he likes to go out to the club. As we've got older 
he's stayed in a bit more but he usually goes out about 41 times a 
week" 
[H3,16+] 
"He doesn't go out a lot now because he cant drink a lot and he is 
happy to sit in the house or if he feels like it he'll say "I'm just 
off to the club" 
[H3,16+] 
This was the limit of Has formal and informal group membership. None went 
to an evening class and none belonged to anything like the professional or 
charitable organisations which occupied the His and some of the H2s "free" 
time. Though none of the H3 respondents thought of going to the theatre 
or to a concert, several went to the cinema. Those who did not go to the 
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cinema claimed that this was because it was too expensive rather than 
because they disliked the films on offer. The following examples 
illustrate the financial nature of the decision. 
"We go to the pictures quite a lot. There's been some good things on, 
we went to ET last week. I'd rather go out and watch a film at the 
pictures. Ft- least it's a night out you're getting [compared with 
watching a video tape], I'd rather pay and get a night out really" 
[H3, pre-school age] 
"It always seems such a lot of money to go out to the pictures, no we 
don't go to anything like that. We're quite happy just sat at home if 
we're not going out" 
_ [H3, pre-school age] 
Essentially, H3s who went out expected to "go out" for a drink. This was 
what H3 respondents did when they went out with their husbands and when 
they went out with their own friends. 
"We always do the same, we go into town and get paralytic. We go with 
friends, we go round the pubs in town. We can only afford so much for 
going out which is really only one night. He hates night clubs but we 
always go when the pubs shut, I make him go just for a bit. " 
[H3, no children, younger] 
"I go out with girlfriends, not in great gaggles just 2 or 3, and we 
go round the pubs, its nice to be in women's company, we do that about 
once a month. " 
[H3, pre-school age] 
Decisions about which pub to go to were as rare as decisions about whether 
or not to go for a drink. Many Has (wives as well as husbands) had a 
"local" and only went there. Others had a normal "round of pubs" which 
they visited in sequence. Either way, H3 respondents did not usually face 
the same "Where to go" decisions as those made by His or, more commonly, by 
H2s. Although wives were generally keener on eating out than their 
husbands, the notion of shared leisure time was comparatively unfamiliar 
for both. The typical H3 notion of a joint night out involved an evenings' 
drinking in which eating, if included at all, was functional rather than 
social. Those few Has who went to a restaurant therefore did so in the 
company of their friends rather than their husband. 
"I don't drink Frank likes a, he is a clubman he likes a pint. I like 
to go out for a dinner. Frank doesn't you see but when we go home 
[she comes from Kent] we'll go out with my brother and his wife. Then 
he'll go, but no, I go. I often go out with the girls. I like a nice 
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meal. No I'm not a club woman and I've never drank. " 
[H3,16+] 
"Well sometimes we will go for a meal, sometimes we will just go into 
town and do a round of the pubs just come home you know and get a 
Chinko on the way home, and that's about it" 
[H3, pre-school age] 
None ate out with other couples and none even mentioned the possibility of 
entertaining. H3 respondents just did not share the kind of general 
conception of a "joint" social life on which such "couple" based activities 
depend. "Going out", then, normally meant going drinking together or going 
out to meet other people at the familiar venues of pub, club, or bingo 
hall. Going to visit relatives did not come under this heading though it 
did occupy much evening and week-end time. Some "visits" were so automatic 
that they barely deserved the title. Others were regular and predictable 
but less frequent. 
"We always go visiting parents. We usually visit your mum on Friday 
night don't we? My mum lives just around the corner so we see her 
virtually every day. " 
[H3, no children, younger] 
"I often take Alex [son] up to see his grandma, they all live near and 
we sit up there sometimes. " 
[H3, pre-school age] 
"There's always mothers to visit, and grandmothers we like to see them 
while they are still here. " 
[H3, no children, younger] 
"I'm out at one of my sisters on a Wednesday, and then I try and get 
to see my dad at least once a week because he's on his own now. He 
lives way out in Acomb [i miles away] so I don't always get there in 
the week but we have him for dinner on a Sunday, so that's not so 
bad. " 
[H3, school age] 
Routine visits fitted in around equally predictable nights for "going out" 
while less predictable "popping in" took place during the day time or in 
the early evening and so did not interfere with the "going out" routine. 
Evidently H3s' social lives were highly organised and often independent. 
This left very little room for family debate about the use of shared 
leisure time. 
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H3s and the week-end 
The week-end pattern described by H3s was much the same as that reported by 
H2s. The wives were typically occupied with domestic responsibilities 
including (in nearly all cases) the task of preparing a proper Sunday 
dinner. 
"Saturday morning I go through the house, Sunday I've the dinner to 
cook, my daughter and her two boys come for their dinner with us, and 
by the time they've gone I'm shattered" 
[H3,16+3 
Week-end routines and hence commitments were, if anything, more elaborate 
than those described by the H2s. Almost all of Sunday was therefore 
occupied (for both husband and wife) by the ritual surrounding the 
preparation and consumption of the Sunday dinner. The wives Saturdays 
were spent "doing the house out" and/or going to town to do the shopping 
while their husbands entertained themselves. 
"We go out every Sunday dinner time. I get up earlyish, not early, 
about 9am, 8.30, or 9am, on a Sunday. I get all my veg done and the 
roast in, parboil my potatoes because he always likes roast round the 
meat. I do that, I partly cook the veg, I make my yorkshire puddings 
and I get everything ready and I get the potatoes and the meat nearly 
done so I turn it right down on the gas to a half and we go out to the 
Crescent [working mens club]. We have a drink and a chat to our 
friends that we've made there. Ron buys me a drink and he has a drink 
and we have raffle tickets where you win a bottle of Whisky, and well 
we've won quite a few bottles. We were only one number off last 
week. " 
[H3,16+] 
"Saturday he is away, he plays football, I take these [children] to my 
mums for the day, and I go to town with me sister, or she has the kids 
and I go with me mum. " 
[H3, pre-school age] 
Although the routines varied in detail, none of the H3s were at all 
uncertain about what they would be doing: one week-end was much like 
another. Such predictability precluded nearly all domestic decision making 
of the "What shall we do? " form about the use of evening as well as week- 
end time. In effect, then, }13s hardly ever made any real decisions about 
the joint use of uncommitted time, for their lives were organised such that 
this commodity barely existed. 
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4. DOMESTIC AGE AND PERCEPTIONS OF CHOICE ABOUT FAMILY LEISURE 
As the preceding discussions have shown, different housing sections of the 
sample expected to use their free time in extremely different ways. 
Accordingly, respondents from the same domestic age groups (but different 
housing categories) shared very few definitions of possible leisure 
options. Young H2s had, for example, much more in common with older H2s 
than with their contemporaries from other sections of the sample. That is 
not to say that age made no difference to respondents' perceptions of 
decisions about family leisure time. The point is that the differences lay 
in the degree to which respondents had uncommitted time, rather than in 
their conceptions of normal leisure options. In this section I shall 
document the patterns of uncommitted time described by respondents of the 
same housing categories, but of different domestic ages and so elaborate on 
the housing specific analysis presented in the first three sections of this 
chapter. 
H1s' joint leisure habits were relatively unaffected either by age or by 
children. Because H1 parents were willing and able to pay for babysitters, 
most were able to go out at fairly short notice. Interestingly, only those 
with older school age children found that their joint leisure lives were 
interrupted by child related obligations. Those who encouraged their 
children to develop their own interests or to join in after-school 
activities were obliged to provide the necessary transport and "back up" 
services. While this commitment ate into the parents' "free" time, the 
respondents concerned still managed to maintain such "normal" activities as 
going to the theatre, to restaurants, or to dinner with friends. This 
additionally busy period apart, changing demands of family life had little 
impact on His perceptions' of possible leisure options. Even the oldest 
His expected to maintain regular, active and, on the whole, joint social 
lives. 
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In contrast, H2s joint leisure lives changed dramatically as soon as they 
had children. The decision to start a family was also seen as a decision 
to devote nearly all free time to a home centered domestic life. The 
following quotation illustrates this view. 
"We'd been married what five years before we had Alex so we feel that 
er I'm not bothered so much now because we have had five years of 
going out, so I'm not so bothered, now we've got him its better I 
think to stay in, and, well when he gets a bit older not so much at 
the moment but I don't think you should go out so much when they are 
small anyway" 
[H2, pre-school age] 
H2s were neither able nor willing to employ babysitters on the casual basis 
characteristic of H1 respondents. As described earlier, some consequently 
abandoned their joint social life altogether while others, who could call 
on friends or relatives, led restricted social lives. The respondent 
quoted below describes what are presented as "eher" babysitting problems. 
"I'm a bit funny about babysitters really because I wouldn't want him 
to wake up and not know who is there. So there's only really my 
sister and my mother-in-law that I feel really comfortable about 
leaving him with. I won't leave him with someone I knew and he 
didn't. It does make things a bit difficult. My mother goes ballroom 
dancing on a Saturday night, and my sister is younger so she's always 
out, and anyway we don't like to ask them too often, its not fair on 
them. " 
[H2, pre-school age] 
Many of the working H2 respondents who were also parents of pre-school or 
school age children were employed during the evening and so had "no choice" 
about what to do with at least 14 week-day nights. In general, however, 
joint leisure opportunities increased as the children got older. Of 
course, not all chose to take advantage of these opportunities. Some 
observed that they preferred to go out as a family (that is with the 
children) while others, like the respondent quoted below, explained that 
they had become so used to their home life that they no longer wanted to go 
out. 
"We are both home birds really. We are happy to stop in. He's not one 
of these who goes out a lot, no, he likes his home. It's not that we 
can't go out its just, well, we prefer to stop in" 
Even if joint leisure was possible, such excursions had to fit in around. 
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independent leisure commitments. Most H2's expected that they and their 
husbands would follow rather different independent leisure careers. For 
example, H2 husbands were expected to maintain a relatively unbroken 
pattern of independent leisure whatever their parental status. 
"I used to go out [on her own] but since I stopped work I haven't 
really. There's no one to leave him [son] with. We don't know anyone 
really. I've been with some of the lasses from work they always ask me 
back, I've been when they've had dos and my mum and dad have come over 
and slept the night with him. I can't leave him [son] with him 
[husband], no, I have to make sure he's asleep, he won't stay with 
him. He goes out. Oh yes well he stays out a lot really, it gets me 
mad sometimes. I don't mind him going out with his mates that's only 
fair, but well he is getting better now but he used to be out a lot. " 
[H2, pre-school age] 
In comparison, most H2s expected that their own independent leisure lives 
would be disrupted, sometimes to the point of destruction, as soon as they 
had a child (23). Unsurprisingly, then, the joint and independent social 
lives of H2 respondents were essentially determined by the presence or 
absence of dependent children. The described patterns of "going out" 
fluctuated accordingly. 
Nearly all H3 respondents were able to go out with their husbands at least 
one night a week whatever their family circumstances (24). In addition, 
even those with small children were able to go out often enough to keep up 
with all their own friends. Once the children were old enough to be left 
without a babysitter, H3 respondents were able to resume what they saw as a 
normal (ie. pre-family) pattern of going out. Most, including the 
respondent quoted below, took up this opportunity. 
"I mean I go out quite a bit, I usually go to bingo on Monday and then 
I go for a drink. Sue that I go with, she is the landlady of the pub 
so we go back and sit there and have a natter to her and then on a 
Saturday I go out with my husband and I'm at my sisters on a Wednesday 
night so its quite hectic. With him being 13 they are OK now... but 
it's only in the last couple of years that we've been able to do that, 
before my mother-in-law used to come and babysit for us but it was no 
problem really going out it was just that you got a bit fed up of 
having to stay in sometimes" 
[H3, school age] 
Has expected to maintain a minimum of one night out per week whatever their 
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parental status. Additional (joint or independent) nights out were more 
or less possible depending on the available child-care facilities. This 
active social life only decreased when the respondent and/or respondent's 
husband concluded that they had had enough and that they were tired of 
going out. 
"I used to go out to bingo. When we were younger we went out a lot. 
But I've well it's too much now. I'm quite happy with my home and 
family, they come to see me, so no, I've had enough of going out. " 
[H3,16+] 
Here, actual age seemed to have as much if not more of an impact on a 
couple's joint leisure life as "domestic age" or family obligation. 
In this short section I have suggested that the location and form of family 
choice about the use of uncommitted time varied depending on the 
respondent's "domestic age". However, those variations were more and less 
dramatic for each of the three housing categories. Essentially, H1s' 
leisure lives changed least of all; H2s' leisure habits changed beyond 
recognition at the point at which they had a child; while H3s maintained a 
routine pattern of going out regardless of their parental status. This 
variation is important in that it reflects changes in routine which in turn 
determine the points at which there is scope for real family debate (that 
is, debate involving both husband and wife) about the use of joint or 
individual leisure time. For example, H2s with young children faced far 
fewer such decisions compared with those whose children were old enough to 
look after themselves. In comparison, H1 couples were always able to make 
decisions about whether or not to go out together, and about when and where 
to go. This was also true of H3 respondents, although many had such fixed 
conceptions about the meaning of leisure that, in fact, there was little 
remaining scope for choice (see section 3). 
I have so far tried to outline the ways in which different categories of 
respondent spent their evening and week-end leisure time. The point was to 
document the patterns of routine and, in that way, to identify the location 
258 
of real decision-making about family leisure; that is, to pinpoint the 
location of decisions about use of time which involved both husband and 
wife. The described habits, constraints, and expectations determined the 
location of the boundary between "no choice" routine and real choice as 
well as the respondent's interpretation of viable leisure options. In 
essence, this discussion reveals the degree to which potentially debatable 
decisions were ordered by networks of routine, habit, and material 
constraint. 
In the next section I shall consider respondents' accounts of those few 
"real" choices which involved both husband and wife and which were about 
the use of uncommitted time. 
5. DECISIONS ABOUT FAMILY LEISURE 
The respondents described two types of domestic decision-making about the 
use of uncommitted time. Both kinds of decision were informed and 
structured by the fixed routines, habits, and more and less "elastic" 
domestic commitments which were the subject of the earlier sections of this 
chapter. 
First, there were decisions about the precise timing of an ultimately 
unavoidable event. Respondents described situations in which they had "no 
choice" but to do x but were free to choose when to do it. For example, 
the husband was, perhaps, obliged to mow the lawn, but free to do it on 
either Sunday afternoon, Tuesday evening, or sometime next week. 
Individuals (rather than couples) fitted their week-end and evening chores 
in and around periods of time committed by habit or fixed obligations. In 
this context it is important to note that husbands tended to have rather 
more "elastic" family and domestic commitments than wives: the washing up 
could not be left until next week though it would do no real harm to wait 
another seven days before cleaning the car. In effect then, husbands and 
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wives constructed different sorts of more and less flexible personal time- 
tables. Though there was some real choice about the structure of these 
time-tables, and hence some room for real dispute, individuals were, within 
limits, free to allocate their time as they wished. It did not matter 
precisely when the jobs were done providing that they were completed to an 
appropriate standard. In other words, the nature of an individual's week- 
end or evening time-table was only the subject of Joint debate if the 
individual failed to allow time to fulfil their domestic obligations 
according to plan (eg. if the car never got washed). There were very few 
described instances of this sort of debate. 
Second, and more important, there were occasions on which respondents had 
to make decisions about the use of what was believed to be "free" time. 
These decisions became the subject of family discussion if it was 
necessary to coordinate the activity of both husband and wife or if an 
individual's leisure time-table contravened the definitions of appropriate 
independent leisure (eg. if the husband or wife stayed out "too often", or 
"too late"). In practice, the majority of debatable leisure decisions 
concerned the joint use of uncommitted time or were about the need to 
"uncommit" time such that both husband and wife could engage in the same 
leisure activity (25). Not surprisingly, the need to make such jointly 
acceptable decisions, and the nature of the choice involved varied 
depending on respondents' expectations of a "normal" social life. Those 
who expected to go out on their own had far fewer "joint" choices to make 
than those who believed that husband and wife should spend all their free 
time together. Different sections of the sample therefore had different 
experiences of this kind of decision-making. In addition, the exact form 
of such choices varied depending on respondents' conceptions of leisure. 
The following diagrams summarise the accounts presented in Sections 1 to 4 
and so illustrate the distribution of potentially debatable decisions about 
the joint use of uncommitted time. 
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FIGURE 8 
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The diagrams reveal two important dimensions of difference. First, H3s 
leisure lives were much more routinised than those of H2s or His. 
Accordingly, there was much less scope for family decision-making or debate 
about the use of "uncommitted" time. Indeed, as I observed earlier, such a 
commodity barely existed in the H3 context. Second, H3s expected to lead 
much more independent social lives than either H2s or His. Again this 
served to limit the number of occasions on which it was necessary to reach 
joint agreement about the use of uncommitted time. 
Despite these differences, there were relatively few leisure issues about 
which husband and wife had to reach joint agreement. The personal time- 
tables of even those couples who emphasised the importance of family 
leisure and of joint activity only crossed at a few critical points. For 
example, H1 respondents only described joint discussion about family 
television viewing, about their entertaining plans, and about the timing 
and form of joint trips out to restaurants, pubs, theatres, or cinemas. 
All other leisure decisions - for example about membership of clubs or 
societies, about the time devoted to a particular sport or hobby, or about 
independent television viewing - were typically believed to be matters of 
individual rather than joint concern and so did not appear on the family 
agenda (26). 
To conclude this discussion I want to consider respondents' accounts of the 
few debatable and so potentially contentious decisions about family 
leisure. This highlights the expectations and cultural emphses which 
informed the course of such family discussion and so illustrates the 
ordering influence of what were very general (if variable) conceptions of 
proper family life. I shall begin with a review of reported family debate 
about the use of the television (27). 
Different sections of the sample described different types of televsion 
related decision-making depending on their normal viewing habits. What 
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were invisible issues for some (say, whether to turn the television on or 
off) were visible and contentious for others. His, for example, conflated 
the "on/off" issue with the decision about what to watch. As noted 
earlier, H1 couples shared a common conception of "worth" watching. This, 
in combination with their characteristic indifference to television 
entertainment, served to minimise occasions of overt H1 dispute. In 
comparison, H2 and H3 respondents expected husband and wife to have 
different viewing preferences and expected that these would produce 
television related conflict. Those whose husbands objected to their 
particular programme preferences found that arguments about what to watch 
were as frequent as the preferred programmes. In other words, those who 
always argued about Crossroads had (at least) twice weekly disputes. 
Although "addicted" to certain programmes, H2s and H3s were 
characteristically disinterested in the rest of the television menu. Or 
rather, they were less interested than were other members of their family. 
The following example was typical. 
"Oh yes they fight over it. That is something they do-fight, the kids 
and their father, 'I want this side on' 'no, I want that side on' so 
you can imagine what it is like here on a night. I'm not bothered, I 
don't get involved. " 
[H2, school age] 
In more detail, the form of overt conflict depended on the nature of the 
household's television equipment and on the relative levels of interest and 
indifference. Those who disagreed about what to watch and who had only one 
television described different types of arguments compared to those who 
had, say, two televisions or two televisions and a video. 63% of His, 68% 
of H2s and 64% of Has had only one television. In this context, the 
described disputes usually involved reference to a specific notion that on 
this occasion it was A's rather than B's turn to choose, or to a general 
expectation that A (usually the husband) rather than B (usually the wife) 
had the right to watch what he wanted (28). The following examples 
illustrate the strategies described by members of one television 
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households. 
"Well as I say if he wants to watch football I can always find 
something to do. I have my programmes that I want to watch and he'll 
sit through them or go and potter about. It's about 50/50 we share 
it. We take turns to watch what we wantP 
[H2, school-age] 
"I don't know but if there is something I want to watch and something 
he wants to watch I always seem to lose. He'll say '0h I want 
football on' and I'll go and do something else, some baking or some 
ironing. I don't know, maybe its unfair to say always but the 
majority of times I seem to lose, but there again he's been out at 
work all day and I've been, well I have been working but I can put my 
feet up some days. When I play with the baby I suppose I'm relaxing 
really, not working so maybe that's the reason. It's fair enough if 
you think about it really I suppose. " 
[H2, pre-school age] 
The respondent quoted above appears to suggest that her husband should be 
able to choose what to watch because of his employed status. Here, as 
elsewhere, leisure is acknowledged to have a different meaning and 
significance for those who "work". For this reason the husband is accorded 
the right to "proper" relaxation and so allowed to determine the nature of 
the family's television viewing. 
Members of two television households were always able to watch their 
preferred programme though they were not always able to see it in "ideal" 
conditions (29). All "second" televisions were black and white and all 
were kept in a less comfortable room than the "main" one (usually the 
kitchen or a bedroom). In this context, those who could not decide what 
programme to watch went on to argue about who should watch which 
television. Some took turns to watch the "second set" while others simply 
presumed that they would end up watching the black and white television if 
there was any real problem. 
"One of us usually gives in or the other will take the portable black 
and white into the kitchen. You know we'll say 'Oh well its your turn 
to have the black and white'. It always seems to be my turn. No, it 
is pretty fair really. " 
[H2, no children, older] 
"We just give and take you know, if he would like it on fair enough 
he'll have it on. We have a second set, a little portable set so I 
could go into the bedroom and watch something if I wanted to on the 
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little black and white one. But I don't bother I just sit and do 
something else ... we never fall out about that. But if it did come to 
a time when one of us you know felt rather strongly about watching 
something then I could go and watch it in the bedroom. " 
[H2,16+] 
In theory, those who had a video had no need to argue about what programmes 
to watch. Time-shifted television was of as high a quality as the "real 
thing" and could be watched in the same comfortable surroundings. However, 
those whose programmes were videoed had to find some unused and so often 
less convenient slot of television time in which to view their tape. In 
all cases of reported disagreement, including the two quoted below, the 
wife rather than the husband ended up with what was seen as the "second 
best" option. 
"Last week we couldn't go out because there weren't any buses and I 
wanted to watch Dallas. He didn't want to watch Dallas he wanted to 
watch football so he had the football on and I had to go and read a 
book. We recorded Dallas and I watched it later. It always works out 
that way round, it's always me that has to record my programme and 
watch it later. " 
[H2, no children, younger] 
"Well we have got two televisions and a video so we don't have that 
problem any more. It is usually me that has to video my programmes 
but now I've got the afternoons free I can watch them. Before I used 
to have to find time to see what I'd misssed which wasn't always 
easy. " 
[H2, no children, older] 
Thus, normal television viewing habits ordered the types of potentially 
contentious decisions, although the form of associated conflict (if any) 
then depended on the nature of the household's television equipment. Those 
who were able to win television disputes (usually husbands) were typically 
able to claim that their preference was either more serious, or more 
"unmissable" than the other's or that they (as breadwinner) had the right 
to relax properly when they came home from work. 
The only other joint debates about home based leisure were about 
entertaining. Given that His and only half of the H2s expected to 
entertain, only these respondents had experience of such discussion. 
Because entertaining arrangements were expected to be reciprocal, there was 
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only room for debate about such detailed decisions as exactly who to invite 
on exactly which occasion. In nearly all cases the wives were responsible 
for making the necessary arrangements and for the associated catering. It 
was therefore their job to designate an evening of jointly "uncommitted" 
time in which to prepare and consume the dinner. The next two quotations 
illustrate such practices. 
"If I say we'll have so-and-so and so-and-so to dinner on Friday, he 
is always very pleased. He likes entertaining but I don't think he'd 
ever say to someone 'how about coming to dinner two weeks on Friday? '" 
[H1,16+] 
"I have to make all the arrangements. I think a lot of men are like 
that, they leave it up to their wives and they enjoy it but they 
wouldn't do it themselves. When we have friends coming he doesn't make 
the effort to do it himself. I think this is the general thing with 
chaps, that they are not bothered. " 
[H1, no children, older] 
In these contexts, the wives expected that they, as cook and family 
administrator, would be responsible for making decisions about this 
particular use of joint time. Interestingly, the same expectation of 
administrative authority ordered accounts of at least some family decisions 
about going out to restaurants, theatres and/or cinemas. However, in these 
cases the effect of such expectations was somewhat modified by a competing 
yet just as important expectation about the nature of being "taken out" and 
by the need (or otherwise) to plan such events in advance. 
Most respondents, but especially the H2s, expected their husbands to 
"treat" them, and to take them out. The husband was expected to make the 
offer but to allow the wife to decide exactly where to go. As I described 
earlier, many of the H2 and H3 respondents had an established "going out" 
routine which removed at least some of the component choices. As this 
example illustrates, however, remaining decisions were framed with 
reference to a general vision of the nature of being taken out. 
"He takes me out for a meal. I'm afraid we go out every week, he 
takes me out on Saturday. Well we have a bar meal so we might go to 
Stockton-on-the-Forest, I like it there, or we somethimes go to Askham 
Richard. We used to just go for a drink, but I prefer a meal, he is 
not bothered but I say if I'm going out then I'd like to go out and 
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have a nice meal. It makes a change if you are cooking all week. He 
realises that it is a treat for me so now we go most Saturdays. " 
[H2,16+] 
Those who ate out in restaurants rather than pubs (ie. H1s) were often 
obliged to book. Interestingly, this task was typically left to the wife, 
although all other aspects of the event were in accordance with the 
conventional notion of "being taken out". Decisions about other joint 
excursions were variously informed by the notion that the husband should 
take charge when taking his wife out, and by the practical expectation that 
the wife, as family administrator, would make the necessary arrangements 
and so some of the associated decisions. In this context, wives had rather 
more influence over choices about events which needed some kind of pre- 
planning. For example, H1 and sometimes H2 wives were able to determine 
the nature of the family's theatre-going experiences because only they 
picked up the relevant programme, only they selected a particular play, and 
only thay made the necessary bookings. While the husbands were consulted, 
few actually initiated the process or went out of their way to make their 
own suggestions or bookings. 
"It is nearly always me that would buy a ticket for something. John 
wouldn't probably go and buy tickets for something himself, but that 
may be because he is not in York during the day although he has 
recently sent off for a brochure about Opera North. If we go out to 
anything like that it is usually me that has said 'shall we go', and I 
usually get the ticketsP 
[H1, no children, younger] 
To summarise, debatable decisions about use of uncommitted time were 
typically informed by a series of surprisingly common expectations about 
the relationship between work and leisure, about "going out" and the 
relationship between husband and wife and, finally, about the nature of the 
wife's domestic administrative responsibility. These general expectations 
had more or less effect depending on the location and form of jointly 
debatable decisions about the use of family leisure time. 
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LEISURE HABITS AND LEISURE CHOICES 
Sections 1 to u illustrated the range of different ways in which H1, H2, 
and H3 respondents, as well as those of different domestic ages, spent 
their evenings and week-ends. This showed first that different housing 
sections of the sample had quite different conceptions of what might 
constitute a "normal" leisure option. To give two extreme examples, none 
of the H1 respondents. even considered going out to play bingo, just as none 
of the Has leafed through theatre programmes. Second, but just as 
important, different sections of the sample saw themselves to have more or 
less routine lifestyles. H1 respondents observed that they constructed 
what were presented as idiosyncratic ways of life and argued that their 
leisure choices were made on grounds of purely personal (or family) 
preference. Those choices combined to produce a varied and unpredictable 
"leisure" package, designed with reference to entirely individual critieria 
but constructed so as to provide enough opportunity for a "normal" joint 
social life. In comparison, H2s spent much of their spare time engaged 
with independent and/or rather more predictable forms of joint leisure 
activity. As they saw it, the form of their leisure lives was ordered by 
financial or material factors beyond their control. In addition, leisure 
choices were made with reference to a static and fairly precise model of 
the meaning of a "good time". Finally, Has emphasised the degree to which 
their leisure lives were ordered by a series of taken-for-granted 
conventions. This section of the sample faced few "individual" choices 
about the use of uncommitted time because it was simply presumed that 
individuals would conform to the normal pattern. For example, few H3s felt 
that it was necessary to expand on the meaning of "going out" and only a 
couple expected to have anything other than an entirely predictable social 
life. Interestingly, these general perceptions of choice, ranging from 
absolute personal control at one extreme to absolute conformity and "no 
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choice" at the other, parallel those presented in relation to other 
domestic decision-making issues (see chapter 8). Perceived choices also 
varied depending on the degree to which leisure lives were, or were not, 
routinised. Those whose leisure habits were most predictable faced fewer 
choices compared with those who elected to make one off decisions about the 
way in which they would (jointly or independently) spend each evening and 
each week-end. Despite the described variations documented above, there 
were really very few areas of potential debate. The first four sections of 
this chapter have also demonstrated the degree to which domestic routine, 
family habit, day-to-day obligation, and independent leisure accounted for 
the week-end and evening time of all respondents and of all respondents' 
husbands. 
In this final section I have suggested that those few genuinely debatable 
leisure decisions involving both husband and wife were resolved with 
reference to one of three common themes. If there was choice and family 
debate about the proper use of uncommitted time, then those debates were 
likely to be informed by certain shared expectations about the nature of 
family life and about the relationship between home, work and leisure. 
While the reported relevance of such general expectations varied depending 
on the form and location of the family debate (which was in turn determined 
by the patterns of routine, habit, and obligation discussed in sections 1, 
2,3 and J4), the appeal of these general arguments was widespread. This is, 
perhaps, not surprising, given that such themes evidently fit into a 
broader vision of conventional family life in which work is contrasted with 
home and leisure, in which the husband is the breadwinner and the wife 
financially dependent, and in which the wife, as housekeeper, takes charge 
of everyday administrative responsibilities. 
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CHAPTER 7: NOTES 
1. By definition, I am concerned with choices about uncommitted time: if 
a particular space of time were committed, then there would be no choice 
about how those minutes or hours might be spent. 
2. This means that I am not concerned with decisions about the use of day- 
time when, for example, only the wife was at home, or with personal 
decisions about the allocation of more and less committed time - other than 
those which, for one reason or another, involved both husband and wife. 
3. As discussed in the work of, for example, Roberts (1981), Parker, (1976) 
or Dumazedier (1967). 
4. See, for example, the introductory chapters of Dumazedier (1967) and 
Parker (1976) as well as the work of Walvin (1978a) 
5. The leisure activity with the best documented history is football. See, 
for example, Walvin (1975) and Dunning (1975). 
6. Roberts (1983), for example, offers a composite definition of leisure 
as an activity, an experience, and a particular sort of time. 
7. See the work on the history of leisure and on current provision of 
leisure facilities (Roberts 1981,1983; Rapoport and Rapoport 1975; Parker 
1976) 
8. Curiously, there is very little comparative work on "class" differences 
in conceptions of entertainment or leisure, although some of the literature 
explores the meaning of leisure as defined by specific age groups (Rapoport 
and Rapoport, 1975; Roberts, 1983). 
9. In that I am concerned with decisions involving both husband and wife, I 
am primarily concerned with decisions about the use of joint leisure time. 
In this context variations in individual access to uncommitted time are 
only relevant in as far as they order what remains as jointly uncommitted 
time. In other words, I am not especially concerned to document the degree 
to which wives might be said to have more or less "free" time than their 
husbands. Rather, the point is to explore the domestic contexts which 
271 
order family choices (ie. involving both husband and wife) about the use of 
uncommitted time. 
10. Again it is important to emphasise that I am interested in patterns of 
obligation and commitment as they affect family rather than individual 
decisions about the use of "free" time. 
11. In practice it was difficult to characterise respondents' perceptions 
of "normal" evening/week-end leisure alternatives. The relevant interview 
material inevitably revealed a wide range of different types of more or 
less frequent events. What I wanted to establish was the respondent's 
perception of the range of possible and acceptable leisure options. While 
this was presumably related to the frequency with which individuals claimed 
to participate in particular leisure activities, I chose not to take one as 
an index of the other. If I had asked questions with a built-in time 
limit eg. "What did you do last night? " or "What did you do last week? " and 
so collected nicely comparable responses, I would have been able to devise 
some definition of "normality" in terms of reported frequency. However, 
that strategy would have been unnecessarily limiting, as would the option 
of asking questions of the form "How often do you do x? " (In any case it 
would have been impractical to restrict the range of possible responses in 
that way). The following discussion of conceptions of "viable" leisure 
options is therefore based on responses to questions which were framed more 
generally, for example, "What do you do at the week-ends? " plus a few more 
precise though commonly applicable questions of the form "What kinds of 
television programmes do you watch? " or "Do you go out to the theatre or 
cinema? ". I have had to presume that responses to those questions gave a 
general idea of at least some of the range of possible leisure activities 
and that it would be reasonable to use those responses as the basis of an 
account of "normal" leisure options. 
12.26% of H1 respondents had a wider range of television centered leisure 
options because they owned or rented a video recorder. Most of them used 
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their machine to "time-shift" the sorts of serious serial television which 
they normally watched. 
"I use it to record things that are on when I'm at work, for example, 
last week I recorded the start of the Citadel er Cronin's novel. I'm 
taping that and I taped Oh what was it called, a thing about a young 
governess, that was on a few weeks ago I've still not seen the tape of 
that yet" 
[H1,16+] 
"I'm glad we've got it now because I like watching serials and if 
somebody says 'Do you want to go out? ' I don't like to say 'No, it's 
the third part of this serial' but now I can keep up with it all. " 
[H1, no children, older] 
This facility, along with the ability to borrow video tapes from a library, 
increased the range of potential television centered leisure options and 
permitted more complex time-tabling of television viewing than would have 
otherwise been possible. 
13. Scott (1957) and Wilensky (1961), amongst others, have observed that 
there is some relation between professional occupational status and 
membership of voluntary organisations. Related to this, much of the 
literature on leisure has been concerned to examine the links between work 
and leisure, and to explore instances in which "work" extends into 
"leisure" time. 
14. Hobson makes the same point although in rather different terms. She 
describes the "two worlds" of television thus: "There is an active choice 
of programmes which are understood to constitute the 'woman's world', 
coupled with a complete rejection of programmes which are presenting the 
'man's world'. " (Hobson, 1980, p109) 
15. These accounts parallel those described by Hobson. She writes "It is 
clear that the news, current affairs, political programmes and scientific 
programmes, together with portrayals of war (real or in the guise of war 
films) are actively rejected by the women. They will leave the room rather 
than sit there while the news is on. " (Hobson, 1980, p111) 
16. From a different angle, Geraghty discusses the importance of time in 
relation to audience reaction to soap opera, and writes: "It can be argued 
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that the most important influence on how the audience perceives the 
continuous serial is its regular appearance, in the same slot every week, 
every year. " (Geraghty, 1981, p9) 
17. Only 10% of H2s had a video recorder. This 10% used their machines to 
time-shift television programmes as much as they used it to play rented 
tapes. What was recorded was much the same as what normally counted as 
"something on" and so varied for husband and wife. From the respondents' 
point of view, the ability to preserve episodes of "unmissable" television 
(soap operas) was especially important. 
"If there's a film on, we'd watch that and tape Crossroads or anything 
like that, Coronation Street. " 
[H2, pre-school age] 
"We use the video when we go out drinking. Like we taped an episode 
of Death of an Expert-Witness the other week. " 
[H2, no children, younger] 
Because the videoed programme "had" to be seen before the next "real" 
episode was broadcast, serials had a very short tape life. Many H2s used 
their video for this short-term time-shifting purpose alone and were able 
to manage with one constantly wiped and re-recorded "holding" tape. 
18. Curiously, video viewing was a rather different sort of leisure 
activity. While decisions to rent a video tape were often informed by the 
respondents' conclusion that there was "nothing" on the television, 
decisions about which tape to rent and about how to view it had little to 
do with the normal perception of television choices. Rented tapes, unlike 
normal television, were reportedly given full attention. In other words, 
H2 choices about what to rent were much like H1 choices about what to 
watch. 
19. Not all saw this to be a problem. Some of the "housebound" H2s, like 
those quoted below, were keen to describe their satisfaction with entirely 
home/family centered leisure. 
"We are quite content to be home together. We are happy with our own 
company. " 
[H2, school age] 
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"We had 5 years of going out, so I'm not that bothered. We've just 
got used to not going out. " 
[H2, pre-school age] 
20. H2s, and especially the H2 husbands, tended to prefer "English" food, 
as opposed to the Chinese, Italian or Indian varieties available in the 
"cheaper" restaurants. Given these tastes, there were essentially two 
alternatives. Either respondents could go out to a relatively expensive 
English restaurant or hotel, or they could go to a pub which specialised in 
bar food. 
21. From my point of view, independent leisure patterns are significant in 
as far as they constrain joint leisure options (in that they consume both 
time and money) and in as far as they might become the subject of domestic 
dispute (if, for instance, individuals infringe the conventions of 
appropriate independent leisure). Nonetheless, it is still important to 
acknowledge that perceptions of the chance to go out independently varied 
according to gender. 
22. Like H2s, Has described video viewing in a rather different way. 21% 
of H3s had a video, most of which were acquired in order to "time-shift" 
television programmes which otherwise would be missed. 
he: "With working three shifts I miss out on every third week. I miss out 
interesting bits. That's why we got it, but she doesn't know how to 
work the teletext to find out what's on so she won't tape things for 
me. I have to set it for her. " 
[H3, pre-school age] 
"With me being out such a lot [in the evening] it's mainly taping 
those [TV programmes] so I can watch them during the day when I come 
home from work" 
[H3, school age] 
In practice, the television diet was also supplemented with rented video 
tapes. Both pre-recorded and rented videos were reportedly given full, 
rather than partial, attention. 
23. H2 respondents could only go out if they could delegate their child- 
care responsibilities. This was often so difficult to arrange that 
respondents found it impossible to go out when their children were young. 
Because they lost contact with their friends at this stage, their 
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subsequent social life was limited: even if they had a greater opportunity 
to go out they had no one to go out with. This respondent sums up the 
position. 
"I don't know what it is I think once they get married they [women] 
tend to lose a lot of their friends. I used to live up in Acomb 
before I was married I had two, there were three* of us all through 
school we were real good friends. Then one got married to a lad in 
the Air Force, then she got divorced, she has an Iranian husband now. 
The other one has four little girls so I don't get up there much and 
she can't come down here. " 
[H2, school age] 
24. Of course those who did not have children were able to stay out much 
later than those who were relying on their mothers/mothers-in-law to 
babysit. 
"We er sort of prefer to go out together when we can. Its just usually 
down to the Winning Post just for a couple of hours but we don't get 
to go out very much. It'd mean my mum, she looks after him [son] and 
well they'd have to put him to bed. Well I don't think they'd like to 
I mean I'd have to sort of change his nappies before he went to bed. 
So we come back early about 9.30 so when I can get back Ican change 
his nappy and put him to bed so we don't have to rely on them. It's 
not fair on them. " 
[H3, pre-school age] 
25. Debatable "family" decisions included, for example, choices about 
where to go on Friday night, (given that husband and wife planned to go out 
together on Friday night), about when to make time to go (together) to see 
x at the cinema or even about what to watch (together) on television. 
26. "Independent" decisions included, for example, A's choice about 
whether or not to plant the potatoes this Sunday or next, about whether 
or not to sign on for a term of Yoga or about what television programmes to 
watch (alone). Such decisions were only the subject of joint debate if A 
or B engaged in "too much" independent leisure and so infringed what were 
expected to be shared expectations about the nature of "normal" family 
life. In my sample, such debate was rare. 
27. Some of the literature on leisure considers the impact of television 
on family life. However, only a few writers have directly attended to 
domestic television related dispute. See, for example, Rosenblat (1976). 
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28. Hobson describes what her respondents saw as their husbands "right" to 
watch certain types of television in these terms: "there is a clear 
distinction between what men and women watch and what is seen to be the 
right of the husband to watch (news and current affairs programmes)" 
(Hobson, 1980, p110) 
29. Parker suggests that "Conflicts over programme preferences are likely 
to be most frequent in the one-set family; such conflicts need not happen 
in multiple-set families". However, that presumes that the multiple 
televisions are of equal quality and located in equally comfortable parts 
of the house. 
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CHAPTER 8 
HOLIDAYS 
This chapter reviews respondents' accounts of decisions about going on 
holiday, accounts which reflect certain common conceptions of the nature of 
holiday as opposed to "normal" life. However, these general conceptions 
informed described decision-making processes, perceptions of choice and so 
the context of associated dispute in a number of different ways. 
In the broadest sense, of course, holiday choices were structured by such 
factors as the availability of cheap air travel, of holiday resorts, of 
hotel accomodation, and of paid holiday time. More specifically, 
respondents clearly had strongly routinised holiday "habits". 
Much of the relevant literature documents the social and economic history 
of the holiday and so provides a general background against which to view 
the particular decisions described by my respondents (1). In this 
literature, as in that produced by economists, geographers and cultural 
analysts (2), the subject of study, the holiday, is taken as given. 
Attention is devoted to changes and patterns in holiday-going practices 
and, occasionally, to the character of holiday experiences, but not to the 
decision-making processes which led to the selection of one rather than 
another holiday option. 
Interestingly, sociologists of leisure rarely discuss holidays, though, by 
almost all definitions, holiday time is also leisure time (3). While 
decisions about holidays, like decisions about leisure, involved choices 
about the use of "uncommitted" time, the notion of being on holiday served 
to frame such choices in a particular way. Decisions about holidays were 
therefore ordered with reference to a discrete set of holiday going 
conventions which were unlike those that informed normal use of "free 
time". That is not to say that holiday decisions were self-contained or 
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easy to identify. As I shall show, conventional notions of a holiday 
ordered a wide range of theoretically distinct choices about holiday 
location, holiday accomodation, and holiday activity. 
In sections 1,2,3 and 4 of this chapter I shall review the definitions of 
a holiday which appeared to inform the choices of different sections of the 
sample. Having done this I shall then examine the ways in which these 
general visions informed respondents' perceptions of the kinds of choice 
associated with a series of particular holiday related decisions. 
By way of introduction, it is important to emphasise the cultural 
significance attached to holiday-making and to acknowledge the complexity 
of what initially appears to be a simple issue: selecting a holiday 
location. Consider first the accounts of those eight respondents (of the 
comparative sample of fifty-two) who had not had a holiday in the last 
year. Without exception, members of this group presented themselves as 
self-defined freaks or as "unfortunates" who were for some reason unable to 
be like everybody else. The respondent quoted below describes what she 
acknowledges to be a deviant view. 
"No I'd rather have a suite, I'm different from everybody else you see 
they'd rather have a holiday, but you see a holiday lasts you a week 
and its forgotten, a suite lasts seventeen years. I'm told I'm 
different from everybody else. " 
[H2, school age] 
For the most part, those who did not go on holiday would have liked to but 
believed that they "could not" because they were either "too old", "too" 
pregnant, or the parents of children who were "too young". All viewed 
their inability to go away with some regret and most tried to arrange 
substitute holidays made up of days out. 
"Well obviously we can't go this year, not with Paul. We'll try to go 
for days out and that but we couldn't manage a holiday not while he is 
a bit bigger anyway. " 
[H2, pre-school age) 
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"We used to go on the Wallace Arnold tours, all 4 of us you know 
Eric's mum and dad and us two well of course all that stopped when his 
mother died but we always had good holidays, oh yes, thats all over 
now, we are too old for all that now. " 
[H2,16+] 
These accounts illustrate the cultural importance of going on holiday. All 
sections of the sample saw holidays as both normal and important events in 
ordinary family life and some clearly marked out the year with reference to 
the highlights of Christmas and holiday. Both events demanded a degree of 
advanced preparation and financial planning and both were seen to be 
important "family" occasions. Even those who adopted a more casual apporach 
to holiday-making agreed that it was important for the family to get away 
for at least a couple of weeks a year and to engage in holiday activities, 
whatever that was believed to involve. 
So, nearly all the sample were faced with the task of deciding where to go 
on holiday. The final choice of a particular resort or destination 
represented the culmination of a complex sequence of theoretically separate 
decisions about what counts as a holiday, about proposed holiday 
activities, and about the financial priority of holiday expenditure. In 
practice these different components were logically and temporally inter- 
related. This double inter-relation made it impossible to conduct a "non 
decision-making" type of analysis of the ways in which particular component 
choices ordered and/or maybe even precluded other subsequent decisions. 
It was even impossible to establish a basic necessary sequence of decision- 
making, since what would seem to be the initial holiday decision ("To go, 
or not to go? ") was evidently made with reference to a set of pre-existing 
holiday-going principles. For instance, if a self-catering holiday did not 
count as a proper holiday then respondents might choose not to go at all if 
they could not afford to go full-board. In this case, the full-board 
definition of a holiday was "decided" prior to the initial question of 
whether or not to go away this year. The general vision of what 
constituted a holiday therefore ordered this choice as much as it ordered 
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the other choices of where to go, where to stay, and what to do. In the 
next four sections I shall attempt to identify the respondents' visions of 
a holiday, though without attempting to produce an analysis of all the 
decisions, sub-decisions, and sub-sub decisions which mutually influenced 
and constrained each other on the way to a final solution. 
1. H1S' DEFINITION OF A HOLIDAY 
Respondents from this housing group had greater financial freedom than the 
rest of the sample and were in principle able to choose from a fairly wide 
range of alternative holiday resorts. In this context it is especially 
interesting to observe that 48% of those who stayed in Britain were His. 
Given their relative financial freedom this choice seems to represent a 
positive pro British preference as it was unlikely to have been the only 
practical option. The following quotations illustrate what the H1 
respondents saw as the pleasures and advantages of staying in Britian. 
"We love Swaledale. We always go there. We have a cottage we can 
stay in and we just go walking. There is not a lot else you can do 
there really. " 
[H1, school age] 
"We are very boring in our holidays, we always go to Scotland or 
Northumberland for our holidays. We go and stay .. we find nice hotels 
and we take the dog, we go somewhere the dog can go, and we drive 
around or go for walks, it is lovely" 
[H1,16+] 
These two accounts are typical of those provided by His who did not go 
abroad. All these respondents headed for the country rather than the 
seaside, some to go touring, others to explore the countryside around their 
own or a rented cottage - 15% of His had their own country cottage and 
another 7% rented or, as in the case quoted below, borrowed one (4). 
"Jonathan's parents have a little cottage in Hareham, near Helmsley 
where we go fishing and on holidays. We go there for one of our 
holidays .. sort of our spring holiday.. and my parents have got a 
cottage in Scotland and so we go there for our summer holidays. " 
[H1, pre-school age] 
His who went abroad tended to choose equally rural locations. They 
described very active holidays spent in the pursuit of "authentic" native 
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culture and, to a lesser extent, of "obligatory" tourist sights. They 
consequently chose not to go on package holidays to coastal resorts. They 
went camping or rented gites or villas and so claimed to get a "better" 
view of the life of the particular country they had chosen to explore. 
"We started to camp on the continent, but this year will be probably 
the most extravagant holiday we've had. We are going to rent a villa 
in Spain. We'll drive there in the van [Dormobile type] because the 
van makes travelling great fun it is like a big living room, you can 
see all the country from your front window it is marvellous, you get 
to see such a lot that way. " 
[H1, school age] 
"The places we go to there isn't much to do anyway.. just walking you 
know or exploring the area, that's what we enjoy. " 
[H1, school age] 
In conclusion, His almost exclusively spent their holidays in the British 
or foreign countryside. MacCannell's (1976) description of the real 
experience seekers fits exactly (5). Some set off wishing to discover the 
great outdoors (70% of those who went camping were H1s) while others were 
bent on unlocking the secrets of France, Spain, or Italy. Even the less 
adventurous wanted to appreciate the particular qualities of the country 
they had chosen to visit. 
"Italy.. Oh well I love Italian food and wine,.. er and we went to see 
the Vatican. I'd never been to Italy before so there were lots of 
things I wanted to see. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
Finally, a couple of H1 respondents travelled to much more distant places: 
one to Africa, the other to Thailand. 
"Well it was either a new kitchen or a holiday in Thailand, and we 
thought about it for a bit and asked some friends 'which would you 
choose' we'd got the money and they were about the same price, well 
they said 'the holiday' and so we went, and it was fantastic. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
Though neither saw these as "normal" holidays they were on this occasion a 
real option. Other H1 respondents were planning (though had not yet been) 
on equally "exotic" holidays (6). In effect, His were principally 
interested in the nature of the place in which they would take their 
holiday. Other issues such as accomodation and activity were subsidiary 
and in part determined by the outcome of the key "Where to explore? " 
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decision. 
2. H2S' DEFINITION OF A HOLIDAY 
H2s went abroad more than any other section of the sample and typically 
chose to stay in full-board hotels in either Spanish, Yugoslavian or, 
occasionally, Greek seaside resorts. None of these respondents claimed to 
have any particular interest in going to one rather than another country. 
That decision was usually a by-product of what were seen to be significant 
issues, such as cost, precise location (ie. the distance from the sea) 
and/or quality of the accomodation. This group, like the holiday makers 
described by Thompson (1982) chose to go abroad principally for the sun, 
the sea, and the comparatively cheap full-board accomodation (7). 
"I'm a sun person... I like to go and sort of fester on some 
continental beach. " 
[H2, no children, younger] 
"We both like going away and soaking up the sun. " 
[H2, no children, older] 
In comparison, those who stayed in Britain described rather more active 
sight-seeing holidays. For example, the respondents quoted below set out 
to explore the coastline and the countryside and to encounter the kind of 
"staged" history presented by historic houses, museums and monuments. 
"Well now they [children] are getting older they want to be doing 
things or they might go on the beach. We like going round stately 
homes and gardens. We like looking round gardens and churches and 
museums, places like that. " 
[H2, school age] 
"He is very good, he is a marvellous driver he likes to notice where 
the roads are-you know he knows all the roads and he can name them 
you know A54, A60 all that he is very clever that way and he takes a 
big interest in maps and areas. He planned a holiday once, we went 
down the all around Stratford area and came back up the West side and 
to Chester, that was a lovely holiday. We hired a car that week and 
it was very nice, he is very good that way. We both take an interest 
in a new area and finding out, we look it up before we go and then we 
can see how it has altered.... We both like old churches and we go 
rooting round old churches and homes like Harewood house and places 
like that and coastal lines.. it suits both of us that sort of thing. " 
[H2, no children, older] 
Compared with the comprehensive style of H1 tourism these H2 trips to 
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historic homes, local museums and "natural beauty spots" reflected a more 
conservative "day out" approach to holiday making. From the base of a 
full-board hotel, guest house, or bed and breakfast establishment, H2 
tourists made daily forays to visit the acknowledged landmarks of the 
British heritage (8). Whether they went to sunny beaches abroad or chose 
to stay in Britain, H2s were concerned to feel "at home" when they were on 
holiday. The "best" bed and breakfasts or hotels were those which were 
most "familiar", just as the "best" foreign resorts were those which were 
like warmer British ones. In addition, H2s, again unlike His, were 
characteristically concerned about their holiday accomodation. Several, 
like the respondent quoted below, believed that anything other than a full- 
board holiday was sub-standard. 
"Oh I wouldn't call it a holiday otherwise. I'd say what's the point 
if you are cooking for yourself you may as well stay home and go to 
the coast from here. I call it a holiday when I can sit down have my 
meal and walk out and let somebody else do the work... he doesn't like 
it [self-catering]. He won't go in a caravan either. He says its no 
fun for me. " 
[H2, school age] 
Others believed, with equal conviction, that it was better to go self- 
catering on the grounds that it was "easier with the children" or because 
you could ensure that the food was to your taste. The following quotation 
illustrates the perceived importance of food and of accomodation. 
"We prefer self-catering, well when we were in Greece, although he 
loved the people, he loves Greece but he couldn't abide the food. He 
doesn't like it... it was all swimming in oil, its just too rich and 
yet you could go to the taverns and get anything you wanted without 
oil, so we said well if we were self-catering we can buy the 
vegetables at the local shops and do as we wish. " 
[H2,16+] 
Whatever the view taken, H2s believed that accomodation was a real and 
significant issue. 
In conclusion, the typical H2 view of a holiday shared certain of the 
features characteristic of the model holidays described by H1 and H3 
respondents. The H2 model could accomodate the idea of touring provided 
that there was a base line of physical comfort and cultural familiarity. 
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In effect, H2 tourists expected to be protected from precisely the strange 
and unfamilar elements that His went out of their way to find. While they 
wanted to visit historic or significant places, they were concerned to 
return to a comfortable and homely environment. The H2 model also 
incorporated a static seaside holiday option. H2 visions of seaside 
holidays, like those of Has, were presented with exclusive reference to the 
sand, the sea, and the sun. What was important was the quality of these 
factors, not the cultural characteristics of the particular country and/or 
resort. 
3. H3S' DEFINITION OF A HOLIDAY 
There seemed to be a general H3 consensus that holidays were spent at the 
seaside (9). Because the "best" seasides were presumed to be the warmest, 
Spanish resorts stood at the top of the list of ideal locations. Four of 
the six who went to Spain had committed themselves to this goal at least a 
year in advance and had made special efforts to save the necessary money. 
"We go abroad yes, I'd never go in England, I don't think it is worth 
it. You can spend as much, you know, and you have no weather. We 
never really thought of going anywhere else but Spain. We've enjoyed 
that, so we stick to that. That's what my wages are for really. " 
[H3, pre-school age] 
The other normal alternatives were, in order of preference, Cornwall, then 
Blackpool, then the nearby East Coast towns of Scarborough, Bridlington or 
Filey (10). 
"I went with my sister to Scarborough with the children, er 
Bridlington, and we've been to Blackpool as well. Last year we went 
to Cornwall but we were in a caravan and it rained a lot so I said I'm 
not going like this again.... so we saved up and we are going to Spain 
for 2 weeks this year. " 
[H3, school age] 
"When they were little we couldn't afford much so we just went to 
Scarborough, just for a break. We've been going down to Cornwall for 
the last 4 years. We've got a nice place to stay and it's such a lot 
warmer down there. " 
[H3, pre-school age] 
It is interesting to note that a few H3s, like some H1s, positively 
favoured a British as opposed to a foreign holiday. As I shall suggest 
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later this issue was potentially contentious. 
she: "I'd like to go abroad but he will never go abroad so there is an end 
of it. There is no point arguing over that" 
he: "Well I think there is too much to see in England. See I'd like to go 
down to Cornwall and Devon. " 
[H3, no children, younger] 
Wherever they went, all H3 respondents headed for the seaside where they 
aimed to "do nothing" and to "relax". In this context, tours were believed 
to be too demanding as a main holiday though some of the older Has went on 
such a venture as a second holiday in the Autumn or Spring. Though some 
believed that self-catering holidays were not properly relaxing and hence 
not "proper" holidays only those who went abroad were able to afford to go 
full-board. The rest had to make do with a holiday in a caravan, bed and 
breakfast, or guest house. However, a few, particularly the younger 
childless respondents, had different holiday ideals and positively enjoyed 
the freedom of self-catering or camping. 
"Well not really [want to go full-board] because we both like camping, 
you know, just up the East Coast to Weighton and Filey. We both enjoy 
that. It's real good fun. We have a good laugh and Dawn and Steve go 
with us some years and other years we've been on our own. We've 
always enjoyed it so we've always gone back, you know, there has been 
no problem. " 
[H3, no children, younger] 
In conclusion, Has appeared to have the most specific definition of the 
"ideal" holiday. Most aimed to spend a full-board fortnight in the warmest 
seaside resort that they could afford. 
4. DOMESTIC AGE AND DEFINITIONS OF A HOLIDAY 
So far I 've considered conceptions of a holiday as described by different 
housing sections of the sample regardless of age. While chronological age 
was not especially important, the presence or absence of children had a 
dramatic effect on respondent's perceptions of possible holiday options. 
Most (75%) of the childless respondents went on a full-board holiday, 
though a few of the younger ones, especially the His, chose to go camping. 
"We always stay in a hotel yes.. well it used to be a boarding house 
when we were first married, we couldn't afford a hotel. Self-catering 
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doesn't appeal to me. I suppose with children, yes, you'd have to 
think about it but you know never having any [children] we've always 
had just ourselves to think about. " 
[H2, no children, older] 
In comparison, 50% of the self-caterers had pre-school children. Many of 
them explained that they had "no choice" but to self-cater "because or the 
child/children. 
"We usually like to go to hotels. This year we went self-catering. I 
found it easier with him [son]. To go in a hotel is hard as regards 
washing nappies and feed on a morning, so you know we will carry on 
self-catering until he gets older. " 
[H2, pre-school age] 
"Generally I would prefer a self-catering holiday because it does mean 
you can go out.. it doesn't mean there are times ... but I think as you 
get older as I get older I'll probably much prefer a holiday in a 
hotel. With the children you have to go self-catering really. " 
[H1, school age] 
As suggested in the above quotation, self-catering was usually presumed to 
be a passing phenomenon: the family expected to have a "normal" full-board 
holiday as soon as the children were "old enough". Reported perceptions of 
possible holiday types (touring, seaside etc. ) were also ordered by the 
presence or absence of children. 55% of those who went touring were 
childless while, at the other extreme, only 2% of those with pre-school 
children did anything but go to the seaside. It is interesting to note 
that His appeared to take much less notice of their children in this 
respect. The next quotation is from a H1 respondent who had a three year 
old child. 
"Oh yes we have lots of holidays. We have a week in London, and then 
three weeks away in Italy, well two in Italy and say one in France on 
the way there. We try to spend another week visiting friends. He 
[son] is no trouble. " 
[H1, pre-school age] 
The decision about whether or not to go abroad seemed to be the least 
influenced by the "child factor". However, it did appear to relate to 
absolute age. Only 25% of those who went abroad were from the two older 
sections of the sample (the older childless and those with children over 
16). In comparison, 60% of the foreign holiday makers were from the two 
younger age groups (the younger childless and those with pre-school 
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children). In general, then, those who had pre-school age children (with 
the partial exception of H1 respondents) observed that their holiday 
options were limited: most felt unable to do anything but go on a self- 
catering holiday to a seaside resort. As the children got older they had 
less effect on the family's holiday plans: those who expected to stay in an 
hotel returned to that style of holiday-making while those who preferred 
self-catering continued with what was seen to be normal practice. The only 
absolute age difference appeared to be that older respondents were often 
reluctant to travel abroad. Essentially, then, respondents were more or 
less able to realise their holiday going ideals depending on their age- 
related commitments. Though these ordered the range of immediately viable 
holiday options, they did not alter respondents' generalised visions of the 
necessary components of a proper holiday. 
5. DECISIONS ABOUT HOLIDAYS 
The above discussion gives a general picture of the range of holiday 
possibilities typically 
considered by)each section of the sample. The next 
task is to consider the kinds of choice associated with decisions about 
holiday accomodation, holiday activity, and holiday resort. I shall 
discuss each decision as if it were a separate issue. However, it is 
important to remember that, in practice, all were inter-related: all 
combined so as to produce a final result and all were informed by the same 
umbrella definition of a "normal holiday" and by an even more general view 
of the relation between everyday life and holiday time. 
Perceptions of choice about holiday accomodation 
80% of the respondents claimed that they had "no choice" about the nature 
of their holiday accomodation. Some of these "no choices" were determined 
by the presence of small children, those with pre-school children typically 
believed that they could only go on self-catering holidays, others were 
determined by the respondent's financial position (some aspired to, but 
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could not afford, a full-board holiday) and still others, including the 
respondent quoted below, believed that full-board accomodation was a 
necessary constituent of a proper holiday. 
"He's always said 'No. When we go on holiday we have a holiday. You 
are not having any washing up for a couple of weeks. It is your 
holiday as much as mine so we can go to a hotel. "' 
[H2, school age] 
Those who stayed with friends or relatives felt that they had just as 
little real choice about their holiday accomodation as those who kept up a 
holiday-going habit and always went to stay in the same place. 
"We've been going down to St Ives because my niece's sister's girls 
have gone down there to live and we've gone in their car and had a 
royal time. We've always stayed with friends and the family and 
that-when we stay at St Ives we look after ourselves but we used to 
go for our main meal we used to go up to Carol's and have our dinner 
at tea time. " 
[H2,16+] 
In the few cases where there was room for some "real" choice about holiday 
accomodation, the wife rather than the husband seemed to determine the 
outcome. The respondents' ability to have the last word, as described in 
the following example, appeared to be related to a general conception of 
the difference between holiday and non-holiday experiences. 
"We've just been to Spain to a hotel, the year before we went to 
Germany camping. I don't really mind whether we go self-catering or 
not it depends where we go. He is very easy about that, he lets me 
decide about that if I didn't want to have to cook then we'd go to a 
hotel. " 
[H2, school age] 
Because holidays were expected to differ from normal life, the definition 
of proper holiday activites varied depending on the respondents' every day 
habits and routines. So, those who did the cooking every day might 
legitimately expect to be relieved of these chores when on holiday. In 
comparison, those who believed that such responsibilities were normally 
shared had no special reason to "demand" a full-board holiday. For 
example, few His concluded that the wife ought to be in complete control of 
all aspects of day-today cooking and so few concluded that not cooking was 
an essential component of a wife's holiday. In this context the final 
catering/accomodation arrangement depended on the outcome of some other 
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holiday-making issue, and the contrast conception of holiday versus no.. 
holiday legitimated certain holiday going demands. This particular issue 
was further complicated by the equally prevalent notion that the family 
holiday was a kind of present given to the wife by the husband in return 
for the domestic services provided throughout the year. In such 
circumstances the husband was under even more pressure to pay for a full- 
board holiday if that was what his wife wanted. The following example 
illustrates both themes. 
"Oh yes, I think we'd more. hotel it than anything else wouldn't we? I 
don't know I think self-catering tends to mean that you are going for 
a holiday but you are still working. So more hotel really. I think 
he would cough up for a hotel. He says it is not fair for me to have 
to cook all year. We have been, I mean when we went to Spain we went 
self-catering but we ate out all the time. It wasn't a case that I 
was stuck in cooking.. If it was done that way [eating out] it 
wouldn't be so bad but you usually tend to find with wives and 
husbands that really well the wives deserve a rest. I think a lot of 
women think they should be over the kitchen sink on these self- 
catering holidays but I think he would think that that wasn't a 
holiday for me so he would, yes I think we would go to hotels... 
otherwise really it is defeating the object when you think of it. " 
[H2, no children, younger] 
In conclusion, most respondents saw "no choice", or only limited choice, 
among types of holiday accomodation. Those who thought that they did have 
some choice almost always believed that the wife, as the non-holiday 
caterer, had the right to make the final decision. 
Perceptions of choice about holiday activity 
Nearly all the parents of pre-school age children believed that they had 
"no choice" about this issue as their child's routine determined the course 
of holiday and non-holiday days alike. Although such routines had 
different implications for husband and wife, the net result was a 
particular ordering of family holiday time (11). 
"Before I had him we'd go and lie on the beach and then go out for a 
drink... but with him, I don't tend to go out on a morning, and then in 
the afternoon we'd go out somewhere and come back. He [husband] 
potters about, we went to Ladbrokes so he was,... he likes darts and 
there were darts contests, they started about 11.30 am so he used to 
go there in the mornings. " 
[H3, pre-school age] 
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All other respondents saw decision about holiday activity to be matters of 
personal preference. As such, these decisions were likely to be 
contentious either at the stage of choosing where to go or deciding what to 
do from one day to the next. Almost all H1 respondents claimed to have the 
same preferences and to have agreed about what to do on holiday. In 
comparison, H2s and Has expected that they and their husband would have 
different preferences as a consequence of what were seen to be inherent 
differences of character: men and women were expected to have different 
interests. For example, only the wives wanted to go round the shops when 
they were on holiday and only the husbands wanted to go off exploring. 
This meant that conflict was almost bound to occur. There were two 
principal strategies for dealing with such contentious situations. First, 
it was possible to devise some system of turn-taking. Several respondents, 
including the one quoted below, adopted this tactic. 
"We tend to go in with each other... if we know what we want to do and 
we all agree to do it you see we would ask them [children] what they 
wanted... Oh yes we are quite easy going, we take turns to decide what 
to do, like one day we would be on the beach, another day we might go 
out somewhere so it works quite well really". [H2, school age] 
Alternatively, couples could agree to spend at least some holiday time 
alone or with friends of the same sex. In this way husband and wife were 
free to indulge in their chosen activities without imposing their own 
preferences on the other. The following example illustrates this option. 
"Well if we go I like to lay on the beach he doesn't. He likes to be 
walking round and things like that but I like to sunbathe. He doesn't, 
he gets too warm. So I sunbathe and he will maybe go for a walk, and 
then he will come back and read or something, or sit for a bit in the 
sun then we will go for something to eat. " 
[H3, no children, younger] 
Those who went on holiday with other couples found it especially easy to 
arrange their days such that husband and wife could take holidays together 
but still spend the time apart, each doing what they wanted in the company 
of someone who was expected to have the same sorts of interests. 
she: "I mean it was nice as our honeymoon but you tended to just miss 
another couple around really and I suppose there were things that you 
[husband] wanted to do and I didn't fancy doing. If Les had have been 
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there he'd have gone with Les and I would have gone round the shops 
with Claire... " 
he: "She was scared stiff going down the Pigale and I wanted to have a 
good look and as soon as we started off she wanted to be off... " 
she: "I was scared of the people I was watching the people and keeping 
really tight hold of my handbag and then we went on the Pigale and 
that didn't look much better.. I think I'd maybe not notice so much if 
I'd got another woman there and I'd definitely go with another couple 
down Pigale and that if we went to Paris again with a couple it's just 
that I'd just been put off that day. " 
[H2, no children, younger] 
Although decisions about holiday activity were potentially contentious, and 
although H2 and H3 respondents positively expected this to be a difficult 
issue, there were well established methods of minimising if not resolving 
the problem (12). 
Perceptions of choice about holiday "resorts" 
The final choice of a holiday resort was seen to be a matter of personal 
preference, although one which was evidently constrained by financial 
limits and which was further informed by respondents' definitions of a 
"proper" holiday. In addition, the actual range of what were seen as 
possible holiday resorts varied depending on the respondent's (or 
respondents husband's) views about going abroad and/or about the nature of 
an ideal holiday climate. Because the outcome of such "in principle" 
decisions ordered the list of options from which a final selection was to 
be made, it is important to review the kinds of arguments and counter 
arguments presented in relation to these two inter-related questions of 
temperature and country. There were several cases of overt dispute about 
such issues, some of which emphasised the question of temperature, while 
others, like the two quoted below, focused on the question of country. 
he: "I think people who go abroad ... they want to spend £295 to go to 
Spain for a sun tan, that's the only reason they go there to say '0h 
look I'm brown, look I've been to Spain'" 
she: "I'd rather see the sights than go spending money just on a sun tan 
but I'd like to go for the experience you know just to see what it is 
like. We probably will go when we are older" 
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he: "Old and senile. " 
[H3, no children, younger] 
In the next case the wife faces financial arguments of a different kind in 
favour of the British option. 
she: "I'd have always I would have liked to go to Jersey but Jack used to 
go abroad for the firm you see. But he hasn't fancied going have 
you? " 
he: "I've never had a fancy to go abroad for a holiday" 
she: "He says there are too many nice places in England" 
he: "I've earned my money in England and I'll spend it in England" 
she: "That's what he says so I've never been" 
[H3,16+] 
In all the described cases, husbands successfully prevented their wives 
from considering anything but British holiday options. It is obviously 
difficult to distinguish between disputes about temperature and those about 
going or not going abroad. However, it seems that anti-abroad arguments 
usually involved reference to some kind of general moral or financial 
policy, while debates about temperature involved appeal to an individual's 
personal preference for (or against) a hot climate. Interestingly, wives 
found it much easier to secure their preference when attention was centered 
on the question of temperature rather than on the absolute issue of going 
or not going abroad. Indeed, they "won" all reported temperature arguments 
while losing all "in principle" abroad or not debates. This pattern of 
relative success was partly related to the wife's ability to present the 
warmer choice as a "better" option only provided that there were no more 
powerful moral objections. After all, nobody actually wanted to have bad 
weather on holiday. 
Once any arguments about climate and country were resolved couples were 
able to make more specific choices about exactly where to go. Some of 
these decisions were complicated by the presence of other holiday 
companions; others were simplified because the family "always" went to a 
particular resort; yet others were expected to be the wife's 
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responsibility. 
Those who decided to go on holiday with friends or relatives (only H2 and 
H3 respondents did this) inevitably faced more complex decision-making than 
other sections of the sample. The respondent quoted below was, for 
example, one of six who had to reach agreement. 
"Well it's a joint decision between the six of us. We meet up at 
Christmas and decide where we all fancy going... and if we are all 
agreed, we decide what sort of holiday we want, whether it is self- 
catering or what and then we have a look at the brochures and try to 
find something that suits us all. " 
[H2,16+] 
In theory, the complexity of the "where to go" decison increased in direct 
proportion to the number of people involved. In practice, such parties 
tended to "appoint" one or two individuals (always women) as decision- 
makers. This simplified matters somewhat. 
"We used to choose my sister and me. We chose where we'd go and we 
used to have a good time, we went on the Wallace Arnold tours in May. " 
[H3,16+] 
"Well my sister has chosen Spain... we usually go with them-last year 
we went with my older sister and her husband, and she's chosen Spain 
this year because it is a cheaper holiday. " 
[H2,16+1 
In other contexts too, wives were left with the job of making the holiday 
arrangements and so deciding (within limits) exactly where to go. Many of 
the H2 and H3 wives were expected to pick the actual hotel/caravan/guest 
house/coach tour having reached some joint agreement about the type, cost 
and location of the holiday. 
"I usually look for adverts and then show him, but he usually leaves 
the actual booking up to me once we've decided where we are going. " 
[H2,16+] 
Decisions about holiday location thus fell by default to the wife though 
her actual role depended on the husband's interest and involvement. 
Completely indifferent husbands allowed their wives to take charge of all 
associated decision-making, though, in practice, wives were usually left 
with the responsibility for making only a few decisions about matters of 
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detail. 
So far I have presumed that there was room for choice about holiday 
location. In some cases, however, there was "no choice" and hence no scope 
for any kind of decision-making. Respondents who always went on holiday to 
the same place did not even need to decide where to go. They simply went 
back to the place where they had been the year before and the year before 
that and the year before that. Such respondents only faced a real "where 
to go" decision when and if the routine was disturbed. 
"Well we always go to this farmhouse in Wales but last year we 
couldn't go there. It was an old couple who ran just a few rooms and 
they retired so we had to think again. Actually we didn't have a 
holiday last year at all. " 
[H1, school age] 
Interruptions apart, I was not in a position to tell for sure whether the 
habitual choice was automatically repeated or whether respondents annually 
reviewed the situation but decided to continue as normal. Either way, the 
"always go" context precluded simple decision-making of the "where shall we 
go this year" form. 
DECISIONS ABOUT HOLIDAYS 
I have suggested that the location, course and outcome of nearly all 
debates about the component issues of climate, country, accomodation and 
activity varied in relation to respondents' definitions of a holiday. In 
practice, the inter-relation of what I have presented as separate holiday- 
making issues therefore limited arenas of potential debate. If husband and 
wife partly shared a holiday "ideal" they were likely to agree about a 
whole network of associated issues. For example, neither were likely to 
object to going abroad in search of the sun if both preferred hot weather. 
Similarly, those who expected to go to the seaside rarely argued about what 
to do on holiday. These areas of overlap meant that respondents' 
perceptions of possible choice about holiday issue "a" were already ordered 
by their agreed position on holiday issue "b". Only issues of detail about, 
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say, what to do from one day to the next were relatively unconstrained by 
these general conventions and, accordingly, only they were especially 
contentious. That is not to say that there was no debate about the nature 
of a proper holiday. The point is, rather, that if there was agreement at 
that general level, there were few "real" choices about subsequent and more 
specific holiday- related issues. In other words, general conceptions of a 
proper holiday provided a package of "answers" to a range of otherwise 
diverse questions. This "packaging" ordered and, in effect, limited the 
range of possible dispute. 
In conclusion, this review illustrates the range of described conceptions 
of "normal" holidays. What was familiar and normal for H3s was quite alien 
for His, and vice versa. Again, H2s' definitions stood somewhere between 
these two extremes. This diversity is hardly surprising given that 
holiday time was often defined in contrast to typical non-holiday activity. 
Although I did not have the material on which to base a more detailed 
argument, it seemed that many respondents (especially H2s and Has) expected 
to break a number of domestic/family "rules" when on holiday. Holiday 
spending money was, for example, quite different from "normal" money, and 
certain kinds of unusual or "illegitimate" behaviour were quite acceptable 
in a holiday context. Wives were, for instance, able to "treat" their 
husband to a holiday drink just as husbands were able to take charge of all 
the washing up in the caravan or self-catering flat. 
Interestingly, different holiday definitions shared some of the 
characteristics of the different conceptions of leisure described in the 
previous chapter. Here, as in relation to other areas of domestic decision- 
making, it was possible to identify a pattern in described perceptions of 
choice. His, at one extreme, believed that they could control their social 
world to the degree that they could make individual choices and so define 
the nature of their own holiday and leisure experiences. At the other 
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extreme, H3s observed that they were like everybody else, and that their 
choices, or, rather, their habits and routines, were simply a reflection of 
a "normal" world in which lives were (and should be) ordered as described. 
H2s belonged somewhere in between, veering toward H3 perceptions in 
relation to some issues and H1 perceptions in relation to others. These 
differences are important because, according to the the general argument 
developed in chapters 1 to 4, those who had or who saw themselves to have 
"no choice" had no room for domestic decision-making dispute and hence no 
occasion to excercise power. 
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CHAPTER 8: NOTES 
1. See, for example, Walvin (1978), Turner and Ash (1975) and Burkart and 
Medlik (1974). 
2. MacCannell (1976) and Thompson (1982) have attended to "cultural" 
dimensions of tourism while Turner and Ash (1975) and others have 
considered the impact of tourism on the economies and social structures of 
host resorts. 
3. Most of the literature on leisure acknowledges the rise of the two week 
holiday as part of an overall increase in "leisure" time, but does not go 
on to consider the ways in which that time is spent. Dumazedier is one of 
the few sociologists of leisure to directly consider "Vacation leisure" and 
"Tourist leisure" on the stated grounds that "Vacations are perhaps the 
most important leisure activities, both because of their length and their 
attractiveness. " (Dumazedier, 1967, p123). 
4. Those who had bought a country cottage believed that they had committed 
themselves to spending their holidays in that building. In other words, 
they had decided that that was where they would "always go", and so no 
longer faced the kinds of annual choices described by other respondents. 
5. MacCannell describes the "touristic desire to share in the real life of 
the places visited, or at least to see that life as it is really lived", 
and goes on to observe that "Some tourists do in fact make incursions into 
the life of the society they visit, or are at least allowed actually to 
peek into one of its back regions... they seek out situations in which this 
type of thing is most likely to occur. " (MacCannell, 1976, p97 and p98) 
6. Interestingly, Turner and Ash provide an account of the effect of 
tourism on the economic and social structures of both Thailand (Turner and 
Ash, 1975, p158) and Africa (Turner and Ash, 1975, p177). 
7. Thompson (1982), Turner and Ash (1975) and MacCannell (1976) all 
describe the presentation of culture as a commodity, or, to borrow the term 
used by Turner and Ash, as "fakelore". Thompsons' account is especially 
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interesting in that it draws attention to the tourists collaboration in a 
staged display of "tradition" which need only include certain stereotypical 
props in order to provide a sufficiently "authentic" backdrop to what is 
then defined as a "Spanish" but essentially seaside holiday. 
8. Although both His and H2s were concerned to have what MacCannell 
describes as "authentic" holiday experiences, "authenticity" was likely to 
take a different form: His aimed to meet "real" people and to absorb "real" 
cultures while H2s were content to collect or at least encounter "real" 
symbols of the "real" past. In this context, MacCannell emphasises the 
"importance of the authenticity of the relationship between tourists and 
what they see: this is a typical house; this is the very place the leader 
fell; this the actual pen used to sign the law; this is the original 
manuscript.. " (MacCannell, 1976, p14). 
9. Walvin observes: ".. how strange it all seems: that through thick and 
thin, the English holiday-maker should return time and again to the places 
where his forefathers found such unique pleasures - beside the seaside. " 
(Walvin, 1978, p165) 
10. As Walvin (1978) and others have noted, different seaside resorts have 
attracted different and changing classes of holiday-makers. These 
differences are not merely related to temperature, even if that was the key 
issue for my respondents. 
11. If husband and wife were engaged with different holiday activities 
the couple faced fewer "family" decisions about the joint use of holiday 
time. The location of joint holiday-making decisions therefore depended on 
patterns of independent holiday activity. 
12. As described in chapter 7, H2s and H3s often had separate interests 
and so led relatively independent leisure lives. The "problem" was that 
couples were obliged to spend more time together (ie. doing the same 
things) on holiday because the familiar, independent leisure options did 
not exist in quite the-same way. 
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CHAPTER 9 
FAMILY FINANCE 
Although it is difficult to evaluate the significance of decisions about 
the management and use of money, it is clear that many dimensions of 
respondents' lifestyles - eating habits, leisure patterns, furnishings and 
sometimes even family size - reflected the outcome of what were 
essentially financial choices. It is therefore important to consider 
questions of family finance if only to understand the domestic context in 
which all these other decisions were set. If the aim is to provide an 
analysis of domestic power relations, it is also important to consider 
family finance as a subject in its own right. As Pahl and others have 
observed: "it is likely that the balance of power between husband and wife 
will be reflected in their control over economic resources" (Pahl, 1983, 
p238). Of course, accounts of the nature of the relationship between 
resources and power vary (1). The feminist literature, for example, tends 
to presume a "one dimensional" view of power and typically adopts a 
straightforward "dependence" account of resources (2). Whoever has more 
money has, it is argued, more power. Accordingly, working wives are 
believed to have greater domestic power than housewives, although neither 
have as much as their better paid husbands. In this way, formal or felt 
financial or economic dependency is taken as a measure of the powerless 
position of wives in the family context (3). On occasion, however, this 
simple analysis is complicated by a recognition that money also figures as 
something other than a resource. In the family context, money needs 
managing, organising, and spending. Individuals who are responsible for 
these time- consuming and demanding tasks can also be seen to be "landed" 
with such obligations because of a different system of power. Thus, while 
women might control the family's money, and so, in a sense, be said to have 
power; (4) there is another sense in which their consequent financial 
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obligations and responsibilities may be taken as evidence of their 
powerlessness (5). They have been obliged - willingly or not - to take on 
the tasks of financial management. 
Much of the relevant literature has set out to document formal patterns of 
financial management (6). This is, no doubt, a useful exercise if the aim 
is to review what Pahl describes as the "flow" of money within households 
so as to counter the traditional economic view of "the household as a black 
box, within which the resources acquired by individuals are assumed to be 
shared amongst household members" (Pahl, 1983, p238). However, in part 
because of their emphasis on formal patterns of management, few writers 
have made the crucial theoretical distinction between money as resource and 
financial management as responsibility (7). Rather, attention has focused 
on broad questions about the relation between patterns of "power" and 
methods of financial management. This emphasis has had two important 
consequences. First, given widespread confusion about the meaning of the 
term power, writers such as Hunt, Pahl, Ayers and Stamp find themselves in 
a curious dilemma: do housekeeping wives have power because they control 
the family's money and because they make a host of decisions about every- 
day expenditure, or is this responsibility evidence of their essential 
powerlessness? (8). Secondly, few of these writers have gone on to 
consider the ways in which, say, joint bank accounts or particular methods 
of housekeeping are actually used, and few have examined the relationship 
between particular expectations of gender or role appropriate behaviour and 
the selection of one rather than another financial strategy. Formal methods 
of financial management have been taken as pre-given, and self-evidently 
important subjects of study. In consequence, literature on the 
relationship between family power and family finance typically begins, and 
ends, with a discussion of formal methods of money management. 
I have suggested that is important to distinguish between an analysis of 
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family finance designed to reveal the distribution of money which could be 
used as a resource in a wide range of domestic contexts, and one which is 
designed to consider questions of power in relation to the context or 
outcome of decisions about financial management and expenditure. In this 
chapter I shall consider each issue, that of resources, and that of 
decision-making (including responsibility for decision-making), separately. 
To some degree, this chapter addresses many of the same decision-making 
issues as those which have been the subject of the previous four chapters. 
Here, too, I am concerned to document respondents' perceptions of the kinds 
of choice associated with decisions. Again I want to explore the range of 
what were seen as "normal" or viable options so as to consider the key 
dimensions of the context in which decision-making dispute might or might 
not arise. In practice, most decisions about every-day expenditure were 
"automatically" taken by whoever was responsible for a particular kind of 
shopping. In addition, then, I shall have to review described patterns of 
responsibility so as to map the borderlines between taken-for-granted 
decisions framed by expectations of responsibility and other more visible 
and so evidently debatable "family" choices (9). The form and location of 
money related decisions depended in part, on respondents' methods of 
financial management. For example, all those who had what was labelled 
"housekeeping money" were expected to use that earmarked sum of money for 
the food shopping and were consequently responsible for that type of 
expenditure. Similarly, couples who had a joint account inevitably faced 
different sorts of financial management decisions compared to those who 
maintained their own separate accounts. Accordingly, it was useful to 
order a review of financial responsibility and decision-making with 
reference to the range of formal methods of financial management. 
It also proved important to consider the allocation of money which might be 
used as a resource in case of domestic dispute. As I suggested in chapter 
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4, money which might have effect as a resource was money which was agreed 
to be independently disposable. Just as methods of financial management 
ordered, but did not determine, patterns of financial responsibility, so 
they ordered respondents' perceptions of different "allocative categories". 
Individual access to what was defined as independently disposable money 
therefore varied in relation to the structure of "real" or "imaginary" 
allocative categories (10). To continue the example used above, those who 
had what was clearly defined as "housekeeping money" were unable to 
legitimately spend that sum on themselves. 
I want to suggest that formal methods of financial management, decisions 
about managing and spending money, and definitions of "allocative 
categories" (and so definitions of financial resources) were inter-related 
such that each had implications for the other as illustrated in the diagram 
below (11). 
FIGURE 9 
FORMAL METHODS OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
(JOINT, SEPARATE ACCOUNTS, METHODS OF HOUSEKEEPING) 
L INFO) 4ED REAL AND IMAGINARY "ALLOCATIVE 
CATEGORIES" - INCLUDING THAT OF 
INDEPENDENTLY DISPOSABLE MONEY 
DECISIONS ABOUT EXPENDITURE AND 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT - 
ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY 
FOR SUCH DECISIONS 
I shall order the following analysis with reference to a) described methods 
of financial management (Section 1), b) the relationship between methods of 
financial management and the described structure of allocative categories 
(Section 2) and c) the relationship between methods of financial management 
and described patterns of financial decision-making and responsibility 
(Section 3). While it is convenient to order discussion with reference to 
formal methods of financial management, I do not want to suggest that these 
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methods determined either the allocation of finanical resources or the form 
of family financial decision-making. Rather, as this chapter seeks to 
demonstrate, formal methods had a somewhat limited effect on everyday 
decision-making routines and even on the perception and definition of 
independently disposable money. In any case, as shown in the diagram 
above, I want to argue that the selection and everyday use of formal 
methods of financial management reflected respondents' prior expectations 
about gender appropriate behaviour and their related expectations of a 
"normal" division of real and imaginary allocative categories. 
1. METHODS OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
Most respondents simply presumed that they would manage their money in what 
they believed to be the "normal" way. The following discussion is 
therefore more a review of the range of what were seen to be "normal" 
methods of financial management than an analysis of decision-making 
processes associated with the selection of one rather than another 
financial strategy. Although there is little to say about the selection 
process (nearly all respondents believed that they had "no choice" but to 
adopt what was presented as the one "normal" option) it is important to 
document described outcomes as these evidently informed allocation of 
financial responsibilities, respondents' methods of formal or informal 
"earmarking", and their definition of different categories of money 
(including that which was believed to be "independently disposable"). In 
this section I shall consider the methods of financial management adopted 
by each of the housing sections of the sample, beginning with the 
strategies described by H1 respondents. 
His' methods of financial management 
52% of H1 respondents opened joint current and deposit accounts as soon as 
they got married. Most of this 52% explained that they saw this to be the 
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easiest and most convenient arrangement for couples who, had a good and 
trusting relationship. The underlying argument seemed to be that all other 
financial systems were inherently "selfish" and so symptomatic of some kind 
of domestic problem. The following examples illustrate the themes of 
sharing and selfishness and what is presented as the consequent selection 
of the joint account strategy. 
"I do know married couples who have been married for a long time who 
have separate accounts and they go through all these motions of she 
pays for this and he pays for that but personally I think it's 
bonkers. I suppose, it depends, I mean you have got to trust your 
other half haven't you. I suppose if I was married to some man who 
squandered all the money away so that there was nothing left at the 
end of the third week of the month I suppose I would feel differently. 
Then I probably would have a separate account, but with Chris, we 
trust each other so neither of us squanders money. I always think it's 
a bit mad if you are sharing a home and everything and you have 
separate money and then one pays for one thing and another pays for 
the other. " 
[H1, school age] 
"It is easier. I never dreamed of having two separate accounts. Ours 
is just everything together. I just assumed that we'd put it all 
together. Well its funny actually. We didn't live together before we 
were married but I'd often go round there [to his flat] say Friday to 
Sunday evening, and then we'd go shopping on Saturday morning and we'd 
buy food and say half of that is yours and half of that ... and count 
it all up and split it. The day we got married we got a joint account 
and it's much easier. Much nicer anyway. You're not fiddling about 
how much he owes me and how much ... I mean I know some folk have got 
about three accounts, two separate and one joint, and all the bills 
come out of the joint one and each puts so much into it and keeps 
their little bits of money. It's too much bother, I couldn't keep 
track of it. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
So, joint accounts were believed to reflect their owners "sensible" and 
mutually trusting approach to family finance irrespective of the way in 
which the account was used without regard to the relative financial 
contrubutions of husband and wife. The need to appear to share financial 
resources and responsibilities in this way was so influential (among the 
His at least) that a couple of those who were "unable" to have a single 
joint account chose to have two separate joint accounts, rather than 
"openly" having their own. The respondent quoted below describes the 
history of this type of arrangement. 
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"They are both joint accounts. We have never thought of having 
separate accounts. We do tend to say in conversation 'my bank' and 
'yours', and my pension goes into Acomb, but my husband because he is 
always travelling he had to have a central bank and he kept the 
Stockton-on-Tees one on and he still has his salary and his pension 
goes into that one, so we do say 'my bank' and 'your bank' but we 
don't in fact live by that at all. The money is ours and we both use 
both cheque books. No, I would never go as far as that [having a 
separate account]. I think you'll find that people who start work 
late in life, they tend to want to have their own accounts but people 
like me who have worked for more than half of their married life don't 
bother so much. The money is just our money and there is none of this 
separate business. " 
[H1,16+] 
Whatever the details of actual use (12), all forms of expenditure were 
covered by money drawn from the joint account/s. There was no formal 
distinction between say, housekeeping money, bill money, entertainments 
money, savings etc., nor was there any practical difference between "the 
wife's" money and "the husband's money". All earnings went into the joint 
account and so lost what might otherwise have been a distinct status as 
especially "his" or "her" income. Although this was certainly true of the 
bulk of the family's money, a few respondents observed that they maintained 
their own supplementary accounts by default. These formally insignificant 
arrangements were presented as the remnants of a past single existence: 
independent accounts currently contained very little money and were 
ususally presented as something of a joke. The example quoted below was 
typical. 
"Both our money goes into a joint current .. we've got a joint deposit 
account as well and we've each got our-what we call running away 
money. He has a little account at Lloyds and I've got a little one at 
the Leeds Permanent .. we both had those before we got married. They 
haven't got much in and we have a good giggle when we get the 
statements you know 'how is your running away with money doing? ' '0h I 
could get as far as Romford'. It was just too much effort to cancel 
it, you know, we thought well we might as well just in case really, 
it's more of a giggle. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
In effect, just over half of the His had nothing which was formally defined 
as their own money. Instead, they had at least theoretical access to the 
family's money which was seen as an undivided whole and which was "stored" 
in a joint account. This, they insisted, was the "normal" state of 
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affairs. 
The remaining 48% of His were just as convinced that it was "normal" for 
husband and wife to each have their own separate account. Interestingly, 
those who opted for this arrangement felt that this was both "normal" and 
yet something which needed justifying. In particular, they were concerned 
to dispel the miserly image which they thought others would associate with 
that method of financial management. This was as true of those who had 
their own income as of those who were financially dependent and who 
received some kind of allowance from their husband. For example, working 
respondents observed that they simply preferred to divide the family bills 
such that each paid "their own" rather than share them in the sense that 
all expenses were covered by what was formally "joint" money. 
"Well when I work I don't feel that it [her income] is particularly 
mine. It never really works out that way I don't know ... I don't feel 
that it is right to say you work and your money is ours, and I work 
and that money is mine .. er we tend to pool everything together really 
and we spend what we need. The money I earn I usually sling it in my 
bank account and then say if a bill came in er I'd say 'Oh I'll send a 
cheque off for that' sort of thing so were flexible about it you know. 
When I don't work, he just writes me a cheque.... whenever I ask for it 
really sometimes I'll have it monthly or sometimes I'll just say '0h 
give me two weeks and I'll see how it goes' We don't make any hard 
and fast rules. It tends to be just whatever is convenient. It's 
very flexible. It's not like this is mine and that is yours. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
Those who had no income, but who received an allowance, also observed that 
theirs was a just and fair arrangement in that they were given more than 
enough to cover their personal expenses as well as those associated with, 
say, the food or clothes shopping. The next example illustrates this view. 
"Yes, he gives me whatever I need. If I ran out and wanted to buy 
some sort of expensive clothes or something then I just ask for more. 
It is not very often I ever run out so you know it's only if I get 
through what I have. I don't really sort of ever think of it as 
asking for money. " 
[H1, pre-school age] 
In conclusion, then, His had either a joint or a separate bank account. In 
most cases this was automatically adopted as the only "normal" arrangement, 
although some respondents were unable to select their initially preferred 
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option because of what they saw as their "unusual" domestic circumstances. 
The respondents quoted below describe such a position. 
"We have separate bank accounts but that is mainly because er.. of his 
.. he pays for the maintenance you see, so we just decided to keep our 
bank accounts separate. He's got a daughter of twenty and he still 
pays money for her-so this is why really we had to keep our bank 
accounts separate. I pay the gas bill and I buy clothes for myself and 
the children. " 
[H1, pre-school age] 
"Well recently we re-organised our finances. Now I pay all the bills 
through standing orders, the rates, electricity, gas, mortgage, er any 
standing orders for like subscriptions and that takes probably about 
85% of my salary. What is left I spend on myself. Peter's salary 
goes on running the car and buying any things we need. Peter's money 
is purely for day-to-day week-to-week things so that we know quite 
accurately where we are and how much money we've got to spend. 
Before, we had a joint account and everything came out of it and it 
was much harder to compartment things. When Peter went to work in 
Leeds he opened another account to have his salary paid into so we 
changed from a joint account to two separate accounts. Somehow it 
seems simpler although it may not be. Before, we got the statement 
and it said we were x pounds in credit. To me that would mean 'Ooh 
good theres x pounds to spend' whereas now I'm more responsible about 
keeping a bank account in order because I've got the responsibility of 
the bills. It is a bit of a curb on my wanting to spend, it means 
that he knows that I can't spend too much. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
Given that there were only two "viable" alternatives (a joint or a separate 
bank account), His saw "no choice" about how to arrange their finances. 
Either they "automatically" chose to have a joint or separate bank account 
or they were obliged to select the only remaining alternative if, for some 
reason, their first "automatic" choice proved to be impractical (13). 
Finally, it is important to emphasise the significance attached to the 
notion of sharing. Though the actual method of financial management 
determined the form of the couple's financial collaboration, all His were 
concerned to explain that they and their husband believed in a notion of 
the "family's money". 
H2s' methods of financial management 
The 20% of H2s who opened a joint account as soon as they married presented 
what they saw as the logic of this arrangement in much the same terms as 
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those used by H1 respondents. As illustrated in the example quoted below, 
these H2 respondents again emphasised the importance of "sharing". 
"Everything is in the joint account. Whatever I want I just get it 
you know with shopping... he doesn't look at it like it is his money, 
which is why whatever he earns is ours. It isn't '0h its mine', it's 
ours so thats all there is to it. It's much easier that way. " 
[H2, school age] 
Curiously, none of the H2 respondents expected to divide the family 
finances into two separate accounts. Those few (10%) who chose this option 
did so in order to regain a sense of their own money (as described below) 
or in order to save up what were seen as especially their wages. 
"Well you see I was married before and we had a joint account and I 
think I got a very sort of raw deal out of that. I was determined 
that I'd never have a joint account again. I'd have my own money. I 
don't think many people realise what a difference that makes, like now 
I've always got a set amount of money per month that is sort of mine 
to do what I want with, which I certainly didn't have before. " 
[H2, no children, younger] 
The majority of H2s (70%) presumed that they would take, or be given, cash 
which they would then use to cover all their normal expenses. 
This notion of "housekeeping" money (however broadly defined) has critical 
implications for the structure of associated systems of financial 
management. If one area of expenditure is distinguished from all others, 
and if sums of money are allocated to the person who is expected to be 
responsible for that area, then the system of financial management is 
inherently compartmentalised. There is consequently no scope for a 
comprehensive vision of "family money" of the type permitted by a joint 
account method. The family's financial resources are instantly earmarked 
and notionally allocated to responsible purchasers who are then obliged to 
make the necessary spending decisions. The detail of resulting 
arrangements varied with definitions of areas of gender-appropriate 
responsibility. A third of the housekeeping H2s believed that wives should 
manage the family's money and so operated what I shall call the 
"taken from" method of housekeeping. In these cases the wife, who had 
total formal control of the family's finances, took her housekeeping out of 
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the family income. The remaining two thirds of housekeeping H2s believed 
(with equal conviction) that the husband should take care of all aspects 
of the family's finances except the housekeeping. Accordingly, they 
adopted what I shall refer to as the "given to" system in which the 
husband handed over what was seen as "housekeeping" money. 
ff2 respondents who operated a "taken from" system expected to convert most 
of the family income to cash and to divide that into a number of "boxes", 
each containing money which was destined to go towards, or to cover, a 
particular type of expenditure. 
"We just get it out. He gets his monthly pay out and I get, we er I 
pay the bills and what has to be paid. The rest is for us. You know, 
we have a box [for that sum of money]. When bills come in they just 
get paid because I've put aside the money for them. We pay cash, we 
don't write cheques at all. " 
[H2, pre-school age] 
Most H2 respondents who "took" their housekeeping in this way observed that 
they simply copied their mother's method of financial management. They 
therefore "knew" how to structure the system of tins and boxes and expected 
that they would be in control of the management of this system and so of 
the family's finance. The actual number of boxes varied depending on the 
range of different bills and on the method of categorising types of 
expense. In all cases the wife determined both the nature of the 
organising categories and the amount of money allocated to each. The 
following quotations illustrate the perceived "normality" of this "taken 
from" arrangement. 
"That's another thing we've never quarreled about, money. I've always 
handled the money. You only want the wife to do that. This joint 
account business is no good, honestly. I have a tin. I have one for 
the rates, ... I have a tin, I put the money in for running the car, I 
have a tin for running the bikes, and I put my telephone money in, and 
I put my coal money in and I have a box I put surplus into until it 
mounts up, and er I put maybe £2 or £3 and that covers my TV licence 
fee, and then there is the kitty. If we go out he always has money 
over and above his pocket money, he never ever goes out with his 
pocket money, that is his own. I buy all his clothes, toothpaste, 
boot cleaners everything" 
(H2,16+] 
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"He usually comes in with his wage packet. I mean he wouldn't give it 
to me unopened. He doesn't believe in that. You know, there are 
clubs at work he pays in, but I get the majority of it and I sort the 
money out for the mortgage and the bills and he gets his spending 
money,.... I don't get any but when I go out with him I don't take my 
purse. I don't buy anything so I don't really need it. " 
[H2, school age] 
The fate of the wages of H2 respondents who worked, and who also "took" 
their housekeeping from the total family income, varied depending on the 
ways in which they were paid. Cash income usually went straight into the 
general family fund and was allocated to the relevant boxes along with the 
rest of the family's money. However, several of those who were paid by 
cheque were able to define all "their" income as the family's savings. 
These working wives, like the one quoted below, left their wages in the 
bank and used cash from some other source, usually their "husband's" money, 
for all normal forms of expenditure. 
"I get paid by cheque. The small amount it is I get paid by cheque 
and that goes into the building society so when we want you know a... 
like I want a new suite then... That account is usually just my wages, 
or if he gets some overtime I'll put the extra away. " 
[H2, school age] 
"Given to" methods of housekeeping, like the "taken from" systems described 
above, also depended on everyday use of cash. While the husband always 
presented his wife with housekeeping in this form, that money was variously 
taken from a joint account, the husband's own account, or directly from his 
pay packet. The arrangements described by those whose husbands gave them 
housekeeping money which was taken out of a joint account had one of two 
typical histories. A couple of H2 respondents observed that this system 
had "evolved" in response to changes in their own working career. In 
effect, they relinquished most of their financial responsibilities, 
including their participation in the task of running the joint account, at 
the point at which they stopped earning. The next example illustrates this 
process. 
"I get a set amount of money, the majority of which will go on food. 
Well it all goes on food really, and then I usually sort of ... I dip 
into my family allowance for food and put some away-for when the boys 
need clothes. I try not to go over the amount Terry gives me, he 
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gives me that in cash every Friday. We've always had a joint account, 
we've never had his money and my money, it was always our money. When 
I was working I used to go out and buy the food out of my wage packet, 
then what was left over went in the bank. Now I'm not earning our 
attitude is if I can manage on what Terry gives me its better to put 
the money into the bank until there comes a point when you've got to 
say '0h well its got to go up by £5 or whatever. "' 
[H2, pre-school age] 
Alternatively, respondents adopted this system on the grounds that it was 
both joint (after all, there was a joint account) and yet appropriately 
separate: the husband was still able to control the family's money. The 
respondent quoted below presents the history of her method of financial 
management in these terms. 
"My money well, I don't use it for.. we've never had any problem over 
money, we've always tipped up. We've always put what we've earned in 
together.... It goes straight into one joint account. He just makes a 
cheque out and gets his own cash and cash for the housekeeping and any 
bills he pays by cheque. He draws out £150 which I say that will do 
us this month. I might get it all out of that or I might have to ask 
him to get a bit more. If I wanted anything I would tell him what I 
wanted and he would give me the money... say I've seen a nice pair of 
shoes he'll say '0h how much are they, where have you seen them, well 
wait till Friday and see how I'm going', or 'wait till next month'. 
It works very well, not like some couples I know who keep their own 
money separate. I'm very lucky that way, some people make life very 
difficult for themselves by having that mine and thats yours and you 
pay for this and I'll pay for that. We've never had that, we've had 
one account and thats it thats finished. This was the method our 
parents used, we were carrying on the method our parents had just, one 
purse. " 
[H2, no children, older] 
Other of the "given to" respondents found it more difficult to present 
their financial arrangement in quite the same joint or shared terms because 
they were presented with housekeeping money which was drawn from what was 
clearly their husband's own account or from his pay packet. Interestingly, 
respondents in this position still argued that they and their husband 
retained a unified vision of the "family's" money despite the fact that 
their system of financial management was formally compartmentalised. 
"I get housekeeping money from my husband and I use some of my own 
money and then my daughters give me some more for the house. He gives 
me a fixed amount of housekeeping money for the week and if I was ever 
short of something he would ... he's never you know hes never mean with 
money. If I was short he would willingly give it to me. Mind I'm 
never short, I don't go rash on things. He's, my husband is the old 
fashioned type of Yorkshire man and er all the years we've been 
married I've never known how much he's earned, but he doesn't keep me 
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short. Some men they can but he doesn't. He gives me a fixed amount 
and he'll increase it and what not but if I said say I had to borrow 
£10 and then I offered it him back he wouldn't take it. Yet he 
wouldn't be over generous in giving money if you were rash and spent 
it or something like that so we've built on that understanding. My 
money gets paid into my account. We have ours separate and I try not 
to draw out too much of that. I mean when a man has all the bills to 
pay a woman should help him you know I think you should pull together. 
That is where all the arguments are involved I think its all over 
money, 'that's mine and that's mine' well we say that's ours, you 
know. I know we have separate but its ours and its our house I think 
you've got to share, that's what its all about. " 
[H2,16+1 
Housekeeping money, whether of the "given to" or the "taken from" variety 
was expected to cover the family's normal household expenses. In this 
context, those who were given or who took housekeeping money, and who also 
went to work, could use their wages in one of two ways. Those who were 
paid in cash tended to use their income to supplement the housekeeping and 
to buy what were by definition, "extras". In comparison, those who were 
paid by cheque often stored their earnings in a separate "savings" account 
which contained what was, again by definition, "additional" or "extra" 
money. 
Thus, H2 respondents adopted one of four possible methods of financial 
management. Most (70%) presumed that they would operate one of the two 
cash-based forms of housekeeping; exactly which depended on their view of 
the proper allocation of financial responsibility. Those who believed that 
wives automatically ought to be in charge continued the "taken from" 
tradition, while others expected their financially responsible husband to 
give them a specific sum of housekeeping money. The remaining 30% expected 
to have some kind of bank account. Some simply expected to have a joint 
account, while others ended up with a separate account having abandoned 
what they believed to be the "normal" arrangement. 
H3s' methods of financial management 
Nearly all H3 respondents paid their bills with "real" cash. Though 54% 
had a bank or building society account these were typically used for the 
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family's savings rather than for everyday expenditure. Those few who had 
to use an account as anything other than a semi-permanent store drew out 
cash in preference to using their cheque book. This way they knew exactly 
how their finances stood at any one moment. Because H3 respondents 
expected to work with cash, and because all expected that they would be in 
charge of the food shopping, all had a fairly clearly defined notion of 
housekeeping money. Again, selection of a particular housekeeping strategy 
reflected respondents' expectations of gender appropriate purchasing 
responsibility. Most (70% of the H3 housekeepers) believed that wives 
should have total control of the family's finances and so operated a "taken 
from" system of housekeeping. Their descriptions, including the two quoted 
below, were much the same as those presented by those H2s who expected to 
have control of the family's finance. 
she: "It is handed straight over to me, he's always handed his wages over 
to me" 
he: "Yes, even before we was married I handed my wages over. " 
she: "I get everything we need and I sort it all out. " 
he: "Anything she wants she gets. If its something like a3 piece suite 
then what we do is she makes her mind up and then she goes and gets 
it. " 
[H3, pre-school age] 
"It is my job really, I don't mind, but we've done it from the start, 
but sometimes Paul thinks that he can get money from the gooseberry 
tree you know it can't be done. I don't mind doing it all because I 
know where I stand with it all. My mum did the same she er gave us 
the idea when we first met. I think his mum does the same. You know 
where you stand and how much money you've got in the house. " 
[H3, no children, younger] 
Again the fate of the wages of those who worked depended on the way in 
which they were paid. Respondents who were paid in cash simply added that 
money to the total family income, while those who were paid by cheque 
tended to keep that money in a separate "savings" account. However, unlike 
the H2s, a couple of those who had what was formally a "savings" account 
found that they had to draw upon that money in order to meet the "larger" 
bills or in order to resolve temporary financial crises. 
"I use my own money if I need it. I'll go and get it out of the bank 
if I need it. The same if he needs it. I'll go up and get it out of 
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the bank. If he's desperate for anything I'll just go up to the bank 
and draw out what's needed. Really my money is just for the mortgage 
and spending money for me and any jobs that need doing around the 
house, or if we get short. " 
(H3, pre-school age] 
Perhaps because H3 respondents were typically poorer than either of the 
other two sections of the sample, those who operated a "taken from" system 
of housekeeping saw their financial role as a particularly important family 
responsibility. As the following respondents observe, the family's welfare 
depended on their skills as financial managers. 
"I don't use the money for what's supposed to be for something else.. I 
wouldn't dream of doing that and I hope my children wouldn't think of 
doing that either because that's just ... well I don't know what do they 
say, rob Peter to pay Paul. No, if I haven't got the money then we'll 
have to do without. " 
[H3,16+] 
"I only do what I suppose, what I see my mother does, putting bill 
money away every week and ... you know like some people will get a bill 
and say '0h I don't know how I'm going to pay this one' but to me 
that's more strange... to me that's just ... well 'why don't you do it 
every week and then it will all be there'. My bills are all paid on 
the day they come through the door, I don't have any I haven't seen 
any different you see that's the way I do it. " 
[H3, pre-school age] 
The remaining 30% of H3 respondents were "given" money by their financially 
responsible husband. This group believed that theirs was an unusual 
arrangement and went out of their way to explain how it had come about. 
Some described how they had switched from a "taken from" to a "given to" 
system when they finshed work. In these cases their husband effectively 
took over the employer's cash providing role as well as control of the 
family's finances. Others claimed that they had deliberately rejected the 
normal "taken from" alternative on the grounds that it was unfair. Because 
these H3s still expected to work with cash, they therefore bad "no choice" 
but to opt for the "given to" alternative as described below. - 
"It was more the woman took all the responsibility. The husband went 
out to work and came home and paid the money and that was it. I mean 
they didn't have a say you know apart from just running the house and 
all the rest of it. The man did his job of work, came home, passed 
over his wages and the woman was left with everything then, even the 
responsibility of giving back pocket money which.. I don't want that. 
I want my [housekeeping] money and that's it. " 
[H3, school age] 
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Like H2s, Has who were "given" housekeeping and also worked either added 
their income to the housekeeping fund (this was especially likely if they 
were paid in cash) or put their money in a separate savings account. 
Evidently, H3 wives expected to have much more control over the family's 
finances and over decisions about spending than did those in either the H2 
or H1 categories. The form of that control was also more detailed than 
that described by respondents from the other sections of the sample, 
perhaps because there was often so little room for financial manoeuvre. 
Methods of financial management 
Few respondents made any real decision about how to arrange their finances. 
They simply did what they thought was normal or what their parents had 
done. In practice there were four key forms of financial management, two 
of which depended on an everyday use of some kind of bank account and two 
of which were cash-centered. Different sections of the sample adopted 
characteristically different strategies, as illustrated in the table below. 
FIGURE 10 
HOUSING CATEGORIES AND 
METHODS OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
ACCOUNTS 
JOINT SEPARATE 
CASH 
-HOUSEKEEPING- 
TAKEN FROM GIVEN TO 
H1 50% 50% - - 
H2 20% 10% 24% 46% 
H3 7% 7% 60% 26% 
I have already observed that the location (ie. joint or separate account, 
savings account etc. ) and hence possible use of the wife's wage (if any) 
varied depending on the overall method of financial management. In detail, 
the fate of the wife's income also depended on the system of financial 
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management and on the form of payment. Figure 11 summarises the patterns 
which the respondents described: 
FIGURE 11 
THE FATE OF THE WIFE'S INCOME AND 
METHODS OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
FORM ACCOUNTS CASH 
OF THE HOUSEKEEP I - IN - 
WIFE'S JOINT SEPARATE TAKEN FROM GIVEN TO 
INCOME 
CASH - USED AS ADDED TO TINS SAVED OR ADDED 
"HOUSEKEEPING" TO HOUSEKEEPING 
CHEQUE ADDED TO KEPT IN SAVINGS AC OWN SAVINGS 
JOINT AC SEPARATE AC IF POSSIBLE AC 
(Note: none of those who had a joint account and who worked were paid in 
cash. ) 
So far, I have tried to describe the range of different methods of 
financial management and to document the strategies adopted by each housing 
section of the sample. In the next two sections I shall explore the 
implications of these various methods of financial management first in 
terms of respondent's perceptions of "allocative" categories (and so their 
perceptions of independently disposable money), and then in terms of 
associated patterns of financial responsibility and decision-making. In 
both respects the method of financial management was of greater relevance 
than the variables of, say, age or housing. I shall therefore review 
perceptions of money and patterns of financial responsibility as described 
by a) those who had a joint account, b) those who had separate accounts, c) 
those who operated a "taken from" system of housekeeping and d) those who 
adopted a "given to" housekeeping arrangement. This is revealing in that 
individual access to legitimately disposable money (ie. money which could 
be used as a resource) varied depending on the structure of the formal and 
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informal system of "allocative categories". Furthermore, financial 
decisions were more or less visible depending on the way in which they were 
(or were not) bracketed together by a system of financial responsibility. 
The probability and the course of associated financial disputes, and the 
patterns of access to financial resources, were structured accordingly. 
2. ' CATEGORIES OF MONEY AND METHODS OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
While formal methods of financial management evidently set limits on the 
range of possible ways in which family money might be categorised or 
"earmarked", those formal methods did not determine the detail of the 
resulting classifications (14). It is important to acknowledge that actual 
use of, say, a separate or joint account varied depending on respondents' 
beliefs about gender appropriate allocations of spending responsibilities. 
Such expectations, in combination with the formal limits imposed by the 
ordering method of financial management, informed respondents' perceptions 
of, and their access to, different categories of money. In addition, 
generalised conceptions of "own" money also varied with the nature of the 
respondent's contribution to family income. 
In this section I want to identify respondent's definitions of different 
categories of money, and, in particular, to explore what they believed to 
come under the heading of "their own" money both in the sense of money 
which was immediately available for their own use and in the more diffuse 
sense of their relation to the "family's" money (15). I shall therefore 
attempt to review the "kinds" of money described by working and non-working 
respondents who had joint or separate accounts and by those who "took", or 
who were "given" housekeeping money. 
Allocative categories described by those who had a joint account 
About half of those who had joint accounts claimed that they made no 
attempt to earmark particular sums or to notionally allocate different 
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portions of their money. The family's income simply went into the joint 
account and remained there until needed by either husband or wife. The 
respondent quoted below illustrates this view. 
"Well I just go and get what I want and sign the cheque. Everything 
is in the joint account so whatever I want I just get, you know, 
shopping I just go out and pay by cheque. Any other money I want I'll 
just get out of the bank. He gets out what he needs. Most of the 
bills we pay by standing orders. " 
[H1, school age] 
Though all made claims of the form "all the money is our money", the other 
50% of those with a joint account felt uncomfortable about using what they 
saw as the "family's" money for anything other than essential "house- 
keeping" purchases. These respondents, including those who were earning, 
observed that while they felt able to makes some purchases on "their own", 
they felt uneasy about making others without first "seeking permission". 
The borderline between unproblematic and debatable expenditure seemed to 
vary depending on the extent to which the husband oversaw the wife's use of 
the joint account (or, less commonly, vice-versa). The respondent quoted 
below describes how her husband established the boundary between these two 
forms of expenditure. 
"You know we don't ever specify exact figures... You know, he's 
terribly nice like that to me. He's always very tactful about saying 
that I've been over doing it or that perhaps I should have checked 
before I bought something.... he wouldn't ever sort of make me answer 
to him, 'What's this cheque for' or, the most he'd ever do is he'd 
sort of go through and say 'Now look we haven't a lot in the account, 
don't buy anything for the house until next month"' 
[H1, pre-school age] 
35% of those who had joint accounts had institutionalised a divide between 
earmarked "housekeeping" money, which the wife took from the joint account 
in order to buy essential supplies of food, cleaning materials etc., and 
"the rest", which could only be spent on jointly approved projects. While. 
the husbands expected their wife's use of the joint account to be informed 
by such a compartmentalised view of family money, they also expected to be 
able to draw upon the account as they wished. In other words, husband and 
wife were expected to use the account in different ways and to take 
319 
corresponsingly different views of particular types of expenditure. 
Respondents who had more complex financial arrangements - for example, 
those who had "their own" joint accounts - tended to make decisions with 
reference to an even more precise definition of legitimate and illegitimate 
expenditure. In the next case, for instance, two joint accounts were used 
as, in effect, separate accounts. Husband and wife each had their own 
buying and spending responsibilities and each used money from their own 
joint account to cover "their own" expenses. 
"We have two joint accounts. My pay goes into one and his goes into 
the other and really unless one account is really low, we tend to 
stick to one account each. We sort of try to use David's for the main 
bills like the mortgage and the gas and electricity and rates, that 
sort of thing and we live on his money. Mine is just for extras, 
household goods or monthly bills. " 
[H2, no children, younger] 
Whatever the pattern of informal compartmentalisation, those who had a 
joint account and who also believed that the family's money should be 
shared had trouble distinguishing a category of money which was 
distinctively "theirs", either in the sense of money to which they had 
immediate and legitimate access or in the sense of a broader notion of 
their own contribution. This can be seen in the difficulty respondents 
experienced in giving their partner a present. Because gift giving 
ideally involved the exchange of something which the presenter really 
owned, and because that item was supposed to be a "priceless" surprise 
(16), responses to the "present buying problem" illustrated respondent's 
ability to buy and hence to own such items (17). The ability to give a 
"proper" present depended on access to a category of independently 
disposable money. Descriptions of present buying therefore provided an 
insight into respondents' access to what could be counted as "their own" 
money. In this case, as in others described by those with a joint 
account, the wife appeared to find it more difficult to conceive of "her 
own" money than did her husband. 
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'Yes, that's the only thing that is a bit funny. Yes, I suppose it's 
just the surprise element. Well I mean what do women do who have 
children and who have no income, they've got to go and buy him a 
present out of his own money..... I suppose I think of it as our money 
er .. I thought that myself when I first started buying presents for 
him. I suppose it would be better if I bought the wool to knit 
something at least you'd feel you'd done something towards it. " 
[H2, no children, older] 
Respondents attempted to maximise the proper gift-like qualities of 
presents in one of three ways. Some chose to take out cash and buy 
presents with some of this joint money. This strategy at least ensured 
that the precise cost of the chosen item never showed up on the bank 
statement. 
"I do try to get out cash rather than writing a cheque so that he 
doesn't know exactly how much something has cost. I do prefer to get 
cash but I mean its only symbolic and I think he does the same but it 
doesn't matter its not a major issue. " 
[H1, school age] 
"I find it quite awkward because when he was away I didn't want him to 
know that I'd bought his present, so how could I make that money 
missing from the account. What I ended up doing was taking £50 out now 
and then and putting it in my Lloyds account which.. I used to be with 
the Lloyds and there was only sort of £3 in the bank to keep it open 
... and you know slipping in £50 and of course he didn't notice it. 
But he found out. There was a statement for the Lloyds because we'd 
lived with his mother for a month and we'd never bothered changing the 
address so my statement went there so he went down and his mother gave 
him the statement. Oh I got caught there I can't do anything like 
that again.... He just goes and buys it he'll come back and he'll say 
'0h I've done so and so' you know. " 
[H2, no children, younger] 
Of course this did not get round the problem of using "his" or even "our" 
money to buy him a present. Other respondents were able to save up what 
they saw as distinctly "their own" money and so avoid the need to mentally 
appropriate a portion of the "family's" cash. Such independent funds 
usually consisted of Family Allowance and/or money which the respondent had 
earned "on the side". 
"If I am honest, [I use] the Family Allowance. I get it monthly now 
and it just saves me from going to the bank that week. I might use it 
for something special, like last time I used it like that I bought my 
husband a radio and I bought it with actual Family Allowance cash that 
I could save. Cash that ... I didn't have to let him see the cheque 
because I didn't want it to come out of the account .. so that was the 
only way I could save some cash myself, it had to be done that way. I 
do that for birthday- presents because I felt well all I am doing is 
spending his money so you see it seemed a bit ridiculous. Otherwise I 
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never have any money of my own, so that's what I do. " 
[H1, school age] 
In theory, all those who had their own income could adopt this or some 
similar method. In practice, those whose earnings went straight into the 
joint account were often as formally penniless as those who had no income. 
However, working respondents did seem to find it easier to make the 
necessary mental division of the block of "our money" into that which they 
could spend (ie. that which they had earned) and that which represented 
their husband's contribution. They were therefore able to buy presents 
with what they imagined to be "their money" even if it was located in a 
formally "joint" account. 
"Well it is different now [now that the couple have a joint 
account... before they had two separate ones], when I am buying him a 
present now it's not really as if I am buying him a present because 
it's our money anyway...... I suppose I am still earning as much as I 
was before and I just have to think of it like that. It would be 
worse if I didn't work at all. " 
[H2, school age] 
"I don't feel as dependent as, when you are not working you do feel.. 
I mean even though you are a partnership you don't tend to.. I mean I 
used to feel a bit guilty ... a bit as though I couldn't do things 
without asking. Like, it's a lot easier getting him a present now. I 
know it all comes out of the joint account but I know that I have 
contributed to that money so it is not his money that I am using. " 
[H1, school age] 
Clearly, then, the joint account system formally stripped both husband and 
wife of anything which they could really think of as their own money. 
This proved to be a very real problem for the wives, especially for those 
who did not work. Though I do not know how husbands viewed joint account 
money, it seems that most behaved as if it was really "their own". None 
went to the trouble of sneaking money out of the joint account and then 
pretending that it was really theirs in order to buy a "proper" present for 
their wife; they simply drew upon the account in order to cover all their 
expenses. Though joint account money was never formally earmarked for any 
specific purpose, it was characteristically used and viewed in a different 
way by husband and wife. This ordered described views of legitimate 
spending power and had certain implications for respondent's (and their 
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husband's) access to "independently disposable cash" which could be used, 
as discussed in chapter 4, as a resource. In effect, respondents who had a 
joint account were less sure about the legitimacy of their access to the 
"family's" money than were those who adopted any of the other methods of 
financial management. This was as true for those who worked as for those 
who had no income. 
A1locative categories described by those who had separate accounts 
Those who had a separate account and who also worked had a very clear idea 
of their own money. Their money was what was in their account. However, 
this fund was usually divided, sometimes mentally and sometimes literally, 
into a) that which was or would be accounted for by "their bills" (ie. by 
the respondent's contribution to the family's expenses) and b) that which 
was left over and which could be treated as independently disposable money. 
In detail, then, the sum of acessible, independently disposable money 
varied depending on the way in which the couple divided responsibility for 
paying the "family's" bills and on the scale of actual income. The 
respondent quoted below describes how she and her husband "balanced" income 
and expenditure. 
"Steve writes a cheque for the food and I give him half out of the 
cash that I've got in my purse. Most of the bills are .. well Steve 
pays the mortgage and I pay most of the bills. I pay gas, electricity, 
telephone, papers, er he pays the rates, and the water rates are split 
in two now aren't they, I pay the small one and he pays the big one. 
When we first sort of got together Steve sort of worked it all out 
proportionally and it seems to have worked quite well. I spend a lot 
more on clothes than he does .... Going out for a meal no, er it's too 
sort of expensive really. Well it all depends on where we go to, I 
mean if we go for a curry and that's fairly cheap I can afford to chip 
in a fiver, that's it. If we go somewhere more expensive, then I 
can't really [afford to contribute]...... I usually keep track of mine 
better than I mean basically there's really sort of no need for Steve 
to be careful with money because he earns so much wheras when you 
don't earn so much you have to sort of keep track of where it 
goes.... I always have some left for me. " 
[H2, no children, younger] 
Whatever the division of "his" and "her" bills, and whatever the relative 
size of the incomes, both husband and wife had access to what was clearly 
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defined as their own money. Each was therefore able to buy the other a 
"proper" present as defined above. Those, like the respondent quoted below 
who had changed to a separate from a joint account system, appreciated this 
difference. 
"Oh that is a lot easier now, it is much better this way. It is more 
of a surprise. I mean Neil can buy me a book and I might think that 
that is more of a present than it was before [the couple used to have 
a joint account]. It is nicer for me too. I can give him a surprise 
present and know that I have worked to be able to give him that. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
Respondents who had their own account but who did not work described their 
financial position in one of two ways. Some concluded that there was only 
one type of money and that was their husband's. This group treated their 
"allowance" as money which was "lent in trust" and used it as such. Their 
own money, if any, was that which they had earned in the past or which they 
had saved from Family Allowance (18). However, a couple of others in the 
same position shared their husband's view that the family's money was 
indeed all "ours". These respondents were quite happy about using money 
which their husband gave them and did not pay any special attention to 
independent sources of income or the Family Allowance. From their point of 
view the separate account "allowance" arrangement was just a convenient 
strategy for distributing the family's money. 
"I don't really sort of ever think of it as asking for money. I don't 
really have to ask, so if I get through what I spend I don't ... we 
just tend to buy what we need. We've never thought about it really. 
I never save up, no, no not at all.... [Family Allowance]... Oh I never 
bother with that it doesn't really seem like anything. " 
[H1, pre-school age] 
Those dependent respondents who treated the money in their account as 
"their own" had no problem about buying their husband a present. 
"Its no problem really because once he's given it to me he regards it 
as mine anyway so no, there is no problem. " 
[H1, pre-school age] 
Clearly, the separate account system formally distinguished between the 
wife's and the husband's money. Yet that did not guarantee that each would 
conclude that they had "their own" money. Perception of the contents of a 
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separate account and of its possible uses varied depending on the intended 
role of that account in the overall financial system and on the source of 
the money which it contained. In other words, formal and felt dependence 
(or independence) did not always go together. Some of those who had no 
income thought of their allowance money as their own; others did not. 
Equally, only some of those whose account contained their own income saw 
that money as essentially "theirs". 
Allocative categories described by those who adopted a "taken from" system 
of housekeeping 
"Taken from" systems of housekeeping generated as many categories of money 
as there were forms of expenditure. Housekeeping wives distributed the 
total income into the physical or mental categories of, for example, "car 
money", "petrol money", "husband's pocket money", "Christmas money", 
"electricity money" and so on and so forth. Once allocated, these sums 
could only be used for their intended purpose. Some, like the respondent 
quoted below, physically separated them so as to avoid confusion. 
"I save up a bit each week for clothes, fortunately we don't buy a lot 
of clothes. Money for the car I put that aside each week and it all 
goes in a tin and if I go to Asda [supermarket] I fill it up and take 
the money out of the tin. If he's out more often than not he does it. 
It doesn't mean he uses his money, it still comes out of the central 
fund. He'll come home and take the petrol money out of the petrol 
money box if he's used his own money. " 
[H2, school age] 
The actual range of tins (and so of allocative categories) depended on the 
range of bills and on the family's spending practices. For example, the 
sum allowed for personal spending money differed depending on the couple's 
normal leisure habits and on their definition of gender appropriate 
behaviour. Some had a separate tin for "entertainment" money. Though this 
was seen as joint money, or rather as "no-ones" money, the wives expected 
to give it to their husband before the couple went out in order that he 
could then "pay for" them in what was believed to be the "normal" way. 
Others managed without a separate entertainments fund and expected to pay 
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for food or drink out of their own "pocket money". In these circumstances 
the husband usually got more pocket money than the wife because he was 
expected to take her out. 
"If we go out? Oh well he pays. Yes. Occasionally er like sometimes 
if Eve's [friend] husband hasn't gone out, you know, he has not taken 
her out, then I, she'll pay a round and I'll pay a round but when 
there are two husbands the women don't open their purses. I use mine 
[pocket money] when I go out on a Tuesday night and well it goes 
towards me clothes and presents, that sort of thing. [Do you get the 
same amount? ] Oh nowhere near as much no, no, nowhere near as what he 
has because he has more expense than what I have because he's taking 
me out. After 23 years I think you get used to being taken out. " 
[H2, no children, older] 
Whatever the anticipated expenses and whatever the formal structure of the 
housekeeping system, those who had what was defined as their own "pocket 
money" were able to use it to buy things for themselves and to buy their 
presents. It was unquestionably their money just as their husband's pocket 
money was unquestionably his money. 
"Oh he always brought his pay packet home fastened, that's perfectly 
true and then he had his pocket money and I had mine and then I sorted 
it all out. I just take a bit for my catalogue and for presents. " 
[H3, school age] 
Those whose accounting system had no such discrete category were obliged to 
appropriate what they would count as "their" money from elsewhere. 
Husbands who had no pocket-money, or, more commonly, "not enough" pocket 
money were in a similar position, as illustrated in the following 
quotation. 
"He will say 'I'll only give you so much out of my wages this week 
because its your birthday'. Actually it is my birthday in a couple of 
weeks time and he's doing a couple of plastering jobs to get some 
money to buy me something. I don't think he minds, it's not so much 
him asking me for the money back as him saying er 'I'll only give you 
so much this week' from his wages". 
[H3, no children, younger] 
The detail and balance of the overall structure determined the significance 
of each component "tin". To continue the personal spending example, 
several respondents argued that they had no need for a tin marked "their 
pocket money" because they were able to buy all they needed with money from 
the other boxes. It is important to remember that those who operated a 
326 
"taken from" system of housekeeping were able to control the use and 
distribution of the family's finances. Most were therefore able to ensure 
that they never "went short" even if the system fostered an appearance of 
financial dependence. 
"See a lot of women say '0h I've no money of my own. I hate asking my 
husband for it, for every pound'. Well I've never had that because 
I've had it all anyway. He never bothers, he wouldn't say well have 
you got £500 in the bank, he thinks what I have to do I do quite well 
so fair enough. " 
[H3, school age] 
"Taken from" housekeepers were obliged to allocate and to manage money 
which was originally more or less "theirs" whatever its actual fate. This 
had certain implications for their general conception of "their" money as 
distinct from the "family's" money, whatever the formal structure of the 
housekeeping system and whatever their immediate access to independently 
disposable cash. Most of those who worked observed that "their money" (ie. 
their contribution) went towards this or that expense. Some used it as 
their own "pocket money". 
"Oh Yes I've got my own cheque account I'd be very upset if I didn't 
have, I can't be er I'm rather what shall I say er I'm a bit not in so 
many words I like to be independent er I'm not a womens libber but I 
think we should stand up for our own rights and this that and the 
other. I've earned my money so I keep a little bit for myself and 
thats only fair. " 
[H3,16+] 
Others used it to pay for specific bills. 
"My wage is for the holiday it goes into the building society and 
stays there for when we go on holiday. I just pay for the holiday. " 
[H3, pre-school age] 
Either way, these respondents were able to monitor the use of their income 
and so maintain a sense of "their" contribution. 
In conclusion, then, "taken from" system of housekeeping generated endless 
different categories of money. Some systems included categories of 
personal pocket money, others did not. However, it was hard to pin down 
the significance or otherwise of such arrangements without knowing about 
the way in which the whole structure operated. Within limits, "taken from" 
327 
housekeepers were able to determine the structure of the allocative 
categories and so order the everyday use of the family's money. Such 
decisions had important consequences in terms of the form of subsequent 
financial behaviour and, indeed, in terms of each partner's ability to buy, 
to spend, to go out on their own, to pay bills etc., etc. Not 
surprisingly, wives perceptions of their earnings as "their money", and 
their vision of their contribution to the family income, varied according 
to the ways in which that money was actually used. 
Allocative categories described by those who adopted a "given to" system 
of housekeeDi 
This method of financial management depended on a minimum of two categories 
of family money. First, there was the housekeeping money, earmarked for 
food/clothes/household shopping, and given to the wife for that purpose. 
Second, there was "the rest". which had to cover all other forms of 
expenditure and which formally "belonged" to the husband. Most respondents 
also identified a third type. This was "their own" money, which consisted 
of un-used housekeeping money (19), Family Allowance, and/or their own 
income. Working respondents who added their own income to the housekeeping 
were often able to accumulate quite considerable housekeeping surpluses. 
Although most observed that their husband gave them "enough" housekeeping, 
many went on to explain that they were working in order to help meet the 
family's food bill, rather than for their own benefit. This legitimised 
their employment and, at the same time, allowed them to save up what 
eventually became "their" money. 
"All my money goes into the house. I take all my money in with the 
housekeeping and if there is any left over I don't mind. ..... I need 
that wage to help live on you know my husband doesn't get a lot of 
money. " 
[H3,16+J 
Those who kept their earnings in a separate savings account had to manage 
from week to week as if they had no extra income. In practice, "their own" 
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money consisted of what cash they could save from the housekeeping plus, in 
a rather different sense, the inaccessible sum in a bank or building 
society which was usually earmarked for some major family purchase though 
occasionally "touchable" for other personal purposes. Most working 
respondents welcomed what they saw as their ability to retain at least a 
sense of their own money in the context of a "given to" system of 
housekeeping, even if the fact of their employment did not increase the sum 
of their instantly disposable cash. The following example illustrates this 
point. 
"Well he used to give it [money] to me. The only thing was it was, 
the actual asking of it that's what I didn't like. I had to ask him 
for all of it you know wheras now I don't. I'll just say I'm going 
now, I'll get some new clothes whereas before I used to say 'can I 
go? '.. 'can I have the money for this or that', you know, no matter 
what it was if it was extra it was 'can I have the money'. I didn't 
like that. Clothes and that I can get now and as I say its my, well I 
say it's my, its our money but I've earned it. I can get his present 
now without having to save for weeks.. saving for his birthday out of 
the housekeeping. Now I can just get it [a present] out of the 
housekeeping and if I go over I'll just get some of my money out and 
use that. " 
[H3, school age] 
It is important to note that the "given to" system of housekeeping was 
founded on the presupposition that the wife had no independent income and 
that the husband was literally the "breadwinner". In this context the wife 
had to be given money with which to buy the "bread". From this point of 
view, the wife's employment (if any) was by definition "extra". 
Accordingly, her income was always used to buy what were defined as 
"extras" rather than "essentials". For example, none of the working 
respondents used their own wage to replace the housekeeping though in at 
least some cases, this would have been financially and theoretically 
feasible. More than that, the implied spending roles of husband and wife 
were theoretically demarcated such that the wife was allowed, even 
required, to determine the use of the housekeeping money, but had to "ask" 
for more money and so "ask" permission to indulge in any other type of 
expenditure. 
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Allocative categories and financial resources 
In this section I have tried to explore the relationship between methods of 
financial management and definitions of categories of independently 
disposable money. Though formal methods of financial management set some 
limit on the range of associated allocative categories, the respondent's 
(and their husband's) methods of mental as well as physical earmarking were 
extremely complicated: perceptions of different categories of money varied 
accordingly. In detail, very few wives (employed or not) felt easy about 
using joint account money as if it were their own, although it seems that 
their husbands had no such difficulty. While those with their own account 
were able to retain a clear, if generalised, sense of their own money, the 
sum which was classed as accessible and independently disposable varied 
depending on the origin of the money in the account (ie. income or 
allowance) and on its intended purpose. Some of those who managed the 
family's finances (ie. who "took" housekeeping money) had what were clearly 
defined sums of "personal pocket money". Others did not. While actual 
access to independently disposable money depended on the structure of the 
housekeeping system, the respondents' generalised sense of their 
contribution varied depending on a number of other factors including the 
existence or otherwise of their own income. Much the same could be said of 
respondents who were "given" housekeeping. However, in these cases, the 
system's in-built presumption of financial dependence ordered the way in 
which individuals were able to secure what they could count as "their own" 
money. Essentially, the existence of clearly defined sums of accessible, 
indpendently disposable money varied depending on a set of expectations and 
practices which determined the way in which the whole of the family's money 
was spent, and, to a lesser extent, on the origin of particular portions of 
the "family's" income. The size of the wife's income (if any) made 
relatively little difference to the respondents immediate access to money 
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which could be used as a financial resource. Other factors such as the 
form of payment (cash or cheque), the structure of the system of financial 
management, and respondents' perceptions of the notional use of different 
categories of money were more relevant. However, earning (or otherwise) 
did inform the respondents' more diffuse notion of "their own" money in the 
sense of "their" contribution to, or their conception of the "family's" 
money. The point is that knowledge of contribution was not the same as 
access to independently disposable money - money which could be used as a 
resource in case of domestic dispute. 
In the next section I shall consider the relationship between methods of 
financial management, perceptions of different categories of money, and 
beliefs about gender appropriate spending responsibilities. 
3. PATTERNS OF FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
In this last section I shall try to establish the identity of those who 
were normally in charge of particular areas of financial responsibility. 
This is important because, as I observed in chapter 3, allocation of 
responsibility appeared to alter the probability and form of any associated 
decision-making dispute. In addition, I need to explore the inter- 
relationship between particular methods of financial management, 
definitions of allocative categories, and associated expectations of 
financial responsibility, so as to complete analysis of the triangle of 
inter-relationships outlined in the introduction to this chapter. So, the 
task is to establish who was in charge of which type of financial related 
decision-making and, at the same time, to explore the relationship between 
formal methods of financial management and the actual allocation and 
delegation of financial responsibilities. In each of the next four sub- 
sections I shall review the ways in which those who had a) joint accounts, 
b) separate accounts, c) "taken from" systems of housekeeping and d) "given 
to" systems of housekeeping made decisions about the overall state of the 
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family's financial position and about routine expenditure on leisure, food, 
clothing and bills. In combination these accounts provide a picture of 
the relationship between patterns of responsibility (and delegated 
responsibility) and overall methods of financial management, as well as a 
map of the decision-making issues which were typically bracketed together 
and defined as the responsibility of either husband or wife. 
Patterns of financial responsibility described by those who had a joint 
account 
In practice it proved to be difficult to "share" the management of a joint 
account. If husband and wife were to take equal charge of financial 
decision-making they would have to monitor every detail of the others' 
spending. All concluded (or discovered) (20) that this was impractical, and 
so either adopted a less than equal arrangement in which one was appointed 
"manager", or agreed to settle for an imprecise system in which neither 
really knew how the joint account stood at any one moment. In practice, 
most presumed from the start that the husband would have overall 
responsibility for monitoring the bank account, or, at least for checking 
bank statements and for making the necessary decisions. 
"Well all the money goes into a joint account but most of it is his 
and I only put in peanuts. I like being treated as a female and the 
man writes the cheques and pays the bills and so on.... I haven't done 
that for so long I wouldn't know how to do it now.. so its nice not 
having to do that, it's one of the luxuries of being female I think. " 
[H1, pre-school age] 
Respondents who had taken charge of this job themselves usually set out to 
justify what they saw to be their deviant arrangement on the grounds that 
they happened to be better financial managers than their husbands. 
"I tend to deal with that sort of thing, er Rowntrees [where she 
works] have a bank and also I just like keeping little books and 
things like that. So if you look in my purse, there is about £50 
there and if you look in his pockets there is about 50p. Somebody 
said don't you find it difficult to keep track of it all and the 
reason it isn't is because it isn't really like a joint account. It 
is like both salaries into a bigger account which I control. I'm not 
cruel honest it sounds awful doesn't it, it's easier, it works that 
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way. Although we've each got a cheque book I must get through one 
about every month and he must get through one about every 3 years. If 
he is buying something like clothes on his own then that is the only 
occasion when I don't write a cheque so I mean then I have to remember 
so that I put it in the book. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
Joint account managers of either gender had to rely on their partner to 
provide details of independent spending. This was easy if the couple 
agreed that the "non manager" would draw out a fixed sum of money per week 
or per month, as in the case quoted below. 
"We worked out that I could take about £40 out of the bank each week 
and that would do petrol and food. Mike watches what the bank balance 
is doing fairly closely and I leave that to him and er he'll say you 
know look we've got to sort of, the bank balance is ... don't get any 
extras, and so er stick to the don't get carried away with those sort 
of things just get the food... but its not rigid er you know I think we 
are lucky in that we don't have to have it absolutely that rigid. " 
[H1, pre-school age] 
In these cases the "non-manager" could be (and often was) quite unaware of 
the overall state of the family's financial situation. In comparision, 
those who used the joint account more flexibly had to exchange information 
about their independent use. In these circumstances financial knowledge 
was more evenly distributed, though possibly inaccurate. Several 
respondents only knew how much money they had when they got a bank 
statement. 
"Oh yes well Brian usually pays all the bills and everything like that 
you know he pays all the bills you know er he does all that I don't 
usually er he usually keeps more of a track of it than me but I mean 
we both more or less know what everything is" 
[H1,16+] 
Each arrangement (sole manager or joint muddle) produced quite different 
patterns of financial knowledge and so potentially worked to the advantage 
of one party and to the cost of the other. Not surprisingly, patterns of 
bill-paying responsibility related to patterns of overall responsibility 
for the joint account. Those who simply drew out £x per week usually 
presumed that the account "manager" would make sure that the bills had been 
paid. In both the examples quoted below the wives "paid" the bills. 
However, in the second case, that was defined as an administrative rather 
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than a financial responsibility. 
"I tend to pay all the bills .. being a secretary I suppose you've a 
tidy mind I go through the letter rack every so often and if I spot a 
bill I pay it, then I file all the stuff away. I've always done that 
so I suppose I always get lumbered with it... I tried to get him to pay 
a bill one week, it took him weeks to pay it, we got a red letter so I 
thought no I'll do it. I mean he could do it quite easily but he 
needs reminding a lot so its easier to do it yourself, then I know 
what needs paying and what we've got in the account so it is more 
convenient really. " 
[H1, no children, older] 
"Well most often I do that just because I've got a bit more time . He 
will just say at breakfast '0h look there's a gas bill', or something, 
and leave it on the top and in the next day or two I'll do it so that 
we don't get cut off or anything... it isn't really official policy. 
We don't work on rules and regulations and official policies at all, 
we would both hate that... my parents are exactly the same, mummy just 
does the same as me, she tends to write the bills and so on because 
he's too busy and we are the same. But that is just well, I don't 
always know how much we have got in the account so in that sense Mike 
keeps a check on how much we are spending" 
[H1, pre-school age] 
Those who used their account more flexibly claimed that either husband or 
wife paid the bills as they arrived or as was most convenient. Yet in even 
these cases wives tended to take responsibility for the associated 
administrative work (posting, delivering etc. ) though it was not always 
their job to ensure that the bill had been paid. Those who had joint 
accounts presumed, like the rest of the sample, that the wife would take 
charge of the food shopping. However, practices of delegation clearly 
reflected respondents' styles of accounting. Those wives who drew out a 
regular and fixed sum very rarely asked their husbands to do the shopping, 
for, if they had done so, they would have upset the notional budgeting 
system. In comparison, those who expected to use a joint account as 
required were free to send their husbands off to buy food. After all, he 
would use the same kind of money (ie. "un-earmarked" money from the joint 
account) as they would have done. "Joint account" respondents also 
expected to buy their own clothes, clothes for their children, and 
sometimes for their husbands. Not surprisingly, those who took out a fixed 
sum of "joint" money were more likely to discuss such purchases than those 
who drew upon the account as required. Whatever the level of discussion, 
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all "joint account" wives expected to take charge of decisions about food 
and clothes shopping. This is curious for, in principle at least, the 
joint account system imposed no formal financial limit on the range of 
possible shopping strategies. It seems, therefore, that the resulting 
practices reflected respondent's common expectations of gender appropriate 
responsibility rather than any strictly financial limitation. Much the 
same could be said of described methods of paying for meals and drinks. If 
all the money was "our money" and if the account was genuinely "joint", 
then there was no purely financial reason why the husband should pay on 
these occasions. However, nearly all respondents expected that their 
husband would buy them drinks and would pay the bill if they went out for a 
meal. Indeed, most concluded that they were only "taken out" if they 
were being paid for. This was a problem for all those who argued that 
their joint account reflected their "shared" approach to family finance, 
but one which was most awkward for those women who managed the joint 
account themselves. If these respondents were to be taken out they had to 
hand over the money or write the cheque and still pretend that they were 
being paid for. Most resolved this problem by giving their husband joint 
money in advance in order that he could then appear to pay. 
"We've got into the habit I'm ashamed to say of him buying the drinks 
in pubs so what happens is .. before we go in 'have you got any money? 
because I haven't any'... so I give him some money and he goes and buys 
drinks. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
Those who normally expected to use a joint account for all routine 
purchases were also obliged to find a way of operating as if their husband 
paid. The simplest solution was for the husband to write the cheque, or as 
in the previous example, to actually hand over the money. 
"If we go out for drinks he buys drinks or meals or whatever... I 
always have money in my pocket... I wouldn't buy drinks, no, no, not if 
he is with me. No. He goes and gets it. Well, he is a great big tall 
bloke so he gets to the bar quicker. Also I suppose really there is 
.. it's a bit old fashioned but if I'm out with a man, well he can go 
and get drinks and things like that, why should I, I'll go and sit 
down and have a nice treat and be waited on, but obviously if I'm with 
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the girls then I'll get a round of drinks. " 
[H2, school age] 
"If we go out for a meal he will write the cheque... its silly really 
but we've always done that. He takes me out and writes the cheque. I 
mean we are still.. er how shall I put it ... there's a tinge of I must 
let the man do it if you follow me. " 
(H1, pre-school age] 
Interestingly, those who regularly drew out what was, in effect, a sum of 
housekeeping money had much less trouble pretending that the joint account 
contained what was "really" their husband's money. After all, he managed 
the account and he was the main breadwinner. Though these financial 
details were important it seems that some could still pretend to be "taken 
out" even when the formal financial arrangements were "wrong". In this 
case, for example, the wife explains that the rituals of going out, 
ordering the meal etc., outweighed the cheque writing problem. 
"There are occasions when we go out and we are not planning on eating 
out. I always have my purse with me and he won't always have his 
wallet.. so it depends who has their cheque card with them. So there 
are occasions when we'll go out and I'll pay, well I'll write the 
cheque because I've got the cheque card, but for the most part going 
out socially, he has the cash. I hate going to the bar so I never, 
he'll do that. Its nice to feel, to think well, he'll handle that so 
I can sit back and relax a bit more, even if he's not got the cheque 
card he gets the meal and everything... its not as if I'm not being 
taken out. " 
[H1, pre-school age] 
Whatever the detail of joint account management, this method theoretically 
allowed either husband or wife to take charge of a wide range of different 
spending decisions. In practice, beliefs about gender appropriate 
behaviour simplified the range of what were seen to be practical 
allocations of responsibility for particular types of spending. As we have 
seen, such gender specific prescriptions of proper behaviour combined 
rather awkwardly with the theme of sharing which often accompanied 
descriptions of the family's finances provided by those who had a joint 
account. Nonetheless, few deviated from what were seen to be normal 
patterns of responsibility. 
Finally, it is important to note that the wife's own income (if any) made 
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no apparent difference to the way in which the couple made their financial 
decisions, or to the way in which they allocated particular spending 
responsibilities. 
Patterns of financial responsibility described by those who had separate 
accounts 
All those who had what they saw as their own account expected to be 
responsible for its overall management. In these circumstances there was 
no such thing as the "family's money" and hence no need to make decisions 
about its use. Those who were employed simply took care of their own money 
and were often unaware of the state of the other's account, as in the case 
quoted below. 
"He can save money without me knowing because he is taking care of the 
food and the car and the petrol he could either spend or save the 
rest" [H1, no children, younger] 
While husbands of non-working respondents were invariably in charge of most 
aspects of the family's finances, they played no part in decisions about 
the use of their wives' allowances. In these circumstances, husband and 
wife had to depend on each other for information about their respective 
accounts. The following example illustrates this position. 
"We have our own current accounts, and he has a standing order which 
pays housekeeping into me and I just draw out what I want. If I get 
short I just tell him and he gives me some more.. I haven't a clue how 
much money we've got really I just, I mean if I ask him he tells me 
but at the moment I haven't a clue because I haven't asked him for a 
bit ... he sometimes gets worried. He came to me in great horror last 
year and said 'we've only saved this this year, what can we do about 
it, ... I said 'well there isn't a lot unless you want to cut down your 
standard of living you know really. "' 
[H1, no children, older] 
In effect, the separate allowance system, like all other separate account 
methods, worked such that neither party knew precisely how much the other 
had at any one moment. Because A had no formal need to know about the 
state of B's account, exchange of information was optional. Only those 
working respondents who expected to pay bills with money from whichever 
happened to be the "fullest" account exchanged financial information on any 
kind of regular basis. Even so, each was still in charge of what was 
337 
clearly defined as their own money, as illustrated in the following 
example. 
"Whoever's got the money in their account pays the bill er as it turns 
up, or we wait till we get a red letter and by then usually a pay day 
has gone past. No, we don't have any secrets about money or anything. 
We share it mainly. " 
[H2, school age] 
Most employed respondents had established what they believed to be a just, 
practical, and gender appropriate method of allocating the family's bill 
paying responsibilities. In nearly all cases this turned out to mean that 
the husband paid what were seen as "serious and important" bills leaving 
the wife with irregular and "less important" ones. The wife's earnings 
were therefore typically classed as "extra" whatever the sums involved. 
Those who deviated from this "normal" arrangement explained that in their 
case it happened to be more convenient if the husband paid what would 
usually be expected to be the "wife's" bills. This view is illustrated 
below. 
"Chris buys the food. There is a Sainsburys in Leeds so he does the 
shopping during a lunchtime or after work. I think our situation is 
slightly unusual too in that I earn more money than he does and in 
that way I probably take more responsibility for our bills than most 
women would. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
Not surprisingly, those who had an "allowance" expected their husband to 
take charge of the family's bills. Though they might pay the milkman they 
would never pay the electricity bill. The following quotations illustrate 
the areas of expenditure for which husband and wife were expected to be 
responsible. 
"It [the allowance] covers generally, it doesn't cover er the bills if 
I bulk buy well it probably does it is hard to say but if because as I 
say if I'm short er no probably I do need extra if I'm bulk buying 
meat but it covers everything else... I might buy a half dozen 
raspberry canes but I mean if we wanted a lawn mower it wouldn't you 
know anything big bills I mean I don't pay for anything like the gas 
or electricity. " 
[H1, no children, older] 
"I just buy what we need. He usually gives me a cheque every month 
and I just you know spend it on whatever you know on food just things 
that we need in the house and well sort of food and clothes for myself 
and Robin [child]. " 
[H1, pre-school age] 
Whatever else they were used for, allowances were designed to cover the 
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food bill and were given to the wife in order that she could do this type 
of shopping. Working wives also expected to do the food shopping and, 
depending on how much they earned, expected to count the food bill as one 
of their expenses (22). Interestingly, very few of those with separate 
accounts used "their" money (ie. that which was in their account) to buy 
important (23) clothes for their husband. While the wife was expected to 
be a better clothes buyer and so expected to accompany her husband and to 
give advice on the selection of important items, he was ultimately expected 
to buy his own clothes with his own money. 
"He has to be persuaded to spend a lot on his clothes you know perhaps 
if he was looking at two sweaters he would go for the cheaper one of 
the two and I'd persuade him to have the other because it was better 
really and would probably last him longer.. but Oh yes he buys his own 
things-sometimes I have to tell him that he needs some new shirts, or 
something like that but he gets it all himself. " 
[H1,16+] 
In theory, those who had their own accounts could choose to pay their way 
when they went out for a drink or a meal. However, the few who took up 
this option were well aware of the social complications associated with 
this unusual practice. 
"I'll get a drink and then he will get a drink unless I've run out of 
cash in which case he will get them both... er when we go out with our 
friends round the corner er the chaps usually pay for the drinks but 
the girl sort of she has got a little kid so she wouldn't be expected 
to anyway. If I've got enough money I will sort of buy our round but 
its strange though I mean when you go out with couples sometimes even 
though the girl is working she won't er buy a drink so if she doesn't 
then I don't but on the other hand if I'm sort of out and there is a 
woman who sort of may earn a lot more than me if she is buying a round 
I'm blowed if I'm going to be impoverished I have to buy a round as 
well even if I have to starve the next day. " 
[H2, no children, younger] 
In practice, most expected to be taken out even if they did have their own 
income and, of course, those who were full-time housewives had "no choice" 
about the matter. Whatever the normal or chosen practice it was, in 
principle, possible for husband or wife to take charge of any discrete area 
of domestic expenditure. Possible allocations of responsibility were 
therefore only limited by differences in the actual amounts of money 
"owned" or earned by husband and wife. The fact that described patterns of 
responsibility were so uniform again reflects the prevalence of particular 
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notions of "normal" financial behaviour. In the separate account context, 
the wife's income (if any) had a more evident impact on the family's 
financial arrangements than it did in the joint account contexts described 
above. Although those women who had their own income had to decide how to 
use that money, those decisions were evidently informed by a common 
conception of the husband as breadwinner and hence of the wife's earnings 
as extra (whatever the sums involved). 
Patterns of financial responsibility described by those who adopted a 
"taken from" system of housekeeping 
Respondents who took their housekeeping out of the total family income were 
expected to take charge of all financial matters. It was their job to run 
the house on their family's behalf (24). This arrangement inevitably 
generated an inequality of knowledge and expertise. In practice only the 
wife knew how to run the household. While the husband might have taken a 
passing interest, and while he was typically seen to have the right to 
enquire about the way in which "his" money was spent, (as in the cases 
described below), none went as far as interfering with what was clearly 
defined as the wife's responsibility. 
"I had to put it [housekeeping] up when David [son] started going on 
to solid food and I found that it was costing me between three and 
four pounds extra a week so I had to put more in [into the 
housekeeping purse]. He [husband] is interested. You know, he is 
careful, when I told him that I'd had to put... you know when I said to 
him 10h I've got to have some more for the housekeeping' he says '0h 
why is that? ' and I told him and he said '0h that's fine'. He is very 
interested like that ... I write cheques out for the bills now, we put 
the bill money in the bank and I write out cheques when they come, and 
he is interested in how much they are. I keep a book so that any time 
he wants to have a look he can see exactly what I've paid out and how 
much we've got in the bank. " 
[H2, pre-school age] 
"Taken from" housekeepers faced a more or less difficult task depending on 
the "tightness" of the family budget. As Land notes "to be a 'good 
manager' on a small income requires an inexhaustible supply of self- 
discipline' (Land, 1969, p61). Although none of my respondents were as 
340 
poor as those described by Land, many observed that they had to vary actual 
sums of "housekeeping" (ie. food money) from week to week so as to fit 
around other immovable expenses (25). While there was some room for 
latitude in relation to different types of expenditure, none were prepared 
to delegate any of the associated decision-making. So, if they were to 
send their husband out shopping, these housekeeping wives would give 
precise instructions and would provide the relevant sum of money, as 
illustrated in the next example. 
he: "What about some money for town ?" 
she: "I thought you'd got enough I can give it you when you come back" 
he: "No I've only £3, that won't buy what you want" 
[H3,16+] 
The detail of buying practices varied depending on the structure of the 
housekeeping system and on the nature of real or imaginary allocative 
categories. For example, some husbands were expected to buy all their 
clothes with what was labelled their "pocket money". 
"No he gets his own, he has his football money which he uses for that 
you know, he likes clothes, he is like me, he likes his clothes" 
[H3, pre-school age] 
Others got less pocket money and were expected to draw upon a specific 
clothes allowance when they needed to buy, say, a new shirt. As the 
following example illustrates, different kinds of clothes (the wife's, the 
husband's, major items, minor items, etc. ) were often paid for with money 
from different "tins". 
"Well what I try to do is I let I have a certain amount of what I keep 
for my pocket money. It [her clothes] all comes out of that money and 
I try to save a little bit of that each week for clothes and he has 
his Burton so it just works out roughly about the same... We usually 
go down together and choose because he doesn't like going on his own 
and choosing suits or anything like that and of course being in an 
office he has to wear better clothes than you would if you were just 
doing ordinary work... I usually buy his shirts for him and underwear 
that type of thing because anybody can buy that you know, that just 
comes out of the housekeeping I mean we usually .. I might take a bit 
extra out for that sort of thing. " 
[H2, no children, older] 
The same variety was evident in relation to sources of money for "going 
out". Some respondents had entertainments allowances, others did not. 
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However, whatever the budgeting arrangements, all expected that the husband 
should pay "for" his wife when they went out together. A few, like those 
who managed the family's joint account, argued that what was really "our" 
money was temporarily converted to "his" money for the evening. Others, 
especially those who did not work, observed that they were merely giving 
back what had been given to them in the first place. 
"Well the money would come out of our money together, what we both 
earn. I keep some separate for drinks and things like that. He would 
pay he would go to the bar and buy the drinks. Well he doesn't like 
the idea of me going to the bar to pay so he gets it. I suppose if a 
man takes his wife out its up to him to provide the drinks really 
isn't it. Men always go and buy the drinks. I don't like going to 
the bar to be quite honest. I don't think it is a woman's place to go 
to a bar... He'd pay for meals but I mean it isn't as if it makes any 
difference really its all our money you know so. " 
[H2, pre-school age] 
"Well Kevin would have the money. He gives it all to me and I put it 
away on a Thursday and Kevin would have it to go out and he'd sort of 
pay [for] me all night. Kevin always pays for me that's the way we've 
always done it. It is better that way I think. It looks stupid for a 
bloke to go into a pub and get money off the woman you know what I 
mean I'd rather him have the money and be manly you know what I mean. " 
[H3, no children, younger] 
In conclusion, then, the "taken from" housekeepers controlled all detailed 
decision-making about the family's method of financial management and were 
in charge of all areas of spending except those associated with "going 
out". This division of financial responsibility was the same whether or 
not the wife went out to work. 
Patterns of financial responsibility described by those who adopted a 
"given to" system of housekeeping 
In this context the husband was invariably responsible for the family's 
overall financial position. Patterns of financial knowledge reflected this 
division of responsibility. Although wives who had their own income knew 
of the fate of their wages, the fact of their earning had no necessary 
impact on the established pattern of knowledge and ignorance. Most, 
including the respondent quoted below, still did not know what part their 
income played in relation to the family's overall financial circumstances. 
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"The whole of my wages are paid into the bank, I try to save £10 each 
month for our holidays. He is very careful with money. He is a true 
Yorkshire man. All the years we've been married I've never known how 
much he's earned. He saves too, he, he must have some saved. Well 
yes he's always got some tucked away. You can't buy a new carpet 
without money can you? " 
[H2, school age] 
So, the husband was formally responsible for managing the family's finances 
and was expected to pay all the bills. Meanwhile, the wife was expected to 
take charge of food shopping, using her housekeeping money to cover this 
and, perhaps, a few other expenses. Interestingly, this type of 
housekeeping, like the money earned by or given to those who had separate 
accounts, was rarely expected to cover the cost of such items as husband's 
jackets, suits, or trousers. While socks and underwear might be counted as 
housekeeping expenses, few "given to" respondents also bought trousers and 
jackets. 
"Yes well I buy my own and I buy them for Helen and I used to buy them 
for him as well. I'm not so daft now I don't he has to buy his own, 
he's [husband] into a punk rocker phase anyway at the moment and so he 
can buy his own because I don't like them. I buy all the boring 
things like socks and underwear still, but that doesn't add up to 
much. " 
[H1, school age] 
In the "given to" context, shopping could only be delegated if the wife 
handed back some of the designated housekeeping or if the husband agreed to 
pay with what was formally "his" money. As I shall suggest in the next 
chapter, this appeared to limit the occasions on which husbands helped out. 
The "given to" system of housekeeping, then, specified the identity of 
proper shoppers and bill payers. Any deviation from those normal roles was 
reported to be awkward, "wrong" or uncomfortable. Respondents only had 
access to the type of money which they would need to fulfil their role as 
housekeeper and their husband's money was just as rigidly earmarked. In 
this context the method of financial management in effect determined (and 
was, of course, determined by) the spending behaviour of both husband and 
wife. 
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Methods of financial management and allocation of financial 
responsibilities 
In this section I have described ways in which respondents allocated 
responsibility for particular types of spending and for management of the 
family's finances. In so doing I have tried to define some of the inter- 
relations between methods of financial management and allocation of 
financial responsibilities. Each of the four key methods, joint and 
separate accounts and "taken from" or "given to" styles of housekeeping, 
sets different limits to the range of possible ways in which spending 
responsibilities can be divided. Though the detail of the resulting 
patterns of responsibility varied, all four methods allowed respondents to 
share out their money-related obligations with reference to what was a 
remarkably consistent vision of gender appropriate behaviour. In all 
cases, for example, wives did the food and most of the clothes shopping and 
so had access to the relevant category of money. Similarly, all expected 
the husband to be the main breadwinner and expected to use his wage in such 
a way as to make that role evident. In this context the wife's own income 
(if any) was seen and used as if it were "extra". In conclusion to this 
chapter I want to suggest that common definitions of "normal" and "proper" 
behaviour had greater impact on every-day financial decision-making than 
either formal methods of financial management or even individual income. 
To be responsible for a particular type of spending was to be able to make 
associated decisions without fear of interference or criticism provided 
that the responsible person behaved "appropriately". Whoever was 
responsible for buying food or shirts or socks or for paying the gas or 
electricity bill was able to control the pattern of spending and saving in 
that area. As I have shown, patterns of responsibility for particular 
types of expenditure were much the same whatever the method of financial 
management. Very broadly, wives bought food and clothes while husbands 
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paid the major bills and handed over the money when the couple went out for 
a meal. This was so whether or not the wife went out to work. In effect 
this meant that respondents were able to determine the use of much larger 
sums of money than those which they actually earned. Expectations of proper 
family behaviour thus combined to produce a situation in which wives were 
able to routinely determine the outcome of a broader range of spending 
decisions than their husband, whatever the formal method of financial 
management. As I observed in Section 2, this did not necessarily mean that 
respondents had access to what they saw as independently disposable cash 
though it did give them a degree of "invisible" influence over many aspects 
of the family's lifestyle and, perhaps more important, immediate access to 
a body of information about the areas of spending or financial management 
under their control. The case, then, is that formal methods of financial 
management made remarkably little difference to the ways in which 
respondents actually allocated spending responsibilities. The literature 
which sets out to document formal methods of money management fails to 
engage with the complexities of use and so overlooks similarities in the 
everyday patterns of financial responsibility (Pahl, 1983; Stamp, 1985). 
Access to what could be used as "own" money appeared to depend on the 
detail of the couple's method of financial management, on the way in which 
they or they and their husband were paid, on their perception of 
associated allocative categories and, to a lesser extent, on their 
knowledge of the significance of their own financial contribution (if any). 
In comparison, generalised definitions of "own money" in the sense of "own 
contribution" varied in relation to such factors as the scale of the 
individual's actual income, and hence their position of relative financial 
dependence or independence, and on the way in which they were paid (if at 
all). Working wives felt themselves to have rather more of their "own" 
money than those who had no income, although immediate access to financial 
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resources depended as much on the method of financial management as on 
actual earnings. In other words, it was important to distinguish between 
"own" money in the sense of cash available for personal use, and "own" 
money in the sense of a generalised knowledge of contribution. Few of 
those who have considered domestic power and family finance have made this 
distinction. 
Although formal methods of financial management ordered individual access 
to immediately disposable cash, that ordering had effect in a world already 
structured by expectations of legitimate earning and spending roles. Again 
it seems that literature has concentrated on formal methods of financial 
management without sufficient understanding of the implications of those 
patterns or of their location in a more complex world of taken-for-granted 
expectation. Furthermore, it was clear that earning did not, in itself, 
ensure that respondents had what they could use or define as their "own" 
money. Accordingly, the observer cannot presume that patterns of financial 
advantage correspond to patterns of earning or to methods of financial 
management. 
I am not in a position to tell whether day-to-day control of domestic 
expenditure was in fact more or less of an "advantage" than access to 
independent spending money. Similarly, I cannot determine the degree to 
which respondents systematically "won" or "lost" particular money-related 
disputes because of, or despite, their financial responsibilities and so 
cannot conclude that, for example, respondents were systematically 
disadvantaged by their systems of financial management. However, I can 
observe that, in combination, methods of financial management, associated 
perceptions of different categories of money, and expectations of gender 
appropriate spending responsibility, ordered the outcome of a wide range of 
clear cut family decisions and the form of many domestic routines. 
Decisions about buying furniture, about holiday and leisure expenditure, 
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and about family size, were all informed by the family's material position 
and by its method of financial management. As I shall discuss in the next 
chapter, allocation of jobs such as "the shopping", as well as the nature 
of that shopping role also depended on the family's method of financial 
management. Yet it was not as if the course of all these other choices 
about expenditure were simply structured by a "pre-existing" method of 
management. For those methods were in turn "devised" with reference to a 
notion of the proper spending and saving roles of both husband and wife. 
It is therefore difficult to fully distinguish these themes from those 
which I shall consider in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 9: NOTES 
1. See chapter 1. 
2. This view is much like that presented by Blau (1964) and Emerson 
(1962). This account of resources is discussed in chapter 1. 
3. For example, Stamp writes: "If the wife is earning she is likely to be 
able to treat her income as her personal spending money. She will probably 
have greater influence on decisions in the family" (Stamp, 1985) 
4. Ayers writes: "In controlling most domestic activities, wives gained an 
autonomous sphere of power" (Ayers, 1986, p211) 
5. Ayers also writes: "we wish to argue that for men, clear elements of 
self interest operated in perpetuating this myth of what constituted a good 
wife and in avoiding involvement with household affairs" (Ayers, 1986, 
p201). Pahl too notes that "The wife in the whole wage system household 
has the appearance of holding power, but this may be largely illusory". In 
contrast to Ayers, Pahl goes on to explain that "The illusion ... is based 
on the fact that the houshold is ultimately an important, a power-full 
location: either power is located elsewhere, in the public sphere or, 
though it is located in some households in the society, it is not located 
in those particular households because of their inferior position in the 
overall class system" (Pahl, 1983). 
6. As Pahl writes: "traditional economics on the other hand, has construed 
the household as a black box, within which the resources acquired by 
individuals are assumed to be shared amongst household members" (Pahl, 
1983, p238) 
7. It is easy to conflate the two issues as formal methods of financial 
management evidently inform both the allocation of financial 
responsibilities and the distribution of money as a resource. 
8. See notes 4 and 5 above. 
9. As I observed in chapter 3, an allocation of responsibility serves to 
demarcate an area of normally unproblematic decision-making. Whoever is 
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responsible is accorded the right to make certain decisions. In addition, 
disputes, should they arise, are then informed by a range of expectations 
and beliefs about the proper fulfilment of domestic obligation. 
10. Very little of the relevant literature goes on to consider the ways in 
which methods of financial management are actually used. For example, 
Pahl, Stamp and others set out to categorise different methods of 
management without reference to the ways in which those methods actually 
informed the every-day use and perception of different categories of money 
or the outcome of routine decisions about expenditure. However, as Comer, 
and Hunt observe, felt financial dependence cannot be equated with formal' ,. 
financial dependence. Similarly, to estabalish that the wife has formal 
access to the family's money is not to establish "that this freedom is 
exercised in practice" (Hunt, 1980, P38). For my purposes it is important 
to recognise that, say, a joint account could be used in any number of 
different ways and that joint account money could be mentally as well as 
"really" earmarked for particular sorts of expenditure. 
11. The triangular form of this diagram is the result of much conversation 
with Stuart Sutcliffe. 
12. Though I will consider respondent's perceptions of joint account money 
in the next section it is important to observe that these formal 
arrangements could turn out to have very different practical implications. 
To give just one example, some respondents used the joint account for what 
was, in effect, housekeeping money, while others drew upon it as 
"required". 
13. Interestingly, a couple of older socially mobile H1 respondents had 
had experience of other methods of financial management. In this case, for 
example, the respondent changed from a "taken from" system of housekeeping 
to a joint account at the point when the family had "enough money". 
"I mean when I first started I had tins, rent, rates, water, 
newspapers, electricity, gas.... we changed, I don't know when, when we 
had more money I suppose, . 
that's when I got rid of my tins, Oh yes 
things were very tight. I mean we still have a glucose tin with a 
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hole in the top. It was to keep threepenny bits in to pay for our 
train fares to go for our holiday. I can't remember when I got rid of 
the tins .. I suppose when I started work. No we don't save up as 
such. Not now. It all goes into the bank and we get what we want, 
what we can afford. " 
(H1,16+] 
14. Mirowsky and others have noted the critical role of "allocative 
categories", in particular, in relation to the use and perception of the 
wife's income. "Although the money goes into a common pool, its use is 
ascribed to a limited purpose. As a result, the wife's earnings may not be 
treated as equally relevant when the equity of marital power is being 
judged" (Mirowsky, 1985, p590) 
15. Ideally I would have liked to document the husband's as well as the 
wife's perceptions of the family's allocative categories, and so to have 
identified what the husbands saw as "their" money. However, given that all 
my respondents were wives, I was unable to collect the necessary 
information. 
16. As Shurmer writes "Of course, the price should be concealed... even 
when the price of a commodity is standardised we remove the tag" (Shurmer, 
1971, p12142). 
17. There is a limited but interesting literature on gift giving. See, for 
example Caplow (1982) on kin networks and christmas presents, Mauss (1970) 
on the gift, Davis (1972) on the relationship between formal and informal 
gift economies, Sehwarts (1967) on the social psychology of the gift and 
Bell and Newby (1976) on the relationship between deference and gift 
giving. 
18. It is interesting to note that those who were "given" housekeeping and 
who did not work were in much the same form of financially dependent 
position as those housewives who depended on an allowance. However, only 
the former group felt able to "earn" their "own" money by careful 
management of the housekeeping. Because the general allowance was destined 
to cover a broader range of expenses than the more specific housekeeping, 
it was more difficult to evaluate the consequences of thrifty management 
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and so more difficult to estimate the amount "saved" and hence the amount 
which the wife could define as her legitimate reward. 
19. Both husband and wife presumed that the allotted housekeeping money 
would more or less exactly cover the costs of the weeks shopping. If the 
wife was able to do the shopping for less she was expected to keep what was 
left as a reward for her efficiency. 
he: "She gets a set house-keeping allowance and if she can do her 
housekeeping under that then she can keep the rest. " 
she: "Its like my wage coming in only it comes from him. " 
[H3, pre-school age] 
The wife's chances of accumulating housekeeping leftovers in this way 
varied depending on the size of her housekeeping allowance and on the 
catering standards which she was expected to maintain. Though both were 
difficult to define, some respondents, especially those without any other 
source of "their own" money, observed that they cut back on food as a way 
of "earning" spare cash. 
"If I want anything other than run of the mill I've got to ask for it 
which goes against the grain. If I want something new, well it 
depends how much it is, if it was something up to £30 I would just pay 
for it out the house-keeping and we'd have to have mince all week 
which er to be fair .. he doesn't moan about what he gets but I don't 
like eating that sort of thing everyday... but if I want something 
I'll just do that. I don't do it every week.. it is very rare that I 
want more than £30. " 
[H2, school age] 
20. A couple of joint account respondents had been forced to review their 
method of financial planning having found that they were unable to "share" 
this responsibility and yet retain control over their financial affairs. 
"Thats why everything went wrong. Neither of us.. we both thought the 
other one was ... he presumed instantly that I was [responsible] and I 
presumed he was and nobody was so the system collapsed. It was a 
complete shambles. It is funny really. He thought I was 
[responsible] and I thought he was and neither of us had ever 
positively said '0h is everything alright with you'. We had both got 
enough money. We ought to have sorted it out really but we didn't. 
You get married to be half a partnership only we both thought we were 
the other half. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
22. Those few who worked but who did not earn enough to pay for all the 
shopping were consequently in a curious position. They believed that they 
351 
should be in charge of that type of expenditure and yet did not have access 
to enough of the right "type" of money. . 
There were two described solutions 
to this problem. In a couple of cases the husband paid the "major" 
supermarket bill while the wife used her income to cover all other "minor" 
day-to-day food related expenses. Alternatively, husband and wife 
literally split the bill. The following quotations illustrate both 
strategies. 
"We both do er he will often go to the supermarket and pay by cheque. 
Say we buy just a few things which add up to £10 or £15 then I will 
just buy that but if I have what I call a good shop ... I'm going this 
week to stock up on things then he might come along and write a cheque 
for £30 or £40" 
[H1,16+] 
"Er Mike writes a cheque and I give him half out of the cash that I've 
got in my purse. Fresh stuff we buy as we need it. If I am cooking 
then I will go into town at lunchtime and get what I need and if he is 
cooking then he might tell me what he wants and give me the money for 
it and I'll go and get it or if he is out he will get it himself. " 
[H2, no children, younger] 
23. Most respondents distinguished between important and insignificant 
types of clothing. Underwear, shirts, sometimes shoes and sometimes 
trousers fell into the insignificant category and were often bought by the 
wife, either with housekeeping money, or, in this context, with money from 
her allowance. In comparison, the husband was typically involved with the 
selection and purchase of "important" items like jackets, suits, sometimes 
trousers and sometimes shirts. 
"I buy shirts and jumpers and socks and pants and I buy the occasional 
pair of trousers but he doesn't like, he is very fussy about his 
trousers he is a bit old fashioned like that er and he buys his own 
jackets of course and shoes I don't do that but the other things I 
buy. " 
[H1,16+] 
24. Although this meant that the wives were in command of all routine 
decision-making it did not necessarily mean that they knew exactly how much 
their husband earned. Some expected to be given an un-opened pay packet 
while others received most but not all of their husband's wage. 
25. For example, this respondent was obliged to budget very carefully. 
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"I set myself a budget each week and then I know if I've used it I've 
got everything stocked up and everything in.... there are some things 
you can't cut down on, like say washing powder like washing powder 
that I use has jumped from 75p to nearly £1 and thats just within the 
last what 18 months and you know you can't really cut that out because 
it is the only soap powder I can use for them [children] because they 
have got exczema and its the only soap powder I find that agrees with 
their skin so I can't really take short cuts there but I can usually 
manage it from one week to the next. If I've got a big bill coming up 
then I try to stock up a bit earlier so I've not so much to get. " 
[H3, pre-school age] 
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CHAPTER 10 
HOUSEWORK AND CHILD-CARE 
In this chapter I shall consider respondents' accounts of domestic 
decision-making associated with the allocation, delegation and performance 
of tasks which could broadly be described as housework and child-care. It 
is important to note that I am not concerned with the allocation of 
domestic labour as a topic in its own right (1). Rather, I am only 
interested in the allocation of housework in as far as that allocation is 
also an allocation of authority (2). As I observed in chapter 3, those who 
are responsible for particular types of domestic labour are 
characteristically expected to make all associated decisions without 
interference from the other. Accordingly, an allocation of responsibility 
is usually also an allocation of a limited area of authority. I am 
interested in authority and decision-making, and in debate about the 
allocation and delegation of domestic responsibilities, but not in the 
nature or volume of the associated labour. 
In practice, there was very little doubt about who should be responsible 
for each of the range of component jobs included under the headings of 
housework or child-care, and so little doubt about who should make the 
related decisions. For my purposes, then, questions about the actual 
allocation of domestic responsibilies were of minor concern: nearly all 
respondents believed that they had "no choice" about this issue. This 
chapter focuses on types of decision-making which were potentially 
debatable and attends to associated perceptions of choice and so to the 
contexts of those debates. Respondents believed that there was some room 
for choice, and so debate, about the delegation of domestic 
responsibilities (ie. about decisions to delegate the work and the 
associated decision-making) and about issues which lay on the margins of a 
clearly defined area of authority/responsibility, and which were for some 
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reason "visible" and so the subject of joint discussion. I shall consider 
respondents' accounts of their shopping, cooking, cleaning, washing, 
decorating and child-care arrangements with a view to exploring first their 
definitions of the circumstances in which delegation would (or would not) 
be legitimate and, second, the nature and location of visible and so 
potentially debatable "borderline" decisons. This will allow me to 
describe the various contexts which ordered debate associated with choices 
about housework and child-care and which consequently structured the 
domestic worlds in which power was (or was not) exercised (3)" 
This decision-oriented strategy clearly differs from those adopted by 
feminist and other writers, and it is perhaps important to outline the 
range of alternative approaches taken towards the subjects of domestic 
inequality, power, housework and child-care so as to highlight the 
particular points of difference between my account and those found in the 
literature. Not surprisingly, these differences reflect what are 
essentially different conceptions of power. 
Consider, for example, the views of power which underlie what has come to 
be known as the domestic labour debate. Writers such as Gardiner, Benston, 
Fox and Malos take as their starting points first, the presumption that 
women are oppressed, second, the notion that that "women are oppressed in 
special ways when the dominant mode of production is capitalist" (Fox, 
1980, p12) and third, the idea that "the material conditions of women's 
household work are central to the determination of women's social position" 
(Fox, 1980, p9). In effect, their common task is that of explaining how 
women are exploited in the capitalist system and, in particular, of 
explaining the economic role of housework as part of that exploitative 
process. In this context, debate about women's real interests is as rare 
as debate about the status of the concept of power. As I observed in 
chapter 1, analyses which focus on "production and reproduction as the 
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material aspects of women's oppression" (Gardiner, p235,1980) variously 
imply that relations of production and reproduction are the product, or 
sometimes the cause, of relations of power (4). Either way the term 
"power" is taken-for-granted, as is the inequality which it is presumed to 
refer to. I do not want to get involved with the arguments and counter 
arguments of the domestic labour debate. My point is that there is little 
overlap between analyses of housework or child-care, which are orientated 
towards the project of explaining exploitation in the terms described 
above, and those which are informed by alternative accounts of power and/or 
inequality. 
While the analyses of housework provided by Gavron, Oakley, Hobson or Hunt 
also focus on housework as work, the emphasis here is on the experience of 
that work rather than on the relationship between that form of labour and 
an overall economic system. These writers examine everyday experience of 
what is presumed to be the oppressed position of the housewife (Hobson, 
1978; Gavron, 1966), emphasise the characteristics of housework as work and 
draw attention to what has been a relatively "invisible" topic (Oakley, 
1974). Such studies of housework are believed to relate to an analysis of 
women's oppression in one of the following ways. Some writers suggest that 
women are oppressed (in the domestic context) because it is they who are 
responsible for doing what is presented as an inherently unpleasant job 
(Hobson, 1978; Gavron, 1966). As Comer writes, "the housewife's most acute 
oppression is experienced in the work she performs" (Comer, 1974, p83). 
Others imply that the key "problem" is the low status of housework and so 
of those who do it (Oakley, 1974) (5). Those who take this argument a 
stage further go on to consider the relationships between housework, 
financial dependence and women's involvement in the labour market (Poliert, 
1981; Westwood, 1984) (6). 
In sum, then, feminist accounts of housework vary depending on the nature 
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of informing conceptions of the role of housework as a dimension of, or an 
explanation for women's oppression. These accounts in turn rest on 
different conceptions of both power and of the nature and "cause" of 
women's oppression (7). This chapter's anlaysis is informed by a rather 
different approach to the study of domestic power relations and so simply 
attends to respondents' accounts of decisions related to issues of 
housework and child-care. My aim is to document perceptions of choice and 
so contexts of decision-making described by different sections of the 
sample, but not to present any additional account of the experience of 
domestic labour or of the justice or otherwise of particular ways of 
dividing responsibility for housework or child-care. 
In detail, this chapter is divided into 3 sections. The first considers 
the kinds of decision-making associated with choices about such regular 
domestic tasks as shopping, cooking, cleaning and washing. The second 
examines the range of decisions related to such irregular and sometimes 
unpredictable jobs as household maintenance and decorating. Finally, the 
third section explores decision-making specifically associated with child- 
care obligations. In each of these sections I shall review respondents' 
beliefs and expectations about the possibility of delegating particular 
areas of domestic work and, where relevant, perceptions of choice 
associated with those few choices which were not automatically taken by the 
appropriate authoritative figure. 
1. DECISIONS ABOUT ROUTINE TYPES OF HOUSEWORK 
As noted earlier, my respondents expressed little doubt about the "proper" 
allocation of domestic responsibilities. Accordingly, all of them were "in 
charge" of the housework (8). However, before I begin discussion of 
specific choices associated with the component tasks of shopping, cooking, 
cleaning and laundry, it is important to observe that these sub-areas of 
domestic responsibility were not as neatly separable as the following 
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analysis might imply. Some decisions had immediate consequences for 
others. For example, decisions about what food to buy ordered subsequent 
choices about what to cook. Furthermore, respondents had to allocate their 
time such that they were able to fulfil all their domestic responsibilities 
according to schedule (9). Individual jobs were therefore slotted into 
elaborate "programmes", the structures of which varied from one housing 
section of the sample to another, and to a lesser extent, according to the 
wife's employed status. This is important for the resulting styles of 
housework had certain common implications for respondents' perceptions of 
component areas of decision-making. For example, those who had a rigid 
daily routine knew precisely how they would structure their washing, 
cleaning and cooking responsibilities, while those who adopted a more 
flexible strategy had to balance their time-table according to an immediate 
and variable set of personal or domestic priorities. Thus styles of work 
had general consequences in terms of respondents' daily routines and so 
influenced their perceptions of an "appropriate" standard of work and the 
possibility and likelihood of delegation (10). 
It should also be observed that different housing sections of the sample 
described characteristically different views of the "meaning" of housework 
and so of the significance of delegating particular component 
responsibilities. While these differences were more and less marked in 
relation to different "component" tasks, there appeared to be some 
systematic variation in overall approaches to "housework". In detail, of 
course, the nature of the choices associated with shopping, cooking 
cleaning and laundry varied considerably. I shall now consider decision- 
making practices related to each of these areas. 
Food shopping 
The range of shopping jobs and decisions which might have been delegated 
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varied depending on the wife's normal shopping habits, on the kinds of 
shops normally frequented, and on her approach to menu planning. As I shall 
show later, the nature of the shop (supermarket or otherwise) determined 
the nature of the work which might be delegated. Yet wherever they bought 
their food, His, H2s, and Has went about that task in characteristically 
different ways. For example, only a couple of His had what they defined as 
a "day" for shopping while, at the other extreme, nearly all the H3s stuck 
to a regular shopping routine. This was important, for the wife's food 
shopping strategy determined the practicality of delegating any of the 
associated decision making. For example, those who bought the same goods 
each week or each month never had to think about what they would choose. 
"I more or less get the same things each week because we stock the 
freezer up for pies and pasties and fish fingers and what not like 
that. Also, we've started getting a chicken and a turkey roll from 
Asda once a month and alternating it. We'd have beef, chicken, pork, 
and turkey roll for our Sunday dinner, and we've, we find it a bit 
cheaper that way. " 
[H3, no children, younger] 
In these cases (typically H3 or H2 rather than H1) there were simply no 
decisions to delegate. The wife always selected the same kinds of food and 
the family always ate the same sorts of meals. In comparision, those who 
decided what to buy just before they got to the shops, or while they were 
out shopping, faced an endless sequence of choices. In these circumstances 
there was some chance that a helping husband could directly influence the 
final outcome (11). A few respondents positively encouraged such 
involvement and felt that their husbands ought to take part in this 
decision-making process. 
"I do the planning which I find not easy.. What am I going to do for 
lunch tomorrow. What are we having for tomorrow night..? and I'll say 
'What do you feel like? ' '0h anything just anything, don't worry about 
it anything will do'. Well anything is not the answer ... so I make 
the list. " 
[H1, no children, older] 
"I always make a list. I sometimes make him make a list. I make him 
make the list then he thinks he's doing something because I get sick 
of these, ... if we run out of anything it's always my fault so I'll 
make it his responsibility as well. I still get in trouble when we 
run out. But he can't menu plan. I mean when you go shopping you don't 
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just buy things you see you think well Saturday tea, Sunday, you plan 
what you are going to have and the veg you are going to have with it. 
He'd come home with a chicken. 'Er right what are you going to do 
with it. ' 'Er I hadn't thought of that' '0k then what veg are you 
going to have' '0h we haven't got any. I didn't get any veg, I never 
thought of that' So really he tries but it's something you've got to 
get into and take a responsibility for, and he won't. I think he 
thinks it's not his place to do the shopping. His mother always did 
the shopping so I'm afraid as far as shopping goes he is a bit of a 
dead loss and he intends to keep it that way. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
As I shall suggest later, the location of jointly debatable areas of 
decision-making varied depending on the wife's preference for supermarket 
or local shopping as well as on her approach to menu planning. 
Respondents' perceptions of the possibility of delegating shopping labour, 
as opposed to decision-making, varied depending on the nature of the 
shopping trip in question. 90% of the sample expected to do at least some 
of their shopping in a supermarket while the remaining 10% (from the H2 and 
H3 sections of the sample) bought their food locally or in town, either 
because they did not have access to a car or because they had an 
established shopping routine which did not encompass the notion of a 
supermarket. 
"I have to arrange it so I go every day it's too far to walk there and 
back with a heavy shopping bag so I only shop once every few days I 
just spread it out over the week. I have to do it all round here 
really. " 
[H2, no children, younger] 
"I go shopping every Friday. I get all my shopping on a Friday. I go 
to the market.. I know where I am going and what I want. I just get 
round it as quick as I can. It's just a routine. " 
[H3,16+] 
On the whole, respondents belived that there was greater scope for 
delegating supermarket labour. Although only a few delegated all the 
associated work (12), most (91% of those who expected to use a 
supermarket) presumed that they and their husbands would go to the 
supermarket together. Many of the H2s and H3s had no choice about this 
because they relied on their husbands for transport. These non-driving 
respondents, including the two quoted below, observed that their husbands 
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helped with the shopping because there was nothing much else to do in a 
supermarket. 
"My husband takes me to Hillards. We get most of our shopping there. 
He helps me, he will take the trolley round and I transfer it [the 
shopping] from the trolley to the cashier and she transfers it and 
then he takes it to the car and he helps to unpack when we come back 
but then he leaves me because I know where things go. " 
[H2, pre-school age] 
"Well he usually takes me because I go to the supermarket once a week 
so he usually takes me. Sometimes I do all the shopping and he comes 
and picks me up. It just depends. Usually he sits in the car for a 
while and then waits while I get so far round and then he comes. 
He'll probably stand in the queue while I finish off the shopping and 
he helps me load it in the car and bring it home. " 
[H2, school age] 
The helping husband, as trolley pusher, box packer, and porter, speeded up 
the shopping process and saved his wife from all unsuitably heavy labour. 
These were seen to be entirely appropriate activities even if there was 
some doubt about the legitimacy of other forms of involvement. Although 
some helping husbands preferred to stay in the car while the decisions were 
made, others came into the shop and were actually to hand and so able to 
inform, or even make, "on the spot" choices. Not surprisingly, respondents 
had different definitions of legitimate and illegitimate "advice" depending 
on their preferred style of menu planning. In the first of the two cases 
quoted below, the husband's involvement was permitted as there was still 
plenty of scope for choice. In the second, such decision-making was 
problematic because the wife had already prepared a mental list of what she 
required and of what she could afford. 
"I keep telling myself that I should be more systematic about it but 
the truth is that we tend to go round and choose what we fancy, it is 
a real old hatch potch some weeks. It's something we've always done 
since we've got married because er well John is interested in food so 
therefore he takes some interest in the buying of it. " 
[H2, school age] 
"If I go round here [ie. shop locally] I just get it all. If we go to 
Asda he usually, we usually get it together there. He just shoves 
things in. He just shoves them in but you know if there is a thing 
that we both like I'll say 'shall we have this one or the other one' 
you know I'll sort of ask him before I get it but he just puts things 
in. I know its cheaper at Asda but I always spend more than if I go 
on my own to the shops round here what with all the bits he adds in.. " 
[H3, pre-school age] 
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Providing that the husband accompanied his wife there was always scope for 
joint decision-making. As Weinbaum and Bridges (1979) have noted, family 
trips to the supermarket potentially undermine the wife's exclusive 
decision-making role. It was certainly the case that few respondents 
expected their husbands to accompany them on local shopping trips. In this 
context, delegation, if any, took the form of an errand., Husbands who were 
sent, like those who volunteered, were simply asked to buy the items which 
featured on their wives' shopping lists and were consequently denied any 
decision-making role. Respondents described very different beliefs abut 
the circumstances in which they could legitimately ask for (or accept) this 
sort of help. Some, especially the older ones, were only prepared to ask 
if they were literally unable to get out themselves. Others were willing 
to delegate odd shopping jobs if it were more convenient that way or if 
their husband offered his assistance. The following examples illustrate 
the range of perceptions about the possibility of such delegation. 
"Sometimes on a Saturday afternoon when he is going out. He likes a 
bet and he says 'do you want anything up there while I'm up there' and 
I'll I give him a little list then if there a few things. If its just 
one he'll remember but he's very good, he always offers... you know do 
you want anything? " 
[H3,16+] 
"Oh yes I phone him up with shopping lists. He always reckons that 
he's too busy at lunchtime but I can't get out either and anyway I 
think its good for him to do some of the shopping. If I forget 
anything I'll ask him to get it. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
"It's my job. He's never you know he's never been one to do any of 
the shopping. He hates going into town or even to the shops down 
here. The only shop he goes into here is the newsagents. No he's not 
fussy for shopping. I don't make him do it. No. When I was ill my 
daughter came down and did it for him. " 
[H2,16+] 
Interestingly, several of those who were in principle prepared to ask their 
husband to help chose not to do so because they believed that this would 
cause more problems than it solved. These women quoted instances of their 
husband's previous failure as evidence of what they saw as the 
impracticality of seriously trying to delegate any of the local shopping 
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work. 
"Can he do it?... Well look, he went, I sent him out for a loaf of 
bread and he came back with food for the cat, six tea cakes, which 
cost 36p whereas I can get them for 26 in town, and some butter 
because he thought I might run out. All I'd asked for was a loaf of 
bread! l.. I learned my lesson then. He's always willing but I bet you 
even if I wrote it down in letters this big he'd come home with the 
wrong things. " 
[H2,16+] 
Such stories emphasised what was seen as the husband's natural 
inefficiency. Errands of the kind described provided an occasion on which 
the husband could show that he was willing to help but that this was not 
really his job and that it was certainly not a job that he could do 
effectively. Curiously, husbands who "failed" to buy the right things were 
always seen to have been incompetent rather than to have positively 
distrupted their wife's plans. It is at least possible that some of the 
"mistakes" were deliberate and so represented conscious interference with 
the decision-making process. 
So, the frequence, and form of delegated labour varied depending on the 
type of shopping trip. Supermarket assistance, which was extremely common, 
usually involved loading and unloading goods and/or pushing the trolley. 
Interestingly, respondents only sought help with local shopping in 
particular circumstances (eg. because they had forgotten to buy something 
or because it was more convenient) and then only asked that the husband run 
an errand for them. 
In sum, the formal character of different types of shopping, in combination 
with a generalised definition of gender appropriate labour (13) appeared to 
order perceptions of the possibility of delegating aspects of shopping 
labour. In comparision, the perceived possibility of delegating associated 
decision-making depended on the respondent's shopping routine, her method 
of menu planning and, to some degree, on the type of shop and the precise 
nature of the husband's labouring role. Not surprisingly, choices which 
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were made or realised in the other's presence (ie. in the supermarket) were 
more likely to be subject to joint discussion than those which were made in 
the privacy of a local shop. In practice, opportunities for delegating 
decision-making were structured by the wife's normal menu planning 
procedure and by the number of occasions on which she and her husband went 
supermarket shopping together. Given their characteristic shopping style, 
H1 respondents were much more likely to decide to delegate at least some 
associated decision-making than were respondents from other sections of the 
sample. Has, who were most likely to shop alone in local stores with the 
aid of highly organised shopping lists were consequently the least likely 
to be faced with jointly debatable decisions about what to buy. 
Cooke 
All respondents believed that they would take charge of the routine 
planning and preparation of the family's meals. However, different 
sections of the sample held characteristically different views of the 
possibility of delegating the associated work or decision-making. Broadly, 
H2 and H3 respondents believed that they cooked for their husband and their 
children while His, especially the younger ones, tended to view day-to-day 
cooking as just one among many domestic chores which had to be done. While 
these His acknowledged that it was "their" job, they argued that this was 
simply a consequence of habit, convenience or experience, and not because 
it should be their responsibility or because it demanded any gender 
specific skill. 
Before going any further it is important to acknowledge that individual 
respondents were more or less likely to delegate particular types of 
cooking work (14). Because cooking jobs were classified as more and less 
"easy" (or, rather, as more and less "easy" for someone of the "wrong" 
gender), it was difficult to simply document perceptions of choice about 
the possibility of delegating something which could be uniformly classed as 
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"cooking". Whatever the general view the wife's cooking responsibility, 
choices about delegating breakfast making, for example, were quite unlike 
those related to the production of a main meal. 
In general, husbands were expected to have much more to do with the 
preparation of "extra" meals like breakfast, lunch tea or supper 
(depending on the terminology) than with "main" meals. Decisions about 
snacks were seen to be relatively unimportant, and, in any case, the 
associated work was often described as heating up, slicing, spreading or 
boiling rather than "cooking". Although all husbands were reportedly able 
to manage these jobs, the occasions on which they were actually called upon 
to exercise their snack-making skills varied depending on the family's day- 
to-day routine. In the following example the husband had to make his own 
breakfast and lunch because his wife was out at work. 
"He cooks his breakfast. That is a very strict routine. I am away 
before all that.. [ie. his breakfast].. we are very well organised. We 
have a fairly strict routine, and he always comes home and gets his 
own lunch because we've always had a dog and a cat and he has quite a 
clever routine for himself ... he likes the radio on with the news 
till 12.30 and he knows where everything is. " 
[H1,16+] 
The structure of the daily routine was not always determined by factors 
entirely beyond the respondent's control. Indeed, most expected to try to 
manage their household so as to minimise the occasions on which their 
husband was left to fend for himself. Where possible H3s, H2s and, to a 
lesser extent, His arranged their own time-table so that they did not have 
to delegate what they saw as their catering responsibilities. 
"He likes me to get up and make some toast and have a cup of tea with 
him before he goes out. He is one of these strange people that 
doesn't like getting up on their own. Occasionally I wouldn't mind 
staying in bed but most mornings I get up quite happily and get the 
breakfast. " 
[H2, no children, younger] 
Some were so organised that their husband's "cooking" capacities were never 
even put to the test. This group, which mostly consisted of older 
respondents, were as proud to announce that their husband could look after 
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himself as they were pleased to observe that this had never been necessary. 
she: "He wouldn't stop me from going anywhere if I wanted to go out in the 
day and leave him some dinner to warm up that would be alright 
wouldn't it? " 
he: "I can look after myself" 
she: "He can do. He can... He would never starve, no there's lots of 
things he could do if he had to. " 
he: "Oh I don't know boiling a kettle I think. " 
she : "He'll boil an egg and he'll poach an egg on toast or beans on toast. 
He can do things such as that, he could do that if he ever had to. " 
[H3,16+] 
Husbands who made their own lunch, tea, or breakfast, and those who made 
snacks for the family, were usually "allowed" to take care of the 
associated decision-making as well as the labouring work and were only 
subject to criticism if they left an enormous mess or if they used up all 
the bread/margarine/bacon etc. This was so whatever the circumstances of 
delegation. Here it is important to note that helping husbands were were 
seen to be doing their wife a favour even if they were in fact preparing 
"their own" meal or snack. In such circumstances wives had no choice but 
to be grateful and so had what they described as a fairly high level of 
"tolerance". 
As I observed earlier, decisions about what to eat were to some degree 
determined by prior decisions about what to buy. Location of choice about 
main meal contents therefore depended on the respondent's menu planning 
strategy, and opportunities for delegating decision-making responsibility 
were structured accordingly. For example, those who compiled their 
shopping lists with a view to Tuesday's dinner, Wednesday's lunch and so 
on, had already made all necessary choices. Even those who were more 
flexible had at least pre-selected the range of possible options in that 
they had, for example, run out of eggs or needed to eat up the carrots they 
had bought (15). Some husbands influenced the early stages of the 
decision-making sequence and offered buying as well as cooking suggestions. 
Others occasionally took charge of decisions associated with the whole 
process from planning right through to production and consumption, yet 
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whatever the formal possibilities such involvement was sporadic. All 
respondents felt that it was their job to ensure that the family was 
properly fed. Accordingly, most "what shall we eat" decisions were taken 
"automatically" and were presented as just one of several normally 
"invisible" components of the wife's more general catering responsibility. 
No respondents expected their husband to take charge of decisions about the 
family diet, though a few did expect help with an occasional menu-related 
choice. 
The perceived practicality of delegating any of the work associated with 
main meals depended, in part, on respondent's definition of this type of 
cooking, and, in part, on such logistic factors as the couple's normal meal 
time and the working hours of husband or husband and wife. All H1 husbands 
worked regular "office" hours (9am to 5,6 or sometimes 7pm) and most 
expected to have their main meal somewhere between 7pm and 9pm in the 
evening. In comparison, the eating habits of H2s and H3s were frequently 
complicated by inconvenient working hours or by repeated cycles of shift 
work. Despite these variations, however, about half of H2s and Has 
expected to have their main meal at, or as close to, lunch time as 
possible. The other half normally ate between 5pm and 6pm. This meant 
that 83% of H2s, 71% of the Has and 21% of His prepared the main meal while 
their husband was out at work and were therefore unable to delegate much of 
the associated labour (16). However, 10% of H2 respondents and 14% of Has 
were themselves out at work at the time when they would conventionally 
prepare the main meal. In three of these cases the husband, who arrived 
home earlier than his wife, chose to take over the cooking rather than 
wait for his wife to come home and prepare what would then be an 
inappropriately late meal. 
"Well my husband is very good. He starts the tea because he gets in 
that bit earlier now. We have our tea together about 6 O'clock. When 
I was working part-time I always did the cooking and he only does it 
now because he is in first. He'd rather do it himself than wait until 
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I get back. We wouldn't be able to eat till well 6.30pm or nearly 7pm 
if I did it and so it is usually something quick like waffles and 
poached egg you know, or grilled fish. He doesn't mind doing it. No. 
He just reads the instructions on the packet and it is... I don't 
think it's ever, ... it is eatable, that is it really. " [H2, school age] 
The only other respondents who routinely delegated the work of preparing 
the main meal were His, both of whom explained that their husbands had 
lived alone before getting married and had found that they enjoyed cooking. 
These men chose to continue what was now seen as their "hobby" even though 
there was no longer any real "need" to do so. 
"We sort of cook alternate evenings. Obviously it's flexible, I mean 
if one has got to go out then we will swap evenings. It just seemed 
to happen like that, I don't know really I suppose it was because he 
is very fond of cooking and he wouldn't like to be sort of done out of 
it. Also it seems sort of fair really when we are both out at work 
all day so he takes his turn, but he doesn't object to that because as 
I say he likes cooking. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
"We probably split it 50/50,50/50 as long as you like curries. Well 
we vary ... I probably do slightly more of the cooking than Dave does 
because I think if it is something basic I'll just go ahead and do it. 
He tends to faff about doing sort of spices and all this sort of 
thing... " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
Many more respondents delegated the work of preparing the main meal on some 
kind of special occasion. In the H1 context this usually meant that the 
husband took over when the family was entertaining or when he wanted to 
make an "exotic" meal. Five His had husbands who enjoyed creating such 
dishes as coq au vin or boeuf bourgignon and who took over when this kind 
of cooking was required. 
"I do it through the week yes. Now and again he will, [cook] and 
really he is marvellous if he wants to be, he always does the cooking 
for special occasions, like if we are entertaining someone then he 
always cooks" 
[H1, no children, younger] 
"He is a very good cook I mean he doesn't just have set favourites. 
At dinner parties he tends to cook more than me. I sort of carry on 
in a normal kind of routine. I do all the routine cooking but when 
it's a dinner party I look after the children and do other things and 
he does the cooking. I might do the pudding but he does the main 
course. I like it that way actually because I do like cooking as well 
but Geoff enjoys it. He finds it relaxing doing er big exotic cooking 
you know get out the recipe book and things, 'lets try this', and 
really .. I used to do it as much as him when we didn't have the 
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children, but I can't concentrate on it now and I take sort of short 
cuts which isn't any good with top cooking er and I can't really 
concentrate when Anna [daughter] is there so I'm happier if he leaves 
me to entertain them and he'll do it. Otherwise if it was left to me 
if it was a dinner party and he doesn't have the time to do the 
cooking I'll always do something simpler than him. If he isn't 
cooking it means he hasn't got the time to cook so I have to entertain 
the children as well so I always make it simpler. " 
[H1, pre-school age] 
Respondents from other sections of the sample occasionally delegated the 
cooking on quite different grounds. For example, a couple of H2 husbands 
and five H3s were prepared to make the family's main meal if it was more 
convenient that way or if their wife was ill or especially tired. In 
these cases the husbands produced simple "specialities" rather than 
elaborate and "exotic" creations. 
"Oh he doesn't mind cooking. He won't er do it all the time but er 
I'll do it all the time but if I said '0h er you know I can't be 
bothered you do it'. He would do it you know he'd do it for a change. 
He won't do it all the time but I mean in the holidays and things he 
will do it. I think he likes it because he just does it now and 
then. " 
[H2, school age] 
Either way, the "special" status of the occasion emphasised the normality 
of ordinary allocations of responsibility. Such delegation was only 
legitimate if the husband enjoyed cooking (and most His believed that their 
husbands would not enjoy cooking so much if they had to do it all the 
time), if the wife had asked her husband to take over as a favour, or if he 
volunteered. None of the occasional "chefs" were expected to be able to 
produce a sequence of acceptable everyday meals. H2 and H3 respondents 
could not eat egg and chips every dinner time any more than His could 
sustain a diet of rich and expensive food. Temporary cooks were therefore 
expected to produce a one-off meal to the "required" standard, the meaning 
of which varied with the context of delegation. Husbands who prepared 
exotic meals were engaged with a kind of cooking to which normal rules did 
not apply. In comparison, those who made the dinner/tea/supper because 
their wife was unwilling or unable to do so either produced what would 
normally count as a sub-standard meal or else stuck to their simple 
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speciality which was as perfect as it was predictable. 
"He always does poached egg on toast. He can't go wrong really" 
[H2, no children, younger] 
Finally, some women were positively unwilling to delegate any of the 
cooking even if this were theoretically possible. A few of these explained 
that, in their view, it was not really right for a man (let alone their 
husband) to do the cooking, while others reasoned that established patterns 
of expertise were such that it would make no sense to delegate the work to 
their necessarily less capable husband. The following examples illustrate 
both views. 
"He will sometimes warm something up if I've got late and can't get it 
all done before I go out to work, but I don't like to ask him I like 
to get it all organised so it's on the table by the time I have to go 
out. I think that is my job really, and I'd feel guilty if I didn't 
do that for them .. I think it is my job to make sure they have 
something hot. " 
[H2, pre-school age] 
"He will do some things, but not really. It would be such an 
investment of time and energy for him to learn to cook it is just 
impractical really.. I can't do his jobs, it would take me just as 
long to learn about them and there is no point really, so we stick to 
what we can do" 
[H1,16+] 
Of course, those who prepared the main meal while their husband was out at 
work were literally unable to delegate any of the the main meal cooking - 
presuming, that is, that the meal time was "fixed" and presuming that the 
husband's working hours were constant. Most of this group (75%) believed 
that theirs was an entirely ordinary arrangement. Cooking was just one of 
a range of housekeeping responsibilities which the wife felt obliged to 
fulfil. Indeed, some respondents had chosen to stay at home in order that 
they could do this and other domestic jobs "properly". 
"We eat at night when he gets in so when the afternoon begins you 
really have to think about the evening meal because if I do, the more 
splendid meal I do it usually means starting earlier but sometimes I 
don't start till about 3 or 3.30 or so.... I know he says he wouldn't 
mind if I went out to work but I think he has come to expect all the 
things to be done, the meal to be ready, if he found that he had to do 
that I don't think he'd be that happy really" 
[H1, school age] 
In summary, decisions about what to eat and therefore about what to cook 
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were inevitably ordered by earlier decisions about what to buy. Most 
respondents took charge of all these choices as part of their more general 
housekeeping and food providing role, and only debated the matter on 
"special" occasions. In theory different planning and catering styles 
determined the exact location of real choice and so created different 
(theoretical) opportunities for delegating associated decision-making. 
Some decided what to eat weeks in advance, others only a few minutes before 
they started cooking. However, decision-making responsibilities were so 
rarely delegated that these details remained invisible. 
Respondent's perceptions of choice about the possibility of delegating any 
of the work associated with preparing the main meal appeared to be ordered 
by the presence or absence of the husband during normal cooking time, by 
the respondent's view of her role as caterer, and by the husband's cooking 
ability. H1 husbands had rather more to do with the preparation of their 
family's main meal than any others. Only this section of the sample were 
likely to adopt a pragmatic approach to the subject and to treat cooking as 
an ordinary domestic chore (or pleasure) rather than as a particularly 
"feminine" obligation. Because respondents from other sections of the 
sample typically believed that cooking was properly the wife's job, 
husbands only took over to help out and only did so when the circumstances 
justified what was seen as unusual behaviour. 
Cleaning 
All respondents felt that they were ultimately responsible for the state of 
their home. This meant that they routinely faced decisions about what was 
or was not clean, as well as decisions about the circumstances in which 
they might delegate particular elements of the associated labour. Again 
the perceived practicality of delegating either the work or the decision- 
making varied depending on the respondent's approach to housework. Those 
who had a "routine", that is those who regularly tidied the bedrooms on, 
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say, Tuesdays, never had to decide when the cleaning needed doing while 
those who cleaned "when necessary" constantly made decisions of the form 
"is it time to do the bedrooms yet? ". The following examples illustrate 
the range of described strategies. 
"I have a day for doing bedrooms which is a Friday. I call Friday my 
turfing out day. I hoover through every day from top to bottom, - but 
Friday is the day when I move all the bedroom furniture, when I move 
the beds and settees I move everything. But generally I wash the 
kitchen floor every day. I used to have a day for doing the windows 
but now with the little one it's nearly every day I do a window clean, 
there are little finger marks all over. I do the toilets every day so 
really when it comes to turfing out it doesn't take me as long as it 
would do if I'd left it all week. " 
[H2, pre-school age] 
"I'm really disorganised, you know, I clean when it needs doing but it 
always seems untidy because we are both untidy people. If I say right 
'it's time we did the house out' he would clean up but there is no 
way I can say I have a routine. I tend to walk into the house with my 
eyes shut, and walk out with them shut. There is no way I can do much 
when I'm working so I just ignore it" 
[H2, school age] 
Styles of housework determined both the form and location of necessary 
decision-making and the degree to which respondents were likely to be able 
to delegate associated work. Irregular cleaners (who tended to be working 
wives) often tidied up at the week-end or at times when their husband was 
available and, in theory, able to help out, while those who had a definite 
routine tended to organise their domestic timetable such that they 
fulfilled their cleaning obligations during the week. Some of this group 
deliberately aimed to get "their jobs" done whilst their husband was out at 
work. 
Described practices of delegation, both of work and, much less commonly, of 
decision-making, (17) also varied with the couple's view of housework. 
Again, different sections of the sample described characteristically 
different definitions of the nature of cleaning work and hence of the 
nature of their proper cleaning role. Most His and many younger 
respondents concluded that cleaning, like cooking and food shopping, were 
simply jobs which had to be done. Those who held this view were unlikely 
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to conclude that they had "failed" if they asked for help, and all were 
prepared to take advantage of opportunities to delegate cleaning work. 
Some positively expected to "share" the housework and so expected to make 
use of their husband's labour. 
"If I said 'right today we are going to clean the lounge dear, you do 
the lounge I'll do the bathroom'. We divide the responsibility but 
again, it's me in charge. 'Right you're lounge, I'm bathroom. "' 
[H1, no children, younger] 
"If I need some help I can just ask him. He is always willing to do 
his share, he will do anything, he will put his hand to anything, 
he'll hoover, he'll dust, * he'll polish, whatever to help me out, it 
doesn't matter what it is, he'll do it to help me out.... he wouldn't 
notice that the place was in a mess so I'd start agitating before he 
would so thats why its me that asks him rather than the other way 
round. " 
[H3, no children, younger] 
Others, like those quoted below, were, in principle, prepared to delegate 
cleaning but chose not to do so on the grounds that this would create more 
problems than it solved. These respondents observed that their husband was 
unable to do even the simplest kind of housework. 
"We don't divide it, I do it all. He would if he had to but it's one 
of those situations where ... if I put things away I know where I put 
them. If he puts them away he forgets where they should be... it's 
easier for me to do it. In any case, he can't stand the hoover. No, 
he can't stand the noise. He can't stand me hoovering so I have to do 
that when he is out... that's the way we are. I prefer it like that, 
you know he'll always say 'I'll do this', or 'I'll do that', but I 
won't let him. It's just for my own convenience really. " 
[H2, school age] 
"I do everything in the house. He'd not wash a pot, or hoover, or 
anything, I'm not really bothered. I've always done it, it's just a 
habit you know I've just always done it, plus he wouldn't do it right 
I don't think so it'd only annoy me. He can't even wash up, he is 
hopeless. " 
[H1, school age] 
At the other extreme a couple of older respondents, both H2s, argued that 
wives should do the housework themselves and should choose not to delegate 
such work even if that were practical. 
"I do firmly believe that that is the female role and that I should do 
all the cleaning and household management that is my job and I 
shouldn't really go to work. " 
[H2,16+] 
These women tried to minimise the occasions on which they sought help 
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although, curiously, they still believed that their husbands should be able 
and willing to offer such assistance if required. 
"I regard looking after the house as my job so I don't see really why 
the husband should come home after work and start doing things that I 
could very well do when I'm at home during the day. I don't think 
that's fair. He would do if I asked but I never have to ask, touch 
wood. " 
[H2,16+] 
Such devotion was exceptional. Most women believed that, although they 
were ultimately responsible for the housework, there were nonetheless 
certain jobs which they might expect to delegate either routinely or in 
particular and unusual circumstances. The exact location of the boundary 
between legitimate and illegitimate delegation varied from case to case, 
and from circumstance to circumstance, although those who went out to work 
expected rather more help than those who were full-time housewives (18). 
"That is basically mine, because I'm in all day so I might as well do 
it really. When I was at work it was different. I believed in 50/50. 
I was going out the same hours as he was so .. so I believed in 50/50, 
then. I believed that he should help with the housework then. " 
[H3, no children, younger] 
he: "I clean up in here I wash the pots every night so er I just I just er 
think that its my right sort of to chip in with her because she is 
going out to work I think if she had to do all the housework it's 
wrong. " 
[H3, no children, younger] 
So, levels of expected help were structured by respondents' domestic 
routines, their working status, and their view of the gender specificity of 
the cleaning role (19). 
Whatever the level or "quantity" of help, assistants took on only a few of 
the possible cleaning roles. Respondents typically delegated routine 
cleaning work which was not thought to demand any special skill. 30% of 
the sample saw hoovering as a relatively easy "gender neutral" task which 
was ideally suited to delegation. 
"Ian always does a certain amount of things, he doesn't enjoy cooking 
so he always does the hoovering. In fact he, it is a bit of a joke, we 
brought a new hoover about two years ago and the other day I had to 
change the bag and I didn't know how to do it. He thought this was 
funny ... that I didn't know how to change the hoover. Ian is the sort 
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of person who will take the initiative in certain things in the house 
and we share, he knows that if I am involved in cooking or ironing or 
whatever I can't do the hall floor and sometimes he finds it a 
relaxation to go and do that. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
"He will hoover, he'll never dust mind, no, but he will hoover. I 
think he thinks it's [dusting] too .... well I'll tell you one thing he 
would never carry a bunch of flowers... well he'd think it was too 
feminine, I don't know, but hoovering yes, he will take the hoover 
round the front room, he likes to see it tidy. I do it properly at 
the week-end but yes, he has a go with the hoover. " 
[H2,16+] 
The only other job to be so frequently "delegated" was the work of outside 
window cleaning. As the following quotations illustrate the "dangerous" 
location converted what would otherwise have been the wife's work into a 
job which could, and perhaps should, be delegated. However, decision- 
making remained the wife's responsibility. 
"He washes the windows upstairs for me, as most of the men do, they 
all do the upstairs windows round here. I never go up a ladder, no, 
so he does that" 
[H2, school age] 
"There are certain things which Dave does for me, like well the 
windows, the outside windows, because he is taller than I am he can 
climb up better. Inside I usually do, except the kitchen which I 
can't reach but it is such a rare event that it hardly, it doesn't 
happen that often. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
Husbands occasionally helped with a rather broader range of cleaning work, 
the exact form depending on the circumstance of delegation. For example, 
all claimed that their husband would take over at least the most pressing 
cleaning jobs in an emergency. The list of such "emergency" work varied 
depending on the couple's definition of "necessary" cleaning and on the 
duration of the wife's incapacity. 
" "Oh no he has done it [the housework] but only if I've been really 
poorly. He wouldn't do the housework just' ordinarily. I went into 
hospital for 48 hours and when I came back he was doing the hoovering 
but I must be honest I felt like taking it [the hoover] off him, but 
at least he tried. He had a go at the dusting then, but no, no, he 
doesn't really do much like that, not unless, as I say, not unless I'm 
really poorly. " 
[H2, no children, older] 
In these circumstances, the husband was expected to do all that was 
necessary to keep the house going as best he could. In comparison, those 
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who helped when their wife was fit and able, if especially busy, were 
directed towards certain specific tasks. These selected areas of cleaning 
work were not necessarily the most "urgent" jobs but were chosen on the 
grounds that they would be "easy" to delegate. 
"On the odd occasion that at week-ends if I'm busy doing dinner and 
it's a bad day and he can't get into the garden he'll put the hoover 
on for me or just tidy up" 
[H2, no children, older] 
"If there is somebody coming round for a meal for example I will 
probably be doing the cooking and Robert will, sometimes he will do it 
off his own bat, sometimes I have to ask him, he usually goes round 
and tidies up while I cook the meal. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
In sum, then, the respondents' perceptions of the possibility of delegation 
varied depending on their cleaning routine (or lack of it) and on their 
view of the nature of cleaning work. Different sections of the sample held 
characteristically different positions with respect to each of these issues 
and so delegated different cleaning jobs under different circumstances. 
The laundry 
All but two respondents believed that they were obliged to ensure that the 
family had clean clothes, sheets, tea towels etc. and so felt that they 
should be in charge of washing, drying and ironing. The scale and the 
nature of these jobs varied as a consequence of the size of family and the 
form of its washing machinery (if any). These factors in combination with 
the wife's normal washing habits, the couple's working hours and the 
respondent's view of the nature of washing work, ordered the perceived 
practicality of delegating either labour or related decision-making. Those 
who had an automatic washing machine (a mixture of Ml, H2 and H3 
respondents owned such equipment) only had to select an appropriate 
programme and then load the machine with a pile of pre-sorted washing. 
Most believed that their husband could turn on a pre-programmed ready 
loaded washing machine and often asked him to do so. 
"Yes well we used to have a twin tub and we used to do it between us 
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on a Saturday morning... I was sort of more or less in charge but he 
would help now and then but now we've got an automatic he is quite 
willing to put a load in but I mostly do that. " 
[H2, no children, younger] 
"He's not too keen on temperatures and which colours you can put with 
which and which soap powders to use. I have different soap powders 
depending on what I'm washing .. soap flakes and a biological and we've 
got an automatic one ... he wouldn't really know I don't think he'd do 
it if I asked, if I said everything is ready all you've got to do is 
turn it on, he would quite happily turn it on ... he wouldn't take it 
out and he couldn't organise himself to put a wash on.. He wouldn't 
think it was about time the sheets were washed, he doesn't even notice 
but then I don't notice when the oil needs changing in the car. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
While these wives were quite prepared to delegate the very simple job of 
doing the washing (given that it involved turning a switch) only a few also 
expected their husband to take charge of the decisions associated with the 
jobs of programming and loading. Several presented descriptions of their 
husband's past failure as evidence of his total incapacity to act as even a 
temporary washerwoman. 
"No he couldn't wash he's never washed in his life, not even now we 
have got an automatic. No, well no not really I think he washed once 
when I had David [son] at home he washed some nappies out for me and I 
got up to have a look at them out of the window and I've never seen 
anything so funny ... there were all these nappies on the line and 
there were about eight pegs in each nappy and .. isn't it funny ... he's 
never washed and he's never ironed ... I can't say he hasn't pressed 
his trousers occasionally but he's never washed and he's never ironed. 
He hoovers and does most other things. It's funny isn't it. " 
[H3,16+] 
A couple of H2s concluded that switching on and loading or programming were 
all part of the same job and believed that this was something which the 
wife should not delegate even if her husband was willing and capable. Both 
organised their domestic routine such that they took complete control of 
the washing. 
"Well that's basically mine. I'm in all day so I might as well do it. 
He's never washed or ironed, it's one of those things but now it's 
just a case of ... well I've shown him how to use the machine because 
it's simple well it's just an automatic and I had him ironing a shirt 
for me, ... well it was his shirt but he ironed it for me. I was more 
or less thinking that when I go into hospital [to have a child] he is 
going to have to fend for himself well Abigail [her friend] says 
she'll come and do it for me she says she will pop in and look after 
him so that should be alright.... I feel really I feel that washing and 
ironing is really a it's a womans job really. I mean I don't mind him 
chipping in with the cleaning up and washing up and cooking and so on 
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but with washing and ironing I really feel that's a woman's job to do 
that. 
[H2, no children, younger] 
Interestingly, husbands were expected to have rather more to do with 
launderette washing than with the home based version. Several H2 and H3 
husbands were obliged to go to the launderette because their wives could 
not drive and/or because this job, like supermarket shopping, involved an 
element of "heavy" labour. 
"We usually go to the launderette on Saturday morning about 8 or 9 am, 
and get that done, or if Nick is at work we'll maybe have to go on 
Sunday. We always go together, yes, well we have to really because of 
the car. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
Although launderette machines offered few choices, none of the husbands 
were asked to make any of the necessary "programming" decisions. They were 
expected to be in attendance and to carry the heavy bags but were never 
asked to go to the launderette alone. 
Respondents who actually had to spend some time doing the washing, or, at 
least, giving their washing machinery fairly close attention, were much 
less likely to delegate any of the associated work let alone the necessary 
decision-making. Doing the washing was a "real" and demanding job and one 
which was comprehensively defined as "women's work". 
"I usually do it on a week-end because I've got a twin tub. If I had 
an automatic I more than likely I'd just do it in the week and leave 
it on on a morning, or get him to put it on when he goes out to work, 
you know, that's the way most people use an automatic .. but I have a 
twin tub so I tend to take all the clothes each day and put them in 
the basket and then as I say I have a week's wash at the week-end. I 
mean obviously if I've a weeks holiday then that's different I would 
do it when I want to. " 
[H2, no children, older] 
In effect, the more elaborate the washing machinery and the less the "work" 
involved, the more likely it was that the wife would delegate the few 
remaining tasks. 
Those without a special drying machine but with a yard or garden hung their 
washing out to dry. Several H2 respondents observed that their husbands 
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would be willing to help bring in the washing but would refuse to hang it 
out (20). 
"If I leave a pile for him ... if I'm going out he will put it in the 
machine, it's an automatic so he'll do that for me, but he'll never... 
he's always drawn the line and he'll never take the clothes out, he 
definitely draws the line at pegging out. He'll bring the washing in 
but thats it. Well he doesn't even like bringing the washing in. He 
will if I ask him but I think he is a bit sort of... he thinks it's 
.. it looks stupid, you know. I think he honestly thinks that's a 
womans job ... he is good on everything else but thats one thing he 
draws the line at. " 
[H2, pre-school age] 
"I do it now, he used to help when I was working. When I worked full- 
time he used to help. He'd put the washer on and that sort of thing 
but he'd always leave me to peg it out. You know, he didn't like the 
idea of doing that ... but he would do some of it [the washing) for me. 
Since I went on part time I thought I don't see why he should have 
that to do. " 
[H2, no children, older] 
While most husbands were prepared to do the washing (in the sense that they 
would turn on the automatic machine) they were not prepared to be seen in 
the "washerwoman" role. Although the machine had done the work, not they, 
this distinction would not be clear to those who watched them hanging out 
the wet clothes. In these cases the problem was the association of the 
pegger out with the washerwoman image, not the nature of the pegging job 
itself. Ironing was an equally sensitive issue, but for different reasons. 
Nearly all respondents believed that their husbands should not do the 
ironing, not because that might imply that he had done the washing, but 
because it was in itself an inappropriate task. Described patterns of 
delegation once more reflected respondent's views of the work involved and 
the practical limits set by the normal washing/drying/ironing routine. 
Those who had set days for each job were usually able to complete the work 
in their husband's absence. Others found that they were ironing at the 
week-end and were therefore able (if not willing) to ask for help. 
Whatever the practical possibility of delegation only a few of the younger 
H1 respondents ever asked for assistance. The rest of the sample 
concluded that ironing was a relatively difficult job (it was certainly 
thought to be more skilled than the job of switching on the automatic 
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washing machine) and one which demanded what were seen as particularly 
"feminine" qualities. Even though some kinds of ironing demanded more 
skill than others, none were routinely delegated. 
"He doesn't like ironing, well he can't really do it. He once ironed 
a table cloth once ... one table cloth I said 'Do the ironing dear I'm 
shattered' and he was very good, he got the board out and got the iron 
heated up ... it's a steam iron and you have to put water in it and 
this table cloth was really dry ... he charged into the kitchen and 
filled it up with water and waited for it to heat up, and it's a round 
one [the table cloth] and he had to keep going round 360 degrees and 
he could only do about three degrees at a time on the board and he got 
to the end of the table cloth and he was shattered and he'd got it all 
in the wrong place. and there were patches that he'd missed altogether 
right in the middle. He gave it up after that" 
[H1, no children, younger] 
"He never irons that's about the only thing he never does. I'd feel 
funny if he ironed, I don't think I'd like it. When I was in hospital 
my mother came in and did it, so, if anything like that happened again 
she'd come in and help out. " 
[H2, school age] 
So, nearly all respondents expected to take charge of decisions about the 
family washing. If they had a machine then they were prepared to delegate 
the task of turning the switch, although the rest of the work, drying and 
ironing, was firmly their responsibility. Described patterns of delegation 
consequently reflected ownership of washing machinery as well as 
respondents' view of different components of the laundering task (21). 
Having examined the particular qualities of a range of routine jobs usually 
classed as housework, I shall now consider two general issues which 
appeared to order patterns of delegation. First, respondents were more or 
less likely to delegate either the labour or the decision-making associated 
with "their" domestic work depending on the structure of their daily 
routine. Those who were highly organised were much less likely to ask for 
help than were those who adopted a more spontaneous style of housework. 
Second, those who concluded that the housework ought to be the particular 
responsibility of the wife were far less willing to ask for help compared 
with those who took a more pragmatic view of the matter. These two 
variables appeared to order the form and the volume of described 
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delegation, as illustrated in the diagram below. 
FIGURE 12 
THE DELEGATION OF HOUSEWORK 
WIFE'S RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF HOUSEWORK 
ROUTINE 
GENDER SPECIFIC GENDER NEUTRAL 
REGULAR H3/H2 H1 
Delegation in times The husband has his own 
of crisis only. helping routine and his 
Urgent jobs delegated own "specialist" role. 
in "emergency". 
IRREGULAR H2/H3 H1/H2 
Occasional delegation Occasional delegation 
if it is justified in as required. The wife is 
the circumstances. prepared to delegate 
The wife delegates "easy" "difficult" as well as 
jobs. "easy" jobs. 
As the table suggests, different sections of the sample were likely to 
adopt different practices of delegation, and, it is, perhaps, useful to 
outline these general strategies so as to emphasise the housing specific 
variations. Broadly, H3 respondents appeared to have the most precise 
definitions of gender appropriate behaviour and were most likely to have 
some kind of organising domestic routine. Not surprisingly, then, many H3 
respondents were only prepared to delegated housework if the circumstances 
justified what would normally be seen to be inappropriate behaviour. 
Accordingly, H3 husbands tended to take over a narrow range of immediately 
pressing jobs in extreme circumstances. H2 respondents arranged their 
housework rather differently. While many had a routine, few had such a 
fixed view of the meaning of "women's work". Although they were in 
principle prepared to delegate the housework, they were usually able to 
cope with it all themselves. H2 husbands consequently helped out, if at 
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all, at their wives' specific request. Most were therefore directed 
towards particular "easy" tasks. In comparison, His, especially the 
younger ones, adopted a quite different approach. Very few had what could 
be described as a fixed routine. Even those who were full-time housewives 
did their jobs as they felt like it, or as "required", rather than 
according to a daily or weekly programme. While most still ended up in 
charge of the cooking, food shopping, cleaning and laundry, few argued that 
this was because such jobs were essentially feminine or because they 
believed that husbands should not have to take on such work. Rather, the 
argument went, this was because it was more convenient that way or because 
they happened to be "better" cooks etc. than their husband. In this 
context there were apparently no cultural limits to the range of house-work 
jobs which, in principle, could be delegated. 
While described decisions about delegation reflected these general patterns 
of belief and practice, detailed arrangements were influenced by a whole 
range of technical, temporal, and subject specific factors, such as the 
nature of the family's household equipment, the organisational implications 
of preferred shopping styles, the family's normal meal time, the couples' 
working hours, etc. etc. The practical inter-relation of component tasks 
further complicated the picture. For example, food had to be bought, 
prepared, cooked, and eaten according to a certain time schedule. 
Similarly, respondents could not iron until they had washed, and that job 
had to be done before the family ran out of clean clothes. More important, 
perhaps, such self-contained sequence of events as those described above 
had to interlock such that family life continued as "normal": for example 
the family could hardly starve for two days just because the wife wanted to 
get the ironing done. This inter-relation produced a certain diffuse 
pressure on the wife. Whether she approached her jobs in a flexible or a 
rigidly routine fashion she had to ensure that all work was done "on time". 
On the other hand, those who were in charge of such a network of 
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interlocking jobs had an equally broad network of influence, and, because 
the outcome of decisions about housework had implications for other 
everyday family choices, respondents were able to order a much wider range 
of decisions than those for which they were formally responsible. As I 
shall suggest in the next section, husbands, who were typically responsible 
for one-off or irregular jobs, had nothing like this level of day-to-day 
authority or decision-making influence. 
2. DECISIONS ABOUT IRREGULAR TYPES OF HOUSEWORK 
Most household tasks which fell by default to the husbands were irregular 
jobs which demanded what were seen as specialist skills. Of course, the 
actual range of irregular repair and maintenance work varied depending on 
the size and condition of the respondent's home and on the couple's 
willingness or ability to employ relevant experts (22). Although this 
makes cross sample comparison difficult, it is still possible to review the 
kinds of circumstances in which husbands were expected to take charge, and 
to consider respondents' views of the possibility of delegating either the 
work, or, less commonly, the decision-making associated with those sorts of 
domestic responsibilities. Essentially, husbands were expected to be 
responsible for one of two types of irregular repair/maintenance work. 
First, they were obliged to resolve immediate and unpredictable problems 
occasioned by breakdown or failure: they mended broken gates, bicycles, 
windows, washing machines and hoovers. Second, they were obliged to keep 
up to date with a long term maintenance programme: cleaning out the 
gutters, painting the house, and so on. I shall consider an example of 
each of these more and less predictable types of "husband's" work so as to 
highlight the general issues that informed what were, in detail, 
idiosyncratic patterns of work and delegation. 
I shall first review respondents' accounts of the allocation and delegation 
of responsibility for dealing with household crises occasioned by 
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electrical failures. While all husbands were normally expected to wire 
plugs and replace fuses, wives occasionally faced decisions about whether 
or not to take on this responsibility so as to resolve an immediate 
problem. Their response depended on three factors: first on their own 
ability to do the work; second, on their husband's presence or absence at 
the time of the crisis and third, their view of their husband's domestic 
role and of the overall balance of domestic responsibility. 
50% of the sample (including respondents from all housing categories and of 
all ages) observed that they could change a plug and/or replace a fuse but 
that they would only take charge of such work if they were on their own and 
if the job was especially urgent. 
"Electrical stuff I know basically what to do. I'm not saying I'd do 
it .. if he's here I'd let him do it ... but I wouldn't be stuck" [H2, school age] 
"Well I'd ask him to do it. I can do it if I'm on my own I'll do it 
but if he is in I'll ask him to do it. There's not much else he does 
so I might as well let him do that. " 
[H2, pre-school age] 
The rest explained that they lacked the necessary skill, not because it was 
a naturally masculine capacity but because they had never had the need to 
learn. In effect their incapacity stood as proof of the fact that they had 
never been left to manage without a man to "take care" of them. These 
dependent respondents were obliged to wait for assistance whatever the 
nature of the crisis. 
"Oh I hate working electricals, I'm always frightened in case I do 
the wrong thing, in case I put the wrong wire in the wrong place and 
blow everything up. When he was away I got his brother to come round 
when I needed things like that doing. So no, I'm afraid to say that I 
don't know how to change a plug. " 
[H3, pre-school age] 
"Oh Gary does that I can't do things like that, I can't do anything 
like that, the fuse went in the ... I think I could change a fuse, but 
er I don't know I couldn't wire a plug on or anything like that Gary 
would have to do that when he came home.... it doesn't really worry me 
no, it doesn't bother me at all, I've got enough to do without 
changing plugs.. anyway I'd be interfering if I asked him how to do it 
so er, no,. he does that. " 
[H3, school age] 
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Both those who were theoretically capable and those who were dependent 
routinely expected their husband to take on the role of family electrician. 
The view described above was common. If the wife took over this job she 
would only make more work for herself and so upset the balance of his and 
her responsibilities; provided that she did not positively enjoy changing 
plugs there was no reason why she should get involved with anything other 
than emergency repairs. Essentially, then, those who were able to do such 
work were only willing to take over in extreme circumstances. If the job 
could wait, they argued, it was better to leave it for the husband so as 
not to disturb the equilibrium of the normal and appropriate balance of 
domestic responsibility. 
In comparison decisions about the allocation and delegation of 
responsibility for irregular but predictable household jobs were 
characteristically informed by a rather different array of beliefs and 
expectations. Although decorating was typically defined as husband's work, 
there was room for debate about allocation of responsibility for particular 
component tasks or about the nature and form of the wife's helping role. 
35% of the sample (a mixture of His, H2s and H3s) expected their husband to 
take charge of all the decorating work on the grounds that this was 
properly his job, or, less commonly, because they believed that he was a 
better painter and paperer than they and so better suited to the role of 
family decorator. The following examples illustrate both views. 
"I wouldn't lift a paintbrush, I don't do anything, no none at all, I 
get dressed up and go out and leave him to it. I think really it's 
his job isn't it. " 
[H3, no children, younger] 
"He does it all. I did it once and I got the wallpaper on I'd never 
been shown how to do it and he'd left this one bedroom to do. I 
thought I'll finish it while he's at work and instead of measuring it 
[the wallpaper] on the wall I cut it all before on the floor and it 
repeated ... so when I put it up it didn't match so it all had to be 
taken off. So he says 'whatever you do don't ever touch a wall again' 
so no, I know my limits. 
[H2, no children, older] 
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In these cases the wives occasionally helped out with what was agreed to be 
the husband's responsibility. Several respondents, mostly His, felt that 
they should be in attendance full-time in order to do such jobs as handing 
tools or holding tricky pieces of wallpaper in place. Others, mostly H2s 
and Has, got on with their normal domestic routine but expected to have to 
do "extra" cleaning as a consequence of their husband's decorating 
activities. The following examples illustrate both positions. 
"Usually I help him ... when my husband is doing things he's, he did a 
lot of painting as well he had a week off and I helped him. Quite 
often jobs can only be done by one person so I end up just being there 
really and just giving him tools or whatever-er usually its him that 
does it and I watch or just help. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
"Say he's emulsioning, I prepare the room and lay newspapers down. 
If he's on the ladder and he says 'I'm going into that corner next, 
move those papers', I do that you see... I make coffee when he wants a 
hot drink and then I put the rooms straight or get them ready for 
doing you see ... like most ladies do. " [H2, no children, older] 
The rest of the sample believed that there was room for choice about the 
allocation of responsibility for some or all the component decorating 
tasks. Indeed, four respondents had taken over all the associated work on 
the grounds that they had somehow managed to acquire more painting and 
decorating skills than their husbands (23). 
"He's no patience for decorating so I don't let him touch the walls. 
Well you see I was a box maker at Rowntrees and once you've done that 
you know how to put it [wallpaper] on so I do all that and he does the 
labouring. " [H2, school age] 
"Well I do most of it because I'm at home but if he's at home he might 
do some painting. He's left handed you see and he's heavy handed, he 
labours for me you see... but I usually do it when he's at work. " 
[H1, no children, younger] 
Another 20% decided that they and their husband would each take charge of 
the decoration of different areas of the house. In most of these cases 
husband and wife expected to work "together" but, having found that this 
led to disagreement, chose to revise their decorating strategy. As they 
described it, they adopted the separate room arrangement so as to avoid 
otherwise insoluble arguments about decorating standards. 
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"I do a lot of it only I'm a bit slapdash. I'm all for getting it up 
and he wants to faff around with plumb lines. His way is best, my way 
suits me better. The hall and the toilet downstairs he wasn't going 
to bother, so while he was away I did it all you see, two nights work 
that's all and he was quite pleased I think but it wasn't quite the 
way he'd have done it but if I'd had to wait for him to take the 
initiative and supervise me we'd never have got it done. We do have 
arguments about decorating and we decided the best thing to do is to 
do different rooms. Well the main problem was he is a perfectionist 
and I'm not. He just won't condescend not to do it perfect and you 
can't really fault him. You can't fault perfection can you but if 
you've got to faff around its no fun is it? He insists on taking all 
the plugs off and putting them all back on again. I just cut around 
and paint it up but the only way is for him to do a room and me to do 
another one. I don't see why I should be a perfectionist. I was quite 
happy to do it like that and if I want to decorate, if I feel so 
moved I'll do it because I enjoy it. " 
[H1, no children, younger) 
Others ended up dividing the decorating in this way because the wife chose 
to re-do particular rooms during the day time. Though the husband was 
still believed to be in charge of the decorating there were some areas 
which could be left out because they had recently been done by the wife. 
"I sometimes decide to do a room by myself. I like decorating and 
I'll sometimes do it during the week while they are both out. He 
would hang wallpaper because I'm useless at that but we tend to... He 
does a lot of it when we do the whole house. I do what I can in the 
day but most of it gets done at week-ends when we do it properly, 
which isn't often. " 
[H1, school age] 
Alternatively, 30% of the sample decided to divide the work such that 
husband and wife each took charge of separate types of decorating. 
Respondents who settled upon this strategy had either failed to work 
"together" amicably or had believed from the start that one would be a 
better painter/paperer than the other. Whatever the history of the 
arrangement, decorating responsibilities were reported to be allocated on 
grounds of expertise. Most argued that they, or their husband, just 
happened to be better at the painting than the papering (or vice versa). 
However, a few believed that certain necessary characteristics such as 
patience and dexterity were particularly feminine attributes. A sub- 
section of this group concluded that women were therefore inherently better 
painters (especially "fiddly" gloss painters) than men. Others concluded, 
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with equal conviction, that these special qualities meant that women were 
better at papering than painting. 
"He usually does all the painting. I do all the papering because we 
found we worked better that way. I'm better at papering than him. He 
doesn't like the fiddle but he is good at painting so it works out 
that way. " 
[H3, no children, younger] 
"I do the painting because I'm a bit more careful. He tends to slop 
it all over so we have each got our own roles. If we both do it 
.. like if we both try putting the paper up we are likely to lose 
tempers and everything gets a bit hot under the collar. So I would do 
the painting first and then he gets on with the papering" 
[H2, pre-school age] 
Although there was no overall pattern to the identity of those defined as 
the "expert" painter or the "expert" paperer, the described sub-divisions 
of component painting or papering responsibilities were much less varied. 
For example, those who painted "together" almost always expected the 
husband to do the emulsioning and the wife to paint the woodwork. 
Similarly, respondents who "shared" the papering expected to paste whilst 
their husbands positioned the wallpaper (24). 
Overall, the allocation of component decorating or maintainence tasks was 
ordered by respondents' perceptions of gender appropriate behaviour. 
However, these irregular jobs seemed to have rather less symbolic 
significance than, say, cooking or washing. None of the wives overtly 
objected to the very idea that they might do some of the decorating, just 
as none of the husbands absolutely refused all offers of help. Most 
sections of the sample were prepared to believe that relevant skills might 
be individually distributed even if most also expected their husbands to 
have more to do with such work than they. While the perceived possiblity 
of delegation varied depending on definitions of individual skill, 
respondents were more and less willing to take advantage of such 
opportunities depending on their view of justice and of the current balance 
of domestic responsibility. Thus wives chose not to get involved on the 
grounds that they would thereby make more (unnecessary) work for themselves 
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and would upset the notional division of labour. Interestingly, several 
respondents claimed that their husband "did" the decorating despite the 
fact that they were personally responsible for, say, all the gloss painting 
and/or for pasting the wallpaper. These wives were able to maintain the 
appearance of a balance of domestic responsibility (the wife doing the 
housework, the husband the repairing and the decorating) however much they 
helped. 
To conclude, then, beliefs about the gender specific nature of irregular 
household tasks, in combination with actual patterns of ability, ordered 
perceived possibilities of delegation. Opportunities to delegate were 
variously taken up depending on respondents' beliefs about the consequences 
of such action in terms of the overall balance of domestic responsibility 
and on the urgency of the task in question. Though many were able to do 
"their husband's" work they either chose not to get involved at all (or 
only in emergency) or defined their role as that of assistant and so 
maintained the case that both partners took on their fair share of domestic 
responsibilities (25). 
3. DECISIONS ABOUT CHILD-CARE 
In this last section I want to consider the ways in which parents made 
decisions about the allocation or delegation of responsibility for work or 
for choices particularly associated with child-care. This means that I 
shall not consider the ways in which respondents dealt with "extra" 
cleaning cooking and washing jobs which arose as a consequence of having 
more than two people living in the house (26). Equally, I am not 
concerned to document the degree to which mothers and fathers "shared" the 
work of bringing up their children. As before I am more interested in 
decision-making practices and in perceptions of choice than in the actual 
distribution of labour within the family. 
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Even having limited the focus of analysis in this way, however, the range 
of potentially relevant child-related choices was enormous. Furthermore, 
that range varied depending on the size of the family, on the age of the 
child/ren, on the parents' approach to child-care, and on the couples' 
working hours. This made it difficult to pin down a common core of child- 
related decisions which I might usefully examine. For example, only some 
parents had made decisions about, say, the nature of their child/yens' 
schooling. Others had not acknowledged this as a discrete issue or as 
something about which there was any choice, and still others were parents 
of children under the age of 5. 
Despite these complications I was able to group accounts of child-related 
decision-making into three categories. First, there were decisions about 
delegating the diffuse task of "looking after" the child; second, there 
were decisions about delegating more specific tasks, the exact nature of 
which varied depending on the child's age; and third, there were decisions 
about approaches to child rearing and discipline. 
A survey of respondents' descriptions under these broad headings 
illuminates at least some of the beliefs and expectations which informed 
perceptions of choice about child-related decision-making. I shall first 
consider the responses of parents of pre-school children and then the 
accounts provided by those whose children were of school age. 
Most mothers of pre-school age children presumed that they would routinely 
take charge of the ever present but diffuse task of "looking after" their 
offspring whether or not their husband was at home. They consequently 
made positive requests for assistance only if they were, for some reason, 
unable to manage as "normal" (27). 
"If I'm doing the ironing and he starts crying or wants something then 
I'll ask him [husband] to take him out or he will take him upstairs 
we've got a black and white TV upstairs. " 
[H3, pre-school age] 
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"A lot of men don't realise looking after kids is a full time job. You 
have to feed them, clean them, you've got to have eyes in the back of 
your head and they are a handful. A lot of fellers don't know that 
but he does. Oh yes, he has her all day on Saturday and then 
sometimes on a Friday night if they are busy I go in then [to work] 
as well. " 
[H2, pre-school age] 
The circumstances in which such delegation was believed to be legitimate 
varied. On the whole, H2s and H3s expected to have charge of their 
children unless they "had to" go to work or unless they were especially 
busy. In comparision, several of the H1 respondents, including the one 
quoted below, found that their husbands were willing to take over whether 
or not there was some extraordinary justifying reason. 
"We don't have any kind of set things ... it all just sort of falls 
into place. Robert is one of these fathers who... if he is around he 
just does things with them, he always ... whatever seems to be 
appropriate if there are any jobs or things that ought to be done with 
them he just sort of knows. " 
[H1, pre-school age] 
Views on the practicality of delegating specific tasks such as bathing, or 
changing nappies varied just as systmatically. Fathers took over such work 
if they were to hand when it needed doing and if they and their wife 
concluded that such delegation was appropriate in the circumstances. The 
described conceptions of propriety reflected respondents' beliefs about 
parenthood and about the proper roles of mother and father. Different 
sections of the sample placed different emphasis on jointness and sharing 
as opposed to gender specific behaviour and made their decisions 
accordingly. Several of the H1 respondents went out of their way to 
delegate what were still seen to be basically "their" responsibilities so 
as to share all forms of child-related labour in what they believed to be 
the "ideal" way. Most of these found that their husbands were unable to 
play as great a part in their children's lives as they would have liked 
because of their working hours. 
"Well we try to share him [son] as much as we can but obviously it's 
difficult because he [husband] is out at work all day" 
[H1, pre-school age) 
In contrast, H2 and H3 mothers maintained 8L very clear distinction between 
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tasks which they believed they could and could not delegate. Most observed 
that their husbands should not have to change a nappy, or bath the 
child/ren, although they hoped that they might receive some help with 
other more "appropriate" forms of child-care. 
"He gave them their bottle and everything like that, the thing he 
wouldn't do was change them, that's one thing, he is so squeamish he 
is terrible squeamish like that 'I'm not changing them' but apart from 
that, everything else he would do you know he would sit and nurse them 
and he would play with them he would do everything you know he would 
even take them for walks and that" 
[H2, pre-school age] 
Of course it was not always possible to maintain such ideals. Several of 
the H3 and H2 mothers "had to" return to work and so leave their husbands 
responsible for what might otherwise have counted as inappropriate jobs. 
"No no, he is quite happy with them now, he'll bath them and change 
nappies, he could do any job now... He has had to learn really. He's 
got used to it now so it doesn't bother him. Afer the first week it 
didn't bother him. " 
[H3, pre-school age] 
All these respondents agreed that the volume of work which the husband 
could legitimately refuse to take on decreased as the child got older and 
as the character of associated child-care tasks changed. 
"With a child that is out of nappies yes [he would help] but a child 
that is in nappies he doesn't want to know. He is better now he is, I 
think with already having gone through it once he is better. " 
[H2, pre-school age] 
"I think a man should show as much interest as what a woman does I 
must say my husband has shown a lot more interest since they've got 
more interesting. When they was little he hadn't much interest in 
them at all. Now he will sit and read a story on a night or he might 
do a bit of drawing with them and er such forth. " 
[H2, pre-school age] 
In particular, husbands were expected to become involved with decisions 
about the control and discipline of their children. Although most claimed 
that they had arrived at a joint definition of misbehaviour, mothers had 
much greater practical experience of implementing the agreed policy. 
Because they made most of the day-to-day decisions they built up what they 
saw as an area of special expertise. While they were keen to observe that 
their child-care policy was joint, they acknowledged that there might be 
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disagreement about its application. 
"He is just too soft with him. I think you have to, you know, you 
can't let them get away with everything. We agree about that, but he 
is too soft, he is you know we've sort of had disagreements over it 
but he lets me get on with it. " 
[H3, pre-school age] 
"Oh I do that he doesn't do that, no not really, he's too soft with 
them ... it's just the way he is, it's just in his nature. Like he'd 
tell him off for being naughty but he wouldn't think he was a naughty 
child. If I tell him, 'I say you ought to tell him off, you know he 
shouldn't do that' ... he might tell him off then but he wouldn't think 
to on his own. " 
[H2, pre-school age] 
The job of "looking after" demanded less and less parental attention as the 
child/ren got older and, at some stage, the task became so "invisible" that 
it was impossible to identify decisions about the allocation or delegation 
of this responsibility. For example, if the husband was around and the 
wife was out then he was notionally left in charge and vice versa. In 
practice, neither might notice the switch. 
Parents of school age children also found it difficult to pin down specific 
child-related areas of responsibility. The vaguest yet the most commonly 
mentioned job was that of getting the children off to school. Many of the 
component tasks (washing, cleaning and cooking) were routinely defined as 
the wife's responsibility and were only delegated in specific and unusual 
circumstances. 
"Well we both accept that it is our responsibility but because I'm 
home say if there is anything to be done for school I tend to deal 
with that because I'm more available than he is. I take her in to 
school in York at ten to eight and then I'm back here. She goes to 
York College for Girls. She is still of an age where I take her in 
but she manages the journey home. " 
[H1, school age] 
"If I'm at home I'm always up by 7.15 because I've got the children to 
get off to school so I always see them off. If I'm working [nights] 
I'm not back till 8.30 or 9 am and he has to get them up and ready for 
school but that only happens on Monday mornings. " 
[H2, school age] 
A few were obliged to transport or accompany their children to school or to 
other activities. Most, including the mother quoted below, claimed that 
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this job was shared as "convenient" 
"On Tuesday Helen goes to Brownies, on a Wednesday she goes to guides, 
on a Thursday she goes to gym and this Friday she is starting 
badminton. To Brownies there are two of us [sets of parents), to 
guides there is more than two and to gym we take it in turns. My 
husband sometimes goes, he doesn't mind... it's whatever is convenient 
really. If we go shopping at Prestos [supermarket] while she is at 
gym then he will drive. You know, you can't let them come home on 
their own so you are tied, well, you know your pattern of life 
changes" 
[H2, school age children] 
Again respondents were keen to observe that they and their husband shared 
the same ideas about how to bring up a family even if it was the wife 
rather than the husband who applied those principles. In practice the 
fathers of school age children were hardly ever involved in routine 
discipline. While most were expected to react if the child misbehaved in 
their presence, such overt deviance decreased as the child got older. The 
more common pattern was for the wife to ask for her husband's help when the 
child had done something "seriously" wrong or if the offender was a boy. 
"It's shared really. It's something we've never had to do you see 
they've never been really bad. We've never had any real bother with 
them. Oh well I says there isn't any bother with them, if there has 
been an argument in the street I tend to deal with that myself. As I 
say there hasn't been any real, and now they are older they argue 
between themselves and I can't stop them once I've said it a few times 
then Jack will say that's enough and they just stop. They tend to take 
more notice of what he says. They tend to take me for granted, they 
know they can get at me. " 
[H2, school age] 
"... the discipline of the children. That really fell very much to me 
early on and remained with me until I grew resentful about it and made 
a statement of such and we talked that out. We agreed that it was a 
shared responsibility really so there it was. It has made a change 
really ... he is much more positive, there is more communication 
between Steve and myself as to what needed to be checked and what 
shouldn't be. There is a much more positive approach on his part, 
particularly with the boys. Steve is much better than I am really I 
get more emotional about it whereas he doesn't and certainly teenage 
boys are better with a matter of fact approach than an emotional 
appeal. I think it's personality very much and I think partly that it 
is a male influence. " 
[H1, school age] 
In conclusion, different sections of the sample held characteristically 
different views of the degree to which fathers should be involved with the 
general task of "looking after" their child/ren, or with more specific 
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child-related jobs. Not all were able to arrange their own domestic lives 
in line with their ideals. Some of the H1 fathers were less involved than 
they might have liked because they spent so much time at work. Similarly, 
some of the H2 and H3 fathers were more involved than they might have 
expected because their wife had to go out to work and leave them in charge. 
Yet whatever the detail of their everyday arrangements, all parents claimed 
to "share the responsibility" of child rearing. While the mother might 
take charge of the bulk of the child-related work, most respondents were 
keen to observe that their husbands were involved with general decisions 
about strategies of child-care, about the meaning of disobedience and about 
the proper response to such misbehaviour. 
Housework and child-care 
In this chapter I have reviewed the contexts in which respondents and their 
husbands made decisions about the allocation and delegation of a selected 
range of domestic responsibilities. The pattern that emerged was one in 
which wives were typically in charge of an enormous network of inter- 
related areas of routine domestic decision-making while husbands were 
responsible for a few irregular jobs. All sections of the sample expected 
to bracket together otherwise debatable choices such that the wife took 
charge of those associated with cooking, shopping, cleaning, laundry and 
the care of the children. In other words, all respondents expected that 
they would have authority over these areas of decision-making. This meant, 
first, that almost all day-to-day decision-making was hidden from family 
view, and, second, that it was the respondent rather than her husband who 
was able to determine the outcome of those invisible choices. While all 
expected to retain control over the details of everyday family life, 
different sections of the sample had different conceptions of the grounds 
on which such a right to decide was based, and further, of the 
circumstances in which delegation would or would not be legitimate. Most 
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Has believed that they were in charge of the cooking, the cleaning, etc., 
because that was what a wife should do. From this point of view it would 
be positively wrong of the husband to have to take on such gender 
inappropriate tasks as ironing, polishing, baking or nappy changing. In 
comparison, most His, especially the younger ones, believed that while they 
did all these jobs, this was because it happened to be more convenient that 
way. From this point of view it was not inherently inappropriate for the 
husband to take on what would normally be the wife's role; it would just be 
a less efficient arrangement. Though these beliefs made little practical 
difference to the way in which responsibilities were allocated, they did 
affect perceptions of the possibility of delegating work, and, perhaps more 
important, they ordered the course of any dispute about performance or 
allocation of such work. In case of argument Has would have, for example, 
immediate recourse to what was believed to be a shared model of gender 
appropriate behaviour. A could argue that B should not behave in a certain 
way because that was not what a proper husband or wife should do in the 
circumstances. In comparison, His would have to make more elaborate and 
particular appeals to a notion of family interest, and/or to the meaning of 
convenience, efficiency or domestic justice in the present circumstances. 
Interestingly, jobs which were notionally the husband's responsibility were 
rarely presented in such gender specific terms as those used to describe 
allocation of responsibility for what was seen as "womens' work". Thus no 
respondents felt it was positively wrong for a wife to take charge of the 
painting. Indeed, most expected to have something to do with decorating on 
the grounds that the component jobs required what they believed to be 
individual rather than gender specific skills. Yet whatever the level of 
delegation, the husband was still presumed to "do" the 
decorating/repairing. It seemed that it was important to maintain such a 
view in order to sustain the notion that the total burden of domestic work 
was divided "equally". Arguments about allocation or performance of these 
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responsibilities were therefore informed by two competing themes. The idea 
that decorating skills were individual rather than gender specific 
qualities undermined the value of an appeal to the absolute legitimacy of 
the husband's role as decorator. However, if couples were to divide 
domestic responsibilities "equally", then most believed that such work 
should fall to the husband rather than the wife. If that were the case 
then there were hardly any circumstances which might legitimately justify 
the total delegation of what were characteristically irregular, one-off 
tasks. 
In sum, wives from all sections of the sample typically took charge of a 
massive portion of the day-to-day decision-making, either because this was 
more convenient or efficient, or on the grounds that this was properly 
"their" job. This gave respondents an unquestioned authority over all 
those areas of decision-making for which they were responsible and an 
influence which spread even further. In comparison husbands had few areas 
of equivalent control. They were typically expected to have overall 
responsibility for such work as the decorating and/or repairing, and 
sometimes the discipline of children who had commited a "serious" offence. 
However, these jobs were irregular, often unpredictable, and certainly 
unrelated to each other. The resulting pockets of associated authority 
never combined to form a base of day-to-day control such as that which 
characterised the wife's position in the family. 
397 
CHAPTER 10: NOTES 
1. In other words, I am not concerned with questions about the equality (or 
otherwise) of the division of domestic labour, about the amount of 
housework done by husband and wife, or about the time which each spends on 
such activities. 
2. By "authority" I mean the legitimate right to decide. 
3. Here I am using the term "power" to refer to A's ability to get B to do 
what B would not otherwise do, in case of overt dispute. 
4. See chapter 1 
5. As Janet Radcliffe Richards has noted, advocates of the argument that 
women's work (including housework) ought to be re-evaluated and accorded a 
higher status have on the whole failed to make explicit the definitions of 
value embedded in this position. She writes: "We have first to decide 
whether the work is of a kind which ought to be highly valued, or whether 
it is possible for it to be highly valued. Those are questions which ought 
to be answered before any practical attempt is made to get people to value 
women's work... " (Richards, 1980, p159) 
6. The level at which the dependence argument is pitched varies. For 
example, Benston writes "in a society in which money determines value, 
women are a group who work outside the money economy. Their work is not 
worth money, is therefore valueless, is therefore not even real work" 
(Benston, 1980, p121). In comparison, Hunt locates her version of this 
argument at an immediate everyday level: "With the cessation of outside 
employment the domestic worker becomes excessively dependent on the 
breadwinner. This dependency takes several forms, the most obvious of 
which is financial dependency" (Hunt, 1980, p37). Either way the case is 
that women's responsibility for unpaid housework, and the associated 
dependency and devaluation, represent key dimensions of their oppression. 
7. Some of those who have been concerned with the allocation of housework 
have documented differences in the respective roles of husband and wife. 
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This work, which is not necessarily informed by a feminist commitment, has 
classified domestic arrangements as joint, segregated (Bott, 1957), 
traditional, modern or symmetrical (Young and Willmott, 1957,1973). 
Attention has focused on the degree to which husbands "help" with what are 
traditionally feminine roles (and, occasionally, vice versa). In criticism 
of this work, or at least of that which implies that housework is 
increasingly "shared", feminist writers have observed that the underlying 
patterns of responsibility remain the same despite superficial changes in 
domestic behaviour. For example, Oakley writes: "Housewives are sharply 
aware of the fact that, however much or little husbands may share domestic 
tasks with them, the responsibility for getting the work done remains 
theirs" (Oakley, 1974, p92). Poliert presents a similar case: "with most 
women it became apparent that 'sharing' meant a limited delegation of 
specific tasks to their husbands while they bore the responsibility for the 
endless, undefined, niggling work. " (Poliert, 1981, p115) 
8. As Oakley observes: "Housework is not a single activity. It is a 
collection of heterogenous tasks which demand a variety of skills and kinds 
of action. Washing a floor contrasts with shopping for groceries, peeling 
potatoes with washing dirty socks and planning a week's meals" (Oakley, 
1976, p48). For my purposes this is significant in that the kinds of 
decisions associated with each component task vary considerably. 
9. Few writers have attended to the way in which component tasks are 
inter-related both in terms of time and in terms of function. In this 
context the work of Berk and Berk is especially interesting. They write 
"We shall consider the degree to which activities necessarily interlock 
with one another (eg., one must wash dishes before drying them) and what 
this implies about the constraints placed on people's household lives.. How 
are meal preparation, child ccare, and more general housework sequenced 
and/or integrated with one another? " (Berk and Berk, 1979, p13) 
10. Circumstantial events which might legitimate delegation had more and 
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less impact depending on respondents' domestic routines. For example, 
those who felt that they had to do x by time y might seek assistance if 
that was not possible. In comparison, those who were prepared to fit in 
job x as "convenient" were less likely to feel that they might legitimately 
ask for help. In addition, those who had a rigid routine had an equally 
precise notion of success and failure. If they did not keep up with their 
self-imposed schedule then, by definition, they were failing to do their 
job properly. Those who adopted a more flexible approach had a 
correspondingly elastic definition of failure. 
11. As Delphy (1979), Kerr (1986) and Murcott (1983) have acknowledged, 
this does not mean that the wife's decisions were made without reference to 
her knowledge of the husband's preference. It is of course difficult to 
identify the nature of this indirect influence or to evaluate its "agenda 
setting" significance. While an analysis of such "invisible" nondecision- 
making processes would prove interesting, I am currently concerned with 
respondents' accounts of the kinds of choice associated with overt, jointly 
debatable domestic decisions; not with those which were simply made as a 
matter of course by the relevant authoritative figure. 
12. In both cases this was possible because the husband elected to do the 
supermarket shopping on the grounds that this was the lesser of two evils. 
One picked the shopping rather than the child-care option but expected to 
be relieved of this responsibility when his son was older. The other went 
shopping in his lunch hour so as to avoid "wasting" time at the week-end. 
13. In particular, married women were not "allowed" to carry heavy bags of 
shopping. The view described below was common. 
"Oh yes we always go together. He says 'you are not to carry anything 
heavy' so this is lovely and I've always had to struggle with, he 
can't realise that I've done all my own shopping before I married 
him. " 
[H1, no children, older] 
14. To some degree, then, the perceived practicality of delegating cooking 
responsibilities depended on the types of meals which respondents expected 
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to consume. In this context it is important to observe that H3s and H2s 
routinely prepared rather simpler meals than did His. 
15. As I noted above, the wife's decisions about what to buy and so about 
what to cook may be informed by a knowledge of her husband's preferences 
and tastes. However, most of these decisions were made "automatically" 
and were only the subject of family debate if the result did not meet with 
the husband's approval. Dobash and Dobash (1980) describe such dispute. 
16. Another 10% of H2s and H3s were sometimes in this position depending 
on their husbands' shifts. 
17. In practice decisions about what was or was not clean were routinely 
made by the wife in the course of her normal cleaning/tidying work. It was 
she who determined the tidying routine (if any), she who noticed the dust, 
and she who then dusted. While husband and wife might have different 
definitions of what was and what was not clean, it seems that-the wife's 
standards were typically "higher" than those of her husband. The house was 
therefore usually "tidier" than the husband would have deemed necessary. 
Several wives observed that their husband's standards were so low that he 
could not be relied upon to acknowledge that it was time to clean. While 
they could perhaps delegate some of the component cleaning jobs, very few 
expected to be able to delegate the associated decision-making, as the 
following examples illustrate. 
"He could do anything if he had to. Oh yes, but I mean he wouldn't 
think of doing things, like my big Welsh dresser we moved yesterday 
and you'd be surprised what was underneath there, but I don't think, 
no he wouldn't think to move it... I don't think any man would... Well 
yes I think women would be [tidier]t' 
[H1,16+J 
"He is quite good. Some things he knows need doing, like the washing 
up, if I'm at work he'll do that or he'll clean the cooker sometimes. 
He is quite good in that respect but he would never dream of going 
into the sitting room and shaking the cushions or moving dead flowers, 
or dusting. If the dust was an inch thick he wouldn't notice it, he 
wouldn't do anything about it, and I've known flowers if I've had 
flowers in and they have died unless I move them, ... I once left them 
for a few days and you know they just ... they would have stayed there 
forever if I hadn't moved them but he doesn't notice things like that. 
That's typical of men I think... but yes he is quite good, if I said 
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'right now in the morning would you put the vacuum on please and dust 
round and make sure its tidy' he would do that. " 
[H1,16+] 
18. While working wives expected "additional" assistance, there was always 
a limit to what counted as legitimate delegation. Even those who employed 
a cleaning lady observed that there were still some jobs which they felt 
obliged to do themselves. 
"I had a house-keeper when I was working but there are so many jobs 
only a mum can do, you know cleaning the bath, and doing the dustbins, 
and the cooker and things like that so it was hard work but very 
enjoyable. " 
[H1,16+] 
19. The meaning of "help" depended on the couple's definition of 
"cleaning" as opposed to "normal, considerate social behaviour". For 
example, if everyone was expected to fold their own clothes or to put away 
their own books and papers then the fact that the husband behaved in this 
way could not be taken as evidence of his willingness to "help". He was 
simply behaving "properly". In comparision, respondents who normally 
expected to have to pick up all the dirty clothes would define, say, their 
husband's sock hunting behaviour as "help". 
20. Yeandle reports similar views: "Other men were reluctant to undertake 
tasks which they identified as 'a woman's job', and several women reported 
their husbands' refusal to do any domestic task which was publicly visible" 
(Yeandle, 1984, p145) 
21. Writers on domestic technology, for example, Bose, Berano and Malloy 
(1984), Ravetz (1965), Busch (1983), Thrall (1982), Vaneck (1978) and 
Davidoff (1976) have variously examined the degree to which "labour saving 
devices" in fact reduce the time spend on housework, the ways in which such 
technology alters definitions of cleanliness, and the social histories of 
the development of particular pieces of household equipment. Curiously 
very little attention has been paid to the relationship between 
technological development and changes in perceptions of the gender 
specificity of particular household tasks. For example, if the washing 
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machines do the washing, then the washing is no longer the wife's job. In 
this context, husbands may well be asked to become involved with an area of 
domestic work which was previously firmly demarcated as "feminine". 
Perhaps "labour saving" devices are of more significance in this respect 
than in the degree to which they literally minimise the time spent doing 
particular sorts of domestic labour. 
22. For example, some expected to clean out the gutters/sweep the 
chimney/have a go at mending the washing machine themselves while others 
expected to pay for such services. More important perhaps, different 
sections of the sample drew this line with reference to characteristically 
different criteria. His and some H2s chose to pay someone to do work which 
they (or their husband) did not enjoy doing, or which was for some reason 
inconvenient.. In comparison, H3s and some H2s only selected this option 
when they were for some reason unable to do the work themselves. Of the 
four who employed a decorator, or whose decorating was done by a friend or 
relative, two (both H2s) claimed that they were too old to do their own 
painting while the other two observed that this was an awkward or 
unpleasant job which they preferred not to do themselves. The following 
examples illustrate both views. 
"Our Derek [son] comes to do it. We wish we could do our own because 
everybody has their own work to do but as I say, we've a great family" 
[H2,16+] 
"We got somebody in to do it for us because it was putting up 
wallpaper and that is a tricky operation. In any case I don't think 
we would do it ourselves, no, not with a small baby, it is just 
impractical. " 
[H1, pre-school age] 
23. Because these four normally got on with the decorating whilst their 
husband was at work they were consequently unable to rely on their partner 
for the kind of clearing up or labouring help which the decorating husbands 
were able to ask for or expect. 
24. These general patterns were occasionally modified with reference to the 
other equally common expectation that wives could not climb ladders. 
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25. Those who allocated domestic responsibilities with reference to a 
fixed notion of the proper role of husband and wife usually believed that 
the resulting division of labour was "naturally" just. In comparison, 
those who concluded that housework was "just work" were obliged to take 
steps to ensure that component jobs were distributed fairly. Actions which 
threatened to upset the balance (ie. attempts to interfere) were of 
different significance depending on the grounds on which that "just" 
division of labour was based. 
26. Although it might be difficult for respondents to distinguish between 
housework and child-care work, it was possible to identify decisions which 
were essentially child-related. That is not to deny that respondents felt 
that the the two tasks "merged". As Oakley notes: "The two jobs are 
carried out simultaneously, and there is a general lack of differentiation" 
(Oakley, 1974, p172). In practice, the detail of the merger depended on 
the precise nature of the child-care component. Unlike housework, this 
task changed as the children got older. 
27. Hunt describes the position in these terms: "If the mother is to have 
time away from her children, in almost every case she has to make the 
arrangements which permit her absence; and the very act of arranging this 
transfer of responsibility is in itself an acknowledgement that the primary 
responsibility is her own" (Hunt, 1980, p51). Allen also observes that 
fathers remain "peripheral in terms of everyday responsibility" (Allen, 
1985, p12). 
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CHAPTER 11 
FAMILIES, POWER AND DECISION-MAKING 
In this concluding chapter I shall consider some general characteristics of 
respondents' descriptions of domestic decision-making conflict and, more 
important, of the contexts ordering the course of such dispute. The first 
two sections of the chapter review the overall patterns of similarity and 
difference in terms of the form and location of particular decisions and 
associated perceptions of choice. I shall suggest, on the basis of the 
material presented in chapters 5 to 10, that different sections of the 
sample faced characteristically different family decisions, and that 
described perceptions of choice varied just as systematically. Such 
patterns of decision-making and perceptions of choice are important 
because, as argued in chapters 1,3 and 4, they order the form and likely 
course of decision-related disputes and so structure domestic power 
relations. My first task, then, is to outline the general patterns which 
emerge from the preceding chapters. Having done so I shall go on to draw 
out some of the implications of this research material with reference first 
to feminist and then to more general sociological analyses of power 
relations. Sections 3 and 4, therefore, reconsider some of the issues 
raised in chapter 1, but now in the light of the summary presented in the 
first half of this chapter. 
Of course, areas of similarity and difference can be distinguished in any 
number of ways depending on the informing critiera employed. I have chosen 
to summarise the material of chapters 5 to 10 with reference to two key 
issues. First, respondents' perceptions of the kind of choice associated 
with a series of common decisions (1). Second, the ways in which different 
sections of the sample allocated areas of domestic authority, so bracketing 
together otherwise debatable domestic decisions (2). If I am now to 
examine the general characteristics of domestic decision-making, it clearly 
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is important to consider variation in both these areas. Note, however, 
that I am only concerned to highlight the most obvious aspects of 
similarity and difference, and that this chapter inevitably neglects some 
of the complexities of domestic decision-making practices documented in 
earlier chapters. 
1. AREAS OF SIMILARITY 
There proved to be relatively little cross sample regularity in 
respondents' perceptions of choice associated with the decisions documented 
in chapters 5 (family and career), 6 (house and home), 7 (leisure) and 8 
(holidays). In other words, there were few issues about which all sections 
of the sample appeared to share basically the same definitions of choice 
(3). Not surprisingly, the few areas of genuine overlap arose in relation 
to what were widely believed to be the most important of all domestic 
decisions: decisions about starting a family, about family size and those 
which were informed by notions of family obligation. This is not to 
suggest that such decisions were made in similar domestic contexts; only 
that, compared with, say, choices about leisure time, holiday making, house 
buying or furnishing, these areas of choice seemed to function within a 
common core of informing belief and a common definition of appropriate 
behaviour. Although views about family size and structure varied, all 
respondents described what they saw as the ideal arrangement with reference 
to two beliefs: one revolving around a positive evaluation of 
"unselfishness" and the other concerning welfare of children. Given these 
convictions, few believed that there was any doubt about how they ought to 
design their family which was generally expected to consist of two parents 
and two children. Provided that the couple could afford it, this was the 
option which was believed to most closely meet the demands imposed by 
beliefs about parental unselfishness and the welfare of children. Most 
respondents also expected that their first child would be born somewhere 
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between three and five years after marriage and that the second would 
"arrive" about two years later. The fact that different housing and age 
groups evidenced varied beliefs about their capacity to actually control 
family planning did nothing to undermine frequent articulation of this 
ideal or its associated rationalisations. 
While different sections of the sample faced different sorts of employment 
related choices, few parents believed that they had any alternative but to 
choose the option which most closely met the demands imposed by their 
family priorities. Thus, all sections of the sample believed that fathers 
"ought" to take the best paid job available and that mothers' career 
choices "ought" to be ordered, if not determined, by their family 
obligations. In detail, however, hierarchies of family versus other types 
of domestic or personal priority differed. Some believed, for example, 
that children's education was more important than income, or that living 
near friends and family was more important than promotion. However, few 
respondents believed that they had any choice about decisions which were 
directly informed by such powerful beliefs as those about "normal" family 
life or the welfare of children. 
Although other discrete decisions were seen to involve similar types of 
generalised commitment - decisions about holdiays, for example, were 
frequently informed by an overall vision of proper holiday making - they 
always allowed some scope for "personal preference" type perceptions as 
well as for definitions of "no choice". In comparison, decisions about 
family size and structure were more immediately constrained by a common, 
yet fairly precise, model of a normal family career. Similarly, parents' 
decisions about their own employment were directly ordered by common 
conceptions of family priority. While there were other areas of overlap, 
these were the most striking both in the sense that choices were uniformly 
and directly ordered by a model of what should happen, and in the sense 
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that most respondents agreed about the content of that informing model. 
As chapters 9 and 10 suggest, there was also little variation in the ways 
in which domestic responsibilities and areas of associated authority were 
divided and allocated. Chapter 9 explored the implications of methods of 
financial mangement in terms of individual access to what was seen as 
independently disposable money and in terms of the allocated responsibility 
for different categories of expenditure. Whatever the other differences 
(4), all four key forms of financial management (joint and separate 
accounts, "taken from" and "given to" systems of housekeeping) permitted, 
and indeed favoured, what were essentially the same patterns of spending 
responsibility. Husband and wife took charge of much the same kinds of 
shopping however they managed their money. Thus, all wives had access to 
money which could, and in some cases should, be spent on family food. 
Equally, all husbands had access to money which could, and perhaps should, 
be used to pay the bill when the couple went out for a meal or for a drink. 
In addition, the wife's own income (if any) was defined as "extra", 
whatever the sums involved and whatever the method of financial management. 
In effect, then, all accounts of domestic finance reflected the common 
assumption that it was the husband's job to earn the family income and the 
wife's job to spend it. Everyday financial decisions were bracketed 
together in ways which reflected these beliefs. So, different sections of 
the sample parcelled out areas of financial responsibility in extremely 
similar ways regardless of their chosen method of financial management. 
This meant that all respondents described what were essentially common 
patterns of "visible" and "invisible" choice about expenditure and family 
finance. 
Furthermore, almost all respondents were in charge of much the same range 
of everyday domestic responsibilities. As described in the chapter on 
housework and child-care, wives were usually responsible for, and so 
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accorded the right to make decisions about, cooking, cleaning, washing and 
child-care. Although such arrangements were reportedly informed by a wide 
range of different beliefs about marriage as a partnership, about sharing, 
equality and justice as well as about gender and role appropriate 
behaviour, the end results were remarkably uniform. While the everyday 
meaning of domestic tasks and the perceived possibility of delegation 
varied according to housing and age, the division of labour and associated 
patterns of responsibility was broadly similar. The location and form of 
domestic dispute about matters of responsibility was structured 
accordingly. 
Thus far, then, I have identified decisions about which almost all 
respondents shared the same perception of choice, or, rather, of "no 
choice". Essentially these were decisions which were directly informed by 
a cluster of beliefs about normal family life and welfare of children. I 
also observed that respondents from all sections of the sample divided and 
allocated areas of domestic responsibilty and authority in much the same 
way. This meant that the form and likelihood of debate about domestic 
decision-making was structured by a similarly general network of routines 
and taken-for-granted expectations. In many respects, to be sure, the 
material and cultural worlds in which these ordering beliefs and routines 
had effect varied dramatically. Yet, despite such differences, common 
conceptions of normal family life and common domestic habits structured the 
perceptions of choice associated with, a considerable range of domestic 
decision-making. 
2. AREAS OF DIFFERENCE 
This section highlights some of the more significant dimensions of 
difference and considers the decision-making implications of cross sample 
variations in terms of both the location and visibility of particular 
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decisions and associated perceptions of choice. The interview material 
documented in chapters 5,6,7 and 8 illustrated, among other things, the 
variety of social and material contexts in which apparently similar 
decisions were set. Decisions about holiday making illustrate the point. 
While all respondents made choices about holidays, different sections of 
the sample held quite different views about the meaning of a holiday and, 
consequently, described contrasting holiday-going aspirations. In this 
respect, as in others, informing definitions of "normality" differed, 
though they always functioned to order the location of potentially 
contentious decisions and so structured associated perception of choice. To 
continue with the holiday example, those sections of the sample with pre- 
school age children believed that they had "no choice" about holiday 
accomodation: they had to be self-catering because of the children. In 
other family contexts, however, there was room for real debate about 
holiday accomodation. Similarly, those Has who wanted a foreign holiday 
had to make that decision some months in advance, and had to make a set of 
related choices about how to save the necessary finance and about how much 
they could afford. However, having made what was seen as an essentially 
financial decision, few then described any doubt about exactly which 
country to visit (Spain being the automatic choice) or what to do when they 
got there. In comparison, His, who were ususally "free" of such strictly 
financial problems, described holiday-going choices in terms of selecting 
one rather than another country and/or one rather than another style of 
touring. Differences in the location of component decisions were just as 
evident in respondents' accounts of, for example, choices about leisure, or 
about house buying. In a sense, then, different respondents lived in what 
were effectively different decision-making worlds. Issues which were 
routinely taken-for-granted by some were highly visible and sometimes 
contentious for others. Equally, what some respondents believed to be 
viable options were quite inconceivable for others. The actual list of 
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"visible" and debatable as opposed to taken-for-granted and routine 
decisions about, say, leisure, furnishing, holidays, house buying or 
career, varied from one section of the sample to another. This is 
important in that such patterns of visibility ordered issues which might 
become subjects of overt dispute and which might provide occasions for an 
exercise of "one dimensional" power. Furthermore, such patterns ordered 
the potential in any situation for agenda setting and domestic nondecision- 
making (5). 
Reported perceptions of choice associated with certain commonly visible 
decisions were just as varied. As I observed in chapters 1,3 and 4 
respondents' definitions of relevant capacities appeared to depend on their 
perception of the kind of choice associated with the decision in question. 
Arguments about matters of preference were characteristically resolved with 
reference to a different set of resources compared to those -which were 
marshalled in cases of dispute about, say, matters of appropriate behaviour 
or about issues in which there was deemed to be "no choice". If different 
sections of the sample saw the same issue in different ways then each would 
arrive at a different definition of relevant capacities with respect to 
that issue. Overall, His, H2s, and Has did believe themselves to have 
different types of choice in relation to what were formally similar 
decision-making issues. For example, H1 respondents, especially those 
without children, explained that they made choices about their own career 
plans on grounds of personal preference. In comparison, H2 and H3 
respondents typically observed that they had "no choice" but to take 
whatever suitable work they could find. Broadly the picture was one in 
which His believed themselves to have rather more control over their 
everyday decision-making than did the other sections of the sample. 
Accordingly, they claimed to make what were essentially personal choices 
about their social lives, their employment, their furniture, their house, 
etc. etc. Each believed that their lifesyle was the product of a series of 
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individual choices, the outcome of which varied depending on their own 
idiosyncratic interests and preferences. At the other extreme, H3 
respondents, especially the older ones, presented a rather more fatalistic 
account of their decision-making processes. That is not to say that they 
were unhappy with the results; only that they tended to believe that the 
outcome was determined by factors beyond their personal control. Thus, 
this section of the sample explained that they changed jobs as a 
consequence of what were seen to be externally imposed pressures, that they 
then took whatever job was on offer at the time, that their children "came 
along", that they always went out to the same pub every Friday night, 
always with the same friends, etc. etc. 
Similarly, although the concrete outcomes were much the same, different 
sections of the sample offered characteristically different accounts of how 
they had come to allocate their domestic responsibilities. His and some 
H2s claimed that their arrangement was simply the most convenient given 
their particular domestic circumstances, whilst H3s and the remaining H2s 
maintained that they "automatically" allocated domestic work in what they 
believed to be the "proper" way. 
I can roughly plot the accounts provded by each section of the sample on an 
amended version of the diagram with which I concluded chapter 4. This 
allows me to illustrate the perceptions of choice characteristically 
defined by His, H2s and Has. If each dot represents respondents' 
perceptions of the type of choice associated with a particular decision 
then the overall distribution might look something like this. 
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FIGURE 13 
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This summary diagram should not be interpreted to mean that His necessarily 
argued more because, as they saw it, fewer decisions were determined by 
factors beyond their control or constrained by conventional expectations of 
appropriate behaviour. The point is, rather, that because His tended to 
face what they saw as more "open" decisions they resolved disputes with 
reference to particular sorts of capacities. Very broadly, different 
capacities were more or less likely to have effect as resources in 
different sections of the sample because each section was likely to take a 
different view of the kinds of choice associated with particular domestic 
decision-making issues. 
In sum, then, different sections of the sample made choices in what were in 
many respects different cultural, social and material worlds. This meant 
that the character of visible and potentially debatable decisions varied. 
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Choices which were routine for some were the subject of joint discussion in 
other domestic contexts. Although it would be possible to isolate certain 
choices on grounds of their characteristic visibility - for example, some 
sections of the sample (mostly Has) faced decisions about which TV channel 
to watch, while others (mostly H1s) equated the on/off decision with that 
of programme selection - it is difficult to detect any general pattern to 
the kinds of discrete decisions which each section of the sample took-for- 
granted, or acknowledged as "visible". 
In comparision, there was some apparent order to variations in perceptions 
of choice associated with the kind of deicisions discussed in chapters 5 to 
8. Very generally, His seemed to define decisions as open "matters of 
preference" rather more frequently than respondents from other sections of 
the sample. At the other extreme, H3s typically believed that they had "no 
choice" about the outcome of many of their routine domestic decisions. This 
pattern was significant in that it was likely to order respondents' 
definitions of relevant capacities and so structure the form of associated 
disputes. Note, however, that perceptions of choice also varied with the 
subject at issue, and that the pattern described above is therefore of the 
most general kind. 
3. POWER, DECISION-MAKING AND WOMEN'S POSITION IN THE FAMILY 
I shall now give some thought to the implications of this research for an 
account of women and power within the family. This is a speculative 
exercise, not least because the research could be variously interpreted 
depending on the observer's view of power and so of women's "real 
interests". I want to suggest that the kinds of conclusions which might be 
reached with the aid of a definition of power which depends on a 
generalised theory of disadvantage (in this case of women's disadvantage) 
are of a different order compared with those which might result from an 
f 
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analysis informed by a concern with the structure of the social world in 
which particular individuals secure particular preferences. 
As suggested in the first two sections of this chapter, the "visibility" 
and type of choice associated with particular domestic decisions seemed to 
be informed by a series of common beliefs about proper family life. 
Despite these areas of overlap, however, there were also systematic 
differences in perceptions of choice as those were characteristically 
expressed by each housing section of the sample. To make such observations 
relevant to a generalised account of women's position in the family the 
observer has to make certain assumptions about both the character of 
respondents' accounts and about the nature of women's real interests. In 
this context it is useful to outline three alternative interpretations of 
the research material, each of which reflect a different view of the 
respondents' accounts, of domestic power relations, and of women's real 
interests. Consider first the conclusions which might be reached by those 
who presume that respondents' accounts are in some way illustrative of 
women's real position in the family. Those who took this view could claim 
that all women, respondents included, are in fact disadvantaged in the 
domestic context. The argument would be that women are unable to realise 
their "real interests" because of the networks of routine, belief, and 
material inequality which constitute their domestic world/s. Given this 
initial "knowledge" of disadvantage, analysis of the interview material 
would be pitched at a level general enough to incorporate the described 
cross-sample differences. So, for example, differences in accounts of the 
allocation and delegation of responsibility for cooking or cleaning could 
be seen as variations in the form of what is basically the same underlying 
system of patriarchal power. Accordingly, the interview material could be 
treated as a whole, as an undifferentiated assembly of evidence of women's 
powerlessness in the family. What is reported simply confirms what is 
already known to be the case, though perhaps in more detail, or with 
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reference to previously unexplored issues. From this point of view 
respondents' accounts, like all other information about everyday domestic 
habits, could be said to further document our understanding of women's 
powerless position within the family. 
The second option is to limit the analysis of power to a study of overt 
dispute. If this strategy were adopted, it would only be possible to talk 
of women's powerful or powerless position if it were possible to establish 
that all women were in fact unable to realise their stated preferences in 
the domestic context. For example, if all explictly objected to the 
notion that they should be responsible for housework, then beliefs and 
expectations which left them with "no choice" but to take on that 
responsibility might be said to work to their collective disadvantage. It 
is difficult to see how one might collect the data needed to. support a 
claim about the powerlessness or otherwise of the category "women". The 
interview material provides only a tiny fraction of the necessary 
information and so makes a correspondingly minute contribution to this sort 
of an analysis of women's position of power within the family. However, 
even this limited range of interview data serves to raise a general issue 
which would face those concerned to reach some evaluation of power on the 
basis of information about stated preferences. Imagine, for a moment, that 
there was some vast database of the preferences of all women. Imagine, 
too, that domestic decision-making contexts were systematically varied in 
something like the fashion documented in this thesis. If all women had the 
same stated preferences, then the argument would have to be that some wives 
were more disadvantaged with respect to their husbands than others, since 
the domestic worlds which ordered the realisation or otherwise of those 
preferences certainly differed. Alternatively, if the argument were that 
all women were equally disadvantaged, that is if all were equally unable to 
realise their stated preferences, then the observer would have to presume 
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that those preferences were systematically varied. 
Finally, one could suggest that the contextual regularities identified in 
the interview material might if generalisable, serve to the disadvantage 
of all women who found themselves in certain decision-making circumstances. 
As I argued in concluding chapter 4, those who have superior access to 
capacities, that is to means which might have effect as resources, have 
potential power. If husbands had more capacities than their wives, they 
would have greater potential power. Yet, as I also observed, the relation 
between potential and actual power is extremely complicated, and appeared 
to be ordered by two critical factors. The first was the level of 
opposition. If there was no opposition, perhaps because decisions were 
automatically taken by the relevant authoritative figure or simply because 
the potential opponent was disinterested or indifferent, then there was no 
occasion for an exercise of actual power and no reason to realise the 
potential. The second factor was the definition of "relevant" capacities. 
Different capacities were believed to be of more and less relevance in 
relation to different sorts of contentious decision-making. The ability to 
make use of capacities therefore depended on definitions of relevance, 
which they in turn related to participants' perceptions of the type of 
choice associated with what proved to be contentious decisions.. Patterns 
of actual advantage therefore reflect a combination of a) personal 
preferences and levels of opposition, b) the distribution of capacities, 
and c) contextual patterns of perception of choice, location of decision, 
informing beliefs and expectations. Even if all women had less potential 
power than all men (ie. fewer capacities), variations in the factors 
ordering the realisation of that potential complicate the picture such that 
potential cannot be equated with actual power. The mediating variables 
which order conversion of potential to actual power are thus critical. 
In this context it is important to note that respondents' abilities to 
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realise potential power appeared to be systematically structured according 
to housing and age. If this pattern were generalisable, then, by 
implication, wives with the same capacities and the same preferences would 
have different chances of getting their way depending on their membership 
of a particular age or housing class. If this were the case, it might be 
possible to characterise the key features of typical domestic contexts and 
to conclude that, say, those in a position equivalent to that of the H1 
category would be likely to face decisions x, y and z, and to define 
capacities p, q and r as "relevant" in those decision-making circumstances. 
Of course, documentation of such contexutal regularities would not in 
itself reveal the distribution of actual power. That could only be 
identified if it were also possible to predict preferences and levels of 
opposition. 
In sum, then, there may well be gender differences in access to capacities 
which might prove relevant in case of overt dispute. However, the 
significance of this differential distribution appears to depend on a 
complex network of factors which intervene in the process of actualising 
potential power. These ordering factors appear to vary systematically 
across my sample. However, even if this variation is generalisable, it 
would be impossible to arrive at any general conclusion about women's 
position of power, for such a claim would also depend on knowledge of 
personal preferences and levels of opposition. 
I have suggested that it would be possible to interpret the research 
material with reference to three sorts of arguments about women's position 
of power. First, the interview data could used to illustrate what is 
"known" to be women's oppressed position. Because this position is founded 
on a prior and essentially moral definition of women's real interests there 
is no room for debate about the nature of domestic power relations. 
Arguments which do not rest on prior definitions of real interests follow 
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one of two routes. First, statements about power relations can be limited 
to statements about instances in which individuals were unable to realise 
their stated preferences. While the observer might be able to make some 
estimate of the relative power of individual respondents, it is impossible 
to generalise from this so as to arrive at any wider conclusion about 
women's position of power. Alternatively, the analyst can broaden the 
scope of enquiry and attend to dimensions of the social worlds which order 
individual's abilities to secure particular preferences in particular 
domestic circumstances. Of course, to observe that the context of conflict 
is systematically ordered is not to conclude that patterns of actual power 
correspond. In other words, conclusions which concern features of the 
ordering social world do not necessarily translate into conclusions about 
consequent advantage. However, statements about the contexts of conflict 
can be pitched at a general level and while they are not strictly about 
women's position of power they do describe critical dimensions of the 
social worlds in which particular husbands and wives actually exercise 
power. 
4. POWER AND DECISION-MAKING 
In this final section I want to review those issues which relate more 
directly to the sociology of-power. There is evidently much to be gained 
from an exploration of power in the family context. Whatever else it might 
do, such an exercise highlights a number of critical issues which are 
routinely ignored even by those who are concerned to consider family 
relations in terms of inequality and injustice. In chapter 1I suggested 
that those who want to identify an exercise of power (defined in the 
oppositional terms of A getting B to do what B would not otherwise do) 
regardless of the views of the parties involved, are obliged to identify 
the relevant counterfactual. That is, they are obliged to arrive at some 
conclusion about what would have happened if it were not for A's presumed 
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exercise of power. While statements about women's powerless position in 
the family are rarely advanced with reference to an explicit view of how 
the world would be if it were not for, say, a system of patriarchal power, 
some such notion, and so some conception of women's real interests, 
implicitly underlies all such argument. It is important to acknowledge 
this characteristic of oppositional accounts of power which seek to go 
beyond a simple "one dimensional" analysis. 
For the reasons developed in chapter 1, I chose to concentrate on the 
context of conflict and to order that analysis without reference to 
questions of advantage or disadvantage. While I reserved the term power to 
describe instances of overt conflict, I was primarily concerned to consider 
the ways in which those instances were ordered by networks of domestic 
routine, perceptions of choice, and definitions of relevant capacities. 
This strategy permitted an analysis of power relations and of the ordering 
domestic worlds in which power was exercised in terms which did not embody 
assumptions about the real interests of husband or wife but which did go 
beyond analysis restricted to situations of overt dispute. 
My research suggests that respondents' perceptions of kinds of choice 
seemed to provide the critical link in a chain connecting context to 
conflict. Focus on this part of the decision-making sequence was 
particularly useful in that it also drew attention to the second critical 
power related issue identified in chapter 1: the relation between 
responsible action and structural determination. I suggested that A got B 
to do what B would not otherwise do in case of overt dispute with the aid 
of what were defined as A's relevant capacities. In this limited sense, 
the exercise of power did depend on "responsible action" and, as I was 
using the term, an attribution of power was also an attribution of total or 
partial responsibility for certain consequences (Lukes, 1974, p56). 
However, this was only a small part of the more general picture with which 
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I was concerned. The factors which ordered the outcome of domestic 
disputes, and which included the definition of relevant capacities, were 
complex, but clearly related to respondents' perceptions of the kinds of 
choice at issue. These perceptions of choice were in turn ordered by such 
variables as domestic routine, identification of external pressure, and 
definitions of appropriate behaviour. These contextual components could 
usefully be seen to belong in a kind of limbo, not entirely determined by 
individual action nor yet entirely fixed by factors beyond individual 
control. Rather, structuring patterns of regularity, domestic order, and 
taken-for-granted expectation could be seen in such a way as to blur the 
presumed distinction between responsible action and structural 
determination, between agency and structure (6). 
The diagram below illustrates the of model of power which emerges from the 
above observations. The darker areas, [1] visible decision, [2] perception 
of choice, and [3] relevant capacities represent those dimensions of the 
domestic world which directly impinge on a particular instance of conflict 
[6]. The diagram is an idealised snapshot of a particular case of domestic 
dispute. In this case, this was the visible decision, this the perception 
of choice, this the associated definition of relevant capacities, and, at 
the time, this the distribution of relevant capacities between husband and 
wife. If we imagine these darker areas sliding across the contextual bands 
of routine/authority/habit [7] and of capacities [8] the diagram could then 
depict different sorts of decision-making dispute, each case concerning 
issues located somewhere in a network of routine [1], associated with 
different perceptions of choice [2] and concluded with reference to 
different classes of capacities [3]. To complicate matters further, 
definitions of relevant capacities and recognition of potentially debatable 
issues is dependent on past experience of conflict. If there bad never been 
any discussion in the past there was no reason to expect any in the future. 
The lines of feedback from [6] to [7] and [8] suggest these connections. 
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FIGURE 14 
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This model emphasises the importance of actors' perceptions of choice and 
the consequences of those perceptions in terms of their definition of 
relevant capacities. It therefore directs attention toward issues which 
have interested "two dimensional" analysts: for example, issues about the 
visibility or otherwise of discrete decisions and about the association 
between these patterns of visibility and structures of authority, habit and 
routine. The range of what would count as relevant belief or action is 
evidently broader than that which would be incorporated in a simple 
oppositional account of power. What is interesting is the relation between 
features of the social world surrounding instances of overt dispute. From 
this point of view, study of capacities and of definitions of relevance, 
exploration of the processes through which invisible decisions become the 
subject of debate, and classification of perceptions of choice are critical 
components of any analysis of domestic power relations. The sociology of 
power has tended to neglect these issues because its agenda has been set by 
those who have adopted an essentially oppositional view of their subject. 
This thesis suggests that such a view is both conceptually unnecessary and 
empirically restrictive. Power, in the fullest sense, is a central feature 
of family relations just as it is central to other aspects of social life, 
for it is an irreducible component of our capacity to act in and upon the 
social world. 
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CHAPTER 11: NOTES 
1. See Chapters 5 to 8. 
2. See Chapters 9 and 10. 
3. As described in chapters 5 to 8, different sections of the sample 
identified different decisions, and perceived different kinds of 
alternatives in relation to, for example, choices about furnishing, 
about television viewing, or about holiday location. 
4. For example, there was considerable variation in the way in which 
respondent's defined what could be used as "their own" money and in the way 
in which cash or cheques were actually handled, if not in the ultimate 
allocation of particular types of spending responsibility. 
5. For example, there were different probabilities of debate about food 
shopping depending on the wife's menu planning practices and so on the 
location of potentially debatable decisions. Those who decided what to eat 
say a week in advance made different choices compared with those whose 
decision-making was frequent and unpredictable. The husband's ability to 
become involved varied accordingly. 
6. As Giddens writes "Resources (foucussed via signification and 
legitimation) are structured properties of social systems, drawn upon and 
reproduced by knowledgeable agents in the course of interaction" (Giddens, 
1984, p15). Giddens uses the term "resources" to cover what I have 
described as capacities and, to some degree, the processes which order the 
definition of decisions and the associated perceptions of choice. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Dear 
I am writing to invite you to take part in a research project, 
currently based at the University of York, and broadly related to the theme 
of Family life. The aspect on which I am now working concerns family 
routines and day to day decision-making. 
Part of this study involves talking with a selected sample of wives (those 
who go out to work as well as those who are full-time housewives) - about 
such routine matters as how they organize their time, how common domestic 
decisions are made and about how the responsibility for a number of 
household tasks is shared within the family. You have been included in the 
sample, and although you are under no obligation to take part, I hope that 
you will be willing to do so, and that you will find the experience 
interesting. 
Any conversation which I may have with you would of course be entirely 
confidential and you would remain completely anonymous in any resulting 
research report. 
I shall visit you some time during the next few days to introduce myself 
and to tell you more about the research. This will give you the 
opportunity to decide whether you are interested in taking part. If my 
visit is inconvenient I can easily arrange to call at another time. 
I look forward to meeting you. 
Yours sincerely, 
Elizabeth Shove 
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APPENDIX 3 
THE INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
The list of issues covered during the course of the interviews barely 
counted as a proper interview schedule. I did not always ask the same 
questions in the same order or in exactly the same way. What follows, 
then, is more an account of the areas in which I was interested than a 
precise description of the questions which I asked. 
Whatever the subsequent modifications, I always began with a series of 
enquiries about age, occupation and children. 
1. Background information and decisions about work 
As a guide, I referred to these questions: 
Do you have any children? 
(If so) How old are they now? Are they boys or girls? 
How long have you been married? How old were you when you got married? 
Is your husband older or younger than you? 
I then tried to find out about the respondent's working life and hence 
about the nature of her experience of employment-related decisions. The 
sequence of relevant decisions obviously varied depending on the 
respondent's present working status. I began with the following question: 
Are you working now? and continued the discussion in one of two ways 
depending on the response. Those who were working were asked: 
Har long have you done that job for? 
What was the first job you did? How did you come to do that? 
And after that? How did you come to change jobs? How did you come to choose 
the next one? (repeated as relevant) 
If the respondent had stopped work for a period but had then returned, I 
asked: 
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Why did you stop? Why did you return? 
In this way I traced the respondent's working history from the time she 
left school to the present. I then tried to find out more about her 
current job. 
What hours do you work now? 
Do you find that convenient? 
Would you like to work more hours? Why? 
Would you like to work less hours? Why? 
What does your husband think about your work? 
At some stage I tried to create the opportunity for the respondent to 
express a general view about the propriety of wives and/or mothers going 
out or returning to work and about the circumstances in which this was, or 
was not, believed to be legitimate. 
The questions addressed to those who did not work covered much the same 
ground: 
What was your first job? 
And then? Why did you change jobs ..? I traced the employment history in 
the way described above and then focussed on the present arrangement. 
Why did you stop work? 
Do you plan to return? 
When and why? (If so) What lind of job would you look for? 
What is your husband's view on this matter? 
Again I tried to create the space for a general discussion of the 
circumstances in which the respondent believed that wives and/or mothers 
should or should not take up paid employment. 
I went on to ask questions about the husband's career. Here too I wanted 
to identify the history of employment-related decisions. 
What does your husband do? 
Has he always done that? What was his first job? 
(If not) Why did he change? 
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Have you had to move because of his job? Tell me about that decision 
(If not) Do you think you would ever have to move because of his job? What 
would you do? 
What hours is he working now? 
In this first part of the interview I tried to find out how respondents 
viewed their own work in relation to their family commitments and how they 
saw their husband's employment related decisions. I was also concerned to 
collect background information about working hours and about the nature of 
the husband's and the wife's occupation. 
2. Daily routine 
I decided to set the scene for detailed enquiry about specific topics 
(cooking, cleaning etc. ) in the guise of a discussion about every-day 
routine. The "typicality" or otherwise of the resulting accounts was not 
especially relevant. The "What do you do on a normal week-day" discussion 
simply served to link together a series of question areas in what appeared 
to be a coherent fashion. I introduced it in these terms. 
The next group of questions are about daily routines. Tell me what you 
would do on a normal week-day. 
Bow do you begin the day? 
Ask about breakfast, about washing up after breakfast (if any) 
When does your husband start work? 
How does be get there? 
(If children) Ask about getting them off to school, about child-care 
arrangements and/or school holiday arrangements. (If work) When do you 
start work? 
Boer do you get there? 
Do you get time off during the day? When? What do you do with it? When do 
you get home? What do you do then? 
(If full-time housewife) What do you do in the mornings? What do you do in 
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the afternoons? 
(All) When does your husband get home? What happens then? 
When do you have your main meal? 
Do you eat together? 
So far I had been concerned to collect information which I could refer back 
to later in the interview. However, when talking about the use of evening 
and, later, of week-end time, I wanted to identify what the respondent 
believed to be a "normal" leisure option and to document patterns of what 
was seen to be uncommitted time. The discussion was ordered with reference 
to these kinds of questions. 
What do you do in the evenings? 
Do you watch the television? 
What do you watch? 
Is there anything which you always watch? 
Do you (and your husband) agree about what to have on? If not, what 
happens? 
Do you take turns to choose? How do you resolve conflict about what to 
watch? Who usually wins? 
Have you got more than one television? What is the other used for? 
When? 
Do you have a video? (If video) Who who uses it, for what purpose? 
Check for time shifting and ask about the use of video libraries. 
What do you do if you are at home but not watching the television? Check 
for hobbies, entertaining, other forms of home-based leisure. 
What about "going out"? Do you go out as a couple? 
(If yes) Where to you go? What do you do? Check, as relevant, for eating, 
drinking, clubs, societies, evening classes, routine and irregular leisure 
options. Establish who organises joint trips, who makes the time, who 
makes the arrangements, who arranges babysitter (if any) and who pays for 
the meal, drink, tickets. 
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Do you go out on your own or with friends? 
What do you do? Who do you go with? 
Would you like to get out more than you do at the moment? 
(If yes) What is the problem? 
Does your husband go out on his own or with his friends? 
Where does he go? What does he do? 
Is that a problem? 
I also wanted to identify separate and joint patterns of friendship and to 
document visiting and entertaining habits. 
Do you have any relatives living nearby? 
Who? Where? Do you see them? 
Check for problems with the husband's relatives and vice versa. 
What about friends? Do you have joint friends? When do you see them? How 
do you come to know them? 
Separate friends? Neighbours? Friends from work? Friends from school? 
Friends made via the children? When do you see your own friends? 
Some where around this point I introduced the notion of the week-end, or, 
more commonly, followed up respondent's accounts of week-end visiting. I 
wanted to compare week-end with week-day routine and to define particularly 
week-end practices. I tried to run through the week-end routine (if any) 
and to find out whether respondents got up later, whether they ate at 
different times, whether they ate different food (did they have a special 
Sunday lunch? ), whether they went out more or took part in some especially 
week-end activity etc. 
In this section I aimed to get respondents to follow their own every-day 
"story" line but in such as way as to introduce the subjects in which I was 
interested. I sometimes chose to follow up relevant topics as they arose. 
Other times I simply remembered relevant details and went back, using that 
detail as an introduction later in the interview. For example, I often 
used the tactic of presenting specific questions in this form "Earlier you 
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said that you always had a proper Sunday dinner. Do you do all the 
cooking? ". In what I felt to be the most successful cases I amassed a 
wealth of detail which I then used in the course of the rest of the 
discussion. In even the "worst" cases the resulting outline of everyday 
routine provided a baseline from which to view subsequent accounts of the 
allocation of particular domestic responsibilities and, perhaps more 
important, it provided a picture of how discrete areas of decision-making 
and domestic responsibility inter-related and fitted together. 
If I were following the sequence according to plan, I ended this part of 
the interview by saying something like this: 
That is all about family routines. The next group of questions are about 
the ways in which you allocate responsibility for a variety of household 
tasks - starting with the shopping. 
3. Areas of domestic responsibility 
Experience with the pilot interviewees and with the first few of the "real" 
sample suggested that it was indeed awkward to initiate discussion of 
family finance unless that discussion were apparently tied to an 
immediately obvious problem. I wanted to create a situation in which the 
respondents would "have to" tell me about the way in which they arranged 
their money in order to effectively explain some other aspect of their 
domestic lives. I tried to order the discussion of shopping with this aim 
in mind though I was also genuinely interested in finding out how 
respondents allocated and delegated responsibility for such work. Ideally, 
the sequence went something like this: 
Do you do the food shopping? 
(If so) Does your husband help? When? What does he do? Is he good at 
it? Do you give him a list? Would he know what to buy? 
When do you go shopping? Do you have a day for shopping? (cheek for 
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routines and for use of the car) 
Do you make a list? When do you decide what to buy? Do you always buy the 
same things? 
(If yes) So, does that mean you always spend the same amount? Do you have 
a set amount of money to spend on food? 
(If no) So, that means you spend different amounts each time you go? Do 
you have a set amount of money to spend on food? 
Having got this far I could then say: 
What money do you use? Is that from your own account, a joint account, or 
is it housekeeping money? 
(If it were some form of housekeeping) Does that money include, say, things 
for the garden, loo paper, plugs, cleaning things ...? What doesn't it 
include? Clothes? Bills? How is the sum fixed? When does the housekeeping 
go up? Why? 
(If it were joint or separate account money) Do you keep track of what 
money you use? What else do you use your or your joint account for? 
Clothes? Bills? 
I was immediately engulfed with information about methods of financial 
management. Because this was a complex area I often had to spend some time 
trying to find out what the arrangements were. Framed in this way, the 
respondents volunteered information in an attempt to help me untangle the 
details of their family finances. For example, they often set out to 
explain ecactly what could be bought with "their" or "their husband's 
money". In the course of this discussion I aimed to find out about the 
respondent's perceptions of different categories of money, about 
responsibility for particular forms of expenditure and about the fate of 
the wages of those who worked. In detail the questions took a different 
form depending on the structure of the respondent's method of financial 
management. Whatever the system, I asked about: 
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a) The origins of the system of financial management 
Have you always arranged your money that way? 
Bow did you decide to arrange your money like that? 
Do you lam if that was what your parents did? 
Do you think yours is an unusual method of managing money? 
Did you consider any other way of arranging your money? 
b) Methods of spending and saving 
Who pays for the gas/electricity/telephone/rent/rates/television licence? 
Does the other know what those bills came to? 
Who actually writes out the cheque or who delivers the cash for the bills? 
Do you save any money? How? What for? 
I then asked those who were working: 
How are you paid and what happens to your wages (ie. What form are they in 
and where are they stored ... cash/account/savings account) 
What are your wages used for? (ie. for what types of expenditure) 
Is your income necessary? 
c) The formal details of cash and accounts 
Do you have an account? What is it for? What money goes into it? Who 
gets money out of it? Who keeps track of it? 
Where do you get your every-day cash from? 
Do you give your husband cash? 
Does he give you cash? 
d) The respondent's felt access to different categories of money 
Do you feel happy about buying things for yourself with your own income, 
with money from the joint account, with the savings, with the housekeeping 
etc.? 
What money do you use when you want to buy your husband a present? Is that 
aidatard? 
What money does he use when buying you a present? Is that awkward? 
Do you have your own spending money? (If so) What do you use it for? (If 
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not) Would you like any? What for? Do you ask for money? Do you ask for 
permission to spend the family's money? 
Does your husband do the same? Does your husband have his own spending 
money? If so what does he use it for? 
What money do you use when you go out on your own or with your own friends? 
What difference did it make when you started/stopped working? Is it 
easier/more difficult to buy things for yourself now? 
e) Details of financial knowledge 
Do you know about the present state of the account/family funds? 
Does your husband? (if relevant) Do you read the bank statements? Does your 
husband? 
Do you save money? How? What for? 
Who is most careful with money? How does that show? 
Having covered these issues I then had to find some route back to a 
discussion of the ways in which respondents allocated and delegated other 
domestic responsibilities. Again I adopted the strategy of referring back 
to some earlier discussion and re-directing it so as to cover different 
ground. For example, I often chose to go back to the discussion of food 
shopping as a way into the subject of cooking. I could say, for instance, 
"You mentioned that you had housekeeping money and that you bought the 
food. Does that mean that you decide what the family will eat or that you 
do the cooking? " 
Do you do all the cooking? 
Does your husband take over? When? 
Can your husband cook? 
What would he/does he cook? Does he have any specialities? 
Does he help you when you are cooking? 
When? in what way? 
Alternatively, I might follow another track and introduce the subject of 
cleaning. For example: 
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You said earlier that you always went shopping on Saturday morning and that 
you cleaned the house out on Saturday afternoon. Do you do all the 
housework? 
Who would be the first to notice that a room needed tidying? 
Who has the highest standards? 
Do you share the housework (If so) Holt do you divide it? 
Are there any jobs that your husband would not do? (If so) What are they? 
Do you mind? 
Does he do those jobs efficiently? Did you/would you teach him? 
Are there any jobs which you would not want him to do? 
From here I might go on to ask about responsibility for the decorating. 
Who suggests that it is time to re-decorate? 
Who does the decorating? 
What part of it (if any) do you do? Why? 
Find out how responsibilities for pasting, paper hanging, painting, 
emulsion painting, and gloss painting were allocated. 
Could you do all these jobs? 
What about other jobs in the house? mending plugs, getting things repaired? 
Who does that? Would you/he known what to do? 
Although I did not use the resulting information I also asked about 
the ways in which respondents allocated responsibility for the care of 
pets, the car and/or the garden. Not all had first hand experience of 
these jobs and so I had to begin with a question designed to establish the 
relevance of each issue. 
Do you have any pets? (If yes) Who feeds it/them? 
(If dog) Who walks it? 
Do you have a car? 
(If yes) Who gets it serviced? Who cleans it inside? Who cleans it outside? 
Who pays for the petrol? 
Can you drive? 
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(If yes) Who drives the car when you go out together? 
(If more than one car) Which do you use when together? Who takes care of 
"yours"? of "his"? Who pays for the petrol? Who pays the other associated 
bills? 
What about the garden? Do you have any? (If so) Who does the gardening? Do 
you/does he help? What do you/does he do? Check for mowing, digging, 
planting etc. 
What about indoor plants? Do you have any? (If so) Who looks after them? 
If relevant, I also asked about the way in which the respondents allocated 
responsiblity for looking after the children. This was difficult because 
the range of applicable questions varied depending on the age and number of 
children. 
Those who were mothers of pre-school children were asked: 
What does your husband do for the children? 
Are there any jobs that he will not do? 
Are there any jobs that you would not expect him to do? 
Who is the softest with the children? 
Do you and your husband agree about how you should bring the children up? 
I had already gathered details which I could use to inform the way in which 
I put these questions. For example, I knew about the respondent's working 
hours (if any) and about the identity of the person normally in charge of 
routine child minding. I had collected similar background details about 
the daily lives of those who were mothers of school age children and 
attempted to frame the following questions in as relevant a way as 
possible. 
Who disciplines the children when they misbehave? 
Who is the softest with them? 
Do you and your husband agree about how to bring up the children? 
Who sees them off to school? (if necessary) 
Who takes them out to and/or picks them up from out of school activities? 
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Have you had to decide about schools? (If so) Tell me about that 
Even if I had not followed the sequence set out in this "schedule", I 
usually tried to extend the discussion of responsibility for the children 
to a discussion of the decision to start a family. In this way I 
introduced the next section of the interview. 
14. Domestic decision-making 
Those with children were then asked: 
Did you always expect to have children or was that a positive decision? 
How did you decide when to have them? 
(If relevant) When, and how did you decide to have the next one? 
Did you have to save up? 
Where were you living at the time? (asked in order to link this section 
with the subsequent discussion of decisions about housing) 
Childless respondents were typically asked about their family planning 
decisions rather later in the interveiw. However, I shall list the 
questions areas here. 
Have you ever thought of having any children? 
(If yes) Follow up with discussion of planning 
(If no) Discussion of that decision 
From decisions about children I went on to ask about housing and furniture 
choices. 
What about other decisions? How did you come to live in this house? 
How long have you lived here? 
Where were you living before? 
Why did you move? 
How did you choose this house ? Were there any alternatives? 
Did you have any furniture before you came? 
Who would suggest that you needed new furniture? 
Do you have the same tastes in furniture, pictures, ornaments, colours, 
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wallpaper, re-decoration, tiles, carpets? 
Do you have anything which is especially yours? 
What did you have before you were married? 
Is there anywhere that you normally sit? 
In this section I encouranged respondents to describe how they had come to 
acquire the pieces of furniture and the pictures which I could see around 
me. 
I also asked about the decision-making associated with the choice of last 
year's holiday. This part of the interview sometimes took place as an 
extension of the earlier discussion of leisure and week-end activity, 
sometimes in relation to a review of spending and saving habits and 
sometimes as one amongst other domestic decisions. Either way I wanted to 
ask: 
Where did you go on holiday? What did you do? Where did you stay? 
What were the alternatives? 
Which did you prefer? Bow did you decide? 
Have you bad that (rind of holiday before? 
What are your plans for next year? 
I concluded this section of the interview by asking something like: 
Can you think of any decisions which we have not talked about? 
5. General issues 
If I had managed to cover all the question areas described above, I aimed 
to finish with discussion of such general themes as sharing and equality. 
By this stage, the respondents were able to refer back to specific events 
or practices as illustrations of a general approach to family life. This 
meant that I could ask something like: 
Do you think that you and your husband share more than, say, your parents 
did? and then follow up the response with some more detailed question such 
as How does that show in terms of, say, the way you manage your money or 
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the bray in which you share the children? 
This concluding section of the interview gave respondents a chance to 
locate their own domestic arrangements in a comparative or historical 
context, and to describe the points at which they believed that their 
domestic strategies differed from those of their friends, parents or 
children. 
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